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State v. Rodriquez
636 N.W.2d 234
Iowa
2001
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*1 the cost be available. Given will fenses Iowa, Appellee, STATE of experts to counter hiring of

and trouble however, defenses, is evident those effectively eliminate today’s decision will in the arising assaults prosecution of RODRIQUEZ, Appellant. Aladdin bar fights. context of No. 00-0763. concern, voluntary permitting greater

Of responsibility diminished intoxication and Supreme Court of Iowa. abuse domestic raised as defenses to be substantially undermine will assault Nov. our abuse purpose domestic

protective

statutes, legis- contravening clear thereby Neuzil, intent. State

lative Cf. 1999) (Iowa (classification 708, 711 re- stalking crime general-intent as but proof purposeful conduct

quires defen- proving hurdle

avoids substantial intent, subjective permit- thereby

dant’s harassment

ting state intervention before confrontation). to physical

escalates short, I court’s am convinced the the intent question

turnabout on the unnecessary in

required assault from of this case unsound

the context standpoint public policy. legisla- A might assault

tive rewrite of the statute run,1 problem long but

remedy will in the meantime. Giv- reign

confusion us, I record see no reason

en the before bench,

subject public the bar upheaval.

LARSON, J., special joins this

concurrence. statute, 708.1(2). example, Iowa section found in the assault section

1. For Code statute, l(2)(a), stalking proscribes Neuzil, 708.1 (proof N.W.2d at 711 of intent See a "purposefully engaging] in of con- course proof subjective on motive whereas focuses person duct" that would cause reasonable proscribed party engaged conduct bodily using injury, rather than to fear behavior). solely objective focuses language place another in fear” "intended *4 Johnston, Muscatine, Douglas E. ap- for pellant. Miller, General,

Thomas J. Attorney Mary Tabor, E. Attorney Assistant Gener- al, Phillips, R. County Attorney, ‍​​​‌​‌‌‌​‌‌​​‌‌‌‌​‌​​‌​‌‌‌‌​​‌​‌​​‌​​​‌​‌‌‌​‌​‌‌‍Richard and Dana Christensen and Teresa Stoeck- el, County Attorneys, appel- Assistant lee.
TERNUS, Justice. defendant,

The Rodriquez, ap- Aaddin peals multiple his criminal convictions aris- ing out of an incident domestic abuse. Concluding that evidence of and sub- sequent occasions of domestic abuse had admitted, been improperly the Iowa Court Appeals reversed the defendant’s con- victions and remanded for a new trial. We granted application the State’s for further review and appeals now vacate the court of (2) (3) murder; injury; ed willful third- and affirm the district court’s decision (4) and domes- degree kidnapping; aggravated of conviction sentence. judgment (5) assault; as- tic serious domestic Proceedings. Background I. Facts 708.4, 707.11, §§ sault. See Iowa Code 708.2A(2)(b) 710.1, 710.4, 708.2A(2)(c), twenty, Enriquez, age was seen Melinda (1999). pled guilty. room of a The defendant emergency Muscatine evening on the of October hospital trial, Prior the State filed notice reported boyfriend that her had 1999. She En- to introduce evidence from intended her, him identify but refused beaten she other riquez regarding and her mother boyfriend her hit her by name. She said objected incidents of abuse. defendant buckle, and hit a metal belt her with with trial, to this the court but her with feet in his hand kicked his permitted testimony by about head, chest, and abdomen. She also and about occasions abuse stomped her alleged boyfriend incident that occurred the October after neck. mother this tes- assault. Her corroborated injuries physical A examination revealed timony. testimony In addition to the *5 history. Enriquez with this had consistent witnesses, emer- these the State called the nose, forehead, around left bruising her gency physician Enri- room who treated cheek. In eye and addition there were quez injuries, for her the officer who inter- neck, her on the side of her right bruises an Enriquez hospital, viewed at and chest, upper cage, lower left right her rib expert who testified about “the battered shoulder, upper the left part across the of syndrome.” women’s upper aspect and the outer right her arm After the court overruled his motion for upper “spar- her left arm. Evidence of verdict, a took the directed defendаnt at the ing,” pattern a often left site of dispute stand. did The defendant an was also This impact object, noted. Enriquez’s injuries, he caused but had being with hit sparing consistent jealous angry. He claimed he was and Although with force. x- great belt buckle Enriquez that he with admitted assaulted fractures, no rays revealed there was some belt, hand, stepped hit her with his and retropharyngeal swelling tissue in En- soft choking on her and neck. denied cheek He neck, indicating that her trachea riquez’s confining and denied her their addition, depressed had been backward. apartment. tender, Enriquez’s abdomen was and she testimony, After the defendant’s was stiff sore. jury jury. case was submitted police a Muscatine officer arrived When charges guilty found the defendant of all hospital, Enriquez gave at the him several except attempted murder. At his later sen- the perpetrator, names for but never iden- tencing, that the two urged the defendant true It was until a tified her assailant. be domestic assault convictions should incident, subsequent approximately one merged in the willful conviction. The injury later, the defendant month when chased court do so declined to and sentenced knife, Enriquez with a she informed defendant to serve consecutive sentences police responsi- the defendant was charge for each of which was convicted. he injuries ble for of October 3,1999, chal appealed, On December the defendant was The defendant (1) separate grounds: with convictions on charged lenging five offenses relat- his four (1) attempt- to the error in evidence of ing October assault: (2) acts; subsequent allowing bad error in conformity acted therewith. It (3) however, expert testify; may, the domestic abuse be admissible for other (4) judge impartial; purposes, proof motive, the trial was not such as op- intent, in failing merge error the assault con- portunity, preparation, plan, injury victions into the willful conviction.1 knowledge, identity, or absence of mis- We transferred the case to the court of take or accident. appeals. That court reversed the defen- 404(b). Iowa R. Evid. This court has re convictions, concluding pri- dant’s 404(b) cently observed that rule “is a codi or and subsequent bad acts evidence was fication of our common-law rule that one

improperly granted admitted. We further crime cannot proved by proof be of anoth review. Castaneda, er.” State v. 621 N.W.2d (Iowa 2001). Thus, 404(b) rule seeks to

