State v. Robbins

sum, judgment we vacate the n.o.v. P.2d 176 Beco, favor remand for a new Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, STATE City’s request- to utilize the directions liquidated damages, ed jury instruction on City present and allow the evidence ROBBINS, Iain Defendant- recovery. Colon damages actual as an alternative Appellant. We that Exhibit further hold 14 should record, admitted as a business No. 18607. improperly and Z were admit- Exhibits O ted. Idaho, Court City. are awarded Costs on d’Alene, 1992 Term. Coeur October request City attorney Because the did not appeal, fees do not them. award 11, 1993. Feb.

BAKES, WINMILL, J., C.J. and Pro Rehearing May Denied 1993. Tem, concur.

JOHNSON, Justice, concurring and

dissenting. opinion, except

I concur the Court’s

part (The Jury Liquidated I Instruction on 11(B)(The

Damages) City’s Exhib- 14). parts, these I respectfully As to

dissent. view,

In my controls question Parson

presented concerning liquidated dam- instruction,

age and would affirm the given by

instruction the trial court. view,

In my correctly the trial court re-

jected Exhibit 14. The exhibit awas sum-

mary pursuant admissible if I.R.E. 1006

the original documents had made been for examination or copying,

available objection

both. The trial court sustained ground the original exhibit docu- made

ments had not been available. On

appeal, city regard states the issue with this exhibit follows: ruling

2. Did the court err that Plain- computer printout

tiff’s Exhibit placed into an

information electronic memory,

computer summary by I.R.E.

contemplated 1006?

Appellant’s Brief, 10. city attempt justify did not

admissibility pursuant of the exhibit Therefore, 803(6). should

I.R.E. question.

not address this J.,

McDEVITT, concurs. Judge Magnuson sentenced Robbins

rape. term of ten to serve an indeterminate forty-two term of years, with a minimum this sentence appealed months. Robbins things, claiming, among other by the terms prosecutor failed to abide bargain agreement by not recom- jurisdic- retain mending that the trial court to I.C. pursuant tion over the 19-2601(4). § and Robbins During appeal, the state re- this Court presented a questing: the district the case be remanded to sentenc- resentencing, at which court specific will be entitled to [Robbins] ... plea agreement, performance of desig- judge shall be that another district hearing sentencing to conduct the nated sentence, that the ... impose [and not be bound judge] new district will set forth the recommendations as plea agreement. then remanded the case

This Court stated that the trial trial court and any action jurisdiction to take “shall have and enter an Order necessary to consider resentencing of concerning the [Robbins] Stipulation for Remand.” provided in the remand, Judge conducted the On updated resentencing. He considered (PSI) investigation report presentence report, new testi- original PSI included victim, recommen- and the mony from McGee, Wallace, for defen- & Watson Judge Haman sen- of counsel. dations Barry (argued). E. dant-appellant. Watson indeterminate to serve an tenced Robbins term Gen., years, a minimum EchoHawk, term of fifteen Atty. and Mi- Larry Gen., Henderson, Atty. years. Deputy of five chael A.

Boise, Michael A. plaintiff-respondent. imposed by appeals the sentence (argued). Henderson grounds that the trial Judge Haman on the process of right to due court violated his

JOHNSON, Justice. informing him that specifically law sentencing a criminal case. This is re- greater sentence on he could receive a greater by imposing a sen- I. imposed. Judge Magnuson than tence AND PRIOR THE BACKGROUND challenged Robbins’ The state has PROCEEDINGS. imposition greater sen- appeal the resentencing, because Robbins tence on pled guilty to Iain Colon Robbins question to the trial court. present charge battery with intent to commit (1992)(sentence P.2d II. provided by stat- imposed in excess of that THE DUE THIS COURT WILL ADDRESS Vetsch, 101 illegal); ute cf. PROCESS ISSUE CONCERNING (1980) THE A IMPOSITION OF GREATER (fact received a that defendant SENTENCE ON RESENTENCING make the accomplice does not tence than THE ER- UNDER FUNDAMENTAL if Robbins’ sen- illegal). Even sentence ROR RULE. process right to due tence violated his not state asserts that we should asserts, illegal not in the as he it was law appeal greater consider Robbins’ in I.C.R. 35 sense the term is used imposed resentencing, sentence on because Martin. present question to the Robbins did not focus for the issue The more relevant agree trial court. While we that this issue proposition by raised the state is basic below, preserved address was not we will As that underlies our decision Martin. of the issue under the funda- merits we said less than four months after Although mental error rule. the state decision: challenge propriety not of our address- longstanding rule of this Court on the other issue raised Robbins that are that we will not consider issues appeal, we decline to address Robbins’ as- appeal. time presented for the first on sertion that the trial court violated his Recently applied the rule to dismiss we right process by informing him to due appeal in a case where the state greater that he could receive a sentence on asked us to rule on an issue that was not resentencing. question pre- This was not raised in the trial court. v. Mar- State court, error, sented to the trial and the if tin, 577, (1991). P.2d 1322 119 Idaho any, would not be fundamental. Arave, 321, 322, 815 v. 120 Idaho Sanchez Appeal A. Al- Greater Sentence omitted). 1061, (1991) (citation P.2d lowed. did not raise in the The fact that Robbins argues The state that under this constitutionality trial court the issue of the Martin, Court’s decision State v. not, imposing greater sentence does 577, (1991), 808 P.2d 1322 the Court however, completely whether we resolve appeal challenging should not hear the question appeal. As will address this on greater imposed resentencing sentence on recently reiterated: legality because the of Robbins’ sentence fundamental error in We will consider presented was not to the trial court. We case, though objection a criminal even point misreading first out that it is trial. In determine was made at order to I.C.R. 35 and Martin to construe Robbins’ pre- whether we will consider an issue pro claims of violation of his to due presented sented on resentencing cess as a claim that his court, the trial we first must assess illegal. sentence was whether the error would be fundamental imposition Martin dealt with the of a error____ if there were sentence that was not authorized specifying penalty driving statute goes An error that to the founda- ... privileges, felony. without This was rights tion or basis of defendant’s is a meaning “illegal sentence” that case. fundamental error. meaning given “illegal This the same Kenner, 121 Idaho State Howard, sentence” 122 Idaho (1992) (citation omitted). (1992). Howard, 830 P.2d 520 In the sen- Kenner, In we held that if the trial court tence at issue not authorized providing privilege against had violated Kenner’s penalty statute for vehicular self-incrimination, manslaughter. The held this would have been a case, “illegal.” sentence was Id. at 830 P.2d fundamental error. we must 521; Lavy, see also 121 Idaho State consider whether errors Robbins as- process right to informed of the due would be funda- the trial court made serte sentence, nor have mental, making possibility they were errors. if error, Therefore, any. if decisions, determine wheth- we must we discovered these fundamental, go to the founda- and we will any, as these was not errors such er rights. Robbins’ or basis of address it. tion challenge process Robbins’ due by Judge him imposed on III. resentencing is founded on North Car- Pearce, 395 U.S. olina v. DID NOT VIOLATE TRIAL THE COURT (1969). If 23 L.Ed.2d 656 TO DUE PRO- RIGHT ROBBINS’ great- in his that the correct assertion were A BY IMPOSING CESS OF LAW imposed resentencing violat- er sentence ON RESEN- GREATER SENTENCE a vindictive right ed his to be free from TENCING. resentencing, the error would sentence court that the trial Robbins asserts fundamental, go it would because right process of law his to due violated rights. or basis of Robbins’

