94 Wash. App. 211 | Wash. Ct. App. | 1999
— The State of Washington appeals the trial court’s dismissal of charges for violation of CrR 3.3, the speedy trial rule. We reverse and remand.
On April 20, 1995, the prosecutor in Cowlitz County charged Roman with first degree kidnapping, first degree extortion, and fourth degree assault. On April 26, 1995, the Cowlitz County Superior Court issued a warrant for Roman’s arrest.
On or about May 1, 1995, police in Stanislaus County, California, jailed Roman on a misdemeanor forgery committed in that county. They notified Cowlitz County that they had Roman in custody, and Cowlitz County forwarded its warrant.
On May 4, 1995, the Stanislaus County District Attorney filed a fugitive complaint based on Cowlitz County’s warrant. Roman appeared before the Stanislaus County Municipal Court and declined to waive extradition. The court scheduled an identification hearing for May 12, and Stanislaus County immediately asked Cowlitz County to send the necessary documents. According to the trial court’s later finding, however, Cowlitz County did not mail the documents until May 12.
On May 12, the identification hearing was held. Apparently because Stanislaus County had not yet received the necessary documents from Cowlitz County, the Stanislaus County Municipal Court “temporarily dismissed” the fugitive complaint.
On June 26, 1995, Roman was convicted on Stanislaus County’s forgery charge. Thereafter, he was sentenced to
On May 15, meanwhile, the Cowlitz County prosecutor asked Washington’s governor to apply for Roman’s extradition. On June 1, Washington’s governor forwarded the necessary paperwork to California’s governor. On a date not shown by the record, California’s governor issued an extradition warrant, which he forwarded to Stanislaus County.
The record does not show when the extradition warrant reached Stanislaus County. It was before September 1, however, for on September 1 Stanislaus County teletyped Cowlitz County that it “still” had the warrant.
On November 27, 1995, the Stanislaus County jail released Roman by mistake. The next day, it teletyped Cowlitz County as follows:
This is an official teletype notice informing you that the Stanislaus County Jail, where Roman has been housed on local charges and with your fugitive hold, has released him from custody in error. What I was told was a mix up in his paperwork when we originolly [sic] placed the hold then dropped it to prosicute [sic] on our local charges. I replaced the hold but some[]how it got missread [sic] as dropped[.] I spent the day checking all the address[es] I thought he might be at with neg. results. Please re-enter him into the system and I[’]m sure he will turn up. He is a local person with family and lots of friends here. If possible we will hold this governor[’]s warrant for as long as possible . . . .4
Roman’s whereabouts were unknown for most of the next two months. On January 19, 1996, however, he was arrested in Idaho. On January 29, 1996, he waived extradi
On May 10, 1996, Roman asked the Cowlitz County Superior Court to dismiss the case because he had not received a speedy trial under CrR 3.3. He claimed that the 60/90-day time for trial included the time he had spent in the Stanislaus County jail, and thus that the 60/90-day time for trial had long since expired.
The sole issue on appeal is whether the trial court properly counted Roman’s time in the Stanislaus County jail (May 1, 1995 to November 27, 1995) as part of the time for trial under CrR 3.3. As far as we can tell from the record, the trial court did not count the time he was at large after being released, and Roman waived any delay that occurred after his return to Cowlitz County.
When a defendant is charged before his or her first appearance, the plain terms of CrR 3.3 require arraignment within 14 days of first appearance, and trial within 60/90 days of arraignment.
Relying on State v. Striker,
State v. Anderson
To apply these principles here, we address two questions. (1) Was Roman amenable to process while in the Stanislaus County jail? (2) If so, did the State exercise due diligence to bring him back? In addressing the first question, we separately discuss (a) whether Roman was amenable to process from when he was jailed to when California issued its extradition warrant, and (b) whether Roman was amenable to process from when California issued its warrant to when he finished his Stanislaus County sentence.
In our view, Roman was not amenable to process from when he was jailed to when California issued its extradition warrant. In State v. Lee,
Roman also was not amenable to process after the extradition warrant issued, but before he finished his
Finally, even if Roman had been amenable to process, the State’s use of the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act constituted due diligence under the circumstances present here. Without so holding, we assume the State could have brought Roman back here by using either the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act, RCW 10.88, or the Interstate Agreement on Detainers, RCW 9.100.010.
Reversed and remanded for further proceedings.
Bridgewater, C.J., and Seinfeld, J., concur.
Reconsideration denied March 29, 1999.
Review denied at 138 Wn.2d 1014 (1999).
Finding of Fact 9, Clerk’s Papers at 99.
At or before this time, apparently, Cowlitz County’s “hold” against Roman . was reinstated by the Stanislaus County authorities.
Clerk’s Papers at 52.
Clerk’s Papers at 54.
Clerk’s Papers at 11.
CrR 3.3(c); see State v. Phillips, 66 Wn. App. 679, 682-89, 833 P.2d 411 (1992), overruled in part sub silentio by State v. Greenwood, 120 Wn.2d 585, 845 P.2d 971 (1993).
87 Wn.2d 870, 557 P.2d 847 (1976). Striker construed an early version of CrR 3.3.
120 Wn.2d 585, 845 P.2d 971 (1993).
Greenwood, 120 Wn.2d at 599; see also State v. Stewart, 130 Wn.2d 351, 360, 922 P.2d 1356 (1996); State v. Hudson, 130 Wn.2d 48, 54, 921 P.2d 538 (1996).
State v. Carpenter, 94 Wn.2d 690, 694, 619 P.2d 697 (1980); Stewart, 130 Wn.2d at 360; Hudson, 130 Wn.2d at 54 n.4; Greenwood, 120 Wn.2d at 599.
Greenwood, 120 Wn.2d at 590, 591, 593, 601; see also Stewart, 130 Wn.2d at 360-61, 367, Hudson, 130 Wn.2d at 54, 55, 58; Carpenter, 94 Wn.2d at 693; Striker, 87 Wn.2d at 871-72, State v. Lee, 48 Wn. App. 322, 325, 738 P.2d 1081 (1987); State v. Hunnel, 52 Wn. App. 380, 384, 760 P.2d 947 (1988).
Hudson, 130 Wn.2d at 54; Greenwood, 120 Wn.2d at 601, 604-05.
121 Wn.2d 852, 855 P.2d 671 (1993).
As we note in the next sentence of the text, Anderson explicitly held that the state had a duty of due diligence. Such a duty arises only when the defendant is amenable to process. Stewart, 130 Wn.2d at 363, 367; Hudson, 130 Wn.2d at 55, 58; State v. Pacheco, 107 Wn.2d 59, 65, 726 P.2d 981 (1986); Carpenter, 94 Wn.2d at 693. Necessarily, then, Anderson held that the defendant was amenable to process under the circumstances described.
Ander$on, 121 Wn.2d at 865.
Id.
130 Wn.2d 48, 921 P.2d 538 (1996).
130 Wn.2d 351, 922 P.2d 1356 (1966).
48 Wn. App. 322, 738 P.2d 1081 (1987).
iSee Hudson, 130 Wn.2d at 56 (discussing Lee, 48 Wn. App. at 325).
Stewart, 130 Wn.2d at 361.
Hudson, 130 Wn.2d at 56.
Anderson, 121 Wn.2d 852.
At this point, we are referring to Article IV of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers. The defendant must invoke Article III, which Roman never attempted to do. Cf. Anderson, 121 Wn.2d 852.
U.S. Const., art. IV § 2.