State v. RobertsState v. Roberts
DECISION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY {¶ 1} This аppeal comes to us from a judgment issued by the Wood County Court of Common Pleas granting a motion for new trial. Because we conclude that the trial court did not err in granting a new trial and dismissing the indictment, we affirm.
{¶ 2} This is the third time this case has come before us on appeal. In affirming the conviction of appellee, Ryan Roberts, for drug possession, in violation of RC.
{¶ 3} In 2001, Roberts again sought and was granted a new trial based upon new evidence regarding the plea agreement. Upon appeal by the state, this court conсluded that, in granting leave to file a motion for new trial, the trial court failed to make the requisite findings pursuant to
{¶ 4} Upon remand, in September 2001, Roberts moved for a
{¶ 5} Appellant, the state of Ohio, now appeals that judgment, setting forth the following three assignments of error:
{¶ 6} "I. The trial court erred in denying the State's request to supplement the record with a police officer's testimony rebutting Roberts' 1997 testimony that he had substantially complied with the cooperation agreement.
{¶ 7} "II. The trial court erred in finding that Roberts had been `unavoidably prevented' from filing a timely motion for a new trial and in inviting Roberts to file another motion for a new trial.
{¶ 8} "III. The trial court erred in granting Roberts' motion to enforce the alleged cooperation agreement and in dismissing the indictment with prejudice."
{¶ 10} The admission or exclusion of evidence is generally left to the discretion of the trial court. State v. Maurer (1984),
{¶ 11} In our view, res judicata may be applicable to pre-trial determinations in a criminal case, even when a new trial is granted. For example, if a new trial is granted based upon prejudicial error which occurs during the actual trial, a defendant would not automatically be permitted to reopen a motion to suppress which was denied prior to trial. Subject to the discretion of the court, however, the suppression issue might be revisited if a defendant had material evidence which could not reasonably have been discovered at the time of the suppression hearing. Thus, when a motion for a new trial is granted, we conclude that it is within thе trial court's discretion whether or not to reopen issues of factual determinations which have already been fully litigated.
{¶ 12} In this case, the issue raised in Roberts' motion for a new trial involved the enforcement of the cooperation/pleа agreement. At the original pre-trial hearing, the trial court heard evidence presented by both the prosecution and Roberts. Based upon that evidence, the trial court determined that an agreement existed, what the terms of that agreemеnt were, and that Roberts had substantially complied with the agreement. Upon the most recent grant of a new trial, the parties stipulated to the court's use of the transcripts from that initial hearing regarding the enforceability of the agreement.
{¶ 13} Appеllant contends, however, that, after granting Roberts' motion for a new trial, the court should have permitted additional testimony of a police officer to rebut factual determinations already established by the court during the first pre-trial. Appellant does not suggest that this officer or testimony was unavailable at the time of the first hearing. Appellant is attempting to reopen factual determinations which could have been challenged at that initial hearing. Therefore, under the facts of this case, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in denying appellant's request to reopen factual issues by presenting additional testimony regarding Roberts' compliance with the cooperation/plea agreement.
{¶ 14} Accordingly, appellant's first assignment of error is not well-taken.
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{¶ 17} "Motions for new trial on account of newly discovered evidеnce shall be filed within one hundred twenty days after the day upon which the verdict was rendered, or the decision of the court where trial by jury has been waived. If it is made to appear by clear and convincing proof that the defendant was unavoidably prevented from the discovery of the evidence upon which he must rely, such motion shall be filed within seven days from an order of the court finding that he was unavoidably prevented from discovering the evidence within the one hundred twenty day period."
{¶ 18}
{¶ 19} In this case, the trial court specifically found that, after the discovery of new evidence, the procedural histоry and deficiencies with defense counsel accounted for the delay in filing Roberts' motion. Therefore, the trial court's decision to grant leave to file the delayed motion for a new trial was supported by clear and convincing proof that Roberts was unavoidably prevented from the discovery of the evidence within the requisite time period.
{¶ 20} Accordingly, appellant's second assignment of error is not well-taken.
{¶ 22} A reviewing court will not disturb a trial court's decision granting or denying a
{¶ 23} In this case, Roberts brought to the court's attention new information regarding an issue which was highly prejudicial to him, namely, the due process right not to be haled into court when there has been an agreement not to prosecute. See Blackledge v. Perry (1974),
{¶ 24} Turning now to the court's dismissal of the indictment, as we previously noted, the trial court had already determined that an agreement existed and that Roberts had substantially complied with the terms of that agreement. We will now examine the enforceability of that agreement.
{¶ 25} Plea agreements are contracts and are governed by contract law principles and standards. State v. Butts (1996),
{¶ 26} In addition, when a valid plea agreement is breached by the state, the trial court, within its sound discretion, may either allow the negotiated plea to be withdrawn, or may require specific performance of the agreement by the state. State v. Mathews (1982),
{¶ 27} In this case, the trial court initially determined that the non-prosecution agreement was not enforceable, since the prosecutor allegedly had no knowledge of the agreement between Roberts and the police. After gaining the knowledge that Roberts had acted as a confidential informant and conducted drug buys pursuant to his agreement with police, however, the prosecution then required Roberts to testify as to those orchestrated crimes. Unlike the usual witness/co-defendant who agrees to testify simply as a witness to a crime, Roberts' participation in the cooperation/plea agreement created the very means by which additional persons might be prosecuted. Without his participation and subsequent testimony, the additional defendants and crimes would not have existed. In our view, the state ratified the original agreement by accepting and retaining the benefits of that agreement. Consequently, since Roberts had already performed his part of the agreement, the only true remedy was to enforce the non-indictment provision. Therefore, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in choosing specific performance of the agreement and dismissing the indictment.
{¶ 28} Accordingly, appellant's third assignment of error is not well-taken.
{¶ 29} The judgment of the Wood County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed. Court costs of this appeal are assessed to appellant.