91 Wash. 560 | Wash. | 1916
Appellant was informed against and convicted of having received compensation for causing a female to cohabit with male persons other than her husband. The date fixed in the information is on or about January £5, 1915. On trial, the state elected to rely upon an offense of date April 10, 1915, and directed all its evidence to that date as to the particular act relied upon for conviction. The case as made by the state was substantially as follows: Henrietta Cairns, the female in question, testified that she and appellant had been acquainted for some time prior to April 10, 1915, she being of the age of about sixteen years; that, about the first of the year 1915, appellant induced her to engage in acts of sexual intercourse with various Chinese, and continued to ply her in such course during the winter and a portion of the spring of 1915, taking her at various times from her home to Chinatown, to the Mitchell hotel, the Columbia hotel, the Tacoma hotel, a Chinese laundry, and the dwelling house occupied by an Austrian fisherman, all in Olympia, Thurston county, for the purpose of meeting the Chinese, appellant compelling witness to such course of conduct by his representations that he was an officer of the law, and by threats of personal violence and exposure and commitment to a reformatory institution. She further testified that, for each of the acts of intercourse, the sum of $£.50 was paid, either directly to appellant or into her hands, to be taken from her later by appellant. On the afternoon of April 10, 1915, she met appellant, accompanied him to her home in the early evening, later returned with him to the downtown portion of Olympia, going to the place referred to as the Austrian shack where she met Chinese, and in front of which place she met the Chinaman Charley Kay whom, together with Roberts, she accompanied to the Mitchell hotel for the act of intercourse relied on for conviction and alleged
Appellant did not take the stand in person, but relied on the testimony of one Jean Brownlee to testify to having occupied room 17 at the Tacoma hotel, being the room complaining witness claimed to have occupied on the night of April 10, and on that particular night spending the evening in the company of appellant, and to deny that the girl in
The court interrupted the cross-examination by the prosecutor, the following occurring:
“By the Court: May I ask this witness just a few questions and if on the part of either party there is any objection to the questions, you will call it to my attention Mr. Yantis or Mr. Collier. Q. You remember testifying in a cause in court last week against this defendant, do you? A. Yes, sir. Q. Do you remember in the trial of that cause that you were questioned with reference to your occupancy of room 17 in the Tacoma hotel of this city? A. Yes. Q.*564 And that you answered that you occupied that room that night? A. I did. Q. With reference to your being certain as to the date you testified that it was on the Saturday following Easter? A. Yes. Q. Do you remember if you stated that you were quite sure of the date because you commenced work with the Lyceum theater in Tacoma on or about the third of April and that the 10th was the second Sunday after you had commenced work with the Lyceum theater in Tacoma that you came down here? A. I believe that was one reason I gave for the date. Q. Do you remember if in that examination you were questioned — cross-examined, and that from time to time you stated to the jury which was hearing that cause that there was no question but that it was during the month of April that you worked at the Lyceum theater? A. Yes, sir. Q. Had you at the time that you gave that testimony here in court last week undertaken to verify the facts that you were at work at the Lyceum theater April 3d to April 10? A. No, sir, not at the time I testified. Q. You simply depended on your remembrance? A. Yes, sir. Q. And you now say that that is true, that is, that you did work there during that time? A. No, sir, I found that I was mistaken. Q. And to what extent? A. That it was in October that I had worked there instead of April. Q. In October last year? A. Yes, sir. Q. How have you found that out since you testified last week, from October last year until April of this year? A. By inquiring. Q. Yes. Is it not true that in testifying last week that you said that you knew it was April 10th that you came down here and left the Lyceum theater because it was Saturday after the Easter of this year? A. Yes, sir.”
After the foregoing examination by the court, this witness was examined in redirect by counsel for appellant and further cross-examined by the prosecutor, and her testimony as to the inconsistency of her former testimony and the untruthfulness of her testimony was further confirmed. At the conclusion of the further cross-examination by the prosecutor, the court announced, “The jury may be excused at this time for ten minutes.” After the jury had retired, the court announced that he would submit to the prosecuting
Appellant contends that the court erred in that he commented upon the evidence of the appellant’s witness Brown-lee in violation of the rights of the appellant under art. 4, § 16, of the state constitution, by conducting a rigid and extended cross-examination of said witness in the presence of the jury during the progress of the trial, which constituted comment prejudicial and detrimental to the rights of appellant. Appellant relies upon State v. Crotts, 22 Wash. 245, 60 Pac. 403; 40 Cyc. 2440; State v. De Pasquale, 39 Wash. 260, 81 Pac. 689, and State v. Jackson, 83 Wash. 514, 145 Pac. 470.
The rule stated from 40 Cyc. 2440, is as follows:
“In a criminal case the action of the tidal judge in subjecting the witnesses of defendant to a rigid and extended examination on the vital points of the defense, or in catechising them at length as to their knowledge of the facts as to which they have testified, has a tendency to discredit them and is prejudicial error requiring a new trial in case of conviction.”
In the Crotts and the De Pasquale cases, the circumstances were very similar. In both cases, important witnesses for the defendant were testifying and were cross-examined by the court in a way which plainly showed that the court discredited the testimony of the witnesses, and in neither of the cases had the witnesses in any way discredited themselves. In the Jackson case, relied upon, there had been no occasion to question the witness’ credibility until the court intervened and by his line of questions plainly indicated a doubt as to the credibility of the witness’ testimony, and thus presented the testimony of the witness to the jury in an unfavorable light. There could be no doubt in any of the cases
The evidence as a whole justified the verdict of the jury, and the further contention of appellant that the judgment and sentence imposed by the court of four years’ confinement in the Washington State Reformatory at Monroe is unreasonable, we do not consider of any consequence. The trial court in such case was charged with the responsibility of determining the punishment to be inflicted according to the conditions and circumstances of the case and of the accused, and there does not seem to have been any abuse of discretion by his Honor in assessing the punishment.
We find no error. The judgment is affirmed.
Morris, C. J., Parker, Bausman, and Main, JJ., concur.