State v. RobinsonState v. Robinson
- Reporters:
- , ,
- Before:
- Bois
Action on a petition to vacate an order that defendant is a habitual offender and a petition to set aside defendant’s conviction for operating a motor vehicle after being decreed to be a habitual offender.
On December 20, 1973, the Superior Court
{Mullavey,
J.) found Robinson to be a “habitual offender” under the motor vehicle laws.
In this collateral attack the defendant claims that the prior motor vehicle convictions on which the habitual offender finding was based are constitutionally defective. The state joined Mr. Robinson in his request for relief. Notwithstanding this concession, the court denied relief and defendant’s exceptions have been reserved and transferred by.Mullavey, J.
Under the statute, habituality is shown by “[tjhree or more convictions, singularly or in combination,” of certain enumerated
*497
offenses.
Defendant alleges that, in fact, he “was not represented by counsel in any of the aforesaid hearings, nor was he then aware of his rights to be, nor was he aware of his various constitutional rights at the time he entered his pleas . . . nor was he aware of the consequences of those pleas.. ..”
Defendant’s allegations squarely put in issue the validity of the convictions used in the habitual offender proceedings. See State v. Maxwell, 115 N.H. 363, 341 A.2d 766 (1975); State v. Clough, 115 N.H. 7, 332 A.2d 386 (1975). The state has conceded the merits of those allegations by joining in the request for the relief sought. See State v. Maxwell, 115 N.H. at 365, 341 A.2d at 767; State v. Clough, 115 N.H. at 11, 332 A.2d at 389. We must conclude that the habitual offender decree lacks sufficient supporting convictions.
The relief prayed for must be granted and the habitual offender decree and the subsequent conviction for its violation must be vacated.
Exceptions sustained.
All concurred.