STATE OF OHIO v. WILLIAM ROBINSON, SR.
No. 98072
Court of Appeals of Ohio, EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT, COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
November 29, 2012
[Cite as State v. Robinson, 2012-Ohio-5510.]
Stewart, J., Blackmon, A.J., and Keough, J.
Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, Case No. CR-521825
Adam M. Van Ho
Burdon and Merlitti
137 South Main Street, Suite 201
Akron, OH 44308
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Timothy J. McGinty
Cuyahoga County Prosecutor
BY: Mary H. McGrath
Anna M. Faraglia
Assistant County Prosecutors
The Justice Center
1200 Ontario Street, 8th Floor
Cleveland, OH 44113
{¶1} Defendant-appellant William Robinson pleaded guilty to one count of attempted manslaughter as a result of his refusal to obtain any medical treatment whatsoever for his cancer-stricken, eight-year-old son, who died of complications brought on by Hodgkin’s lymphoma.1 Robinson complains on appeal that (1) he was denied the right to counsel during sentencing when the court refused to allow him to cross-examine two medical doctors who described the nature of Hodgkin’s lymphoma, its affect on children, and the survival rate of the cancer if treated and (2) that the court erred by allowing a caseworker from the Department of Children and Family Services to give a victim impact statement.
I
{¶2} The first assignment of error complains that Robinson was denied his right to counsel by the court’s refusal to allow his attorney to cross-examine two medical doctors who gave statements at sentencing concerning the victim’s medical condition and his likelihood of survival had Robinson sought treatment for him. Robinson claimed to have been unaware of the child’s physical condition, that he lacked medical insurance, and could not otherwise afford medical care for the child. The doctors collectively told the
{¶3} The right to counsel attaches to all critical stages of trial. Sentencing is considered a critical stage to which the right of counsel attaches. Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 358, 97 S.Ct. 1197, 51 L.Ed.2d 393 (1977).
{¶4} But Robinson’s assignment of error is not really a complaint that he was denied the right to counsel. His claim is that the court refused to allow his attorney the ability to cross-examine the doctors who gave statements to the court. This is a confrontation claim under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution that gives the accused the right to be confronted with the witnesses against him. Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 20, 106 S.Ct. 292, 88 L.Ed.2d 15 (1985).
{¶5} As a general rule, there is no right to confrontation during sentencing. See Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 69 S.Ct. 1079, 93 L.Ed. 1337 (1949) (a criminal defendant’s Sixth Amendment right of confrontation does not extend to sentencing hearings); State v. Moore, 8th Dist. No. 86224, 2006-Ohio-816, ¶ 8; State v. Williams, 11th Dist. Nos. 2007-L-131 and 2007-L-137, 2008-Ohio-2122, ¶ 35-36; United States v. Tardiff, 969 F.2d 1283, 1287 (1st Cir.1992); United States v. Silverman, 976 F.2d 1502 (6th Cir.1992) (en banc). Robinson’s argument is an attempt to recast a settled
II
{¶6} The second assignment of error complains that the court erred by reading portions of a letter prepared by a caseworker from the Cuyahoga County Department of Children and Family Services (the “agency”). The letter detailed how the agency took temporary custody of the remaining siblings, the caseworker’s description of the emotional trauma the siblings suffered from their parents’ crimes, and how Robinson and his wife failed to take “full or appropriate” advantage of unrestricted visitations with the children. This letter was in addition to a statement made by an aunt who took custody of the child’s siblings when they were removed from Robinson’s custody after the child died. Part of the aunt’s statement, given as though made in the first-person by the child, detailed the impact the crime had on him. The second part of the aunt’s statement detailed how the crime had personally affected her. Robinson argues that the court should not have allowed two people to act as the child’s representative.
{¶7}
{¶8} As argued by Robinson,
{¶9} The letter was thus properly admitted under the “any person” provision of
{¶10} The caseworker’s letter detailed the varying degrees of trauma and behavioral afflictions the siblings developed since the child’s death, how the child appeared to sense that his death was imminent and called his siblings into his room to say “goodbye,” and the confusion the siblings continue to manifest from having watched the
{¶11} Judgment affirmed.
It is ordered that appellee recover of appellant its costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas to carry this judgment into execution. The defendant’s conviction having been affirmed, any bail pending appeal is terminated. Case remanded to the trial court for execution of sentence.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
MELODY J. STEWART, JUDGE
PATRICIA ANN BLACKMON, A.J., and
KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, J., CONCUR