{¶ 2} In April 1993, Robertson was charged with numerous counts of felonious sexual penetration and gross sexual imposition. Pursuant to a plea agreement, he pled guilty to felonious sexual penetration, without force, as amended in counts one and two of the indictment. In August 1993, he was sentenced to eight to twenty-five years in prison on each count, to be served concurrently.
{¶ 3} In November 2006, the State requested a sexual predator adjudication hearing. The trial court conducted a hearing in January 2007 and determined that Robertson was a sexual predator based on the factors listed in R.C.
{¶ 4} Robertson now appeals, raising one assignment of error in which he argues that the trial court erred when it classified him as a sexual predator. He contends that the State failed to produce clear and convincing evidence that there was a likelihood that he would commit future sex crimes. He further contends he was denied due process when the trial court classified him as a "predator."
{¶ 6} The civil manifest-weight-of-the-evidence standard "affords the lower court more deference than the criminal standard." Id., citingBarkley v. Barkley (1997),
{¶ 8} In order to satisfy this standard, "there must be something of substance from which one could draw a logical conclusion concerning the likelihood of recidivism to reach a firm belief or conviction that the defendant is likely to commit a sexually oriented offense in the future." State v. Arthur (Aug. 16, 2001), Cuyahoga App. No. 77770.
{¶ 9} In making a determination as to whether an offender is a sexual predator pursuant to R.C.
{¶ 10} At the hearing, the trial court should discuss on the record the particular evidence and factors upon which it relies in making its determination regarding the likelihood of recidivism. State v.Thompson,
{¶ 11} However, the trial court is not required to `"tally up or list the statutory factors in any particular fashion.'" State v. Ford, Cuyahoga App. No. 83683,
{¶ 12} In the instant case, we find no error in the trial court's adjudicating Robertson as a sexual predator. The record demonstrates that the trial court relied on the factors in R.C.
{¶ 13} Therefore, the sole assignment of error is overruled.
{¶ 14} Accordingly, we affirm Robertson's sexual predator adjudication.
It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant its costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the Court of Common Pleas to carry this judgment into execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
*1FRANK D. CELEBREZZE, JR., A.J., and MELODY J. STEWART, J., CONCUR
