Dеfendant’s appeal presents two questions: (1) Was defendant’s motion for nonsuit properly overruled? (2) Did the court err in admitting evidence of the action of the dog, with which, according to the State’s evidence, the deputy sheriff tracked defendant?
Even if the bloodhound evidence were eliminated, the remaining evidence was, taken in the light most favorable to the State, sufficiеnt to establish these facts: Three hundred dollars (two one-hundred dollar bills and others of smaller denomination) was taken from the person of Maggie Hunt while she was unconscious from a blow. An unseen аssailant had inflicted the blow within minutes after Mrs. Hunt had heard a noise inside of the house and while she was investigating it. Defendant had been on the premises fifteen minutes previously, begging food. He had been penniless the day before and had been wearing the tennis shoes with holes in them. The afternoon Mrs. Hunt’s money was taken, defendant purchased, among other things, shoes and whiskey. That night, when the deputy entered the room where defendant was, defendant attempted to conceal between the cushions and the coverlet of the sofa on which he was seated two one-hundred dollаr bills and eighteen or nineteen dollars in smaller bills. The only statement he made was that the money was not his.
The crime of which defendant was charged and convicted was robbery with the use of a dangerous weapon, to wit: a large club or blunt instrument. It is defendant’s contention that his motion for nonsuit should have been allowed because,
inter alia,
there is no direct or positive evidence that Mrs. Hunt wаs struck with any dangerous weapon, namely a club or blunt instrument. Defendant’s motion for nonsuit was general. He did not specifically move to dismiss the charge of armed robbery. “A motion for judgment as of nоnsuit addressed to the entire bill is properly overruled if there is evidence sufficient to support a conviction of the crime charged or of an included . . . crime.”
State v. Virgil,
“Having been rendered immediately unconscious by the blow, and not having seen in advance the instrument with which he was struck, the witness could not know what weapon was used. The character of weapon used by the defendant may be shown, of course, by circumstantial evidence, and proof that the victim was rendered unconscious by the blow and remained in that condition for a considerable time, together with the nature of the injury inflicted, warrants the inference, in the absence of other evidence, that a dangerous weapon was used.” Id. at 309,278 P. at 493 .
In
People v. Liner,
When the motion for nonsuit calls into question the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence, the question for the court is whether a reasonable inference of defendant's guilt may be drawn from the circumstances. If so, it is for thе jury to decide whether the facts, taken singly or in combination, satisfy them beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is actually guilty.
State v. Thompson,
Defendant next contends that he is entitled to a new trial because the bloodhound evidence was-both incompetent and prejudicial.
In
State v. McLeod,
“It is fully recognized in this jurisdiction that the action of bloodhounds may be received in evidence when it is properly shown: (1) that they are of pure blood, and of a stock character *359 ized by acuteness of scent and power of discrimination; (2) thаt they possess these qualities, and have been accustomed and trained to pursue the human track; (3) that they have been found by experience reliable in such pursuit; (4) and that in the partiсular case they were put on the trail of the guilty party (who) . . . was pursued and followed under such circumstances and in such way as to afford substantial assurance, or permit a reasonable inference, of identification.” Id. at 545,146 S.E. at 411 .
Defendant argues that the State did not lay a proper foundation for the bloodhound evidence in that it failed to establish either that Deputy Thompson’s dog was of pure blood or that, at the end of the trail, the dog identified defendant with reasonable certainty — requisites (1) and (4) as set out above in McLeod.
With reference to the first requisite, the deputy described his dog as “a bloodhound” and “a thoroughbred.” “The terms
thoroughbred, full-blood,
and
pure-bred
are generally used in this country as practically synonymous.” 3 Dictionary of American English 1861 (1942 Ed.). In
State v. Wiggins,
We find no North Carolina casеs, and defendant has cited us to none, in which bloodhound evidence has been excluded for a deficiency in the proof of the bloodhound’s pedigree
if
he is shown to be naturally capable of following the human scent,
i. e.,
that he is a bloodhound,
and if
the evidence is corroborative of other evidence tending to show defendant’s guilt. See Annot., Evidence of trailing by dogs,
It is true that the evidence is silent as to what the dog did when he and the deputy arrived at Earline Carter’s. She said that the officer tied the dоg outside and never brought him into the house. The deputy said that the dog went in with him, but counsel for neither the State nor defendant inquired into the dog’s actions inside the house. They, as we, probably considerеd the dog’s conduct at the end of the trial immaterial when, there, the deputy found defendant sitting on a cache of money, which included two one-hundred dollar bills. Such a circumstance ordinarily wоuld satisfy the fourth requisite given above in
McLeod.
See
State v. Norman,
The feat of the dog in following defendant’s tracks from Maggie Hunt’s to Earline’s furnished, in itself, no relevant evidence, under the facts of this case, that defendant was the robber, i. e., no relevant evidence linking defendant with the corpus delicti. It is irrelevant that defendant’s tracks led from Maggie’s house, for he had been there earlier to beg, a lawful mission. That defendant was present at Earline’s house at the time the dog arrived there was clearly a coincidence. Since, coincidentally, defеndant happened to be at Maggie’s with the money, we think the admission of the evidence, if error, was not prejudicial error. It explained the deputy’s timely arrival and is equivalent to the testimony we frequently hear from officers that “in consequence of a telephone call from X” they went to a designated spot, where they found a certain item or person. Such evidenсe does not itself tend to link a defendant with the corpus delicti, but it does relate to other evidence so tending.
As previously pointed out, the State’s evidence was sufficient, without the bloodhound evidence, to take the case against defendant to thе jury. Upon a third trial, “with the dog left out,” we apprehend that the verdict would be the same, because of defendant’s possession of the bills. See
State v. McLeod,
In the trial we find
No error.