The opinion of the Court was delivered by
The primary issue on this appeal is whether an offer or transfer of a firearm that is made “knowingly,” but not “pur
I
Defendant, Thomas Rovito, was a police officer for the City of Weehawken. On March 11, 1981, he attended a meeting of his fraternity at his alma mater, Bloomfield College. After the meeting, Rovito and five of his fraternity brothers, including Jose Gonzalez, went to another brother’s room to drink beer and watch television. While there, Rovito removed his service revolver, placed it on the floor, and asked if anyone wanted to play Russian Roulette. In response, Gonzalez picked up the gun, pulled the trigger, and killed himself.
Rovito was indicted for manslaughter, N.J.S.A. 2C:ll-4b, and for unlawful disposition of a weapon, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-9d. The jury acquitted the defendant of manslaughter, but convicted him on the weapons charge. The trial court sentenced him to one-year probation and imposed a $500 fine and a $25 Violent Crimes Compensation Board penalty.
With regard to the unlawful disposition of the weapon, the trial court instructed the jury that it must find that the defendant “knowingly” disposed of his firearm. The court defined “knowingly” in accordance with N.J.S.A. 2C:2-2b(2):
A person acts knowingly with respect to the nature of his conduct or the attendant circumstances if he is aware that his conduct is of that nature, or that such circumstances exist, or he is aware of a high probability of their existence. A person acts knowingly with respect to a result of his conduct if he is awarethat it is practically certain that his conduct will cause such a result. ‘Knowing,’ ‘with knowledge’ or equivalent terms have the same meaning.
The Appellate Division concluded that the trial court erred in not instructing the jury that the defendant must have intended to dispose of the weapon to be guilty of violating N.J.S.A. 2Cc39-9d. It reasoned that
[t]he jury should have been specifically instructed that neither jesting, mistake nor inadvertence would be sufficient but rather that they must specifically find beyond a reasonable doubt that it was the intent of the defendant to permit the transfer of possession of the weapon and that no degree of recklessness or inadvertence will suffice.
Accordingly, the court reversed the defendant’s conviction and remanded the matter for a new trial. Nonetheless, the. Appellate Division rejected defendant’s contention that N.J.S.A. 2C:39-9d applies to commercial dealers in firearms, but not to private individuals. The court also rejected defendant’s contentions of trial error.
The State sought certification on the reversal of the conviction. Defendant cross-petitioned on the question whether N.J.S.A. 2C:39-9d extends to private individuals and on the allegations of trial error. We granted both petitions. 97 N.J. 635 (1984).
II
Our analysis begins with N.J.S.A. 2C:39-9d, which provides, in relevant part:
Any person who manufactures, causes to be manufactured, transports, ships, sells or disposes of any weapon including gravity knives, switchblade knives, daggers, dirks, stilettos, billies, blackjacks, metal knuckles, sandclubs, slingshots, cesti or similar leather bands studded with metal filings, or in the case of firearms if he is not licensed or registered to do so as provided in chapter 58, is guilty of a crime of the fourth degree.
The phrase “to dispose of” is defined to mean “to give, give away, lease, loan, keep for sale, offer, offer for sale, sell, transfer, or otherwise transfer possession.”
N.J.S.A.
2C:39-ld. The Code, however, does not define the terms included in
N.J.S.A.
2C:39-1 such as “offer,” “transfer,” or “otherwise transfer possession.” Nonetheless, it is apparent that the
The critical question is whether the gift, offer, or transfer must have been “purposeful” or merely “knowing.” A person acts “knowingly” if he is aware of the nature of his conduct or of the existence of circumstances attendant upon that conduct. N.J.S.A. 2C:2-2b(2). With respect to the offense of the unlawful disposition of a weapon, for example, it would be sufficient that the defendant knew he was offering his gun to his fraternity brothers. See II Final Report of the New Jersey Criminal Law Revision Commission 40-41 (1971). The trial court determined a “knowing” disposition was sufficient and so charged the jury. Pursuant to these instructions, the jury found Rovito guilty of unlawfully disposing of his gun.
In reversing, the Appellate Division found that the defendant should not have been convicted on “something less than an intent * * * to give * * * offer or transfer possession of the gun to the decedent * * *.” That finding is more akin to a requirement that a defendant is not guilty under N.J.S.A. 2C:39-9d unless he or she acted “purposely,” a term that the statute defines:
(1) Purposely. A person acts purposely with respect to the nature of his conduct or a result thereof if it is his conscious object to engage in conduct of that nature or to cause such a result. A person acts purposely with respect to attendant circumstances if he is aware of the existence of such circumstancesor he believes or hopes that they exist. ‘With purpose,’ ‘designed,’ ‘with design’ or equivalent terms have the same meaning. [N.J.S.A. 2C:2-2b(l).]
By elevating the culpability requirement in N.J.S.A. 2C:39-9d to “intentionally,” the Appellate Division applied a standard that more closely corresponds to the Code’s definition of “purposely.”
The difference between the trial court’s ruling and the Appellate Division’s decision arises from the absence of a specified requirement of culpability in N.J.S.A. 2C:39-9d. In the absence of such a requirement, the question becomes what is the appropriate construction of the statute. Another code provision, N.J.S.A. 2C:2-2c(3), answers the question by declaring that “[a] statute defining a crime, unless clearly indicating a legislative intent to impose strict liability, should be construed as defining a crime with the culpability defined in paragraph b.(2) of this section,” a reference to N.J.S.A. 2C:2-2b(2), which requires that a defendant act “knowingly.” Thus, the Code mandates that a person will be culpable under N.J.S.A. 2C:39-9d if he or she acts “knowingly.”
Ill
Although we reject the Appellate Division’s requirement of purposeful conduct, we agree with its conclusion that
N.J.S.A.
2C:39-9d applies to private individuals as well as to commercial dealers in guns. Defendant’s countervailing argument is based on a reference in
N.J.S.A.
2C:39-9d that “[a]ny person who * * * disposes of any weapon * * * or in the case of firearms if he is not licensed or registered to do so as provided in chapter 58, is guilty of a crime of the fourth degree * * Nothing in the words or history of the legislation suggests the statute is to be limited to commercial transactions. Furthermore, the overriding philosophy of the Legislature and of the judiciary is to limit the use of guns.
E.g., State v. Hatch,
64
N.J.
179, 184-86 (1973) (applying New Jersey Gun Control Law to a Massachusetts resident driving through New Jersey on his way to Pennsylvania);
State v. Wright,
155
We agree also with the Appellate Division’s conclusion that defendant’s allegations of trial error are meritless. Those allegations include two evidentiary points. First, defendant claims that the trial court erred in admitting testimony that he had displayed his gun on three prior occasions. Defendant also contends that the trial court erred in allowing testimony concerning police department training in the use of firearms. Both evidentiary points relate to whether defendant acted recklessly, an element of the crime of manslaughter. N.J.S.A. 2C:ll-4. Defendant, however, was acquitted of the manslaughter charge. We recognize that the erroneous admission of evidence on one charge could conceivably be prejudicial on another charge. Under the circumstances of this case, however, we find that the asserted errors in admitting the evidence are, at most, harmless. R. 2:10-2.
Defendant’s final allegation of trial error also relates to the manslaughter charge. The alleged error arises from the
The judgment of the Appellate Division is reversed, and defendant’s conviction of the unlawful disposal of a weapon under N.J.S.A. 2C:39-9d is reinstated.
For reversal and reinstatement — Chief Justice WILENTZ, Justices CLIFFORD, HANDLER, POLLOCK, O’HERN and GARIBALDI — 6.
For affirmance — None.