foundation greater than him to a term (cid:127)resentencing Therefore, the merits of we will address disagree. originally imposed. We the term this issue. that the trial court argues Robbins Concerning to In- Appeal Failure B. opportunity to had the should not have Might Trial Court that completely. The trial Robbins resentence form not Al- Impose a Greater Sentence court, contends, only deter- should have lowed. jurisdiction, retain or not to mined whether original that was the true, however, of The same is not prosecutor sentencing procedure appeal by Rob issue raised on the other resentencing allow to honor. To failed the trial court violat bins. Robbins claims discourage argues, completely, he would failing process by right his to due ed appealing their sentences from defendants greater might impose a inform him that it prosecu- alleged by the an breach based on original sentence. Rob than sentence In es- bargain agreement. of a tion presents this issue under axiom bins contends, sence, chill de- would guilty plea must be a defendant’s that exercising right their from fendant’s voluntarily, knowingly, and intelli made appeal. issue. mischaracterizes the gently. This plead guilty at the resen Robbins did not Pearce, ruled that Supreme Court In request opportunity tencing, nor did he following sentence imposition of a heavier Judge told change plea. his His counsel process, if the due retrial would violate selected the that Robbins had not for the heavier sentence were motivation plea and withdrawing guilty option of origi- getting for punish the defendant trial, stipu had instead proceeding to but protect To a de- aside. nal conviction set resentencing judge, a new before lated to a motivation, the retaliatory fendant from making recommen prosecutor with the judge imposes held that “whenever Court jurisdiction that was dation for retained a defendant upon more severe sentence plea bargain agreement. part of the trial, the reasons a new [the after ap- affirmatively doing must judge’s] pled issue is not whether Robbins The 2081, 726, 89 S.Ct. pear.” 395 U.S. knowingly, and intelli- guilty voluntarily, read to rule has been at 670. This L.Ed.2d he had a constitutional gently, but whether vindictiveness, presumption of “[apply] a trial court that informed to be objective only by may overcome im- which resentencing trial court could the in- justifying record information in the had than Robbins pose greater sentence States Good- creased sentence.” United Magnuson. Robbins from received 2485, win, authority 457 U.S. presented us with has (1982). 74, 81 73 L.Ed.2d that he had a supports his contention Pearce, duct, In cases after there motivation a number of was no Supreme “self-vindication,” has limited the Court effect the defendant and that presumption. Pearce v. Ken- Colten judge chose to be sentenced instead tucky, 407 U.S. S.Ct. Supreme The first jury. Court found (1972), the L.Ed.2d 584 Court refused to apply did presumption that the Pearce apply the presumption Pearce Ken- even if it and then commented that did tucky’s system. trial two-tiered The Ken- enough apply, trial additional tucky system court allowed a defendant satisfy at the information retrial to Pearce. de novo trial from inferior court’s order. Smith, Alabama v. Supreme system Court found this did (1989), S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 865 the Su- possibilities not have inherent of vindictive- preme appli- reversed a court’s Court state ness system and noted the Kentucky presumption cation of the Pearce where separate systems, involved two court original sentence was on a based the de require novo review followed a higher court to find “fault” in the inferior judge imposed full The same trial. both court. higher The fact that the knew noted sentences. about the inferior court’s sentence was not bring a full more out informa- dispositive. also Colten made it clear tion about the crime possibility the focus of is on Pearce give than a guilty sen- sentencing following vindictiveness in retri- judge tencing appreciation a fuller of the al possibility and not on the defen- of the nature and extent of the crimes. The Su- receiving greater dant following a sentence preme apply held that in Court order forgo retrial. That some may defendants presumption Pearce there must be a “rea- appeal they an might a receive likelihood” trial sonable court’s higher non-vindictive sentence not a greater sentence was based actual vin- limiting legiti- basis for the trial court’s Supreme dictiveness. The Court held the options. mate sentencing system possess Alabama not a reason- In Stychcombe, 412 U.S. Chaffin able likelihood actual vindictiveness. (1973), S.Ct. 36 L.Ed.2d 714 Court apply pre- refused to the Pearce Supreme In following Court cases sumption separate juries imposed where Pearce, especially Colten, McCullough and the sentences. The Court a jury noted that it is clear chance system did possess not the same inherent sentence on was not the basis for possibilities of system vindictiveness as a in expressed concern about vindictiveness in judge imposes a The sentence. Pearce Pearce. addressed means of acknowledged Court also jury that a would protecting a retaliatory defendant from mo- length sentence, prior know the part the sentencing tivation unlikely personal to have a stake judge. prior conviction, and would be sen- Although all of Supreme Court cases sitive to might “institutional interests” that addressing this with issue deal resentenc- higher occasion a sentence de- judge a retrial, ing after there is no reason to treat discouraging appeals. sirous of meritless resentencing pursuant ato In McCullough, Texas v. any differently resentencing remand than (1986), 89 L.Ed.2d 104 after retrial. Court reversed a state application court’s case, In judge this a resen- presumption different origi- Pearce where the Judge imposed nal tenced Robbins on by jury sentence was remand. explained the imposed second sentence was basis for the sentence he by the trial judge. imposed. gravity The He judge in McCul- focused on the lough judge presided objectives was the same offense and the of criminal sen- the original Supreme tencing prescribed by trial. not- Court. Court He ac- ed that the retrial was knowledged imposed held because the that the sentence judge prosecutorial herself found miscon- Judge Magnuson’s was more severe than