II. Did the Triаl Err Court in Admit- exclude evidence that serves no purpose ting Evidence Prior Bad Acts? except to show the defendant is a bad person, from which likely Scope A. review. This court infer he or she committed “generally the crime evidentiary rulings review[s] question. Hedican, Id. 439-40. Accordingly, to be abuse of discretion.” Williams “ admissible, (Iowa evidence must 1997); be relevant 561 N.W.2d ‘to accord (Iowa some fact or 173,177 element in issue other Bugely, State v. ” 1997) than the disposition.’ defendant’s criminal (applying abuse discretion stan Cott, Id. at 440 (quoting State v. reviewing dard in admission of other (Iowa evidence). 1979)). crimes An abuse of discretion *6 occurs when the trial court exercises its Evidence is relevant ... “when it has discretion “on grounds or for reasons ‘any tendency to make the existence of clearly clearly untenable or to an extent any fact that consequence is of to the Maghee, unreasonable.” State v. 573 proba- determination of the action more (Iowa 1, 1997). N.W.2d 5 “A ground or ble or probable less than it would be ” reason is sup untenable when it is not without the evidence.’ Evidence is rele- ported by substantial evidence or when it vant if person a reasonable might be- application is based on аn erroneous of the probability lieve the of the truth of the law.” Graber v. City Ankeny, 616 of consequential fact to if be different (Iowa 2000). 633, N.W.2d 638 person knew of the challenged evidence. (Iowa Brown, 113, State v. 569 N.W.2d 116 Analytical B. Iowa framework. 1997) Plaster, (quoting State v. 424 N.W.2d 404(b) Rule of Evidence addresses the ad (Iowa 1988)). 226, 229 missibility of of evidence other bad acts. It states: If the evidence is relevant for a crimes,

Evidence of other wrongs, legitimate purpose, or the court must then acts is not admissible to the char- assess whether the “probative evidence’s person acter of a in order to show that substantially value is outweighed by the alleged 1. The defendant also Jeopardy precludes error in submis- Clause our review of a attempted charge sion of the murder to the judgment acquittal. Taft, of State v. jury. acquitted charge, Because he was of that (Iowa 1993). The defendant any error in its submission was harmless. any respect does not contend that error with Sharpe, State v. 304 N.W.2d 223-25 attempted charge to the murder infected his (Iowa 1981); Love, State v. convictions of the other offenses. (Iowa 1981). addition, the Double analy- in the Iowa R. Evid. of review context of the prejudice.” dard of unfair danger “ the trial The abusе of required of court. gauges value’ sis 403. ‘[Probative “to in applicable standard of review force of’ evidence discretion strength and less recognizes fact more or that whether evi- consequential this matter make a Plaster, 231. N.W.2d at Un- crimes admitted should be probable.” dence evidence that is on trial fairly prejudicial judgment part evidence call of the is court. arous- sympathies, “appeals jury’s to the horror, in- provokes its its sense

es Analyzing pertinent weighing other punish, triggers stinct costs and benefits [of may action mainsprings [that] of human is trivial task. Wise evidence] acts no on its decision cause a base may differing come conclu- judges other than the established something sions similar situations. Even propositions the case.” may item of fare differ- same evidence al., next, depend- et (quoting 1 Jack B. Weinstein from one case ently Id. ¶ 403[03], at 403-33 relationship Evidence its to the other evi- ing Weinstein’s (now (1986) Joseph case, M. importance to 403-40 found of the dence bears, Federal Evi- McLaughlin, likely Weinstein’s on which and the issues 403.04[l][c], § at 403-40 to 403-44 dence to the efficacy cautionary instructions (2d 2001))). pro- weighing A proper ed. jury. Accordingly, leeway given much requires value and unfair bative pro- judges fairly weigh trial who must court that the consider dangers. probable bative value side, for the actual need “on the one § at 647- 1 McCormick on Evidence light other-crimes complaining party the de- —here available and the other evidence issues establishing “the fendant —has burden convincingness prosecution, to the the trial court its discretion abused crimes were the evidence the other balancing process under rule 403.” accused was the committed Plaster, 424 N.W.2d at 232. actor, or weakness of strength Relevancy. consider C. We first *7 supporting the other-crimes evidence the evi the trial conclusion court’s hand, issue, and on other the the the to legitimate dence was relevant issue probably which will degree to the trial that evi the case. The court ruled by roused the evidence to overmas- be prior the assaults on dence of defendant’s hostility.” tering kidnapping was relevant to the Enriquez Wade, 284-85

State N.W.2d agree. third- charge, and we To (Iowa 1991) Cleary, (quoting Edward W. kidnapping, required degree the State was (2d § on at 453 McCormick Evidence Enri- confined to show defendant 1972) (now substantially at 1 found ed. did apartment, knowing in the that he quez Strong, on Evidence John W. McCormick so, have сonsent do with the her to (5th 1999) § at 672 [hereinafter ed. injury upon inflict her or intent to serious Evidence])). de- on Since our McCormick secretly the intent to confine her. with Wade, we that there cision have stated 710.1(3), (4). relevancy of § Iowa Code proof’ “clear that the defendant must be under bad acts evidence is best Brown, 569 bad acts. committed context with the record stood at 117. There respect kidnapping charge. to the fore, ruling pertinent we turn now to testimo

Before we examine the case, stan- the witnesses. briefly ny in this we consider the Enriquez testified that at approximately Shortly after the defendant removed his neck, a.m. on morning 3:00 of October foot from Enriquez’s she was allowed 1999, the angry go defendant became when to to the bathroom. As she was wiping face, mother, his blood off request she refused to have sex. The her her Carmela Escobedo, Enriquez being Upon defendant accused un- arrived. seeing her faithful, daughter, they argued, him Escobedo and she told she became nauseated. Escobedo begged him. the defendant going was to leave This statement to let her take her daughter hospital, to the caused the defendant to an- but he become even Eventually, refusеd. when some of grier began forcefully and he the de- hitting her (The fendant’s apartment, friends arrived at the with the metal buckle of a belt. vi- Enriquez and her mother were attack able to highlighted by ciousness this escape and drive to emergency room. Enriquez’s testimony that one of the blows from the belt broke her skin and resulted Enriquez questioned was also about her scar.) permanent in a Enriquez When tried tumultuous relationship with the defen- bedroom, run out of the grabbed her dant. This testimony included the defen- hair, belt, by again hit her with the physical dant’s Enriquez, abuse of includ- pushed bedroom, her back into the and ing incidents where punched the defendant told her to quiet. be He said that he didn’t her, threatened her gun, attempted with a want her to leave because the day she her, strangle her, slapped twisted her leaves she “will be six feet underground.” arm, lips iron, burned her with a curling Enriquez understood this statement hit causing abdomen her to mean that Rodriquez would kill her. suffer a miscarriage. Enriquez said that Rodriquez had threatened to harm her or

