Lead Opinion
At the time of the incident giving rise to this case, Respondent Vadim Roshchin was employed as a driver by Respondent American Sedan Services, Inc. (“American Sedan”). American Sedan is a commercial transportation service that has a permit from MAA to provide ground transportation services at BWI. In February 2010, Mr. Roshchin was picking up passengers at the airport without the required permit in his possession. Providing commercial transportation services at BWI without displaying a permit as required by an MAA regulation is a misdemeanor. Maryland Transportation Authority (“MdTA”) police, who happened to be conducting a special enforcement effort of the permit requirement that night, arrested Mr. Roshchin and impounded American Sedan’s car. Both were released early the next day. The criminal charges against Mr. Roshchin were ultimately dropped.
Two years later Mr. Roshchin and American Sedan sued MAA, MdTA, the
We hold that nothing in the MAA regulation or the Transportation Article deprives a police officer of the general authority under Maryland law to arrest an individual who commits a misdemeanor in the presence of the officer. Thus, the arrest of Mr. Roshchin and the impoundment of the American Sedan car for noncompliance with the permit requirement were lawful. The regulation requiring commercial transportation services to display permits need only have been published in accordance with the State Administrative Procedure Act and State Documents Law and was not required to be posted at the airport as a prerequisite to its enforcement. On the basis of the undisputed facts, the claims of Mr. Roshchin and American Sedan fail as a matter of law.
I
Background
A. Regulation of Ground Transportation at BWI
MAA operates BWI, a State-owned airport. Maryland Code, Transportation Article (“TR”), § 5-412. MAA has established certain rules concerning the discharge and pick-up of passengers by commercial transportation services on the roadways adjacent to the airport terminal. MAA enters into contracts with certain transportation companies, which pay fees for the privilege of using the “inner roadway” near the baggage claim to pick up passengers who have not previously arranged for transportation.
Certain other categories of commercial vehicles are authorized to use the “outer roadway” under permits issued by MAA. One such category is for-hire commercial transportation services that arrange in advance to pick up arriving passengers. COMAR 11.03.01.05-1 A(6) (“Regulation 05-1 A©”).
MAA regulations require operators of commercial vehicles conducting business at BWI to obtain and display a permit from the MAA. Regulation 05-1 A(l), (3), C(5). A commercial operator that falls within this category must display the permit on the rearview mirror of the vehicle. There is no dispute that the failure to obtain or display the permit is a misdemeanor, although the parties disagree as to the statute that sets forth that offense.
The MdTA Police Force, a law enforcement
From time to time, in response to numerous complaints about the unauthorized operation of commercial vehicles at BWI,
B. The Arrest and Impoundment
The circumstances of the arrest of Mr. Roshchin and the impoundment of American Sedan’s vehicle are undisputed. During the evening of February 23, 2010, MAA and the MdTA police were conducting an initiative at BWI focused on enforcement of the regulations requiring commercial transportation services to obtain and display a permit. As part of that effort, police officers stopped commercial vehicles to check for permits.
On that evening, Mr. Roshchin was operating a commercial vehicle on behalf of American Sedan to make a pre-arranged pick-up of two passengers at BWI. American Sedan had a valid permit for the vehicle,
At around 7:40 p.m. on that night, officers stopped Mr. Roshchin and determined that he was not displaying a permit. They arrested him and impounded American Sedan’s vehicle. Mr. Roshchin was processed
C. The Litigation
Two years later, in February 2012, Mr. Roshchin and American Sedan filed a complaint in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County against the State of Maryland, MAA, MdTA, and the MdTA police (collectively, “the State”). The counts seeking relief for Mr. Roshchin alleged false arrest, false imprisonment, and a violation of Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights — the due process clause of the Maryland Constitution. The counts seeking relief for American Sedan asserted tort claims for trespass to chattels and tortious interference with business relations.