sentence, IV. but said he did not feel bound cir- original sentence. Based on these CONCLUSION. cumstances, apply we do not the Pearce imposed on Rob- We affirm presumption, because there is a reason- by Judge Haman. bins able likelihood that Haman’s tence vindictiveness. was based on actual McDEVITT, TROUT, J., concur. C.J. exactly stipula- Robbins received what the BAKES, pro (following retire- J. tem. requested—resentencing tion for remand 1,1993), February parts concurs in ment on This removed different I, III, IV; concurs in the result of vindictive- reasonable likelihood actual II. resentencing. ness in the concept argues that the of vin- BISTLINE, Justice, dissenting. dictiveness arises from judge “institutional interests” of a within THE INITIAL BACKGROUND PART I. system. the “institu- Chaffin, the court proceed- challenge Robbins raised a sentencing judge is tional interest” of a sentencing, ings regard to the first may act, judge as how the described agreed place after enter which took discourage judge general, to plea, plea bargain accord appeals. are considers meritless McCul- agreed in agreement wherein Robbins so lough, rejected as “too prosecutor’s agreement that return for the speculative” argument sentenc- imposed pro- would contain a the sentence vindictively merely be- judge would act jurisdiction. under- vision for retained seeking acquittal defendant is cause the jurisdiction standing was that the retained “annoyed” at that the trial would be psycho- to obtain would allow Robbins through a having to sit second trial. examination, con- logical to which also ceded, might “We decline to premise Court stated: that it thereaf- on the receiving for men- adopt judicial tempera- view that the lead to his treatment ter admitted, and problems to sud- tal which judges ment our Nations’s trial will him concern. which caused denly change filing of a upon the success- post-trial ful at motion.” Id. not, prosecutor For some reason argu- at 111. Robbins’ at 89 L.Ed.2d commitment; not, fol- fulfill his it or could in argument rejected ment is similar upon imposed Rob- the sentence lowed that McCullough. by Judge Magnuson did not include bins jurisdiction. Because the rider of retained pre In the absence of Pearce ap- development, filed an Robbins sumption, prove actual a defendant must Court, and, we peal this while contin- with States, vindictiveness. Wasman v. United a jurisdiction, ued retain 3217, 3223, S.Ct. prepared the office of had been (1984) (“where the filed in this Attorney L.Ed.2d was Idaho General depu- by two apply, It had been executed presumption does Court. [Pearce] attorney generals and sent to Robbins’ ty affirmatively prove actual defendant must counsel, who, turn, in it. executed defense vindictiveness”). portion of the record in full as Attach- stipulation appears That “pure upon relies to show which Robbins discussed, Ament and is prove that vindictiveness” does not infra. with Judge dealing harshly Haman was ERROR PART II. FUNDAMENTAL pursued because Robbins his AND COMMENDABLE Rather, transcript indicates appeal. CANDOR Judge practice to deal that it is Haman’s concerning very harshly charges all to an extent This is a case which contains error”; is one it also which rape. Robbins has carried the burden “fundamental fairness,” “fundamental or more proving involves actual vindictiveness. accurately, and, although doing put so defense counsel the lack The “funda- thereof. clearly poor error” involved demon- the laudable light, mental is in did serve igno- strated counsel’s conceded defense which Robbins purpose paving route client, Robbins, rance that his Iain a sen- appealing in his increased sen- might follow tenced defendant who had been victimized or in imposed by tence by prosecutor’s promise broken to recom- Mr. Wat- pursuing post conviction relief. jurisdic- mend to the court that inclined, son, just had he been so could retained, tion be could receive an increased easily his re- been less honest above sentence, resentencing should court be sponse to Justice Johnson. argument It inclined. was oral appeal defendant’s Court that de- PART III. LACK OF FUNDAMENTAL counsel, Watson, Barry fense was first ATTRIBUTABLE TO FAIRNESS made aware that the net inex- result his THE STATE perience seeing practice the criminal was being on resentencing client handed a beyond cavil that least attor- It two initially sentence than the one im- neys the office of posed by Judge Magnuson: District stip- participated fashioning General So, why, JUSTICE JOHNSON: sent ulation which then to Watson. problem very you sug- avoid the which slight- There not in record the gest, go wouldn’t it have been better to any previous est indication of conversations judge back the same district depu- or contacts the two involved between before the prosecutor, maybe I think attorney party ty generals as one and Wat- you’re making more out of the dilemma yield son as the other. Nor does the record really than exists. that a indication letter transmittal Well, MR. in retrospect, WATSON: accompanied proposed stipulation true, may but at time which Watson received. at, Santobello and to look Rutherford opinion, majority In the Justice Johnson suggested both those cases dif- presents his conclusion that we address honest, ferent To be quite I controversy merits of under well- our resentencing didn’t realize that before rule, salu- established fundamental error the same was an alternative. during tary my rule which saw evolve situation, This is an unusual I would time attribut- court, to expe- submit the one even which primarily able to Chief Justice Bakes.2 think, attorneys, rienced defense I don’t However, having so, done Justice Johnson often, very see simply and we to referred applicable that it not un- then concludes time, the eases we had at the both present. der the circumstances here In- suggested resentencing those before stead, contrary he arrives at a conclusion judge. different We had run with the to relative to assertion that the trial Robbins’ ball that was tossed to us. court, Haman, Judge violated his Watson, in responding to Justice John- process informing not by due him that son, candidly admitting apparent was to an upon resentencing, he a sen- could receive prima malpractice, rising facie case of imposed by Judge tence than that the level fundamental error. To Wat- Magnuson. everlasting son’s credit was utter can- dor in so advising Justice Johnson of his While the from the first sentenc- ignorance. Speaking truthfully ing being processed, was Justice of Robbins the course, General, only Johnson was the per honorable office of the Idaho York, 257, McQuade, J., dissent); concurring Santobello v. New 1. 404 U.S. in the State v. 495, (1971); 249, 251-52, L.Ed.2d 30 427 State v. Haggard, 94 Idaho 486 P.2d Rutherford I), (Rutherford 107 Idaho 693 P.2d 1112 C.J., (1971) (McQuade, 261-62 McFadden and (Ct.App.1985). JJ., J., concurring, Spear, Shepard, dissent- concurring part). in in Swenor, 331-34, 2. State v. 96 Idaho 528 J., (1974) (Bakes, dissenting, P.2d 675-78 attorney deputy generals, stipu- by filed a the recommendations two bound agreement. plea set in the in this Court which had been execut- lation forth by that office and Watson. first ed added.) (Emphasis stipulation paragraph of the observes that abundantly It is clear from Watson’s dis- filed brief in this Court Robbins’ raised initially course with Justice Johnson that proceedings that the at the sentenc- issue fully scope understand the ing hearing were not accordance with stipulation. particular- More extent plea agreement reached argument ly, appear as would later oral paragraph State. The second Court, gos- accepted this before Watson stipulation that the relief then noted stipula- pel supported that case law presently Robbins, because of asserted sentencing proposition tion’s that a “new comply plea the State’s failure to hearing judge” before district different agreement, the district remand to i.e., options mandatory, or alterna- oppor- have an court where Robbins would experienced deputy attor- tives. two tunity plea guilty, which withdraw the New ney generals cited Santobello v. York paragraph is the he had entered. The third drawing up State Rutherford3 attention, deserving one the closest the es- Only signed stipulation. after Watson being appropriate sence thereof depu- and returned agree- remedy violation attorney filed ty generals, who then specific performance ment is Court, wholly executed document “ringer” agreement. Therein is found the appraised belatedly would Watson become readily appeal any practi- which should did not in actu- opinion that the Santobello being injustice of an tioner’s innate sense ality require that circumstances as such perpetrated: here, present initial those preside resentencing. judge not performance [Tjhis specific Resentencing only here became neces- agreement would involve remand State, person in the sary a new the district attorney, up lived prosecuting local sentencing hearing a different before exacted of the plea agreement to a See, v. New district Santobello agreement its to recommend State York, S.Ct. presiding judge at trial and Magnuson, the (1971); [499], 30 L.Ed.2d 427 Robbins, who would sentence Rutherford, Judge Magnuson would also retain (Ct.App.1985). The state jurisdiction. The kicker this circum- appellant agree remedy is an beguiling of attor- benign was the stance case. appropriate resolution into by the counsel ney Watson State’s opinion belief the Santobello mandated United States parties request The therefore before a resentencing must be done court for case be remanded to district judge who had judge different than the resentencing, ap- at which pronounced imposed initially the sentence specific perfor- to pellant will be entitled upon Robbins. plea agreement. spe- of the Such mance performance cific will consist opening appeal by brief Robbins The making a in ac- state’s recommendation Judge Magnuson filed in this Court after agreement. plea him, The assigned cordance with as imposed had sentence on stipulate that another parties prosecutor to com- error the failure further i.e., bargain, designated ply part shall be district with his Judge Magnu- sentencing hearing and im- recommend to promise conduct the be, might sentence judge will son that whatever the pose sentence. The district York, (1985); Rutherford, State v. New 693 P.2d 1112 3. Santobello v. (1988). (1971); Rutherford, Idaho 712 P.2d 717 Idaho jurisdiction. court retain ter under doctrine such district would of the offender already pointed That out in the has been as State v. Renke.” again and opinion lead mentioned herein. controversy might been readily