Enriquez lay down in the corner of the kill her if reported she ever his abuse. She room and “didn’t move so [the defendant] also testified that these incidents almost time, again.” wouldn’t hit During [her] always began when she announced an in- positioned the defendant top himself on tention to leave Rodriquez, simply said door, by purportedly pre- bed she wanted to Enriquez visit her mother. vent Enriquez escaping. Eventually, from did not go great respect ‍​​​‌​‌‌‌​‌‌​​‌‌‌‌​‌​​‌​‌‌‌‌​​‌​‌​​‌​​​‌​‌‌‌​‌​‌‌‍into detail with the defendant apolo- calmed down and prior assaults, these by as evidenced Nevertheless, gized. testified fact testimony subject that her on this that she was not allowed to leave the bed- during comprised direct examination less room during day entire October pages than six 274-page trial tran- Rodriquez She said continued to sit on the script. bed the door “watching [her] whole time.” cross-examination, On defense counsel *8 sought Enriquez to establish that did not In the early late afternoon or evening of stay with the defendant out of fear or 11, Enriquez October told the defendant intimidation, but out of love. Counsel made that she was tired him hitting of her and a point emphasizing of that Enriquez re- going she was to leave him. He became turned to live with the defendant after the enraged and began hitting her with the October incident. herself, belt. she tried When to defend he began punching her. When she fell to Enriquez’s the mother prior corroborated floor, stomped he on point her neck “to the incidents of personally abuse that she had witnessed, where [she] couldn’t breathe” and injuries her “vi- as well as bruises and sion went black.” She testified she thought daughter. she observed on her Escobedo going she was to die. also recalled occasions when she overheard force, deception.” threat Enriquez’s threaten life. or The fact the defendant cruelly defendant had Enri- testimony direct-examination concern- the assaulted Her occupied quez past than four when she tried to leave ing prior less abuse him it probable makes more that his mere transcript. pages of the in presence bedroom the was intended— earlier, testified noted the defendant As perceived and be a of harm threat —to admit- in his own defendant defense. calculated to In prevent leaving. her from belt, striking with hitting Enriquez the ted addition, prior of the evidence defendant’s arms his hands her in the face and with intentional, violent acts towards the victim neck, fists, on her and stepping and cheek coupled with his to kill her if threats causing “nasty” injuries in the general and him it probable she left also makes more of taken at photographs Enriquez shown inju- that he to cause her intended serious days hospital the and а few later. Rodri- ry on claim October contrast to his this conduct was quez acknowledged injuries day that the he inflicted that were assault, and wrong, guilty was unintended, merely incidental conse- Then, in punished that he for it. would be Haskins, quences anger. See his State v. words, attorney’s his defendant was (Iowa Ct.App.1997) 45-46 questioned and the “about elements (finding evidence assault counts for.” [the five defendant here was] victim intent relevant of defendant response attorney’s In his questions, victim). charged attempted with murder that he defendant denied ever confined Enriquez apartment kept or D. value preju Probative versus leaving. from The defendant testified Having dicial concluded that effect. keep Enriquez intention to relevant, was his is we evidence now consider leaving that he trying from was not whether the trial court its discre abused kill He cause her. said he did intend to deciding probative tion in value of any permanent injury, disfigure- a serious outweighed inherently this evidence its ment, any Enri- permanent damage first “the prejudicial inquiry effect. Our body quez’s Rodriquez or mind. testified actual need ... for the his simply temper that he lost and beat light of the and the issues other evidence Enriquez anger jealousy. out of He Wade, availablе.” 467 N.W.2d at 284. The Enriquez always said was free to leave the surrounding alleged circumstances bedroom. Enriquez confinement of October disputed by only persons present: were think of prior We the evidence assaults Enriquez. light defendant and In of the is relevant existence con- to the of several “he nature of disagree said” said/she (1) sequential Enriquez whether was facts: ment, the for on the need other evidence kidnapping purposes “confined” for issue of was confinement substantial. (2) charge; intend- whether defendant injury ed to cause a fact challenged serious addition to the needed, purposes testimony the willful and kid- injury strength (3) napping charges; whether the de- admitted evidence on the of con- element finement, intent, secretly *9 fendant intended to confine Enri- as as In high. well was quez purposes kidnapping regard, significant for of the this was is that there charge. respect With to Enriquez up the confinement no evidence that tied was issue, the jury was instructed that locked the bedroom. Rather the fact of “[a] person is when to ‘confined’ her freedom confinement turned on whether Rodri- substantially by quez’s presence move about mere be- restricted the bedroom addition, tioning. tween аnd the door constituted a unlike most criminal defendants, substantially threat that force or restricted the defendant here admitted prior her freedom to move. The bad perpetrator acts he was the charged the highly probative evidence was on this mat- assault.3 He even that acknowledged ter, probable more making it that Rodri- injuries caused the vicious to Enriquez quez’s act of remaining the bedroom pictures. shown in the prior assaults operated Enriquez. as a confinement of to which Enriquez testified were no more Laible, generally See State 594 N.W.2d brutal than the October 11 assault admit (S.D.1999) 328, 335 (explaining rationale by Therefore, ted the defendant. this is not prior admission of defendant’s threats a prior case where the acts evidence would toward and abusive treatment of victim: the jury “overmastering rouse to hostili past “an accused’s conduct in a familial Larsen, ty.” See State 512 N.W.2d explain context tends to later interactions (Iowa Ct.App.1993) po that (holding persons”). between the same prejudicial tential effect of subsequent acts factor, by evidence was “neutralized equally rep

The final whether there was clear crime”). rehensible nature of prоof charged that the the defendant committed the acts, Moreover, prior supports also admission of the fact that the defendant ad only Enriquez testify evidence. Not did mitted the October 11 assault any to removed incidents, these but her mother corrobo- danger prior acts evidence would many rated of the abusive events and be used to show that on October 11 he threats. in conformity prior acted with his acts and perpetrator. therefore was the See Godber On the other side of balancing Miller, (Iowa sen v. process, the trial court required was 1989) (stating prejudicial pri- effect of consider degree prejudice by or acts evidence was weakened defen prior would result from of the admission respect dant’s admission with the cur testimony.2 Certainly acts this evidence crime). rent would have capability producing un balance, say fair On we cannot that the trial jury, such as desire fairly court did not punish weigh probative the defendant. But the effect put perspective. probable this evidence must be value of the evidence against the dangers The State did not elicit it. think great detail about We the trial prior spent assaults and a relatively balancing court’s resolution of this delicate small amount time ques- process on this line of was reasonable and did not consti- Prejudice 2. lo defendant can be limited he had committed the October 11 assault be- cautionary with the use of a instruction ex- acknowledged cause defense counsel in his plaining purpose prior for which the acts opening statement that the defendant con- Plaster, may be used. See guilty ceded he was of at least one of the N.W.2d at 232. Here the defendant did not charges. assault request limiting instruction and none was future, given. In the trial courts would be jury 4.If in this case had been molivaied give jury, wise to such an instruction overwhelming hostility toward the defen- specifically requested by even if not the defen- evidence, likely dant acts it seems dant, whenever bad acts evidence is intro- would have convicted the defendant purpose. duced for a limited attempted charge. of the murder To con- trary, jury acquilted Rodriquez of this Although the defendant had not testified at offense, charge which the most serious the time the trial court ruled on the admissi- bility on which he was tried. acts the court was dispute aware that the defendant did not

