68 Mo. 52 | Mo. | 1878
— Defendant was indicted for the larceny of some United States bonds ; on trial had, was convicted, which conviction was affirmed in the St. Louis court of appeals, and he now appeals here.
Counsel for defendant have filed an elaborate brief, in which they.object to many of the rulings of the criminal 'court. We think it unnecessary to advert to many of the objections thus urged, because we think that the case was* with some exceptions to be presently noted, very well tried, and as to evidence of defendant’s guilt, there was certainly enough to go to the jury for the purpose of letting them say whether the defendant had formed a larcenous intent when he picked up the bonds from the floor where they had fallen. And such unlawful intent could be legitimately inferred from the subsequent conduct of defendant in relation to the bonds; conduct which it would be somewhat difficult to explain, save upon the theory of defendant’s guilty intent formed at the outset of the transaction. In this view of the case, we need not rely on the testimony of Samuels, whose testimony, he being an accomplice, should be received with appropriate caution; 1 Whart. Ev., § 414. 1 Greenl. Ev., § 380; State v. Jones, 64 Mo. 391; but may look alone to the intrinsic improbabilities of defendant’s own statement. Taking only that statement as our guide, it is hard to divest the mind of the conviction that defendant’s zealous solicitude and care for the safe keeping of the bonds, when he first obtained possession of them, was singularly .at variance with his gross carelessness in exposing them to open view in his wardrobe, in his rooms, to which a negro boy had daily access, and which a gambler, by defendant’s permission, occupied. Nor did defendant’s conduct comport well with honest in
We pass now to the consideration of those matters which must result in a reversal of the judgment. It appeared from the testimony of Samuels, that during the pendency of the prosecution, he had been induced to leave the State, and that money was paid to him by one Looney for that purpose; and the endeavor was made by the State to connect the defendant therewith. In this endeavor the witness was allowed to state that he did not know from whom the money came; that he “expected” the money came from Rothschild. He was then asked if he had ever seen any letter that was written by Rothschild, when he replied: Not by Jimmy Rothschild, but from his brother. This question and answer were objected to, but without success. The witness was then asked: Do you know of any other witness that was tampered with? Upon this question being objected to as an assumption, the question was changed to this form: Do you know of the defendant’s tampering with any witnesses? When witness answered, I don’t. Similar replies were made as to whether the letter referred to was written by defendant, and as to whether witness knew the person to whom it was addressed; and as'to whether witness knew of any letters having been written by defendant. Notwithstanding the failure to connect the defendant with furnishing the money which enabled the witness to get away, the prosecuting attorney was allowed, against the objection of defendant’s counsel, to ply the witness with questions, and to receive answers thereto, as to the money received by him, being sent to Prank Conway, in the absence of witness, and as to whether from witness’ own knowledge, the person who paid him
But the evidence was not withdrawn from the jury by instruction as promised; it, therefore, went to them, and remained with them, under the direct sanction of the court. The jury, under such circumstances, would very naturally infer that defendant was in some way concerned, through the agency of others, in gettingtke witness out of the way, so as not to testify against him. It will- not do to say that the testimony, being irrelevant, did defendant no harm, since the court had sanctioned its relevance by admitting.it; .by promising to withdraw it by instruction, and by failing to do so. The effect of the irrelevant testimony was'thus just as damaging, to all intents and purposes, as if it had, in truth and fact, connected defendant with the alleged attempt to tamper with and remove the witness from the State. If the minds of the jury were
As the cause must be re-tried, we have deemed it unnecessary to review the alleged errors in greater detail. Judgment reversed and cause remanded.
Reversed.