The have warped ingenuity resolved for the but February 1990, Judge Magnu- “In who State’s counsel had authored and son sentenced Mr. Robbins to an indeter- stipulation then, executed the and after years, period minate not to exceed ten obtaining signature, Watson’s transmitted than forty- with a minimum of not less to the clerk this Court. judgment The included lan- two months. quote, guage, “That defendant be mentioned, missing As above from that given opportunity to attend sexual chronology any insight explanation evaluation offender treatment and/or preliminary presum- discussions which program prior practical as soon as to his ably place by taken and be- custody.” the court release from But tween State’s counsel Watson. jurisdiction____ prose- not retain prepared obviously by was [T]he cuting attorney counsel for State to recommend so as to written failed Cottonwood, jurisdiction serve retained purpose, the State’s while at and, same appearing fact, time an recommended the maxi- to extend “offer- ing” possible mum consisting “relief” sentence of fifteen court, remand years____ [Ajppeal judgment to the district where he from that given filed, would be the opportunity to with- was and the case draw the which entered. went before Court.” stampings The office which evidence re- “Thereafter, September ceipt Stipulation its way it wound Attorney office the defen- General’s to this Court illustrate it was mailed dant, through his attorney, entered into a originators September Watson stipulation for remand ... [which 10, 1990, signed, and then received back in upon] plea agree- based the breach of the on September General’s office ment by prosecuting attorney. executed, fully and thereafter filed in proceedings stayed this Court were September 13, Court on pending resentencing a differ- before 1990. ent us, question The basic before as seen by Thereafter, appeared Justice, consists of question of fair- before Judge counsel Haman in De- ness, thereof, or lack of trial resentencing. cember of 1990 for At counsel representing State district proceeding the court reviewed the proceedings appel- then State presentence original report, plus ... late in misleading counsel defense counsel presentence report supplement up- with the stipulation. aforesaid A second testimony date. again Sworn was admit- question, ensues, naturally is wheth- arguments ted and of counsel and recom- er this going passively Court is approve again mendations were received. At this facially appears egregious hearing prosecuting attorney did rec- overreaching. case of jurisdiction pursuant ommend retained Turning argument presented to the oral However, agreement. (who yet this Court Watson conclusion this hearing, unaware he may beguiled): have been years sentenced the defendant to fifteen I “MR. WATSON: would like to initial- Department Corrections, the with a ly advise the Court what this case is not years, minimum confinement of five about. This case is not where one that year constituted an increase issue is abuse discretion. and a half on the minimum and five claiming We’re not that the sentence in years on the maximum.” harsh, unduly this matter is considering the nature offense and charac- Mr. “Now, protective JOHNSON: absent the measures “JUSTICE Henderson, you’ve I’m sure read v. today, it State suggesting