244 Holland, Accordingly, any prejudicial effect.” Stаte v. tute an abuse of discretion. 1992). 652, (Iowa per- trial court’s decision to es- we affirm the 655 “To the de- by prejudice, mit bad acts defendant] evidence of tablish must [the probability for fendant. show reasonable but of the trial the error the outcome would Err Admit- Trial Court III. Did the Crone, have been different.” State 545 Act Subsequent ting Evidence the of 1996). (Iowa 273 it Although N.W.2d by Abuse the of Defendant? reviewing for a court “to sur- is difficult scope governing question by of review and the Our mise what answer to what in the legal have been set forth of principles tipped proof witness the burden what repeated verdict,” and be precipitated division will not preceding and thus the where by the de- challenged overwhelmingly The evidence here. the other evidence estab- by Enri- testimony of fendant consisted guilt, ap- lishes the we have defendant’s November, quez after the October plied the error doctrine. State v. harmless assault, (Iowa had another Rodriquez Brodene, 1992). she and N.W.2d leaving for work Enriquez altercation. was think that even without the We subse- to come and the defendant wanted her evidence, acts there was quent bad over- straight home when she was done. She whelming guilt. evidence of the defendant’s demand, this he told agree so refused Both Enriquez He admitted the assault. her not The defendant she could leave. mother that' even and her testified after money. proceeded then her When she took apartment Escobedo arrived at the on Oc- door, pull he tried to walk out 11, the tober defendant still would not Rodriquez back in the hair. then ran emergency allow to leave. The knife, apartment, and got back into the physician room both the na- corroborated Escobedo, began Enriquez. Enri- chasing injuries. Enriquez’s ture and extent of In mother, quez’s witnessed this event. After addition, he testified to the force that was incident, Enriquez police this called injuries as required inflict these well as reported the November assault injury Enriquez’s fact that the tra- Rodriquez as the identified assailant have threatening. chea could been life This October assault. evidence, together with the bad acts analysis in an engage willWe detailed, previously sup- evidence we have relevancy evidence nor will ported each element of the crimes of which balancing we review the trial court’s convicted, including the defendant probative against of the its value evidence specific of confinement and in- elements prejudicial do so because effect. We do not tent, disputed. which had When we if we think that even the evidence was prejudicial weigh against this evidence admitted, improperly such admission was evidence, subsequent effect of the bad acts harmless error. preju- we do not think the defendant was prejudicial required Reversal diced. The effect subse- unless acts minimal quent erroneous admission of evidence bad evidence was when Liggins, 524 of the other results. State v. viewed context (Iowa 1994); State v. behavior al- N.W.2d defendant’s assaultive 1982). (Iowa Windsor, simply ready the record. cannot We admission determining prejudicial effect conclude but for the evidence, subsequent court other evi bad the outcome reviews the acts presented of the trial would have been different. For “weights] dence *11 reasons, violence,” tionship, cycle we hold that the admission or “the these assault, control, aspects power how different of evidence of the November even violence, erroneous, the core of domestic by if are used was harmless. abuser the victim. Smock noted Trial Err in IV. Did the Court Admit- it very is common for the abuser to refuse ting Expert’s Testimony? family to let a sеe her victim and to isolate they the victim from others so do not know review is Our standard of isolation, going what is on. This she testi- it alleged same for this error as was in fied, commonly also extends to controlling considering the admission of bad acts evi ability the victim’s to work and her access dence: abuse of discretion. See State v. resources, to economic as well as access (Iowa 1998) Rains, 574 N.W.2d medical care and treatment. (considering whether court abused its dis expert testimony). cretion admission of Smock also to what testified is referred Thus, the trial court’s will decision not be to as “the battered women’s syndrome.” overturned unless the trial court opined exposure “exer She that continued to do- cised mestic abuse leads to a grounds feeling helpless- [its] discretion or for ness, where the victim often clearly begins reasons untenable or to an extent believe what being she is told her abus- clearly Maghee, unreasonable.” er, i.e., stupid, that she is ignorant, ugly, a at Additionally, we note “[t]he mother, terrible etc. The victim feels general jurisdiction rule is one of trapped and unable to leave. Smock said liberality opinion in the admission of evi statistically, “the national it average is Halstead, dence.” 362 N.W.2d State usually takes about seven times for a wom- (Iowa 1985). an go finally back and forth [she] before provide rules of Our the ultimate decision to leave.” make[s] following standard for admission of Additionally, Smock noted that is com- expert testimony: deny mon for a battered woman to scientific, technical, If spe- or other place, testify incident took be reluctant to knowledge cialized will assist the trier of batterer, against her refuse assist fact to understand the evidence or to in prosecution. Often these reactions issue, determine a fact in qual- witness are out of fear. Smock also testified that skill, expert by ified as an knowledge, statistically, a battered woman is experience, training, may or education danger most when she tries an to leave testify opinion thereto in the form of an relationship. Finally, in- abusive Smock or otherwise. although formed the she had met case, the victim in this she did not have words, R. Iowa Evid. 702. In other “[e]x- any personal information about the facts of pert testimony is if it admissible is reliable the case at hand. and ‘will assist the trier of fact in resolving ” Rains, an issue.’ 574 N.W.2d at 916 challenge The defendant does not Broton, (quoting State qualifiсations Smock’s to render the testi- (Iowa 1991)). mony argument we have summarized. His testimony was not relevant The evidence at pres issue deny because he did not Enri- assaulting testimony ent case consists of the of Ra quez, nor her did ever recant Smock, supervisor chel who was a story put credibility so as to at issue. Sexual Assault and Domestic Abuse Advo cacy Program in Although deny Muscatine. She described defendant did his Enriquez, sought elements of a domestic violence rela- assault on *12 14(a)(5) App. R. P. this issue. See Iowa seriously injure to not intend that he did in his appellant to state (requiring not confine her he did her and that Thus, necessary preserved for was for it was how each issue her will. brief contrary victim’s in review, places defendant to attack references to the “with cross-examining Enriquez, testimony. In raised and where the issue was the record re- testimony that she elicited decided”). the defense a motion for cannot locate We despite the Rodriquez turned to live with record, we in trial court nor do recusal assault, al- that the defendant 11 October ever Rodriquez that any find indication work, she and and that go her to to lowed over judge presiding trial objected to the times” “good did have somе Rodriquez addition, has In the defendant his case. questioning of this The thrust together. why appeal reason on as offered no as- impression to create an this issue preserve error on did not have as bad or as serious not as sault was objection or some sort of by making an had not claimed and she Therefore, we in the district court. record as a result of the really been confined v. Channon waived. consider this issue presence in the bedroom defendant’s Serv., Inc., 835, Parcel United 629 N.W.2d his threat. Potts, v. (Iowa 2001); State 240 866 cf. (Iowa 1976) testimony allowed the (holding think We Smock’s 656 N.W.2d and the view the defendant’s jury to both ar- supported by assignment of error na- waived). in the context of the victim’s behavior authority was gument or clearly relationship, which ture of their Failing Err in Did the Trial Court VI. Moreover, “cycle of violence.”

