106 Wash. App. 876 | Wash. Ct. App. | 2001
At issue is whether the trial court should have suppressed evidence of cocaine discovered during a search of Ralph Ross following his arrest on a misdemeanor warrant. Because there was no violation of RCW 10.31.030, the statutory authority under which Ross was in custody, we affirm.
Everett police officer Aaron Defolo saw a male, later identified as Ross, and a female leaving a known drug house. Officer Defolo asked them for their names and dates of birth. They provided the information and proceeded on their way. He then ran their names through his computer, and learned that each had misdemeanor warrants from different jurisdictions out for their arrest.
Officer Defolo approached them again, advised them of the warrants, and placed them under arrest. He searched Ross incident to arrest, but did not reach inside the small coin pocket in Ross’ pants because the officer had once discovered a razor blade in such a pocket.
The warrant for Ross’ arrest was from the City of Lynnwood. In accordance with the Everett Police Department’s ordinary procedure in such cases, Officer Defolo contacted dispatch and arranged to meet a Lynnwood police officer, who would take custody of Ross and transport him to
Because Officer Burns had probable cause to arrest Ross for a felony after discovery of the suspected cocaine, he drove Ross to the Lynnwood Police Department. There, he interviewed him regarding the drug offense. He did not book Ross on the misdemeanor warrant. The Lynnwood Jail does not handle felons. Therefore, Officer Burns then took Ross to the Snohomish County Jail, and booked him there on possession of cocaine.
The State charged Ross with possession of a controlled substance, cocaine, in violation of RCW 69.50.401(d). Ross moved to suppress evidence of the cocaine as the fruit of an unlawful search. The trial court denied the motion, and a jury convicted Ross on the possession charge.
Ross appeals.
Directly and Without Delay
Ross argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress evidence of the cocaine because Officer Defolo violated RCW 10.31.030 by failing to take him “directly and without delay” before a judge or officer authorized to receive bail. We reject this argument.
RCW 10.31.030 provides, in pertinent part, that:
The officer making an arrest must inform the defendant that he acts under authority of a warrant, and must also show the warrant: PROVIDED, That if the officer does not have the warrant in his possession at the time of arrest he shall declare that the warrant does presently exist and will be shown to the defendant as soon as possible on arrival at the place of intended confinement: PROVIDED, FURTHER, That any officer making an arrest under this section shall, if the person arrested wishes to deposit bail, take such person directly and without delay . . . before an officer authorized to take the recognizance and justify and approve the bail. . . .[5 ]
Ross argues that the statute implicitly requires suppression of any evidence that is gathered in violation of the statute. We note that the statute is silent on the question of searches associated with arrests done under its authority. We also note that Ross does not challenge on constitutional grounds either search by the two police officers.
Ross’ sole argument is that Officer Defolo violated this statute by failing to take him “directly and without delay” to a place where he could post bail. This argument is based on the phrase contained in the second proviso of the statute.
When reading a statute, this Court will not construe language that is clear and unambiguous, but will instead give effect to the plain language without regard to rules of statutory construction.
Officer Defolo’s actions in arranging to transfer custody of Ross were consistent with the purpose of RCW 10.31.030, which is to “provide a defendant with notice of the charge and the amount of bail as soon as possible after arrest so that the defendant may avoid incarceration by posting bail.”
Ross argues that the search that revealed evidence of a serious criminal offense would not have occurred had Officer Defolo complied with the mandatory language of RCW 10.31.030 and taken him “directly and without delay” to the Snohomish County Jail and given him the opportunity to post bail. It may be true that the second search in this case would not have occurred under Ross’ alternative. But it is also irrelevant because the officers complied with the statute.
Ross relies primarily on State v. Caldera
In Smith, police arrested Smith on a warrant and performed an inventory search of her purse while reading her the warrant at the jailhouse.
But this Court has expressly limited application of the rule in Smith and Caldera to inventory searches performed at the jail at the time of booking.
do not apply to search as incident to arrest, but to inventory searches prior to booking the defendants into jail. To read RCW 10.31.030 to treat defendants arrested upon warrants differently at the time of arrest would lead to absurd results. RCW 10.31.030 does not permit the officer to take bail at the scene of arrest or even to have the warrant available at the time of arrest.[22 ]
Here, because Officer Burns searched Ross prior to their arrival at the Lynnwood police station, Smith and Caldera do not apply. Officer Defolo did not violate RCW 10.31.030
Having so held, we need not address the State’s cross-appeal and other arguments.
We affirm the judgment and sentence.
Ellington and Appelwick, JJ., concur.
Review denied at 145 Wn.2d 1016 (2002).
State v. Dempsey, 88 Wn. App. 918, 921, 947 P.2d 265 (1997); State v. Hill, 123 Wn.2d 641, 647, 870 P.2d 313 (1994).
Hill, 123 Wn.2d at 644.
Dempsey, 88 Wn. App. at 921.
State v. Johnson, 128 Wn.2d 431, 443, 909 P.2d 293 (1996).
(Emphasis added.)
Allan v. Dep’t of Labor & Indus., 66 Wn. App. 415, 418, 832 P.2d 489 (1992).
State v. Elgin, 118 Wn.2d 551, 555, 825 P.2d 314 (1992). See also Amalgamated Transit Union Local 587 v. State, 142 Wn.2d 183, 225, 11 P.3d 762 (2000).
State v. Smith, 56 Wn. App. 145, 147, 783 P.2d 95 (1989), review denied, 114 Wn.2d 1019 (1990).
84 Wn. App. 527, 528, 929 P.2d 482, review denied, 131 Wn.2d 1022 (1997).
Smith, 56 Wn. App. at 147.
Smith, 56 Wn. App. at 151-52.
Caldera, 84 Wn. App. at 529.
Caldera, 84 Wn. App. at 529.
Caldera, 84 Wn. App. at 528.
State v. Jordan, 92 Wn. App. 25, 28, 960 P.2d 949 (1998), review denied, 137 Wn.2d 1006 (1999).
Jordan, 92 Wn. App. at 28.
Jordan, 92 Wn. App. at 26.
Jordan, 92 Wn. App. at 26.
Jordan, 92 Wn. App. at 27.
Jordan, 92 Wn. App. at 28 (citing Smith, 56 Wn. App. 145).
Jordan, 92 Wn. App. at 28 (citation omitted).