81 Iowa 138 | Iowa | 1890
Guided by the rule stated, we have no hesitancy in raying that the district court, in admitting the evidence, on the basis of the existence of a conspiracy, did not abuse its discretion. The record is a justification of the •court’s action in that respect. Besides the particular •complaints as to questions and answers, there is in argument a general complaint that, because of the course pursued by the court in admitting so much of evidence without any foundation or right, the minds of the jury wereaffected to the prejudice of the defendant generally; and it is only because of this complaint that we notice the •question of a conspiracy to the extent of determining that there was such a prima facie showing as to justify proofs of the acts and admissions of co-conspirators. The indictment was for murder of the first degree, and ■on the trial it was competent to admit evidence tending to establish murder of either degree, or of manslaughter. The question of a conspiracy had reference only to the •crime of murder. Its bearings were alone with reference to the essentials of that crime, — premeditation and malice. To justify a verdict of manslaughter, the jury was told that the killing must have been “done as the result of some sudden, violent impulse of passion or •excitement, or in the heat of a sudden quarrel, and upon reasonable provocation, without time between the provocation given and the killing for the blood to cool, or the voice of reason and judgment to be heard, and without opportunity to premeditate or reflect upon the
Appellant says: “The error is in qualifying or intensifying the idea or phrase ‘self-defense’ by the word ‘justifiable.’” And it is said in argument that the word “justifiable” implies a higher degree of right conduct than the word “excusable,” and the instruction is criticised because of the use of the word “justifiable,” to the exclusion of such, expressions as “excusable self-defense,” or “excusable killing in self-defense,” if either modifier is to be used ; but it is urged that the term “self-defense” is well defined in the law, and that such terms as “justifiable self-defense” or “excusable self-defense” are not used by law-writers, and that, by the irse of the former, the jury must have presumed that “justifiable” self-defense was something more and higher and better and purer than “self-defense.” The thought, to us, is rather of hypercritical than of practical significance. Conceding that, in the eye of the law, an act in self-defense is one that the law will justify or excuse, and that such justification or excuse is an attribute of self-defense, and understood when not expressed, still we must keep clearly in view
It is said the instruction only justifies in self-defense the use of “reasonable and moderate force,” and it is urged that the only limit which the law places upon a man thus wrongfully sought to be deprived of his liberty is just that force which wall prevent the doing of the unlawful purpose. That is the clear import of the instruction given. It enjoins moderate force only where moderate force will be effective, and it justifies sufficient force, even to the extent of taking life. The difficulty lies in giving effect to only a part of the language used.
XIY. Complaint is made that Mr. Phillips, in the closing argument to the jury, abused his privilege by a statement of facts foreign to the case, and prejudicial to the defendant. The abstract contains several pages of the argument, which cannot be set out, and an extended discussion of the point would be of no avail. The argument did not introduce into the case facts as to which there was no evidence, as was the case in Hall v. Wolff, 61 Iowa, 559, nor do we discover anything in the argument unusual, or that could prejudice the defendant.
XY. As we have said, the verdict is for manslaughter, which operates to acquit the defendant of the crime of murder. We could not, with propriety, attempt, in an opinion, a discussion of the multitude of questions presented by the assignments and arguments. We have, therefore, confined ourselves mainly to such questions as bear most directly on the validity of the verdict returned; but, in so doing, we have not overlooked other questions which might have been to the prejudice of the defendant, to avoid which the entire record has been carefully considered. The instructions are voluminous, covering every phase of the case, and, we think, fair to the defendant. Those asked, in so