reflected Merge the Assault Convictions expert on battered testimony of Injury Into the Conviction? gave jury informa- syndrome women’s Willful sig- to understand the tion that it needed claims that Iowa Code Rodriquez the defendant’s meaning of nificance trial court to required 701.9 section the victim’s and to understand conduct aggravated for do merge his convictions Thus, evi- that conduct. this reaction to assault аnd serious domestic mestic abuse jury resolving in assisted the dence into conviction for willful abuse assault his and intent. disputed issues of confinement this claim for correction injury. We review conclude, therefore, that the trial court We Anderson, v. error. State legal of its discretion in did not abuse (Iowa 1997). N.W.2d Griffin, State testimony. this Cf. in Iowa is ex- merger doctrine (Iowa 1997) (allowing ex- pressed section 701.9: battered women’s pert testimony about pub- convicted of a person No shall be credibility victim’s syndrome on issue of necessarily included lic offense which is where, trial, had recanted her prior to she public offense of which another Gettier, defendant); State accusation If returns a person is convicted. (Iowa 1989) (allowing, more than one of- guilty verdict of abuse, expert tes- criminal trial sexual verdict conflicts with fense and such “rape syndrome” trauma suf- timony on section, judgment the court shall enter abuse). of sexual fered victims of the offenses guilty greater Judge Duty the Trial Fail in His V. Did only. Impartiality ? recently § This court has Iowa Code 701.9. principles applicable to legal stated the

The defendant has failed to state merger doctrine: preserved application in his brief how error was dеtermining whether a lesser offense abuse assault did not include the alterna- one, we greater referring display weapon, is included look tive aof found if the elements each and determine aggravated first element for the can greater offense be committed assault offense. The third elements of committing without also the lesser of- entirely these crimes were different. For *13 If greater fense. offense cannot be assault, the serious domestic abuse without committing committed also jury required was to find that defen- “[t]he offense, lesser the lesser is included in bodily injury dant’s act caused to the vic- “impossibil- call greater. We this the tim.” ity” test. The so-called “elements” test nowWe contrast the elements of applied only for included offenses is as charges these with the elements of willful an in using impossibility aid test and injury: fully subsumed in it. day 1. On or about the 11th of Octo- Hickman, State ber, 1999, attempted the defendant (Iowa 2001) (citations omitted). repeatedly choke and struck Melinda The court instructed the on the Enriquez. following charge elements of the of aggra- 2. specifically The defendant intended vated domestic abuse assault: injury to cause a serious to Melinda day 1. the 11th On or about of Octo- Enriquez. ber, 1999, the defendant either did an Enriquez Melinda sustained a bodi- pain act which was meant to cause or ly injury. in injury, physical result contact which apparent It is at once the domestic offensive, insulting place was or Melinda charges abuse assault contain an element physical in fear of immediate injury not found in the willful charge: “The painful, contact which would have been act occurred between household members injurious, her, insulting or offensive to together who at the resided time of the displayed threatening a manner a Thus, possible incident.” it is to commit the weapon Enri- dangerous toward Melinda greater committing offense without also quez. Consequently, the lesser offenses. the do- apparent 2. The defendant had the mestic abuse assault convictions are not ability to do the act. “necessarily injury included” in the willful 3. At that time the defendant used or conviction. displayed dangerous weapon a or intend- aggravated Because domestic abuse as- injury ed to cause a serious to Melinda sault and serious domestic abuse assault Enriquez. are not of willful injury, included offenses 4. The act occurred between house- merger requirement of section 701.9 together hold members who resided Therefore, apply. does not the trial court the time of the incident. separate in entering judgments did err charge of serious domestic abuse as- for each sentences conviction. separate sault was submitted instruc- tion. The second and fourth elements of Summary Disposition. VII. serious abuse were identi- domestic assault cal to the and fourth elements of The trial court did not abuse discre- second its charge aggravated admitting domestic abuse tion in evidence of acts of slightly; assault. The first element vai’ied domestic abuse the defendant Error, any, admitting the first element for serious the victim. if evi- domestic in law. probative recognized value not domestic vi- tial act of subsequent dence of Goodwin, 492 F.2d also hold States harmless. We United olence was Cir.1974). Therefore, (5th ex- “[t]he not abuse its discretion trial court did testimony on the bat- expert evidence is founded clusion of bad-acts irrelevant, The defendant syndrome. women’s the evidence is tered a belief that claim that error on his preserve failed to juries a fear that will tend but rather on fi- impartial. And was not judge the trial and on a funda- weight, give excessive trial court conclude the nally, we should be con- mеntal sense that no one con- that the defendant’s ruling correct in on his or her victed of a crime based abuse domestic aggravated victions v. Dan- States previous misdeeds.” United abuse as- and serious domestic (D.C.Cir.1985). assault iels, 770 F.2d *14 merged into not have been sault should ju- that have confirmed Empirical studies injury as the for willful the conviction highly proba- such evidence as ries treat not included offenses former crimes are Most, Id.; also v. 578 tive. see State no error or Finding in latter crime. ‍​​​‌​‌‌‌​‌‌​​‌‌‌‌​‌​​‌​‌‌‌‌​​‌​‌​​‌​​​‌​‌‌‌​‌​‌‌‍(Iowa (“In 250, Ct.App.1998) 254 N.W.2d in trial court’s rul- discretion abuse of evidence is any case where crimes convic- we affirm the defendant’s ings, offered, strong court must consider tions. tendency jury to use for an for improper purpose.”). AP- OF OF COURT