The State moved for summary judgment on the basis that the arrest was supported by probable cause and did not violate Mr. Roshchin’s rights under Article 24, and that the impoundment of the American Sedan vehicle was appropriate in light of the lawful arrest.
Mr. Roshchin and American Sedan appealed. The Court of Special Appeals reversed the grant of summary judgment.
We granted the State’s petition for a writ of certiorari to consider whether there was legal justification for the arrest of Mr. Roshchin and whether posting of the regulation affects that determination.
Discussion
At issue before us is whether the State is entitled to summary judgment on Mr. Roshchin’s claims of false arrest and false imprisonment and American Sedan’s related tort claims.
A. Whether There was Legal Justification to Arrest Mr. Roshchin that Precludes Potential Tort Liability in this Case
1. The relationship between tort liability and police authority to arrest a driver and impound a vehicle
For a plaintiff to succeed on a false arrest or false imprisonment claim, the plaintiff must establish that the defendant deprived the plaintiff “of his or her liberty without consent and without legal justification.” Okwa v. Harper,
Likewise, one is not liable for trespass to chattels when one “is acting in discharge of ... authority created by law to preserve the public safety, health, peace, or other public interest, and [one’s] act is reasonably necessary to the performance of [one’s] duty ...” Restatement (Second) of Torts § 265. Police have authority to “seize and remove ... vehicles impeding traffic or threatening public safety and convenience.” Wilson v. State,
To prove tortious interference with business relations one must show, among other things, that the defendant acted with malice. Natural Design, Inc. v. Rouse Co.,
In short, there is ordinarily no liability for false arrest, false imprisonment, trespass to chattels, or tortious interference with business relations when a police officer observes a driver committing a misdemeanor, arrests the driver, and impounds the now-unattended vehicle that has been left where it may not be left unattended.
2. Whether TR § 5-1104 Precludes an Arrest in these Circumstances
Mr. Roshchin and American Sedan argue that the ordinary rule does not apply in this case because the arresting officer failed to issue a citation to Mr. Roshchin and, in any event, the officer’s authority was limited in these circumstances to issuing a citation instead of effecting an arrest. They also contend that MAA itself has interpreted its own regulation to preclude an arrest for failure to display a permit.
Mr. Roshchin and American Sedan rely on TR § 5-1104. They argue that this statute makes the issuance of a citation a prerequisite to an arrest and, in the circumstances of this case, precludes an arrest. TR § 5-1104 provides that, when a person is “apprehended by a police officer” for a misdemeanor violation of any provision of Title 5 of the Transportation Article — the aviation title of that Article — or for the misdemeanor “violation of any rule, regulation, or order adopted under” Title 5, “the officer shall prepare and sign a written citation.” TR § 5-1104(a) (emphasis added). If the person charged gives “his written promise to appear in court by signing the form for written promise on the citation prepared by the police officer,” then “the officer need not take the person into physical custody for the violation unless” one of two conditions is met: either “[t]he person charged does not furnish satisfactory evidence of identity,” or “[t]he officer has reasonable grounds to believe the person charged will disregard a written promise to appear.” TR § 5-1104(c) (emphasis added).
Mr. Roshchin and American Sedan argue that the issuance of a citation pursuant to TR § 5-1104(a) and the opportunity for the alleged violator to provide a written promise to appear in court are a prerequisite for an officer to have discretion to arrest under TR § 5-1104(c) — and then only if one of the two conditions in that subsection is met. Because the arresting officer did not issue a citation to Mr. Roshchin and because neither of the conditions mentioned in TR § 5-1104(c) were present, they argue, the officer had no authority to arrest Mr. Roshchin.
This poses a question of statutory construction. In construing a statute, one begins with the “plain meaning” of the statutory language and may end there if the meaning is plain enough.
