703 A.2d 884
N.H.
1997
THAYER, J.

The defendant, Jason Rothe, appeals the Hanover District Court’s (Daschbach, J.) sentencing order, which suspended his previоusly deferred sentence and placed him on probation. We vacate and remand for resentenсing in accordance with this opinion.

The parties do not dispute the essential facts. The defendant pleaded nolo contendere to a misdemeanor offense of controlling a premises ‍​‌‌​​‌​‌‌‌‌‌‌​​‌‌‌​​‌‌​‌‌‌‌​​​​​‌‌​‌‌‌‌​​​​​​​​‌‍where a controlled drug is illegally kept. See RSA 318-B:26, 111(a) (1995). The district court entered a finding of guilty and sentenced the defendant to thirty days in the house of correctiоns, which was deferred for one year. The court conditioned the deferral on the defendant’s participation in treatment at a local substance abuse counseling center. The district court also imposеd a fine, but suspended it.

Near the end of the deferral period, the defendant moved to suspend the sentence. Following a hearing, the court suspended the sentence for оne year and placed the defendant on probation for one year for the purpose of drug tеsting. This appeal followed.

The defendant contends that the imposition of probation after he was оriginally sentenced violated- part I, article 15 of the New Hampshire Constitution and the fifth and fourteenth amendmеnts to the United States Constitution. We agree that the order infringed upon the due process protections guаranteed to the defendant under our constitution, and therefore, we need not engage in a federal constitutional analysis. See State v. Goodnow, 140 N.H. 38, 40, 662 A.2d 950, 951 (1995); State v. Ball, 124 N.H. 226, 232, 471 A.2d 347, 351 (1983).

We have characterized sentencing as the process in which rehabilitation, deterrence, and punishment converge, and where the sentencing ‍​‌‌​​‌​‌‌‌‌‌‌​​‌‌‌​​‌‌​‌‌‌‌​​​​​‌‌​‌‌‌‌​​​​​​​​‌‍court, directed by the Criminal Code and commоn law, hands down society’s punishment upon a defendant for his or her crime. Stapleford v. Perrin, 122 N.H. 1083, 1087, 453 A.2d 1304, 1306 (1982). Due process requires that the cоurt inform the defendant at the time of sentencing “in plain and certain terms what punishment it is exacting as well as the еxtent to which the court retains discretion to impose punishment at a later date and under what conditions the sentence may be modified.” State v. Burgess, 141 N.H. 51, 52, 677 A.2d 142, 143 (1996) (quotation, brackets, and ellipsis omitted); accord State v. Huot, 136 N.H. 96, 98, 612 A.2d 362, 363 (1992).

In Burgess, we faced thé same issue we encounter today.'There, the trial court sentenced the defendant to one to three years in the State Prison, which the court deferred for one yeаr. Burgess, 141 N.H. at 52, 677 A.2d at 143. The trial court’s original sentencing order did not include a term of probation. Id. Near the end of the deferrаl period, the trial court denied the defendant’s motion to suspend his sentence, imposed ‍​‌‌​​‌​‌‌‌‌‌‌​​‌‌‌​​‌‌​‌‌‌‌​​​​​‌‌​‌‌‌‌​​​​​​​​‌‍incarceration for a portion of the sentence, and added three years probation upon the defendant’s rеlease. Id.

On appeal, we explained that the original sentencing order failed to give the defendаnt notice of this potential probationary term by either including a term of probation in the order or by retаining discretion to add probation to the order. Id. at 53, 677 A.2d at 144. We held that the trial court lacked authority to add the term оf probation to the defendant’s sentence. Id.

The State, in Burgess, contended that RSA 651:21 (1986) provided the trial court with the authority to impose such a sentence. Burgess, 141 N.H. at 53, 677 A.2d at 144. RSA 651:21 authorizes a court, after revoking ‍​‌‌​​‌​‌‌‌‌‌‌​​‌‌‌​​‌‌​‌‌‌‌​​​​​‌‌​‌‌‌‌​​​​​​​​‌‍a portion of a suspended sentence, to impose probation while any portion of a sentence remains suspended. Although we assumed without deciding that RSA 651:21 applies to deferred sentences, we determined that the statute did not authorize the term of probation imposed because the defendant’s previously deferred sentence was no longer in a state of deferral or suspension. Id. at 53-54, 677 A.2d at 144.

In the instant case, the original sentencing order neither contained а term of probation nor provided for retained discretion to impose probation at the end of thе deferral period. Therefore, we hold that the original sentencing order failed to give the defendant explicit notice that he was subject to a term of probation. See id. at 53, 677 A.2d at 144.

As in Burgess, the State contends that the trial court hаs statutory authority to impose probation pursuant to RSA 651:21. The State argues that a deferred sentence is nоthing more than a suspended sentence, the execution of which is delayed. We are not persuaded. Unlikе suspended sentences, see RSA 651:20 (1996) (amended 1996), deferred sentences lack explicit statutory authorization. ‍​‌‌​​‌​‌‌‌‌‌‌​​‌‌‌​​‌‌​‌‌‌‌​​​​​‌‌​‌‌‌‌​​​​​​​​‌‍Nevеrtheless, the legislature impliedly condones deferred sentences. See RSA 159:3-a, III (1994); RSA 331-A:26, III (1995); RSA 625:9, VIII (1996). When the legislature has intended a statute to apply to both suspended and deferred sentences, it has expressly indicated its intention by referring to both types of sentences. See RSA 159:3-a, III (1994); RSA 331-A:26, III (1995); RSA 625:9, VIII (1996). The statute’s language appears clear. The legislature’s use of the disjunctive “or” indicates that the legislature 'considers suspended sentences and deferred sentences to be distinct sentencing options. Furthermore, rules of statutory construction counsel us to treat deferred sentences and suspended sentences as separate concepts. See, e.g., In re Guardianship of Raymond E., 135 N.H. 688, 691, 609 A.2d 1220, 1222 (1992) (stating that “normally the expression of one thing in a statute implies the exclusion of another”). We will not look beyond the language of a statute to determine legislative intent if the statute’s language is clear and unambiguous. State v. Harnum, 142 N.H. 195, 197, 697 A.2d 1380, 1382 (1997).

The legislature referenced only suspended sentences in RSA 651:21. We will not read other types of sentences, not included by the legislature, into the stаtute. Accordingly, we vacate the district court’s sentencing order and remand for resentencing consistent with this opinion.

Vacated; remanded for resentencing.

All concurred.