DECISION VACATED; OF JUDGMENT PEALS “diverts the attention Bad-acts evidence AFFIRMED. COURT DISTRICT question from the of defen of the charged responsibility for the crime dant’s LAVORATO, except, concur justices All of charac improper issue his bad CARTER, J., who dissent and C.J. Phillips, v. 401 F.2d ter.” United States STREIT, J., part. no who takes (7th Cir.1968). 301, Consequently, even 305 LAVORATO, (dissenting). Chief Justice carefully crafted judge gives if the trial reason, long have fol- good courts For significance of such limiting instruction admitting bad-acts against lowed the rule the defendant is prejudice to showing of purpose “for the v. “well-nigh inescapable.” United States disposition in has criminal the defendant (D.C.Cir.1973). Carter, 738, 482 F.2d 740 the inference that he generate order to is against rule bad-acts evidence “ he is the crime with which committed in ‘just and wise’ order avoid therefore Myers, v. 550 charged.” United States prejudice to the danger the enormous Cir.1977). (5th 1036, As the 1044 F.2d creates.” evidence] defendant [such observed, Myers concomitant “[a] court Martin, v. 505 F.2d States San United innocence is that a presumption Cir.1974). (5th 918, 921 did, what he must be tried for defendant Finally, recognize courts “funda- Id. This rule is not for who is.” jurisprudence.” to American Unit- mental exceptions categories that the various 517, Foskey, F.2d 523 ed v. 636 States intent, de- the bad-acts [to evidence]— (D.C.Cir.1980). identity, mag- etc.—are not sign plan, or incantation passwords whose mere ic impor- recognize the critical also Courts open wide the courtroom doors will guarding tance of incursions may be offered whatever evidence rule, has no because bad-acts evidence ex- contrary, To the each value, their names. very reason probative but for carefully been carved out ception has may very have substan- that such evidence 249 404(b) exceptions in judi- a limited The listed rule arе general rule to serve not exclusive. Id. The critical issue purpose. prosecutorial cial and disputed evidence “whether the is ‘relevant Goodwin, excep- 1155. These 492 F.2d at legitimate and material to some issue oth- cautioned, tions, courts have “should general propensity er than a to commit permitted to swallow the rule.” San be ” wrongful (quoting acts.’ Id. State v. Bar- Martin, (quoting F.2d at 921 United 505 rett, (Iowa 1987)). 187 “If (5th Miller, F.2d v. States challenged evidence is relevant to a Cir.1974)). dispute, legitimate prima issue then it is 404(b) of Evidence controls the Our Rule admissible, regardless any facie tenden- admissibility pro- of bad-acts evidence. It cy to also establish a defendant’s bad char- vides: propensity committing acter or bad crimes, wrongs, Evidence of other However, Id. courts do not look with acts.” char- acts is not admissible to upon favor bad-acts evidence and its use person acter of a order to show narrowly “must be and lim- circumscribed conformity he acted in therewith. It Hodges, ited.” United States F.2d however, may, be admissible for other (9th Cir.1985) (quoting United motive, purposes, proof op- such as Bailleaux, 685 F.2d States *15 intent, preparation, plan, portunity, (9th Cir.1982)). or mis- knowledge, identity, absence of disputed To determine whether such evi take or accident. admissible, engage dence is courts in a 404(b). R. Iowa Evid. Mitchell, two-step process. 633 N.W.2d foregoing authority, Consistent with the First, the court must determine 404(b) we have noted that rule whether the bad-acts evidence is relevant legitimate dispute. to a factual issue in Id. principles: recognizes two fundamental relevancy If the court determines such first, that acts evidence of other bad exists, proba it then decides whether the relevant to whether a defendant commit- tive value of the bad-acts evidence is sub crime, second, charged ted the un stantially outweighed by danger evidence, reality highly that such while Id.; prejudice fair Iowa defendant. probative, highly prejudicial is also to a finding R. Evid. 403. An affirmative in this attempts defendant. The rule to balance evi balancing process overcomes the competing by presuming these interests Mitchell, prima admissibility. dence’s facie evidence is inadmissi- [bad-acts] 633 N.W.2d at 298. The court must then placing ble and the burden on the State However, in em exclude the evidence. Id. to show the evidence is relevant ploying two-step process, courts must this purpose than to some show other keep mind that bad-acts evidence “must conforming defendant acted in a manner carefully pro be scrutinized to determine Cott, to the other bad acts. See State v. Back, v. 588 bative value.” United States (Iowa 1979) (“The 324, 283 N.W.2d 326 (9th Cir.1979). 1283, 1287 F.2d purpose of the rule is to exclude from jury’s consideration evidence which states, majority step As the each invokes relevancy except has no to show discretion. But that dis- district court’s person defendant is a bad and thus like- parameters: cretion has ly crime in question.”). committed the however, that recognized, It should be Mitchell, 295, depart from State v. 633 N.W.2d 298 this is not discretion to (Iowa 2001). principle that evidence of other 250 particular- relevancy should alert trial courts be