that I’m to the Court August year, Griffin, issued of this a position faces is our that defendant the distinction there that where first grizzly accepting choice: either issue, actually trial court addresses the prosecut- requiring without regardless might of how it have other- up ing attorney promise to live may preserved, that this Court wise been plead guilty, him made which induced appeal. it on address as one the issues breach, appealing appealing or or a acknowledge perhaps You that is re- “fundamen- what I calls the Rutherford rule, least, at finement of the Martin prosecuting error” on behalf of the tal of its further illumination dimension.” jail attorney risking more time. Well, I read it “MR. HENDERSON: Now, as agreements impor- if are yes.” way, that Burger as stated Santo- tant Justice light JOHNSON: And “JUSTICE bello, I that Court should then feel that, you Judge Ha- what do make procedural protections afford some said, when he “Whatever man’s comment into the put some teeth enforcement Magnuson do Judge did or did not is of Again, plea agreements. I would these read, me. I have as importance no refer to v. Pearce and North Carolina said, transcript I proceedings Rice, companion Simpson case of well, just probably that’s Supreme a 1969 Court decision. U.S. approach I I would approach this importance spoke of the Justice Stewart will, novo, you if I any case de anew protecting rights to the defendant’s my will own apply my own criteria and appeal. goes length He on some I reasoning appropriate think what page Supreme and 2081 of the 89 said, I be. I sentence should As don’t decision, just briefly, Reporter Magnuson’s by Judge feel bound exercise of he states that defendant’s considerably le- tence. I think right must be free as, in nient.” Can that not be read ef- Again, I submit that unfettered. would fect, ruling by Judge Haman that there you posi- put when the defendant illegality by giving a harsh- would be choice, making it tion of fetters er sentence? appeal.” encumbers his I think it “MR. HENDERSON: don’t ruling can read in context as a Watson, I Mr. “JUSTICE JOHNSON: legal being issues which are now raised you’ve don’t find cited Alabama Judge appeal. I think Haman was Smith, decided the U.S. cognizant of fact that because you Are familiar with Court in 1989. to the district reasons the remand that case?” proper course for him to court that the That, Yes, “MR. I am. WATSON: from take was to insulate himself eroding again, cases is one sentencing proceedings, and there- first original holdings of Santobello.” fore, making He what he did. that’s You ac- “JUSTICE JOHNSON: would transcript, clear, “I haven’t read holding of that case knowledge Magnuson Judge did.” don’t care what apply pre- is: in order the Pearce was ad- And I think that was what he called, sumption, so there must be dressing.” the trial reasonable likelihood that higher court’s sentence was based likely Isn’t it “JUSTICE JOHNSON: actual vindictiveness.” happened that what have with the “MR. Yes. We have now WATSON: court, Haman would there is shifted from a situation where said, say you “You don’t under- vindictiveness, to a situa- presumption of maximum stand that those could be the required to tion where penalties, you do understand?” vindictiveness____” prove actual said, “I And if the defendant had can’t me, Judge Magnuson gave

get more than outset, hoping get jurisdic- speaking I’m at the generally and to retained states addition,” already done, tion in then the issue I would “I do have remind the framed, maybe it have been so was the potential penalties that defendant obligation point defendant’s at that to you can assessed. Do understand raise the issue.” those, Robbins,” and line Mr. then at listening Mr. wasn’t or Well, clearly,

“MR. HENDERSON: that said, hear, didn’t and “Excuse me?” At brings us back kind to where we are regard issue, raising point rephrases with that the court and at regard portion changes question least to this or with the statement nothing said, There by right now, case. was either says, “As matters stand defendant, obviously point, you that plead guilty to the crime of throughout pro- defense counsel those battery with the intent to commit the ceedings, they that indicated that had rape. you crime of Do understand impression different or that the de- response, that?” His The sec- “Yeah.” given fendant to be some additional I question important. ond think is “I sentencing pro- information before could just you that need remind that is a ceed. And I certainly regard think with possible crime that carries a maximum aspect issue, that it is some- penalty up years imprison- to fifteen thing simply that isn’t framed on the possible up ment a fine of to $5000. this basis of record. The defendant was you Do understand that?” “Yeah.” penalty informed of the maximum goes Then on he to talk about the recom- acknowledged that he understood it.” mendations and he that the understands might “JUSTICE JOHNSON: It be a Court isn’t bound the recommenda- possible way issue, to deal with this tions, nothing but else is until the said say preserved the issue was sentencing proceeding end of the when a therefore we won’t address it?” pronounced sentence is about the Well, “MR. HENDERSON: anew, least starting de all novo over on____ regard So, aspect, yes. that we’d I don’t think we take the can ask judgment that proceedings in way. a vacuum in I that imposed by Judge Haman be affirmed. vagaries would submit that due to the you.” Thank subject, law on case where we’re

coming on back a remand for resentenc- ing, it more appropriate would be a I “MR. WATSON: would like to take a procedure specifically the court to few moments to address the second issue that, “you advise the under- appeal, of our and that is we con- defendant prior stand I’m not bound tend is the lack showing of record that tence, give you up and that I can the defendant walking knew was into five years top more additional time on get situation where he could more than bottom, and more on the ... well.” years previously the ten that struc- King And I cite would v. State that is on by Judge Magnuson. tured IAs stated brief, page my reply “That before, for remand was guilty unfairly shown to have been ob- silent on that issue specifically; simply given through ignorance, tained or resentencing judge stated that the inadvertence, fear, or by any plea will not with- agreement. be bound And, judicial scrutiny.” stand would submit Lock- status of this record, State, hard the most can 92 Idaho 813 we infer that [451 might again long defendant knew “Idaho has adhered 1014]. get principle rider. But did he know that must be get he might years? freely, made voluntarily, additional and with an five I would submit understanding the record consequences at- have, page transcript, 5 of the upon plea.” tendant such I think in First, is no. answer the court at line that if were resentencing, any pro- the due proceed don’t find assertion of intelligently with level, challenges at court cess the trial clearly that one of the he know should are there?” consequences proceeding of in that man- “MR. were not as- WATSON: Those get ner he harsh is that could more level, trial court no.” serted at the the than that which received sentence How, then, can “JUSTICE JOHNSON: specific first time around. There was them?” we address all, questioning defendant, of re- the that “MR. I think those WATSON: garding plea agreement, regard- or to level arise a fundamental understanding court’s Rutherford, particularly the first Ruth- to tencing options. important I think its decision, State’s, considered erford twenty- point out that defendant they in nature and that are fundamental twenty-five years four old at the time or if on even not ob- can be raised sentencing, first and second jected to. 107 1112]. [693 pre- felony proceeding, first was his Such fundamental...” report investigation that sentence really Martin “JUSTICE JOHNSON: ninth court has that had a indicates here, you acknowl- isn’t involved education, grade he did receive a GED preserved edge they weren’t when that equivalency, the evaluation psychological error you simply assert fundamental IQ is in he had an shows at all in rule which wasn’t discussed I percentile average, and as 70th or Martin.” before, many I submit that stated just As one “MR. Yes. WATSON: experienced completely lawyers are not aside, of vindictive- final on issues you pun- an get that can increased aware defendants have ness and the fears that they’re on if proceeding appeals under certain circumstances with ishment on punish- more getting about with concerned resentencing, let alone a defendant ment, I think that North Carolina So, background. it would be this kind closely. more read a bit Pearce has be due our if the Court decides position that there, court Justice Stew- I think that the process prevents penalty, a more harsh art, on the fear focusing more there was it should instruct trial court that chilling possible vindictiveness limit the resentence defendant but proceedings has effect that that on first, given maximum time actuality of rectify wrongs than in the If the judgment the first and sentence. fact foot- itself. The vindictiveness process decides that due does specifi- opinion, note 20 I prevent penalty, a more harsh then states, “The of a retaliato- cally existence think that the case should be remanded would, course, ex- ry motivation court advise the defen- and have tremely prove individu- difficult are, clearly, and options what the dant of case, data been collected al but have knowing make sure that he makes on recon- increased sentences show that intelligent accept either choice to rare,” they and then are far from viction the bro- judgment first with letter that an inmate go on cite a agreement, or withdraw his ken judge in Patton v. North written to a original charges, to trial go “Your Hon- Carolina, basically saying, option, for- go still or that would trial, or, I’m I afraid don’t want new resentencing, least but at ward with have here. more That’s time.” risking re- knowing point, he is situation We where of, option “Do I put grizzly in that more ceiving time.” that was agreement

