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State v. Ross
953 S.W.2d 748
Tex. Crim. App.
1997
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*1 discretionary petition for re- ed the State’s the of the Court view and reversed prove suffices to an indict- What evidence State, Appeals. Rankin v. 953 S.W.2d 740 allegations? ment’s (Tex.Cr.App.1996). now refuses This Court panel opinion’s erroneous basis second rehearing. appellant’s motion for to hear judicial striking appellant’s confes- down is in clear conflict with This decision improper proof under the indictment sion (Tex.Cr. State, McFarland v. 930 S.W.2d judicial confession was not is that the 1996), Judge correct App. where McCormick State,” by “proved up by the but the defense. Appeals ly determined when sufficiency I limitation on know of no appellant’s challenge to the fails to address proof of the elements evidence that restricts evidence, the case is not sufficiency of the to one side or the other. of an indictment has held properly before us. “This Court routinely they are Jurors are instructed and that an court must examine proved, the judges the exclusive of the facts sufficiency challenge if the even decide witnesses, credibility weight and the reversed on other conviction must be They given to the evidence. are McFarland, at 100 grounds.” 930 S.W.2d proof any element must instructed that State, (citing Foster v. 635 S.W.2d party or the other. come from one (Tex. 1982)). App. Cr. Further, sufficiency it is well settled that charge Accordingly, opinion of the evidence is measured our in this case State, given jury. Boozer v. that was should be withdrawn and (Tex.Crim.App.1984); majori- Orte Court of vacated. Since (Tex.Crim. State, I ga precedent, v. 668 S.W.2d ty fails to follow extablished State, App.1983); respectfully Benson v. 661 S.W.2d dissent. (Tex.Crim.App.1982). 714-15 Whether testimony or

jury chose to believe the State’s confession, judicial either

the defendant’s every that met

version constituted evidence out in the indict

element of the offense set charge.

ment and prosecutor

I would hold that the did jury closing argument by inviting

err Texas, Appellant, and the defen- to consider both State’s STATE evidence, to convict versions of the dant’s under either. Coya ROSS, Appellee. Johawn for en grant the State’s motion would opinion on hearing, panel’s set aside the

bane No. 0982-96. judg- trial court’s rehearing, and affirm the ment. Texas, Appeals of Court of Criminal En Banc. HEDGES, JJ.,

MIRABAL, WILSON, and join in the dissent. Sept. BAIRD, Judge, dissenting, on Denial of Appellants’ Rehearing. Motion for possession jury appellant guilty of

A found cocaine, substance, namely

of a controlled grams. Appellant pled

weighing than 28 less counts,

true to two enhancement twenty-five years’ punishment at

assessed Appeals re The Court of

confinement.

versed. Rankin 1994). grant- We

(Tex.App.-Houston [1st] *2 Korioth, Attorney, District

Sue Assistant Paul, Austin, Dallas, Atty., Matthew State’s for State. en banc.

Before PETITION FOR OPINION ON STATE’S DISCRETIONARY REVIEW MEYERS, Judge. involuntary appellee guilty

A found a sentence of six- manslaughter and assessed years appealed, teen confinement. The State illegal sentence was because contending the deadly weapon the trial court did not enter a Fifth Court of The parties Appeals requested that both submit its briefs so that it could determine whether jurisdiction was invoked under Tex.Code 44.01(b), CRiM.PROC.Ann. art. which allows ground “on the that the illegal.” argued sentence is The State weapon finding ought be consid- 44.01(b) part of art. ered the sentence under and that the trial court’s failure to include error, finding in ease was a clerical rendering illegal. the sentence For his thus part, appellee legality focused on the Referencing sentence. those cases that set properly out when the court can enter deadly weapon finding into the appellee argued that the trial court could not have entered such this case and doing not err in not so. sen- thus did tence, by appellee’s therefore reckoning, was jurisdiction illegal such that was invoked 44.01(b). appeals, art. The court under State, citing Marshall v. (Tex.App.—Dallas pet.), no dismissed jurisdiction. for want of We granted discretionary review determine appeals whether the court of erred its determination. outset, emphasize, at the that the