Statutory Text
CP § 2-202 provides that an officer “may arrest” for a misdemeanor committed in the officer’s presence. The verb “may” indicates that an officer has the authority to arrest, but need not do so. Rockwood Casualty Ins. Co. v. Uninsured Employers’ Fund,
In asserting that TR § 5-1104 precludes an arrest in these circumstances, Mr. Roshchin and American Sedan argue that TR § 5-1104, which requires the issuance of a citation, is more specific than CP § 2-202, which authorizes a police officer generally to arrest for misdemeanors committed in an officer’s presence. They also note that CP § 2-201(b) specifically says that the subtitle that contains CP § 2-202, which grants the authority to arrest, “does not deprive a person of the right to receive a citation for ... a criminal violation as provided by law or the Maryland Rules.” Thus, they conclude, both because the specific governs the general and because CP § 2-201(b) explicitly protects the right to receive a citation, Mr. Roshchin had a right to receive a citation in lieu of being arrested.
It is true that “ ‘when two statutes, one general and one specific, are found to conflict, the specific statute will be regarded as an exception to the general statute.’ ” Maryland-Nat’l Capital Park & Planning Comm’n v. Anderson,
While Mr. Roshchin may have had a right, pursuant to CP § 2 — 201(b) and TR § 5-1104(a), to receive a citation, that requirement has no bearing on whether the officer had authority to arrest him. A failure to satisfy the direction in TR § 5-1104(a) to issue a citation does not detract from the authority provided in CP § 2-202 — TR § 5-1104 does not specify any consequences for the failure to issue a citation and so the officer still had discretion to arrest.
Legislative History
The legislative history of TR § 5-1104 does not reveal a legislative purpose to trump the usual arrest powers of police officers. The predecessor of TR § 5-1104 was originally enacted in 1949 as a part of the revised “Aeronautics” article of the Maryland Code (Article 1A) that authorized the enforcement of regulations adopted under that article. Chapter 422, § 31, Laws of Maryland 1949. As originally enacted, the provision did not specifically address the issuance of citations or making arrests. The statute was recodified as Article 1A, § 10-1001 when the
This language was in contrast to a contemporary provision of the Maryland Vehicle Code that stated that an officer “shall” issue a citation for certain violations, but that, in specified circumstances (including when there was failure to provide satisfactory evidence of identity or there were reasonable grounds to believe the person would disregard a provision to appear), the officer had discretion to issue a citation “or” arrest the alleged violator — apparently identifying issuance of a citation and arrest as alternative courses of action. Maryland Code, Article 663A, § 16-107 (1974). The authority to issue a citation or to arrest for a violation of the Maryland Vehicle Code is now incorporated in TR § 26-201 et seq.
In 1977, the aviation provision was recodified in its current location as part of the Transportation Article. Chapter 13, Laws of Maryland 1977. The code revisors indicated that the language had been revised to “conform more closely” to a similar provision in the Natural Resources Article (“NR”). Id. at pp. 248-49 (Revisor’s Note). The referenced provision in the Natural Resources Article — NR § 1-205 — as revised in 1973, had been “modeled” after the provision in Motor Vehicle Code mentioned above (Article 66)6, § 16-107). See Chapter 4, 1st Spec. Sess., Laws of Maryland 1973 at p. 466 (Revisor’s Note). The revisors indicated that the language was included in NR § 1-205 “to elucidate the circumstances under which a Natural Resources Police officer must take a person into custody.” Id. (emphasis added).
When one wanders through the weeds of this legislative history, it is evident that the code revisors were attempting to conform similar, although not identical, code provisions concerning the issuance of citations in relation to arrests that appeared in different articles of the Maryland Code. But it is equally evident that the provision of the Motor Vehicle Code, which specified circumstances in which an officer has discretion to arrest, is distinct from the other two provisions, which are phrased in terms of the circumstances under which an officer must arrest.