want enforce my plea I made promised to me when I’m And JOHNSON: ... “JUSTICE time, just more sit on guilty and risk here the status concerned think that in the and remain mute.” I preservation of these record as to the agreements, context of broken I issues, except passage law on this. there’s a lot proge- and its North Pearce from Haman’s comments. Carolina read nient,” then maxi- ny of handed Robbins the talk about vacation a conviction Obviously, trial, retrial, reconviction, mum the law. sentence within and a and a Judge Judge Haman was not satisfied with type things, of those are and those Robbins, par- Magnuson’s sentencing analogous, different, but those are still ticular, on expressed antipathy his think is a and I there dearth of case law doing circum- record. His so under the area is and this a matter first present salutary or stances then served no impression, at issue in least this final In casti- purpose. useful a sense case bar.” dis- gating judge, one of the same another you.” “Thank for, trict, unnecessarily, al- and uncalled added.) (Emphasis though quickly takes note that one progeny speak specifically Pearce its attorney as State’s tendered an “excuse” of vindictiveness directed at a defendant “isolating” himself Judge Haman was pursuing appeal. successful thing transpired from or was which holding logic just and the it Pearce behind said, said, not or was readily applies affect- vindictiveness by Judge Magnuson. Robbins administered rights arise a defendant’s which from culpa, particu- That mea advocated words, some other source. other if a it, deputy attorney general lar who uttered sentencing judge’s vindictiveness stemmed purpose evapo- did not its intended serve animosity from towards someone or to rating judicial the aura of vindictiveness something defendant—say, other than the permeated which the courtroom. The ma- defendant, a brother of the perhaps or an- jority concluding is thus incorrect judge—and other a result thereof the sen- there was not a reasonable likelihood that tencing vindictively imposed great- on re-sentence was based vindictive- er reasonably appeared ap- sentence than ness, is strong which a rather assertion in propriate, then after a fair and neutral light circumstances, of facts and which judicial sentence, review the in- speak for themselves. stand, ought creased sentence not to else readily might It is understood it how injustice perpetrated an is judi- which the attorney yet that an been who not ciary may be aiding abetting. seen as ready burned too by a reliance on another above, light it is instructive to attorney’s representations might thereby Judge turn to during Haman’s remarks in, say be taken which is not that is what resentencing: Robbins’ Watson, happened Barry cannot but one Well, first, help if exactly but wonder I think I should make it of record, happened. clearly clear, record demon- that it’s that whatever representation strates Watson’s Magnuson dedicated Judge did or did not do is of Robbins, importance Iain which was a formidable read, I to me. said, charged task with a as I because transcript proceed- very serious criminal act a nature which ings, probably well, just that’s any degree sympa- does not lend itself to approach I I case as would thy diffi- anew, novo, empathy, making counsel’s role approach any you de if Nevertheless, will, cult I indeed. Watson apply my and will own criteria and best. my reasoning own think what I