We legality of the sentence this case is appeals before us. The court of did not they address that issue and were correct to plain language not do so. As the of art. 44.01(b) clear, jurisdiction makes under that hinge legality statute does not on the Instead, ap sentence. and as the court of 44.01(b) Dallas, assessed, Johnson, juris appel- peals properly Karo William appeals lant. diction turns on whether the State fact, all, technicality. only applies sentence as mere sentence. After before us quite central to the issue sentences: seems plain language of art. today since appeal a is entitled to sentence [S]tate appeal sen- only allows the State to ground in a case on the Boykin v. 818 S.W.2d 782 tences. See illegal. *3 (Tex.Crim.App.1991). 44.01(b)(em- PROC. Ann. art. TexCode CRIM. added). Thus, ap court phasis once the of By plain language, its TexCode Crim. peals appealing that the is determines State Ann. art. 42.02 considers a “sentence” Proc. 1, something jurisdic a sentence and not else “part judgment.”3 This has not of the properly questions invoked and tion is fact, always the sentence been the case. legality can addressed on their merits. be encompass judgment the entire used to 44.01(b) This, provides for the because art. was “the order of the that the sentence appeal of a not when a sentence is sentence ordering pronouncing judgment ... ground illegal. that it is illegal, but on the to execute.” Thornton same jurisdictional question of Addressing the 407, citing (Tex.Crim.App.1979) S.W.2d properly appealing a whether the State was (as art. 42.02 enacted Crim. Proc. Tex.Code sentence, appeals relied on the court 317, 722, 1, Leg., p. ch. by Acts 59th proposition a for the that Marshall 1966). subsequent amend But a eff. Jan. weapon finding part of a sentence. significantly the definition ment narrowed Marshall, 860 S.W.2d at 143. State only includes “that “sentence” so that it now misplaced is since argues that this reliance ordering] part judgment that of the appeals in Marshall determined the court of into in the punishment be carried execution scope not under art. of a sentence prescribed by law.” TexCode CRIM. manner here, 44.01(b), in- provision at issue but (as by Acts art. 42.02 amended Proc. Ann. under TexCode CRIM. PROC. stead 291, 112, Sept. Leg., p. ch. eff. 67th 42.03, that the sentence which mandates 1981). plain language thus indicates pronounced in the defendant’s “shall be nothing than the that a sentence is more urges that the term presence.” The State setting the terms portion of the out 44.01(b) influ in art. should be example, the sentence punishment. For construction of enced the broad Tex appel that this case would include the 44.01(a).2 Specif Phoc. Ann. facts Code CRIM. peniten years in the lant to serve sixteen is ically,- points that this Court the State out 28,1995, July his term is tiary beginning that 44.01(a)(1) broadly to al has construed art. pay a fine. that he must $500 concurrent appeal when an order low a State’s incorporate, as the State would It would not explicitly not “dismiss” an indictment does it, merely aspects of the have those of a dismissal. nevertheless has the effect logic, By facts. the State’s affecting those (Tex. 327, 333 in art. should be the word “sentence” to this Crim.App.1991). Extending Moreno affecting embody anything construed to that, case, “whether or suggests in the everything But almost “sentence.” technically deadly weapon finding is not the “sentence”, including judgment affects the sentence”, be part should a of the verdict, for which defen jury the offense under art. when allowed findings. We, and affirmative dant is convicted sentence. court’s action affects the if the is found however, example, For defendant question of cannot dismiss the all. Like- punished at part guilty, he cannot be deadly weapon finding is a whether a information, indictment, (Tex. (1) Roberts, or dismisses an S.W.2d 656-57 1. State v. indictment, nay portion (each complaint of an jurisdiction or Crim.App.1996) court has complaint; or jurisdiction). information determine whether it has today us is whether 3. The before 44.01(a) Proc. Ann. art. 2. TexCode Crim. provides sentence, judgment, incorporates part as that: part of the findings, are also affirmative art. 42.01 (a) a an order of The state is entitled Crim. Proc. Ann. TexCode 1(21). case the order: court in criminal if Marshall, wise, deadly weapon always shoplift- the fact that he is convicted of murder, ing, opposed capital and, as also neces- imposed before is occurs sarily his sentence, affects sentence. Like the while such a affect the offense for which a verdict and defendant effectively any or does not become convicted, deadly weapon finding also Marshall, part at 143. thereof. Yet, impacts any the sentence. to consider Marshall, holding its To further buttress findings of these of the “sentence” the Dallas turned to Tex. disregards legislature fact that has sets Code Crim. PROC. Ann. art. narrowed, broadened, the definition of out in a what should included “sentence”. portions “concerning and noted those any sepa- deadly weapon finding are listed compel Moreno does not conclu- different *4 rately portions regarding from the the sen- 44.01(a), may appeal sion. Under the State Id. tence.” certain actions the trial court. Pursuant Moreno, jurisdiction to vests when ac- these said, recognize That we concern the effectively tions are taken even if not identi- “may in judges Moreno that trial have a by But, fied the name in stated the code. tendency legal questions resolve doubtful to exists, while “effective” action there is no in favor of the such a defendant because thing such as an “effective” sentence. After ruling harm judge’s cannot the reversal all, legislature explicitly the has defined a rate.” 807 S.W.2d at 329 n. 3. Of “sentence”.4 Tex.Code crim. PROC.Ann. course, the State should be able to seek relief words, although things 42.02. other some sentence, something when a trial court fails to do it is may impact deadly weapon like a required Fortunately, grants finding, they way to do. our law in no become a “sentence” by by way legislature. as defined the the State an avenue of relief As the Dallas order, correctly pointed Court of in pro may out nunc tunc to used Judge dealing Womack’s solution to with the anee of the law as it is written where it does ” Legislature’s overstep provisions.... confines of the definition is to disre constitutional gard (Tex. apply that parte Hayward, definition and instead the com Ex S.W.2d 655-56 usage meaning (citations omitted). ap mon Crim.App.1986) of "sentence." This proach contrary precedent, is to Judge the Code of Womack the reasons because terms Criminal Procedure and treads on notions of "sentencing” "sentence” and as used in various separation powers. not, view, places appear Code in the Code do in to his Tex crim. Proc. Ann. ("All words, phrases art. 3.01 and terms used in be consistent with how the term "sentence” is this Code are to be taken and understood in their give defined in article then we should the acceptation language, except usual in common meaning construing term its common when it in added); specialty j(emphasis where Ver the context of article 44.01. Never mind that defined..’ State, (Tex.Crim.App. non v. 841 S.W.2d application Legislature’s definition to arti 1992)("words specifically by Leg defined the provision cle 44.01 does not render that absurd ordinary usage). islature” are to be understood in State, ambiguous. Boykin or v. explained duty We have of this Court to (Tex.Crim.App.1991)("If plain 785-86 lan intruding legislative refrain from on the realm: results, guage of a statute would lead to absurd language plain ambigu or if the ous, is not but rather power legislate. Courts have no to It is the then, only necessity, observe, then out of absolute duty disregard court's to not to statu- constitutionally permissible is for a court to tory provisions. ignore Courts can neither nor consider, arriving interpretation, at Further, in a sensible emasculate the statutes. courts have statute, such extra textual factors as executive or admin power exception no to create an ato interpretations legisla istrative of the statute or they power nor do have to add to or take from State, history”); tive see also legislative pains, penalties Schultz and remedies.... 1996)("It courts, (Tex.Crim.App. is Legislature, S.W.2d It is not the to ambiguous remedy when statute is or would lead to supply defects or deficiencies in the laws, give absurd results that a court resort to extra- unjust and to relief from and unwise legislative history”). legislation. textual factors such as If supra, longer interpreting p. this Court is no bound when In Dodd 201 S.W. at Procedure, this Court wrote: terms in the Code of Criminal to duty statutory apply "The of the courts is to observe the definitions of those terms that are Procedure, provisions. provided does not lie with to arbi- in the Code of Criminal It them trarily disobey rights public respective them. The law then interpreter roles of lawmaker and protected by beyond recognition. are citizen best an observ- are blurred Tex.R.App. 36(a); entry jury-made finding, affirmative correct clerical errors.5 P. Poe, optional with If trial thereof into the parte Ex at 876. S.W.2d here, question is a nunc the trial court. There motion for a court denies State’s however, order, jury-made whether there is pro tunc the State can file writ about appellee jury compel finding. The found judge in affirmative mandamus order rather judg- guilty in the indictment finding into the as included to enter the affirmative type alleged in This Appeals, 738 than as the indictment. ment.6 Perkins v. Court of to enter an (Tex.Crim.App.1987). But of verdict allows the finding, but whether a court cannot a case under affirmative Tex. settled required in to do is an issue never Ann. order CRIM. PROC. Court, tell. as far as can rectify the absence of an affirmative cannot rewrite art. and we finally, go saying without it should And to allow the order doesn’t) (but if the State apparently “judgment” rather than the problem in the wants affirmative “sentence”. submit the to the the State should appeals’ on its The court of reliance special issue. hold opinion in Marshall was correct. We 44.01(b), al for art. as the Marshall Court *5 PRICE, JJ., join this and MANSFIELD 42.03, deadly weap ready that a has for note. finding part a sentence. To hold on is not of 42.02, plain text of art. otherwise defies the WOMACK, Judge, dissenting on state’s a “sentence”. defines petition discretionary review. for appeals court of therefore did err jurisdic- dismissing appeal in this want legislature meant is what the appeal in we will not reinstate this tion and a right the “to gave when it the State that court. the that the ground in a case on sentence Proce- illegal.” is Code of Criminal

