State v. RobertsState v. Roberts
STATE OF OHIO, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE vs. DAVID W. ROBERTS, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED
Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas Case Nos. CR-480193 and CR-483914
BEFORE: Sweeney, J., Stewart, P.J., and Jones, J.
RELEASED: July 15, 2010
JOURNALIZED:
David W. Roberts, Pro se
Inmate No. 511-605
Lake Erie Correctional Institution
P.O. Box 8000
Conneaut, Ohio 44030
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
William D. Mason
Cuyahoga County Prosecutor
BY: Matthew E. Meyer
Diane Smilanick
Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys
1200 Ontario Street
Cleveland, Ohio 44113
N.B. This entry is an announcement of the court‘s decision. See
{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant, David W. Roberts (“defendant“), appeals pro se from his convictions and the agreed six-year prison sentence imposed pursuant to his guilty pleas to two counts of drug trafficking, two cоunts of drug possession, and two counts of possession of criminal tools. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
{¶ 2} On April 27, 2006, defendant was charged with nine offenses in CR-480193. On July 21, 2006, he was charged with five other offenses in CR-483914. On July 28, 2006, only seven days after the second indictment was issued, the State presented defendant and his counsel with аlternative plea offers described as a package deal that would resolve both cases. The terms of the plea agreement defendant ultimately selected provided he would plead guilty to three counts from each case and would receive in exchange an agreed sentence of six years mandatory time.1 Defense counsel indicated that he had “an extensive conversation with both the prosecutor and [defendant]” and said, “I believe [defendant] fully understands what the offers are. He understands that his case was scheduled for trial earlier this week, and that, at some point, the case would be given another trial date, and I believe he understands that he will be coming back to court on Monday morning, and for another pretrial.”
{¶ 4} On July 31, 2006, the trial court conducted a plea hearing. Defendant pled guilty to two counts of drug trafficking, felonies of the third degree; two counts of drug possession, felonies of the fourth and fifth degree; and two counts of possession of criminal tools, felonies of the fifth degree. The remaining counts in both cases were nolled and the parties agreed to a prison sentence of six years.
{¶ 5} Defense counsel said he had long conversations with his client and that defendant was fully aware of his constitutional and statutory rights. Counsel further stated that “no threats оr promises” were made “in order to reach this plea” and counsel believed defendant was entering into the plea freely and voluntarily.
{¶ 6} The judge then informed defendant she would make further inquiry of him to ensure his pleas would be a “knowing and intelligent act on [his] behalf.” Defendant was instructed to inform the judgе if he did not understand something or if he did not wish to proceed. Defendant affirmed that he understood. Defendant denied any threats or promises being made in order to induce his plea.
{¶ 7} The trial court agаin explained defendant‘s constitutional rights, which defendant said he understood. Defendant said he understood that by entering his pleas he was “waiving [his] trial rights and [he was] admitting to the truth of the charge to which [he was] pleading.” The court reviewed the potential penalties of the offenses, including that some convictions would require a mandatory prison sentence. Defendant said he understood he would be ineligible for judicial release and community control, which was described as probation. Defendant was advised of the mandatory fine. Defendant was advised of postrelease control. Dеfendant acknowledged his understanding of the nature of the charges, the possible penalties (maximum and mandatory requirements), and postrelease control.
{¶ 8} The defendant repeated that he had not been threatened or promised anything other than what was stated in open court аnd on the record to induce his plea.
{¶ 9} The trial court, satisfied that defendant understood his constitutional rights, the nature of the charges, the effect of the plea, and the maximum and
{¶ 10} The trial court accepted defendant‘s guilty pleas as set forth previously. The court found defendant to be indigent and waived the fines. The trial court accepted the agreed sentence and imposed it as follows: in CR-480193 defendant received a four-year prison term for drug trafficking, to be served consecutively to a one-year prison term for drug possession, to be served consecutively to a one-year prison term for possession of criminal tools, totaling a six-year prison term. This sentence was ordered to be served concurrently to the six-year sentence imposed in CR-483914, which included a four-year sentence for drug trafficking, consecutive to a one-year sentence for drug possession, consecutive to a one-year sentence for possession of criminal tools. Both cases were resolved with a total prison term of six years.
{¶ 11} Although this Court on two prеvious occasions denied defendant‘s motion to pursue a delayed appeal, the Federal District Court for the Northern District of Ohio later granted defendant habeas relief providing that “the State must grant him leave to file a delayed appeal” or release him from custody. Seе Roberts v. Gansheimer (June 3, 2009), N.D. Ohio No. 08-CV-1473, unreported. Accordingly, on July 1, 2009, defendant was granted leave to appeal and was appointed counsel. Upon defendant‘s multiple requests, however, his appellate counsel was terminated and he proceeded pro se.