crimes, no substantial having evidence. ly careful such that ac- the inference except ground probably man and hence cused is a bad Carleo, 846, v. 576 F.2d United States crime, omitted). must be excluded. (10th Cir.1978) (citations committed this rather in leeway discretion lies intending to introduce bad-acts When direction, empowering the opposite only duty has the State the other-crimes evi- judge to exclude proffered the trial court how the to show dence, inde- even when it has substantial to one or more issues evidencе is relevant relevancy, judgment if in his its pendent case, precisely in the it must also articulate purpose for this is out- probative value 404(b) exception. of a rule applicability will danger that it stir weighed Golochowicz, 298, Mich. People v. See sweep as to passion such (1982) (holding beyond a rational consideration of them requesting that when admission bad- trial. or innocence of the crime on guilt evidence, prosecutor’s duty first is to acts only leeway but implies Discretion 404(b) exception upon specify the rule clearly wrong A responsibility. decision noting which the relies and State probative question balancing on might the evidence while some instances danger will be value single pur- than a be admissible for more appeal as an abuse of dis- corrected case). usually the pose, that is not cretion. Additionally, the trial court must identi fy applicable exception. United States Mitchell, (quoting 633 N.W.2d at 299 State (7th Beasley, 809 F.2d Cir. (Iowa Johnson, 1987). merely invoking A broad statement 1974)). 404(b) restating rule will not suffice. See *16 majority My disagreement with the Golochowicz, 319 at 523 (holding process required balancing stems from the require prosecu that trial court should the I stated in rule 403. will therefore focus in “identify specific to the basis the tor it my process discussion on that as relates admission”). its This re justifying rule I point this case and out the flaws that to that a quirement only ensures decision require think reversal because of an abuse admit or exclude bad-acts will to evidence of discretion. only be made after issues and reasons are stated, by noting I begin clearly but exposed also greatly appellate aids an court in its re [wjhile in trial courts have discretion evidentiary view of these issues. probative striking the balance between brings regard- That me to the first flaw prejudice they value and unfair ... must process in ing balancing the rule 403 particularly potential be sensitive to the hearing case. In the on the defendant’s in always that is inherent evi- in limine to exclude the motion prior uncharged dence of an accused’s subsequent regarding bad-acts evidence Rule wrongs.... Although crimes or assaults, the prosecutor the the took “shot- provides protection umbrella broad approach: gun” spe- unfair the prejudice, from or undue 404(a) provision relationship long This is a not of real prohibiting cific Rule standing to show but of some number of—almost unclnirged evidence of crimes that, year, like over the something character or tendencies toward bad special which a number of violent acts criminality only reflects the course of upon danger perpetrated [the victim]. of other crimes evidence but have been however, court, nothing regarding said those to notice the defendant’s We offer kind of bad commit injury. ... conform some intent to serious Nor did acts with have prove that he must character or mention the evidence the court whether point this when he those. Our unfairly pro- done did prejudicial was not more than intent, motive, the lack his his is to show of the issues for which the bad-acts bative accident, mistake, involved lack of an point, evidence offered. On this here. court in Golochowicz had this advice for trial courts: course, statement, prosecu- by his Of using he was the evidence for tor indicated Similarly, judges, admitting trial when ex- very reason bad-acts evidence is crimes, of other avoid evidence should prove bad character or cluded—“to his justification with the doing vague so this when he prove that he must have done worth,” “I’ll it in for what “I’ll let it is or prosecutor not even did those.” did plan, sys- it to allow show scheme or majority key issues that the mention tem,” suggested when that is the basis disputed was nec- emphasizes the prosecutor, requiring a by the without in- prove: with the essary to confinement by prosecutor showing as to how injury. inflict Rather than tent to serious plan, evidence is such relevant show necessary key issues and the articulate system or scheme plan, scheme or how arising disputed evidence inferences from case, or, system is material to the issues, sim- prosecutor those importantly, most whether exceptions rule ply mouthed various material, if indeed relevant and is not 404(b). unfairly probative prejudicial more than point, appellate proposition this last court On one for which it is offered. observed: Id. Experience the trial courtroom things about the disturbing One of appeal sug- of trial on review records ruling trial court’s the motion limine that, when gests ineontrovertibly rather gave the reason it for judge specify the trial asked subsequent assaults: to bolster the victim’s ev- grounds admission of similar-acts Clearly, our deci- credibility. according to idence, prosecutors loose a “shot- often Mitchell, Mitch- this was error. See sion *17 typically fusillade of which gun” reasons ell, at (holding N.W.2d 299-300 633 most, all, purposes if include not of the evidеnce is admissible to bol- bad-acts not response in named the statute. Such a credibility). majority The dismisses ster course, hints, of if not demon- it does of this harmless er- admission evidence as strate, prosecutor an inade- that the has prejudi- was not ror because evidence ap- the correct quate understanding of follow, I For disagree. cial. I reasons and is unclear as to plication rule prior evidence with the along think this or precisely why evidence is is unfairly prejudicial highly assaults was and admissible. The failure to the defendant. trial court’s (foot- Golochowicz, at 523-24 N.W.2d recognize this is the second omitted). note pro- balancing regarding flaw rule 403 all of trial court mentioned The likewise cess. mentioned exceptions prosecutor prep- prejudice” cases define “unfair opportunity, in addition threw in Our but aration, tendency suggest con- as “an undue plan, knowledge rule 403 basis, commonly charge. improper on an kidnapping finement for decisions necessarily, assaults, an though emotional one.” As to the the victim testi- Plaster, State v. 231 fied that the defendant beat her many so (Iowa 1988) times, private (adopting public, definition from advi that she “stopped sory counting.” to Federal She described how on committee’s note Rule of 403). Thus, one unfairly put gun occasion the defendant a Evidence In describing her head. other prejudicial “appeals jury’s when it to the incidents of assault, horror, she sympathies, testified as follows: arouses its sense of provokes punish, triggers its instinct to Q. you any inju- Have suffered other mainsprings other of human action [that] ries that we haven’t talked about may cause base its decision on here so far him? from A. Yes. something other than the established Q. ... What’s worst? A. Where propositions in the case.” Id. at 231-32 burned me with a curling my iron in (quoting Berger, J. Weinstein & M. mouth. ¶ 403[03], Weinstein’s Evidence at 403- (1986)). 33 - 40 Q. injury give What kind of did that defendant, jurors When hear that a on you you go hospi- had to to the occasions, earlier has committed essential- tal? A. When he took curling ly the same bad acts for which the defen- off, my iron whole skin melted and trial, unques- dant is on “the information stuck to curling iron.[La- tionably powerful prejudicial has ter the victim argu- testified that an Johnson, impact.” United States v. 27 F.3d ment led to this action during which (6th Cir.1994). regardless And the defendant tried to strangle her purpose of the stated of such curling with the iron.] “the very great jurors likelihood is precisely will use the evidence pur- Q. you Have hаd any children [the pose may not be considered”—to convict I pregnant defendant]? A. was person. defendant because he is a bad one time. Id.; see Daly, also State v. (Iowa 2001) (suggesting that admitting Q. happened What then? A. ... I told evidence of impeach- convictions for him I pregnant. gotWe into a ment purposes, exactly which were fight. punched He me in the stom- same crimes for which defendant was on just kept ach. He beating me trial, very likely “could have a substantial point some more to the where I lost which, jury, effect on a although instructed baby. so, not to reasonably do could expected be to misuse the evidence as substantive As subsequent to the assault to the one proof guilt”). question, the victim testified the defen- *18 my money, ripped dant “took up my he prior The subsequent and bad acts here chain, and when I was walking out the involved the same kinds of acts the State door tried pull by me back in the relying on to convict the defendant of hair.” He also chased her with a knife. charged. the offenses majority tries to prejudicial addition, minimize the effect of such acts In the victim’s mother testified by stating the State did not great elicit that she witnessed the violent defendant’s prior dеtail about the bad acts—assaults— behavior during toward the victim the rela- spent relatively and a tionship. small amount of The mother testified that she saw time on questioning. bruises, this line of eyes, black and other marks on crime, similari- of the other the to the vic- mission victim, injury the including the crimes, the interval of ties between the defendant burned when the tim's mouth elapsed between the time that has curling iron. her with the crimes, the the need for the shocking are so these acts I think proof, and the de- efficacy of alternative mention of them the mere horrific probably will gree to which the evidence sense of jury’s aroused the very likely overmastering hostili- jury rouse the punish, horror, instincts to provoked its ty. its decision to them to base and caused Evidence, § rather than on the these acts at 672-73 convict on on McCormick (John ed., 1999); case. The propositions the ed. see also Strong 5th established W. the evi- Most, effect of prejudicial fact that the was somehow prior assaults dence has been described balancing This test reprehensible the by “equally

