State v. RobinsonState v. Robinson
- Reporters:
- , ,
- Before:
- Westhues, Bohling Cc., Barrett Cc. (per curiam)
A paragraph of the decree is to the effect that should any future born issue of Clark Garrison assert a claim against the trustees to the income theretofore distributed under the instant decree, and the claim be sustained against said trustees “by a valid judgment,” then the interests of Clark Garrison, Jr., and the alternative contingent beneficiaries in the trust estate “shall stand as indemnity” to the trustees et cetera. The trustees say: “The folly of this provision for the alleged protection of the trustees is obvious.” The respondents make no contention to retain this paragraph of the decree. Let the decree be modified by striking the paragraph therefrom without prejudice to the rights of any one.
The judgment is reversed and the cause is remanded with directions to enter judgment and decree consistent with this opinion. Westhues and Barrett, CC., concur.
PER CURIAM:—The foregoing opinion by BOHLING, C., is adopted as the opinion of the court. All the judges concur.
Claude C. Fogle for appellant.
WESTHUES, C.—Appellant was convicted in the circuit court of Sullivan county, Missouri, on a charge of burglary and larceny and sentenced to serve three years’ imprisonment for the burglary and two years for the larceny. He appealed.
The only points briefed by appellant pertain to the issuance of a search warrant and the evidence obtained in the search made pursuant thereto. These points were raised by a motion to suppress the evidence. It will be necessary to review the evidence introduced at the trial which was substantially as follows: Otto Lucas owned and operated a retail store in Greencastle, Sullivan county. He had on hand a quantity of whiskey and other merchandise. On the evening of November 29, 1942, Lucas left his store at about 8:00 P. M. and returned about two hours later, when he found that the lights had been turned out and a coal chute broken open. An investigation revealed that twenty-seven cases of whiskey valued at $685.00; eight cartons of cigarettes valued at $10.00 and $80.00 in cash were missing. A witness for the state testified that he saw appellant walking in the street near the store building shortly after 8:00 P. M. on the night in question. Two other witnesses testified that they saw two men in the store on the night in question at about 9:00 o‘clock and that they recognized appellant as one of these men. A number of witnesses testified of having seen appellant on the highway near Greencastle on that night. Another witness testified that appellant visited him about three weeks after the alleged theft and that he saw a number of cases of whiskey in appellant‘s truck; that it was Schenleys whiskey, the same brand as the whiskey stolen from the store. The only article obtained in the search and introduced in evidence was a pasteboard box which was marked Exhibit E. Lucas, owner of the store, testified that the exhibit was in his store when he last saw it and contained twenty-four pints of Schenleys Red Label Whiskey; that he checked the serial numbers and wrote the number 286421 on the box at the time the shipment was received; that that number appeared on Exhibit A. A witness testified that he was employed at the wholesale house dealing in Schenleys whiskey and that a case of such whiskey bearing that number had been sold to Lucas in October, 1942.
“Since the service of a warrant for the search of premises is sufficient when made at the place designated in the warrant, it is not necessary to the validity of a search and seizure that it be made in the presence of accused; hence the effect of the warrant cannot be avoided by accused by absence when the warrant is executed. Nor is it necessary that service of the warrant be made on the owner of the premises when in jail.”
As to the second point, appellant urges that the search warrant was void because the record disclosed that no sufficient affidavit or evidence was offered to show probable cause. To this we cannot agree. The allegations contained in the application, duly sworn to by the prosecutor, were not based upon his information and belief, but were stated as facts. Such an application is sufficient to support the issuance of a search warrant. It was expressly so held in State v. Naething, 318 Mo. 531, 300 S. W. 829, l. c. 831 (1) (2-5); State v. Brugioni, 320 Mo. 202, 7 S. W. (2d) 262, l. c. 263 (1-3).
We must, therefore, conclude that the officers executing the search warrant were legally on appellant‘s premises for the purpose of searching for illegally manufactured whiskey and utensils used in the making of illicit liquor. Being on the premises legally for that purpose, did the officers have the right to seize stolen property found on the premises? We think so. Possession of the stolen property was unlawful per se. It was therefore contraband, and subject to seizure when discovered by the officers legally on the premises. 56 C. J. 1166, also page 1244, sec. 164, and the following cases which sustain our ruling: State v. McKindel, 268 (Wash.) Pac. 593; United States v. Old Dominion Warehouse, 10 Fed. (2d) 736, l. c. 738 (2, 3).
Appellant in his brief insists that the bases for obtaining the search warrant were fictitious and were used merely as a device and subterfuge to enter defendant‘s home, and that after being in the home the lawfully made whiskey, the real object of the search, was seized. Suffice to say on this point that it was not covered by the motion to suppress and no evidence was offered to sustain that charge. It is therefore not before us for review. The evidence in this case was certainly sufficient upon which to base a search warrant for the purpose of searching appellant‘s premises for the stolen property. Why a search warrant was obtained under the provisions of the liquor control statute the record does not disclose and we are not in a position to decide that question. The record proper, that is the information, arraignment, selection of jury, trial, verdict and sentence are in proper form.
The judgment is affirmed. Bohling and Barrett, CC., concur.
PER CURIAM:—The foregoing opinion by WESTHUES, C., is adopted as the opinion of the court. All the judges concur.