KELLER, note: Judge, concurs with 44.01(b). particularly, More dure Article appeal the Court, I am does the statute allow join judgment I of the but an affirmative trial court’s failure to make majority that relief would not as sure as the deadly use of a finding on the defendant’s forthcoming on the facts via mandamus be weapon?. holds that is a The Court It is true that when there this case. words, is, (when mandatory duty), questionable in It in this case whether there other is comply finding. is consid- jury-made When court to affirmative then failure of the was finding, entry reasoning jury-made judicial is a affirmative its since no there ered a clerical error optional upon judgment the trial required: into the is not is 42.12, 3f(a)(2), stated, court: previously As Article judge clearly enter in mandates that the trial finding under this subdivi- an affirmative On weapon judgment finding that a sion, finding court shall enter the in during the commission used or exhibited was the court. offense, makes a of fact of an once trier 42.12, 3(g)(2) Crim. Proc. Ann. Tex.Code per In the proper Polk. , affirmative added). (emphasis The failure of a trial court case, undoubtedly present of fact the trier mandatory something has been do is finding. Once such an affirmative made opposed to error of a clerical error as an deemed judge been made the trial determination had Poe, judicial reasoning. parte Ex by making proper required to reflect this was (Tex.Crim.App.1988). Judge Womack judge entjy judgment. retained in The trial statement, disagreement with this voices his ,Consequently, to do otherwise. no discretion authority to correct an error “that a court has judge an to do so was not failure of pro was the violation of nunc tunc if the error reasoning error judicial rather an but error pro mandatory duty” says “nunc and he believes a clerical nature. to clerical should be limited tunc corrections Id. say that Poe should be But he doesn't errors.” faulty reasoning in is overruled or show how its construction, Judge Womack's 6.' Under mandatory duty equating with a violation of a remedy would be an "adequate at law” State's explicitly held clerical error. In Poe this appeal, thereby foreclosing mandamus relief. a matter no discretion on that when a court has may stage produces “sentencing a new because such affirmative ment part stage.” Procedure Article of the sentence. Code of Criminal 44.29(b). statutes, In these which are in the Statutory language should be construed chapter same as the article we are constru- according usage, according to common “punishment,” not a ing, “sentence” means meanings.1 a com- technical “Sentence” has judgment. part of the meaning particular mon and technical or meanings. meaning “punish- pronouncing Its common in a mis- “Before sentence” may particular “judge ment.”2 of its technical or demeanor ease the consider al- One 42.02, meanings sentencing” remanding comes from Article ternative the de- part facility. defines “sentence” as a fendant to a treatment Code of meaning The Court holds that this technical Article 42.023. This is Criminal Procedure from in Article 42.02 should be used constru- not a reference to the 44.01(b). ing technically Article believe the com- which is defined Article 42.02. meaning mon should be “sentence” used. These statutes demonstrate that the term It is a mistake to think that the technical “sentence” the Code of Criminal Proce- meaning always of “sentence” in according Article 42.02 is dure cannot be construed always appropriate to other statutes. In the to the technical definition in Article 42.02. It Code of Criminal Procedure given meaning sometimes must be its com- has meaning, usage: punishment, sometimes the common and mon in the broad sense. meaning. sometimes a technical considering usage After the common example, statute, meaning For Code of Criminal Procedure technical of a term a we 2(a) says Article that in according the trial of construe a statute to the ob- capital felony sepa ject case there shall “a sought to be attained. Code Construc- sentencing Act, rate proceeding” in which evi tion Texas Government Code *6 311.023(1). may presented any § dence be as to matter that the court deems relevant to “sentence.” thoroughly This Court has considered There “sentence” cannot mean a of the Moreno, object of Article 44.01 in v. 807 State judgment; “punishment.” Living means (Tex.Cr.App.1991). S.W.2d 327 There the (Tex.Cr.App.1976), ston v. 542 n. 4 S.W.2d 661 (a)(1) Court construed Section of Article denied, t. 431 97 U.S. cer 44.01, says may appeal an which State (1977). S.Ct. 53 L.Ed.2d 250 Identical indictment, order that “dismisses” an infor- 3(a). language appears 37.0711, in § Article mation, complaint. required or This term usage appears Similar in Article Texas courts have no construction because 3(a), says non-capital that in a case general authority charging instru- to dismiss may any evidence be offered as to matter the Johnson, 821 ments. See State S.W.2d 609 “sentencing.” court deems relevant to (Tex.Cr.App.1991). While it would have punishment appropriate