neutralized standing of a long as “the modern bastion a red charged crime” is nature of the protects a criminal defen- tradition that Biswell, 700 herring. Seе United States reputation’ and from ‘guilt by dant from (10th Cir.1983) ” (holding F.2d ‘unnecessary prejudice.’ United States bad-acts evi- improper admission of Cir.1976). (3d Cook, F.2d dence, am- other evidence even face of “[bjecause com- weighing And the entails verdict, impinged upon the ply supporting interests, delicate, must be it is peting trial). the The fact fundamental fairness of with care lest accommodation employed prior the and subse- that without remains needs results subvert- prosecutor’s the jury the would have quent assault evidence central to our con- ing principle a is to convict the defen- opportunity had no Otherwise, we allow cept of fairness.” Id. That solely on this evidence. dant based 404(b) in rule to swallow exceptions to the of whether brings question me Id. important rule. evidence is probative value of the bad-acts case, I think the In the context of danger substantially outweighed important weigh- two critical factors prejudice. unfair of the confinement ing process, light why balancing authority describes One issue, the evidence and are the need for go and the factors that into test needed is proof. disagree I efficacy alternative such a test: says majority when with accepted logi- an fact that there is [T]he necessary to evidence was assault than the for the evidence other cal basis with, a careful re- begin To confinement. showing proclivity one of forbidden téstimony regarding view of the victim’s preclude jury criminality does support an does not assaults apparent a defendant’s relying from that the defendant confined inference Ac- criminal behavior. propensity toward of these assaults. on the occasions authority recognizes cordingly, most Therefore, evi- only reason for such problem merely one was a the defendant dence was to show then classifying and but of pigeonholing, convict should person and bad whether the dan- balancing. deciding acts. him because of such the like sub- unfair ger concedes the majority Additionally, the incremental stantially outweighs *19 prior assaults was testimony of the value, variety matters victim’s a probative victim’s to bolster the considered, actually needed including the must be of confinement. credibility on the issue the com- evidence as to strength of the 254 impermissible heightened application

This is an use bad-acts need for the careful 403.”). Mitchell, principles at in evidence. 299-300. of the sеt out rule There convincing was no evidence that Finally, proof apart there was other fact, that was done here. the record is prior from from which infer- the assaults any by barren of mention the trial court of could be made. ences of confinement See any possible prejudice the defendant. Most, First, 578 at 254. there was N.W.2d Daly, 623 at N.W.2d 802. Cf. testimony on the the victim’s direct issue. Second, testimony her on the ‍​​​‌​‌‌‌​‌‌​​‌‌‌‌​‌​​‌​‌‌‌‌​​‌​‌​​‌​​​‌​‌‌‌​‌​‌‌‍issue was The trial court’s failure to make an ex- testimony police plicit probative a offi- finding bolstered on the value versus physical prejudicial cer and her mother as to effect of the evidence and following give limiting condition the assault on October its failure to instruction circumstances, 11. highlight inadequate giv- Under the the need for consideration simply Johnson, balancing process. bad-acts evidence was not es- en to the See Back, probative 1193; tablished and its value was nomi- 27 F.3d at at 588 F.2d Cook, nal at best. See 538 F.2d at 1003 failure Such constitutes still another flaw (“The principles treasured underlying balancing process here. Daly, Cf. rule against admitting evidence of other 623 (holding it was only crimes should be relaxed when such engage pro- error trial court not to genuinely evidence is needed and would be value prejudice balancing bative verses relevant.”) genuinely (quoting process United under Iowa Rule of Evidence 609 Miller, (5th States v. regarding impeachment F.2d of criminal defen- Cir.1974)). conviction). dant for prevent process

To the balancing from The final flaw as I see it was the failure becoming process a mechanical of allowing give limiting of the trial court to instruc- just bad-acts evidence because it meets tion. trial judge Once the concludes that 404(b) exception, a rule balancing there must be a weighs favor of evidence, “principled exercise of discretion.” Beas- the court ordinarily should 1279; ley, 809 F.2d at see also jury carefully United instruct the as to the limited Lavelle, States v. 751 F.2d purpose for which the evidence is admit- (D.C.Cir.1985) (“Introducing evidence of ted. v. Sangrey, United States 586 F.2d (9th Cir.1978). legitimate purpose, bad for a acts advisory however, automatically does not cleanse committee notes to Federal Rule of Evi- the evidence of its unique quality of unfair- dence 403 the trial require judge to consid- accused.”). ly prejudicing rights er the effectiveness of a limiting instruc- That the trial judge means “must both tion in reducing prejudicial impact identify exceptiоn applies to the evidence. an only Such instruction is the evidence in question way guard evaluate whether the undue although relevant and within engenders. bad-acts United (2d exception, sufficiently probative Danzey, to States v. 594 F.2d Cir.1979). jurors make tolerable the risk that will act jury Otherwise the is left to its on the basis of emotion or an inference via usually own devices. That means the the blackening of the defendant’s charac- will consider such evidence for an improp- 1279; ter.” Beasley, purpose 809 F.2d at see also er convict based on the bad- —to Johnson, (“[Bjecause prior 27 F.3d at 1193 acts evidence alone without regard to the acts evidence carries with it high purpose such a limited for which it was intro- risk of confusion and misuse ... is a there duced. *20 not, court’s error tainted the lower that’ 105 directs Rule of Evidence

Iowa verdict.”). more say that it is I cannot pur- for one is admissible when the bad-acts evi- than not pur- probable another but not admissible pose not affect this case did dence introduced restrict upon request shall “the court pose, F.2d at Hodges, 770 jury’s in- verdict. See scope and proper to its the evidence the decision of the I affirm 1481. would The rule sim- jury accordingly.” struсt court reverse the district appeals, if court of must instruct that the court ply means for a new trial. and remand judgment, about a no mention It makes requested. obligation give sponte sua trial court’s CARTER, J., joins this dissent. by the advi- as directed

such an instruction Rule 403. notes to Federal sory committee the defen- simply notes that majority

The instruction request such an

dant did not That not answer given. does

and none was court the district question whether giving own considered

should have its the nature of instruction. Given possible only I think the bad-acts BLUMENTHAL INVESTMENT prejudice unfair was have avoided way to Partnership, TRUSTS, an Iowa instruction, Such an give the instruction. Appellant, however, guaranteed not have still would v. to erase jury would have been able MOINES, WEST DES CITY OF collective mind. evidence from its bad-acts Iowa, Appellee. Toto, F.2d Islands v. Virgin See Castaneda, (3d Cir.1976); State v. 282-83 No. 99-1458. (Iowa 2001). 435, 442 621 N.W.2d Iowa. Supreme Court of probative value the whatever I conclude had in this case bad-acts evidence Nov. danger

substantially outweighed by the admis- prejudice engendered

unfair all of into evidence. Given

sion of such acts I process, con- balancing flaws in the trial abused its discretion

clude the court I also conclude the evidence. affected of such evidence

the admission and consti- rights

defendant’s substantial prejudicial

tuted error. defendant] prejudice, [the

“To establish probability that a reasonable

must show of the trial the error the outcome

but for Crone, different.” State

would have been (Iowa 1996); ‍​​​‌​‌‌‌​‌‌​​‌‌‌‌​‌​​‌​‌‌‌‌​​‌​‌​​‌​​​‌​‌‌‌​‌​‌‌‍also see Enterprises, Circus

Tennison Circus Cir.2001) (“A (9th

Inc., 244 F.3d only find

reviewing court should that, probably more

if it concludes

Case Details

Case Name: State v. Rodriquez
Court Name: Supreme Court of Iowa
Date Published: Nov 15, 2001
Citation: 636 N.W.2d 234
Docket Number: 00-0763
Court Abbreviation: Iowa
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