appropriate sentence should be.4 stipula- What for certain here is that a Judge add, said, Haman went on to I I Attorney “As tion was drawn in the Gen- by Judge office, don’t feel Magnuson’s bound ap- eral’s which fashioned a rather tence. think was considerably pealing oppor- le- proposition for Robbins: an Here, may Judge phrase 4. leniency be noted that Haman was added on the relative disavowing any knowledge of the sentence im- Judge Magnuson, readily it is assumed that posed ly Judge Magnuson. high- This gossip fully courthouse or the news media had judges unusual where were both of the same Judge Magnuson’s informed as to him District, presided First Judicial both of Robbins. city of Coeur d’Alene. When prosecutor, by a here rests on the tunity to be resentenced “different” fault sentencing judge. judge, terminology was borrowed General’s office from Santo- If the state court decides to allow withdraw will, course, plea, petitioner York, al of bello v. New charge felony plead original two anew equiva- is not much the which case too counts. the scenario of Robbins’ situation. lent of Santobello, 404 at 92 at 499. U.S. S.Ct. Paragraph the 3 of concocted 910, 107 Rutherford, 693 by recogni- (1985), par the General’s office in P.2d 1112 is on a with Santobel- lo, upon length: plea in fact relies at some tion the violation of the of admitted agreement, correctly specific to is stated be charges by disposition “The of criminal performance plea agree- the of violated agreement prosecutor the and the between correctly not ment. What is stated recognized by the United accused has been misleading following is the statement Supreme important as an com States ponent system justice. to of our Santobel “[tjhis would involve remand of the case York, 260, 257, 92 lo v. New S.Ct. for new the district court a 495, (1971). 497, 427 a 30 L.Ed.2d Since hearing judge. a district before different guilty plea waives certain constitutional 257; York, 404 New U.S. See Santobello v. constitutionally rights, defendant is enti ‘a 495; (1971).” A 427 92 S.Ct. 30 L.Ed.2d to relief the state breaches a tled when reasonably reading of close Santobello plea in a promise made to him return for support does not the State’s intimation Ocanas, 628 guilty.’ v. F.2d United States must sentencing hearing necessarily a new denied, 353, (5th Cir.1980), 451 358 cert. be a different district What before 2316, 68 L.Ed.2d 840 U.S. 101 S.Ct. the court said this: Santobello princi (1981). upon rule the This is based question need reach We not the wheth- valid, guilty plea, to must be ple that a be sentencing judge ‘Thus, er the would or would intelligent. voluntary only both develops known the was not been influenced when it defendant consequences its fairly appraised negotiations the details of the for all the Due plea challenged his under can prosecutor’s plea. He stated that Johnson, Mabry v. Process Clause.’ him recommendation had not influenced 2543, 2547, U.S. to doubt that. and we have reason (1984). words, L.Ed.2d 437 other ‘when Nevertheless, inter- we conclude promise prosecution breaches its justice recogni- appropriate ests of respect agreement, an executed to prosecution tion of the duties of the premise, pleads guilty on a false negotia- promises made relation his conviction cannot stand.’ and hence pleas served tion of will be best Id.” by remanding the case to the state courts “In the state contends that The ultimate for further consideration. specific ‘promise’ not a to recommend petitioner to which is entitled we relief agreement part sentence was court, of the state leave the discretion all, of inten- merely a statement but was position is in a better to decide such, according state, it tion. As the circumstances whether pro- of the inducement which was by specific perfor- there require only that guilty plea. See duced the Santobello plea, agreement mance of the event, York, supra. state New petitioner should resen- which case is not argues mere statement intention a whether, judge, different tenced a prosecu- binding. urges that the The state court, in the view of the state the circum- reviewing could, upon presentence tor relief require granting stances evaluations, psychological report i.e., sought petitioner, opportunity kind of change position his on what em- guilty.2 his We to withdraw A similar ar- tence he would recommend. ques- phasize this is in no sense to in the case gument made the state Palodichuk, Wash.App. sentencing judge; of Matter tion the fairness (1978). quiries 589 P.2d There court the defendant—establish that agrees said:” defendant both understands and repeat We only terms. can the sound reasoning Under the of Santobello v. admonition our Court in State York, supra, and New United States v. 98 Idaho Colyer, 557 P.2d Brown, (4th supra, F.2d 375 Cir. [500 that, (1976), ‘[b]y type conducting this 1974)], petitioner had right analogous record, thorough inquiry right bargain to contract once guilty plea court can insulate the much entered; exchange renun- possible from Specifi- collateral attack.’ right trial, ciation of his jury peti- cally, [sentencing] ‘the court should inform tioner had prose- insist that the that the is not bound [the defendant] cutor adhere agree- terms by any from prosecu- recommendation ment and probation. recommend As in impose.’ tor as to the sentence to Id. See contracts, the law of party agree- 11(c)(5).” also I.C.R. ment cannot refuse to adhere to the bargain terms of a it later dis- “In some instances of where the nature may covers information which have plea bargain the disputed is and the record caused it bargain to enter a different on appeal clearly does not disclose the suffering without the consequences of a plea bargain, might ap- terms of the it be breach. propriate appellate an court to remand to the district court evidentiary for an hear- agree. “Id. at 271. We See [589 P.2d] ing specific findings. and We do not be- Carrillo, also United States 709 F.2d 35 (9th lieve this such a From Cir.1983) is case. our review (applying contract law stan- record, particularly of the the statements plea dards to bargain agreements).” of sentencing defense counsel at the hear- “Aside from brief dialogue the we have response and prosecuting the of the quoted, the record is devoid of details attorney quoted, which we believe agreement. of the bargain The sen- position state is no that contend tencing judge, course, partici- does not prosecutor was free to make a recom- pate negotiations in the actual between the sentencing mendation for a prosecutor, defendant and the and he can imprisonment. fixed life As- only therefore know revealed by is suming, deciding, but not that Rutherford parties. addition, appellate has the on appeal burden show both only can know what is revealed on the plea bargain agreement terms of the and It record. is upon therefore incumbent comply the state failed to with its attorneys agreement to state the in its agreement, we hold that has Rutherford entirety record, and in a clear and carried his burden.” coherent 11(c)(5).” manner. I.C.R. “The state next contends that Ruther- important is equally “It record object ford’s failure to breach of the discloses the understanding defendant’s agreement precludes raising him from the terms of plea bargain agreement. However, appeal. issue on case ‘[i]n It is not necessary that plea bargain error fundamental in a criminal case agreement in writing signed be may consider the same attorneys defendant, al- even though objection had been made at though this is permissible way one of mak- time of Haggard, trial.’ State 94 ing a record of showing the defen- 249, 251, 260, (1971). P.2d 486 262 Wheth- understanding dant’s acceptance er the up failure state to live its may terms. Even then it necessary agreement arising out a bargain is judge to query the defen- fundamental error question is a never be- dant about his understanding con- fore decided Idaho.” of the agreement. tents Where the terms “ bargain agreement merely are ‘Fundamental error’ is an amorphous orally stated on the record one of concept which difficult to define attorneys the specific court should—by in- even Idaho, more difficult apply. it