When error affects for the statute to been more trial, stage capital spoken “setting have in terms of aside” a instrument, charging reformed. Code of Criminal Procedure Arti- which is the nomencla- Procedure, “sentencing” stage may cle 44.251. Or a new ture of our Code Criminal recognized be held before a new if the “sentence” is that Article 44.01 Court borrowed capital liberally counterparts, set aside or invalidated case in from its federal which a defendant to was “sentenced death.” U.S.C. 3731 and Federal Rule of Criminal 44.29(e). 12(a), Code of Criminal Procedure Article which use the term Procedure “dis- case, Moreno, non-capital punish- error at the miss.” at 329 n. State Act, otherwise, 1. Code Construction Tex. Gov’t Code definition or shall be con- islative accordingly. 311.011: strued (a) phrases Words and shall be read in context 2. defined as "the "Sentence” is according grammar and construed to the rules of person convicted in usage. awarded law court to and common trial_” (b) phrases acquired a criminal American Dictio- Words and that have Oxford (1980). particular by leg- nary meaning, or technical whether taking “in- a re- recognized that Article 44.01 was follows that the Government’s We respondent’s sentence does not appellate pow- to extend to the view of tended jeopardy principles itself offend double ers akin to those that United States deprive gov- just might re- Congress had to the federal because its success extended case,” spondent at benefit of a more lenient ernment in a criminal id. power appeal to whenever the sentence.... included permit. Af- Id. at 332. Constitution would focus, thus, jeopardy B. The double examining practice, the federal held ter we appeal but the relief that is not on the on (a)(1) to that Section authorized the State our task is to determine requested, and any concerning appeal from order sentence, pro- a criminal once whether or information whenever the indictment nounced, accorded constitutional is to be prosecution effectively terminates the order finality conelusiveness similar to defendant, though even favor of the jury’s acquit- which attaches to a verdict technically not a “dismissal.” order was history neither the tal. We conclude that Ibid. practices, pertinent nor the sentencing Court, nor consider- rulings of this even that, Remembering as we held support jeopardy policy ations of double give to Article 44.01 was intended equation.... such an powers full whenever the to Constitu- permit, and federal law is a tion would in the sen- This Court’s decisions C. 44.01, we guide to the construction of Article tencing clearly establish that a area interpretations of the Con- must consider qualities not have the sentence does corresponding and the federal stat- stitution finality that attend an ac- constitutional utes. quittal. ... jeopardy Supreme of the United D. The considerations

