State v. RosalesState v. Rosales
On July 9, 1987, Veronica Rosales and Emilio Gonzales were charged by bill of information with violation of
On appeal defendant asserts the evidence seized was illegally obtained and should have been suppressed because the officers did not have probable cause to believe it contained contraband.
The evidence at the hearing оf the motion to suppress consisted solely of the testimony of Deputy Timothy Valenti of the Jefferson Parish Sheriff‘s Office. He testified that on January 14, 1987, he was contacted by Detective Steve Gaudet of the New Orleans Police Department, who had information regarding some narcotics being imported into Jefferson Parish. Detective Gaudet wanted to coordinate an investigation with Deputy Valenti. Valenti and Gaudet met at Gaudet‘s office, where Gaudet
Deputy Valenti testified further that he and Detective Gaudet set up surveillance of the Quality Inn at 3750 Westbank Expressway at apprоximately 7 p.m., where they observed was parked a blue Cutlass, about a 1980 model, with some damage to the front end as described by the informant. They maintained surveillance of that vehicle throughout the night.
At 2:15 a.m. they observed a Spanish female, the defendant, and Emilio Gonzales exit Room 207, proceed down the stairway and walk to the bluе Cutlass parked in the lot right across from the room. They were walking very slowly, very nervously, looking around a great deal. Miss Rosales was carrying a large plastic bag. Thеy entered the vehicle and sat in it for a few minutes, then backed up, circled the parking lot, and exited going down the Westbank Expressway, with Miss Rosales driving. They were going very, vеry slow in the far right-hand lane, going even slower as they proceeded.
At that point the officers decided to stop them, using police lights and sirens. While doing so Deputy Valenti observed Gonzales leaning down, appearing to place something under the front seat. As Valenti approached the vehicle, he identified himself аs a narcotics detective and advised both subjects he was conducting a narcotics investigation regarding cocaine. Both subjects exited the vehicle at Valenti‘s request, whereupon he proceeded to the passenger side of the vehicle and retrieved a clear plastic bag containing apрroximately one-fourth ounce of white powder, which tested positive for cocaine in a preliminary field test.
Valenti placed both subjects under arrest and advised them of their Miranda rights. He then searched Miss Rosales’ purse and found a white folded piece of paper containing approximately a gram of white powder, which also field-tested positive for cocaine.
Valenti testified further that when he stopped the vehicle and took the contraband from under the seat, he was concerned for his safety due to the information that the suspect might have machine guns and that Gonzales was possibly a member of the Cuban Mafia. He аlso stated the suspects’ pattern of behavior was typical of drug dealers, who will take a new shipment of cocaine to a hotel room to “cut” the сocaine and package it in plastic bags.
Detective Gaudet did not appear at the hearing. The parties stipulated that if he had testified his testimony would be the same as Deputy Valenti‘s.
Information provided by an informant comprises probable cause for arrest where other sources corroboratе the information, reducing the chances of a reckless or prevaricating tale and providing a substantial basis for crediting the hearsay. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983).
Here the officers’ visual observation corroborated the identifying information provided them by the informant. Although their surveillance alone did not corroborate the illegal possessiоn of narcotics, it gave reasonable grounds for them to believe that remaining unverified bit of information was likewise true. Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 79 S.Ct. 329, 3 L.Ed. 2d 327 (1959).
A law enforcement officer may stop а person in a public place whom he reasonably suspects is committing, has committed, or is about to commit an offense.
The search of the vehicle and resultant seizure of the contraband were justified by Deputy Valenti‘s reasonable belief, based on the information provided him as well as his own knowledge of the drug trade, that the suspects were likely to be armed and that he was concerned for his safety. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 103 S.Ct. 3469, 77 L.Ed.2d 1201 (1983).
A warrantless search of an automobile is justified when there is probable cause and exigent circumstances are present. State v. Tatum, 466 So.2d 29 (La.1985).
“[P]robable cause is a flexible, commonsense standard. It merely requires that the facts available to the officer would `warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief’ * * * that certain items may be contraband * * *; it does not demand any showing that such a belief be correct or more likely true than false. A `practical, non technical’ probability that incriminating evidence is involved is all that is required. * * *.” (Citations omitted.)
Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730 at 763, 103 S.Ct. 1535 at 1543, 75 L.Ed.2d 502 (1983).
Based on the information received and on the officers’ own observations, they had probable cause to stop the vehicle. Further, because the suspects were traveling in the vehicle at the time they werе arrested, sufficient exigency was present to justify an immediate search of the vehicle to prevent the discarding or destruction of any contraband.
Accordingly, we conclude the district court correctly denied the defendant‘s motion to suppress.
Defendant also assigned as error any errors patent on the face of the record. The only patent error is that the sentence imposed does not give credit for time served, as required by
For the foregoing reasons, the district court is ordered to correct the record to reflect that defendant is to be given credit against her sentence for time served.
CORRECTION OF SENTENCE ORDERED AND, AS CORRECTED, AFFIRMED.