In any event, there is no indication in the legislative history that the General Assembly intended to abrogate the common law authority of a peace officer to arrest for a misdemeanor committed in the officer’s presence — authority that the Legislature codified in the predecessor to CP § 2-202 in 1969. Chapter 561, Laws of Maryland 1969. Thus, we are reluctant to construe TR § 5-1104 as limiting that authority. See Mummert v. Alizadeh,
Significance of the Acting Parking Manager’s Letter
Mr. Roshchin and American Sedan argue that MAA itself has interpreted Regulation 05-1 to be enforceable only by the issuance of a citation without an arrest, and that this agency interpretation should be given deference. See Maryland Bd. of Pub. Works v. K. Hovnanian’s Four Seasons at Kent Island, LLC,
The Acting Parking Manager’s letter did not purport to be an interpretation of the enforcement provisions of the aviation title of the Transportation Article and said nothing, one way or the other, about police authority to arrest violators. Moreover, the authority to arrest in this case did not come from the MAA regulation, but rather CP § 2-202 and the common law, which MAA does not administer. In any event, the reference to a fine appeared to be a reminder that there could be adverse consequences for failing to display a permit even if, as the letter detailed, the permit on its face appeared to have expired.
Finally, the degree of deference given to an agency interpretation depends on, among other things, “whether the agency (1) administers the statute it is interpreting, (2) developed its interpretation through a well-reasoned process, (3) in an adversarial proceeding or formal rule promulgation, and (4) consistently applied that interpretation for a ‘long’ period of time.” Bayly Crossing, LLC v. Consumer Protection Division,
3. Summary
Thus, while statute directs an arresting officer to issue a citation for a failure to display a permit in violation of Regulation 05-1, the issuance of a citation was not a prerequisite to arresting Mr. Roshchin for that offense. Nor does the statutory direction to issue a citation preclude the making of an arrest in these circumstances. There is no dispute that the officer had probable cause to believe that a misdemeanor violation of the regulation was being committed in the officer’s presence. Accordingly, there was legal justification for the arrest.
B. Whether a Factual Dispute about Posting of the Regulation Matters
Mr. Roshchin and American Sedan contend that, even if the statutes permit an arrest for violation of Regulation 05-1, that regulation would not have been enforceable at the time of Mr. Roshchin’s arrest if it was not posted at that time. The Court of Special Appeals agreed on that point and concluded that there was a factual dispute as to whether the regulation had been posted prior to the arrest, thereby precluding the award of summary judgment.
1. Preservation of the issue
As an initial matter, Mr. Roshchin and American Sedan argue that this issue
2. Statutory authority for the regulation
MAA proposed to adopt Regulation 05-1 in 1998, together with two other new regulations and amendments to two existing regulations. See 25:25 Md. Reg. 1853 (December 4, 1998). While the regulatory action largely concerned the issuance of permits to commercial and courtesy vehicles to operate at BWI and the enforcement of the permit requirement, it also proposed amendments to existing regulations, one of which concerned parking and ground transportation at BWI.
The notice listed four statutes as providing authority for the regulations that were the subject of the notice: TR §§ 5-204, 5-208, 5-408, and 5-426.
TR § 5-204. This statute provides MAA with authority to adopt regulations that are “for the functioning and administrátion” of MAA. TR § 5-204(d)(4). The regulations proposed in 1998 and adopted the following year dealt with the “functioning and administration” of MAA in the sense that they detailed the responsibilities of MAA’s Division of Transportation and Terminal Services with respect to the issuance of permits to commercial transportation services and assigned the Division authority to conduct disciplinary proceedings as set forth in Regulation 05-2. TR § 5-204 does not set forth any special publication or posting requirement for such regulations. Thus, any regulations would be published and available in accordance
TR § 5-208. This provision broadly authorizes MAA to adopt regulations to carry out its duties under State law, to protect public safety, and to develop aviation in Maryland, among other things. TR § 5-208(a).
TR § 5-408. This statute authorizes MAA to enter into contracts and other “arrange[ments]” regarding services provided by or at an airport. TR § 5-408(a). It authorizes MAA to establish “terms and conditions” for those entities that MAA allows to provide services at an airport. TR § 5-408(b). Under this provision, MAA clearly has authority to regulate those who provide commercial transportation services at BWI, which is no doubt why it was cited in the notice.