{¶ 13} “I. Appellant‘s rights were violated by law enforcement officials of the Cleveland Police Department and Cuyahoga County Sheriff‘s Department in Case No. CR-06-480193; and the Broadview Heights Police Deрartment in Case No. CR-06-483914 in violation of the
{¶ 14} “II. Appellant was deprived of his right to the effective assistance of trial counsel in contravention of the
{¶ 15} “III. The State, by and through its prosecuting attorney exercised prosecutorial misconduct and failed to disclose exculpatory evidence prior to trial violating appellant‘s right to due process as guaranteed by the
{¶ 16} Each of these assignments of error are based upon purported constitutional errors that occurred before defendant entered his guilty plea and therefore are without merit and overruled. State v. Spates (1992), 64 Ohio St.3d 269, 272, 595 N.E.2d 351, quoting Tollett v. Henderson (1973), 411 U.S.
{¶ 17} Assignments of Error I, II, and III are overruled.
{¶ 18} “IV. The trial court erred in accepting appellant‘s plea of guilty, as it was not entered knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily pursuant to the requirements of
{¶ 19} The standard for reviewing whether or not the trial court accepted a plea in compliance with
{¶ 20} A trial court substantially complies with
{¶ 21} Defendant contends his plea did not comply with
{¶ 22} Defendant also maintains that the trial court was required to spread upon the record the type of controlled substances involved including “their weight, type, composition” or “how these charges came to fruition * * *.” Defendant‘s reliance on State v. Corbin, 141 Ohio App.3d 381, 386, 2001-Ohio-4140, 751 N.E.2d 505, is misplaced. In Corbin, this Court found that the defendant was not informed of the “correct maximum penalty” that was the basis for invalidating the
{¶ 23} Defendant concedes that the record includes a description of each of the charges as drug trafficking, drug possession, and possession of criminal tools with corresponding numerical statutory designations. Yet, defendant insists that a knowing, intelligent, voluntary plea require a recitation of the essential elements of each offense upon the record.
{¶ 24} We have repeatedly held that “courts are not required to explain the elements of each offense, or even to specifically ask the defendant whether he understands the charges, unless the totality of the circumstances shows that the defendant does not understand the charges.” State v. Cobb (Mar. 8, 2001), Cuyahoga App. No. 76950; State v. Swift (1993), 86 Ohio App.3d 407, 412, 621 N.E.2d 513; State v. Rainey (1982), 3 Ohio App.3d 441, 442, 446 N.E.2d 188;
{¶ 25} The record establishes that the court conducted an extensive inquiry of the defendant, asking his age and education level, asking whether he was under the influence of drugs or alcohol, and whether he was satisfied with his attorney‘s representation. He responded to all these questions. He also indicated that he understood his various constitutional rights, the result of his plea upon them, and what the maximum and mandatory penalties were for each offense. Defendant was specifically instructed to inform the judgе if he did not understand something or if he did not wish to proceed. There is no indication whatsoever that defendant misunderstood the substance of the indictments, the matters for which he was charged, or the possible penalties.
{¶ 26} The record also contains representations that defense counsеl had extensive and “long” conversations with defendant about the plea offer. Defendant did not dispute this fact. Although defendant alleges his attorney did not advise him of the nature of the charges, this is not supported by any evidence in the record. Counsel stated that defendant was fully aware of his cоnstitutional and statutory rights. Counsel further stated that “no threats or promises” were made “in order to reach this plea” and counsel believed defendant was entering into the plea freely and voluntarily. The trial court conducted its own inquiry and was satisfied that defendant understood the nature of the chаrges and the penalties. Any lack of pre-trial discovery in CR-483914 is not fairly attributed to
{¶ 27} Accordingly, we find that defendant‘s guilty pleas were offered knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily and that thе trial judge substantially complied with the statutory guidelines for accepting a guilty plea.
{¶ 28} Assignment of Error IV is overruled.
Judgment affirmed.
It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant its costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the Court of Common Pleas to carry this judgment into execution. The defendant‘s conviction having been affirmed, any bail pending appeal is terminated. Case remanded to the trial court for execution of sentence.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to
JAMES J. SWEENEY, JUDGE
MELODY J. STEWART, P.J., and LARRY A. JONES, J., CONCUR