State v. RobertsState v. Roberts
- Reporters:
- ,
- Before:
- Wolcott
Lead Opinion
(for the Majority of the Court):
We are called upon to decide the constitutionality of the portion of
The defendants were charged with possession of dangerous drugs, possession with intent to sell, and maintenance of a place for the illegal keeping and selling of dangerous drugs, in violation of
The defendants contend, inter alia, that the portion of
Article 4, § 11(1) (b) of the Delaware Constitution, Del.C.Ann., provides that this Court shall have jurisdiction to receive appeals from the Superior Court:
“ * * * in criminal causes, upon application of the accused in all cases in which the sentence shall be death, imprisonment exceeding one month, or fine exceeding One Hundred Dollars, and in such other cases as shall be providеd by law; and to determine finally all matters of appeal on the judgments and proceedings of said Superior Court in criminal causes. * *
This Court has repeatedly held that, under
The basic constitutional policy of this State has been аgainst interlocutory appeals in criminal cases. In the Norman case, Chief Justice Southerland stated:
“ * * * Prompt review of interlocutory rulings in criminal cases might in some cases be desirable, but our basic constitutional policy is against it, no doubt because of the impоrtance to the public pf speedy law enforcement. For example, the procedure here urged upon us would permit the review in criminal cases of rulings on motions to suppress evidence. This highly undesirable result аctually arose under a former statutory provision * * 177 A.2d at 349.
There has been no relevant constitutional change since the foregoing statement of our established constitutional policy.
The State contends that a constitutional basis for the interlocutory appeal provision of
It is also suggested that a constitutional basis for the interlocutory appeal provision of
“To issue writs of error in сivil causes to the Superior Court and to determine finally all matter in error in the judgments and proceedings of said Superior Court in civil causes.”
“To receive appeals from the Superior Court in civil causes and to determine finally all matters of appeal in the interlocutory or final judgments and other proceedings of said Superior Court in civil causes: Provided that on appeal from a verdict of a jury, the findings of the jury, if supported by evidence, shall be conclusive.” (Emphasis supplied.)
It will be noted that in amending § 11(1) (a), the words “interlocutory or final” were inserted before the word “judgments”, thus giving this Court jurisdiction to hear and decide interlocutory appeals from the Superior Court in civil cases as in appeals from the Court of Chancery.2 But no similar change was made in § 11(1) (b) relative to appeals in criminal cases. While the draftsmen of the 1960 constitutional amendments made other changes in § 11(1) (b), they did not modify the word “judgments” therein, by inserting the words “interlocutory or final”, as was done in § 11(1) (a). This change of the Constitution to permit interlocutory appeals in civil cases, without a similar changе for criminal cases, was noted by this Court in Norman:
“ * * * Our Constitution was recently amended to confer upon this Court jurisdiction to entertain appeals from interlocutory judgments in the Superior Court in civil cases. * * *. Significantly, the section dеaling with appeals in criminal causes was not so amended. * *.” 177 A.2d at 349.
This constitutional history can lead to only one reasonable conclusion: § 11(1) (b) continued to permit appeals from final judgments only in criminal cases, as theretofore.
The other constitutional basis upon which the interlocutory appeal provision of
“(8) To exercise such other jurisdiction by way of appeal, writ of error or of certiorari as the General Assembly may from time to time confer upon it.”
The interlocutory appeal provisions of
“The applicable rules of construction require that effect be given, if possible, to the whole Constitution and to every word thereof. If different portions of the Constitution seem to conflict, they must be harmonized if possible. That construction must be favored which will render every word of the instrument operative; and that construction must be avoided which would make any provision idle and nugatory. Every provision of the Constitution must be construed, whenever possible, to give effect to every other provision. Otherwise stated, whenever avoidable, no constitutional provision should be so construed as to nullify, or substantially impair, any other constitutional provision or to produce an irrational result.”
It follows that § 11(8) may not be read to render § 11(1) (b) nugatory; that § 11(8) must be construed to supplement § 11(1)
The State relies upon Commonwealth v. Bosurgi, 411 Pa. 56, 190 A.2d 304 (1963) in which it was held that the grant of a motion to suppress has such “attribute of finality” as to warrаnt a right of appeal by the Commonwealth. Our decisions do not permit such construction of a “final judgment” appealable in a criminal case. Only a judgment of conviction or a judgment of acquittal meets the degreе of finality required by our law.
Accordingly, we hold unconstitutional and invalid the proviso at the end of
The appeal must be dismissed.
Notes
.
Ҥ 9903 . Appeal in the discretion of the appellate court
“The State may apply to the appellate court to permit an appeal to determine a substantial question of law or procedure, and the appellate court may pеrmit the appeal in its absolute discretion. The appellate court shall have the power to adopt rules governing the allowance of the appeal; but, in no event shall the decision or result of the appeal affect the rights of the defendant and lie shall not be obligated to defend the appeal, but the Court may require the Public Defender of this State to defend the appeal and to argue the cause; рrovided, however, that if the order appealed from is an order siippressing or excluding substantial and material evidence the Court may permit an interlocutory appeal of any pretrial order, and if the order suppressing such evidence is reversed, the defendant may be subjected to a trial.” (Emphasis supplied.)
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Dissenting Opinion
(dissenting):
I cannot agree with the majority of the Court that Art. 4, § 11(1) (b) imposes a limitation on the authority conferred upon the General Assembly by Art. 4, § 11(8) to confer upon this Court additional appellate jurisdiction in criminal mattеrs. I point out that Art. 4, § 11(1) (b) is limited in application to appeals by the accused. 10 Del.C. Ch. 99, enacted pursuant to Art. 4, § 11(8), however, is not concerned with appeals by the accused but only with appeals by the State. The two аre completely unrelated. As such I think neither acts as a limitation on the other.
If it be argued that 10 Del.C. Ch. 99 denies an accused a similar right of appeal granted the State, i. e. the right of review of pre-trial motions to suppress evidence, I agree with the statement of Commonwealth v. Bosurgi, 411 Pa. 56, 190 A.2d 304 (1963).
In my judgment the majority has held unconstitutional a portion of 10 Del.C. Ch. 99 by reason of an unrelated and irrelevant other provision of the Constitution. I agree that constitutional provisions should be construed to harmonize if possible, but in the appeal before us there is no necessity to harmonize because Art. 4, § 11(1) (b) and Art. 4, § 11(8) are unrelated.
I would refuse to dismiss the appeal.