TR § 5-426. This statute authorizes MAA to adopt regulations regarding parking, traffic, safety, and order at an airport. TR § 5-426(a). It explicitly requires that regulations adopted under the statute “be posted conspicuously in a public place at the airport” — a requirement that was in the statute in 1998. TR § 5-426(b). It was likely included as part of the statutory authority for the regulatory action proposed in the 1998 notice because that notice proposed an amendment of Regulation 05, entitled “Control of Landside Traffic
3. Whether posting was necessary to enforce the permit requirement
Mr. Roshchin and American Sedan have consistently focused solely on TR § 5-426 as the source of authority for the permit requirement in Regulation 05-1 and asserted that, accordingly, the regulation had to be posted to be enforced. The State has been inconsistent during the course of this case as to the source of authority for the offense for which Mr. Roshchin was arrested — failure to display a permit. In the Circuit Court, the State apparently accepted the contention that TR § 5-426 was the source of authority for the regulation and that, accordingly, the penalty was set forth in TR § 5-427(b) (violation of regulation adopted under TR § 5-426— other than a parking regulation — is a misdemeanor punishable by a fíne up to $500). In holding that the arrest of Mr. Roshchin was justified on the basis of a misdemeanor committed in the officer’s presence, the Circuit Court referred to the misdemeanor offense set forth in TR § 5-427(b).
Before the Court of Special Appeals, the State continued to accept the premise that TR § 5-426 was the pertinent statute underlying the offense, but argued that posting was not required for the regulation to be effective. It is thus unsurprising that the intermediate appellate court focused in its opinion on the posting requirement set forth in TR § 5-426(b).
Before us, the State has taken the position that the permit requirement of Regulation 05-1 was not — and could not have been — adopted under TR § 5-426. It now points to TR § 5-208 and TR § 5^408 as the bases for those portions of the regulation and, accordingly, cites TR § 5 — 1105(a)
If this were a criminal prosecution, we might well hold the State to its original position and limit the potential criminal penalty to be imposed accordingly. A violation of TR § 5-1105(a) potentially carries a term of incarceration while the penalty under TR § 5-427(b) is limited to a fine. But this is not a criminal prosecution, both statutes define misdemeanors for which an arrest may be made, and the only issue before us is whether public posting in addition to the requirements of the State APA and State Documents Law is required for the permitting scheme established by the regulation to be effective.
TR § 5-426 supplies none of the authority necessary to adopt a regulation imposing a permitting regime. If MAA had only the rulemaking authority in TR § 5-426 (concerning parking, traffic, etc.) it could not have created this permitting regime in Regulation 05-1. On the other hand, if MAA did not have the rulemaking authority in TR § 5-426, it still could have adopted the permit requirement for commercial transportation services under TR § 5-208 and TR § 5-408. Consequently, Regulation 05-1 was not “adopted under” TR § 5-426.
In our view, the citation of TR § 5-426 — presumably because the regulation cross-references and incorporates parking and traffic laws adopted under the authority of TR § 5-426 — does not import the posting requirement of TR § 5-426 into the other statutes that provide authority for the permit requirement. Regulation 051 need not have been posted to be enforced. Thus, any factual dispute regarding posting is not material to the outcome of this case.
Ill
Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, we hold that, on the basis of the undisputed facts, the arrest of Mr. Roshchin and impoundment of the American Sedan vehicle were lawful. The Circuit Court properly awarded summary judgment on the tort claims asserted in the complaint.
Judgment of the Court of Special Appeals Reversed. Costs in This Court and in the Court of Special Appeals to be Paid by Respondents.
Notes
. All of the regulations cited in this opinion appear in a chapter of the Code of Maryland Regulations designated as "COMAR 11.03.01." For readability we will refer to each regulation by its individual number and refrain from repeating the chapter designation in each instance — i.e., COMAR 11.03.01.05-1 will be referenced as Regulation 05-1.