In-1980 double acquittal after an do up reprosecution took the issue of whether authoriz that bar States prohibit a sentence of a sentence.... ing the Government review Jeopardy violated the Double Clause Jeopardy does E. The Double Clause Fifth Amendment of the Constitution. Unit right provide the defendant with DiFrancesco, ed States v. U.S. in time what any specific know at moment (1980). right S.Ct. L.Ed.2d punishment will turn the exact limit of his for certain review sentences out to be.... *7 in two offenses had been enacted identical 132-37, 101 Id. at S.Ct. at 434-37. recognized statutes.3 “Aca between highlights “All this the distinction commentary professional on the demic and Double acquittals [T]he and sentences.... 4, 101 Id. at 121 n. general issue is divided.” require that a Jeopardy Clause does five at 429 n. 4. The Court identified S.Ct. finality that given degree a of sentence be pertinent to the wheth propositions 137, Id. at 101 prevents its later increase.” review,of vio appellate er a sentence would that the Gov- held S.Ct. at 438. The Court prohibition against late the constitutional vio- appeal a sentence did not ernment’s multiple trials: multiple prohibition the constitutional late Jeopardy A The Double Clause trials. complete appeal by a barrier to “(W)here increase of a also held that the ease. The Court prosecution in a criminal not consti on review did appeal presents no threat of Government 138-40, 101 Id. at Jeop- multiple punishment. prosecutions, the Double tute successive pro none of the Therefore S.Ct. at 438-39. ardy is not offended.” United Clause Co., Jeopardy were Clause tections of the Double Supply Linen v. Martin States 1354, appeal of a sen 1349, [564], denied the Government’s at 569-570 S.Ct. [97 U.S. (1977).... this it tence. From 642] 51 L.Ed.2d 1970, 1970, Drug and Control Act of Abuse Prevention Organized Act of Act of

