State v. RonoState v. Rono
- Reporters:
- ,
- Before:
- Yetka
Defendant was found guilty by a district court jury of a charge of assault in the second degree,
On the evening of December 13, 1980, defendant and his wife began arguing with each other at a tavern north of Crosby. After his wife walked out of the bar and began walking to their house some two miles away, defendant got involved in an argument with the owner of the tavern, claiming that the owner was harboring defendant’s wife in the owner’s attached residential quarters. The owner told defendant to go home and he would probably find his wife there. Defendant left saying that if she was not home when he got there, he would return with a gun and shoot off the owner’s head. A short time later, defendant was observed as he returned to the bar. After checking the front door of the bar and finding it locked, he got his gun out and fired it through the front window at close range. The owner and the customers by then had taken refuge in the residential part of the building. Defendant was arrested at his mother’s house in Crosby a short time later and the shotgun used in the assault was seized in a consensual search of the house.
There is no merit to defendant’s contention that the evidence was insufficient to establish the requisite intent to cause fear.
We do not decide whether reckless use of a dangerous weapon,
Defendant’s only other contention is that the trial court prejudicially erred in refusing to specifically instruct the jury that identification must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt and in refusing to give a cautionary instruction specifying factors to be used in evaluating eyewitness identification testimony. Cases bearing on this include State v. Helterbridle, 301 N.W.2d 545 (Minn.1980); State v. Christian, 309 Minn. 393, 244 N.W.2d 284 (1976); State v. Bishop, 289 Minn. 188, 183 N.W.2d 536 (Minn.1971); and State v. Burch, 284 Minn. 300, 170 N.W.2d 543 (1969). In a close case in which identification is in issue, it might be prejudicial error for the trial court to refuse to specifically instruct the jury that identification must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt and to refuse to give a cautionary instruction specifying the factors to be used in evaluating eyewitness identification testimony. However, in this case, our examination of the record convinces us that defendant was not prejudiced by the trial court’s refusal to give the requested instructions.
Affirmed.
Notes
. The presumptive sentence for this offense (severity level VI) by one with defendant’s criminal history score (one) is a stayed sentence with a duration of 26 months if sentence is imposed. However, this was defendant’s second offense with a dangerous weapon and, therefore, under