. Mr. Roshchin and American Sedan assert that the relevant misdemeanor is defined in TR § 5-427(b), which provides for a penalty of a fine of up to $500. The State entities contend that the relevant statute is TR § 5-1105(a), which states that the penalty is up to 90 days imprisonment, a $500 fine, or both. See also Regulation 10D(3). Although the applicable criminal penalty is irrelevant to this civil case, for other reasons we later determine that TR § 5-1105(a) defines the relevant misdemeanor. See Part II.B of this opinion below.
. TR § 4-208.
. One of the deposition in this case that unauthorized commercial vehicles often do not have the required license from the Public Service Commission, do not have automobile insurance coverage, and charge exorbitant fees to customers. He stated that commercial transportation services that operated legally at the airport under contract or permit became concerned about losing business to the illegal operators, which sometimes resulted in confrontations at the airport.
. While the putative expiration date of American Sedan’s permit had long passed, there is no dispute that it remained valid. At the time of the enforcement initiatives in 2009 and 2010, many permits- — -including permits held by American Sedan — apparently stated on their face that they expired on June 30, 2006 or June 30, 2007. Consistent with a notice sent to permit holders by MAA’s Acting Manager of Parking and Transportation in June 2009, MdTA police officers recognized the validity of such permits. (As we shall see later in this opinion, Mr. Roshchin and American Sedan also rely on a statement in the Acting Parking Manager’s June 2009 notice that failure to display a permit "could result in a $50.00 fine.” See Part II.A.2 of this opinion below.)
. A permit is not assigned to a particular vehicle and a transportation service may transfer a permit among vehicles that are listed on its application for the permit.
. Mr. Roshchin and American Sedan also moved for partial summary judgment contending that they were entitled as a matter of law to a ruling that a violation of Regulation 05-1 A(l) is not an offense for which an alleged violator may be arrested or incarcerated. The Circuit Court did not explicitly rule on that motion, although its disposition of the State's motion effectively denied it.
. Mr. Roshchin did not file a cross-petition concerning the Court of Special Appeals’ decision to affirm the award of summary judgment in favor of the State on his claim under Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. Thus, the constitutional claim is not before us.
. W.R. Grace & Co. v. Swedo,
. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore v. Chase,
. 120 West Fayette Street LLLP v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore,
. Notably, the Legislature elected not to use the defined phrase "may not” which has “a mandatory negative effect and establishes a prohibition.” Maryland Code, General Provisions Article, § 1-203.
. Obviously, the two conditions triggering an obligation to arrest depend to a great extent on the officer's judgment — whether the evidence of identity is "satisfactory” and whether there are "reasonable grounds” to believe the individual will fail to appear.
. The State argues from context and legislative history that the word "shall” in the statute is directory, not mandatory. See In re Najasha B.,
. Mr. Roshchin and American Sedan note that TR § 5-1104(c) provides that a person who has received a citation "may give his written promise to appear in court” by signing the citation. They argue that this is "rendered meaningless” if the police have discretion to arrest the person even if the person has signed the citation form. TR § 5-1104(c) may be given its full effect even if the alleged violator is arrested; the alleged violator need only be given the opportunity to sign the form and promise to appear in court. A willingness to sign the form and promise to appear may be to a person’s advantage even if it does not avoid arrest, because, for example, it may affect a judicial officer's decision whether to release the individual and what, if any, conditions to impose.