3. Crime Control II, 91-513, 27, 1970, 15, 1970, 9M52, X, 1001(a), Tide P.L. Act of October Oct. P.L. Tide 1984). 409(h), 1984); (repealed Comprehensive (repealed 84 Stat. Stat. With the constitutional issue settled Article should be Con construed to passed gress Sentencing power Reform Act of give appeal illegal to State 1983,4 gave every Government punishments. right appeal criminal case a to a “sentence” my respectful I also want to record dis- imposed that “was in violation of law.” 18 statement, agreement with the Court’s ante 3742(b)(1). This U.S.C. statute authorizes authority at n. that a court has to correct appeal the Government to the trial court’s pro if an error nunc tunc the error was the apply mandatory punishment failure to stat mandatory duty. violation believe that See, e.g., utes. United States v. Investment pro nunc tunc corrections should be limited Inc., (5th

Enterprises, 10 F.3d Cir. to clerical errors. 1993) (denial personam of motion for in for feiture); Anderson, United States v. McCORMICK, J., joins. (1st Cir.1990) (failure apply F.2d 335 to Act). Armed Career Criminal light previous our holding DiFrancesco,

the constitutional doctrine of similarity

and the of our statute the corre- statute,

sponding federal I believe that “sen-

tence” in punishment Article means

in the broadest sense. The statute should be permit construed to appeal the State to ille- Mercado, C & V CLUB and Valentin V. punishments gal distinguished as from ac- Individually Agent and as for C & quittals. give This power, would it the full Club, Petitioners, V permitted by Constitution, sentence. I would also hold that entry, court’s entry, or failure to make an Calletano GONZALEZ and Elsa an affirmative the defendant Gonzalez, Respondents.

used or weapon part exhibited is a No. 13N95-364-CV. appealed by the State without violating Jeop- the Double Texas, Court of ardy Clause. Corpus Christi. By construing according to one May 1997. meaning, technical the Court authorizes the particular defect Rehearing Overruled Oct. of a distinguishes It a sen- parts tence from other rather acquittal.

than from an This does not accom-

plish legislative objective recog- that we

nized Moreno.

Not does this prevent construction

full review of issues

when a imposed, sentence of confinement is impossible

it also will make for the judgments granting community most

supervision because there is no Article 44.02

“sentence” in (Only most of such cases. in a probation” judgment

“shock is there a sen-

tence, suspended.) the execution of which is

This cannot have been what the statute was

intended to do. 12, 1984, 98-473, II, II,

4. Act of Oct. P.L. Title ch. 98 Stat.

Case Details

Case Name: State v. Ross
Court Name: Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas
Date Published: Sep 10, 1997
Citation: 953 S.W.2d 748
Docket Number: 0982-96
Court Abbreviation: Tex. Crim. App.
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