Mr. Roshchin and American Sedan also observe that a citation can be an alternative charging document to a statement of charges, and that, when an offender is arrested without a warrant, "unless an information is filed in the District Court, the officer who has custody of the defendant shall ... cause a statement of charges to be filed against the defendant in the District Court.” Maryland Rule 4-211(b)(2). The charges are then given to the defendant at the first court appearance. Maryland Rule 4-213(a)(2). Asserting that a statement of charges would be duplicative of a citation, Mr. Roshchin and American Sedan say that it is anomalous to give a citation to a person who is to be arrested. However, as noted in the text, TR § 5-1104(c) explicitly contemplates that an alleged violator who receives a citation will also be arrested — and presumably receive a statement of charges later in the proceeding. Moreover, the rules allow for several types of charging documents. See Maryland Rule 4-102(a) (defining "charging document”). It is not unusual for one charging document to be superseded by another in a particular case.
. Mr. Roshchin also points to deposition testimony of the Acting Manager that, at the time he sent the letter, he believed that the penalty for failing to display a permit was limited to a fine. That may be because the MAA parking regulations provided for a $50 fine for failure to display a permit. See Regulation 05 E(2)(k).
. We express no opinion on the wisdom of making an arrest for such an offense.
. See State v. Parker,
. In addition to adopting Regulation 05-1, the notice also proposed to adopt new regulations Regulation 05-2 (disciplinary proceedings concerning permit holders) and Regulation 05-3 (appeals of denials, suspensions, or revocations of permits). The notice also proposed amendments to Regulation 01 (Definitions) to add definitions of certain terms and Regulation 05 (entitled "Control of Landslide Traffic and Ground Transportation”) to delete permit-related provisions that had previously been codified in that regulation.
. Under the State Administrative Procedure Act, a regulation is not effective unless the agency cites the statutory authority for its adoption. Maryland Code, State Government Article ("SG”), § 10-106. Regulations based on statutory authority — sometimes referred to as "legislative rules” — have the force and effect of law. Maryland Port Administration v. Brawner Contracting Co.,
. See SG § 10-101 etseq.
. See SG § 7-201 ef seq.
. In relevant part that statute provided, in 1998:
(a)(1) The Administration may perform any act, issue and amend any order, adopt and amend any general or special rule, regulation, or procedure, and establish any minimum standard consistent with this title and necessary:
(1) To perform its duties and carry out the provisions of this title;
(ii) To protect the general public safety, the safety of persons who operate, use, or travel in aircraft, the safety of persons who receive instructions in flying or ground subjects that relate to aeronautics, or the safety of persons and property on land or water; or
(iii) To develop and promote aeronautics in this State.
(2) The Administration may also adopt rules and regulations by which a person engaging in aeronautics may be required to establish financial responsibility for any damage or injury that might be caused by the person.
TR§ 5-208(a) (1999).
. Indeed, the statute has been construed to provide MAA with state action immunity under the federal antitrust laws in connection with its regulation of commercial taxicabs at BWI. See 73 Opinions of the Attorney General 38 (1988).
. See SG § 10-101(h).
. In particular, it provided that "[p]arking is only allowed in the public parking facilities subject to current parking rates and regulations.” Regulation 05-1 A(4). Similarly, the regulation prohibits a permit holder from violating the parking regulations. Regulation 05-1 C(9).
Other portions of the regulations proposed in 1998 prohibit violation of State traffic laws, which arguably concerns the movement of traffic at the airport. See Regulation 05-1 C(10)-(l 1).
. That statute provides:
(a) Except as otherwise provided in this title, any person who violates any provision of this title or of any rule, regulation, or order adopted or issued under this title is guilty of a misdemeanor and on conviction is subject to a fine not exceeding $500 or imprisonment not exceeding 90 days or both.
See also Regulation 10 D(3) ("Violators of any other of these regulations may be charged with a misdemeanor and, upon conviction ..., shall be subject to a maximum fine of $500, or imprisonment for not more than 90 days, or both.”).
. If indeed TR § 5-426 were the statutory authority for the licensing regime, we would agree with the cogent analysis of that statute by the Court of Special Appeals concerning the requirement of posting. See
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting.
Respectfully, I dissent. I would hold that the arrest was not valid for the reasons set forth in the opinion authored by Judge Kehoe for the Court of Special Appeals.