542 sentencing hearing deprived appeared has tor who at the error least means ‘which prosecutor rep- Byla- different from the who appellant process.’ due ma, plea negoti- 103 Idaho resented the state in the earlier court has (Ct.App.1982). However, An Indiana holds a ations. ‘Santobello ‘Funda- given more detailed definition: deprived a criminal defendant is consti- only plain or error results where mental promise if prosecutor’s tutional is made or an act done statement kept, agreement even plea bargain is not goes prejudicial error results Pierre v. the breach is inadvertent.’ where party’s case where that heart of (9th Thompson, 666 F.2d Cir. wholly pre- or act outside statement 1982); Palodichuk, 22 Wash. Matter of powers par- of that ventative corrective (1978).” App. 589 P.2d ty.’ Family Farm Bureau United Life guilty plea “A involves the waiver of Fultz, Ind.App. 375 N.E.2d Ins. v. rights, only fundamental but several (1978). For reasons which we set voluntary plea constitute knowing and will below, out we hold that the error in important Mere silence or such an waiver. ‘wholly preventa- outside of the object not suffice. Since the failure will powers’ tive or of Rutherford corrective myriad of state and federal Santobello fundamen- therefore constitutes way agreed or another courts have one tal error.” Marshall with the statement Justice York, de supra, “In v. Santobello New that, prosecutor the bar- breaks ‘[w]hen objected immediately when fense counsel for the gain, he undercuts the basis waiver the recommendation in viola state made a implicit in plea.’ the rights of constitutional plea bargain agreement. The tion of the 268, York, 404 U.S. at v. New Santobello sentencing judge replied: ‘I am not at all dissenting (concurring at 502 92 S.Ct. Attorney by what District influenced Marshall).” opinion of Justice adjourn says, that there is no need to so bargain “We hold a breach sentence, and there is no need to agreement the state affects volun- any testimony. particle It doesn’t make a guilty plea and is fundamen- tariness of Attorney the District difference what fail- conclude that the mere tal error. We do, says will or he doesn’t do.’ object error in district ure such The went on outline his reasons to raise the court does not waive imposing particular sentence— on appeal.” the first time issue for recommended which was the same sentence course, error, States fundamen- the state. United “Of all even Court, assuming the district although error, v. demands reversal. See State tal accurately saying judge spoke 92, 665 P.2d 1102 Urquhart, 105 Idaho did not influence state’s recommendation (Ct.App.1983). error can still Fundamental him, emphasized ‘that this is no sense Indeed, Court harmless error. be question the fairness of required guilty rest Santobello judge; prosecu the fault here rests on the promise or degree on a ‘significant in a tor, sentencing judge.’ Santo can agreement prosecutor, of the it York, 263, 404 92 S.Ct. bello v. New U.S. said be inducement in concluded ‘that the 499. York, New consideration.’ Santobello recogni justice appropriate terests of 262, (emphasis at 498 404 U.S. at prosecution tion of duties added). Thus, in which a not all cases negotia promises relation made bargain agree- prosecutor violates pleas tion will be best served in a ment will result remand by remanding courts the case to state Supreme Court has held that court. Our 262, 92 Id. at further consideration.’ er- determining whether standard for ‘[t]he 498.” S.Ct. at is “harm- dimension ror constitutional case, Chapman forth in Santobello, less” as set present like “In Califor- nia, 17 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d may 386 U.S. agreement by the state breach of (1967), a federal consti- prosecu- 705 is “that before have been inadvertent because the meanwhile, harmless, prosecu- further tutional error can be held taken. In the stayed. tion Robbins should be of Iain must be able to declare belief that beyond was harmless a reasonable ’ LePage, doubt.” State v. 102 Idaho A ATTACHMENT denied, (1981), 630 P.2d cert. JIM JONES 1057,102 606, L.Ed.2d S.Ct. Attorney General (1981). present case, say cannot promise the state’s a life to recommend KANE MICHAEL Attorney Deputy had no de General effect on Rutherford’s Chief, Law Division Criminal plead guilty. cision was not The error beyond harmless doubt. a reasonable A. MICHAEL HENDERSON Rutherford is entitled to relief.” Deputy General Statehouse, Room 210 “The Supreme indicated there Court has Boise, variety constitutionally acceptable are (208) Telephone: 334-2400 example, modes relief. For a defendant may be entitled specific performance plea bargain agreement, which would IN THE SUPREME COURT OF resentencing by

entail a different district STATE OF THE IDAHO permitted A defendant may also IDAHO, Plaintiff-Respondent, STATE OF guilty plea go to withdraw his to trial vs. all original charges. Santobello v. York, Here, supra. New ROBBINS, while Rutherford Defendant-Ap- IAIN COLON appealed pellant. from judgment has convic-

tion, requests only order specif- that we performance plea bargain agree- ic NO. 18607 He ment. does not seek to withdraw his Idaho, by through The State and Mi- plea. Therefore, we need not deter- Henderson, Deputy Attorney chael A. Gen- mine whether and under what circum- eral, appellant, by through and the and his permitted stances a defendant would be to Watson, counsel, Barry E. hereby enter guilty plea. specific withdraw his holdWe following stipulation: into the performance appropriate remedy is an July appellant’s 1. brief filed case.” 5, 1990, an issue has been raised as 913-16, Rutherford, v. State 107 Idaho proceedings whether the at the 693 P.2d at 1115-18. hearing plea were accordance with the agreement appellant between and the firmly view of the am foregoing, I state. view judgment that the final entered should herein be vacated and cause appellant’s 2. In the brief the relief re- specific remanded district court with quested appellant for the asserted assigned directions that the case comply agreement failure to with judge district from outside the First Judi- is the case to the remand of district court give defendant an purpose opportunity specific cial District for the guilty. (Appellant’s withdraw conducting key a hearing wherein the issue Brief, 13). p. first ascertain the circumstances which led to the office General’s appropriate 3. One remedies preparing which interfered type plea agreement of violation of the judicial process with insofar as con- appellant asserted in this Robbins, cerns the defendant-appellant Iain specific performance plea agree- report and thereafter for in- to this Court ment. This involve remand of the structions further action to be ease to the district court for a new sentenc- 544 P.2d 193 CO., INC., ASHLEY GLASS hearing a different district before Plaintiff-Appellant, See, York, v. Santobello New [499], U.S. 30 L.Ed.2d v. Rutherford, (1971); State 107 Idaho Larry Hoff, Moore Financial Services (Ct.App.1985). Defendants, Incorporated, agree appellant state and the that this rem- and

edy appropriate is an resolution of the case. Sherry H. B. BITHELL and Walter proposed 4. In view of the remand Bithell, wife, the Ida- husband court the case the district for resentenc- Bank, N.A., Defen- ho First National ing, necessary Supreme it is not for the dants-Respondents. judge’s the issue Court address exercising refusing to re- discretion Sherry H. B. Walter BITHELL and jurisdiction. tain Bithell, wife, husband and Cross Claim- Plaintiffs, Party ants-Third parties request

5. The therefore the case be remanded to district sentencing the resentencing, at which Hoff, Cross-Defendant, Larry appellant specific perfor- will entitled to specif- plea agreement. mance of the Such performance state’s

ic will consist of the Hoff, Larry hus- A. and Annette HOFF making a in accordance recommendation wife; R. Hoff and band Dean plea agreement. parties fur- wife, Hoff, R. Maria husband stipulate judge that another ther district Third-Party Defendants. designated shall be to conduct the sentenc- 18865. No. ing hearing impose The dis- sentence. recom-

trict will not be bound Idaho, agree- forth mendations as set Boise, December 1991 Term. ment. April 1993. day September, DATED 10th 1990.

/s/ Michael A. Henderson A.

MICHAEL HENDERSON

Deputy Attorney General

State of Idaho Barry

/s/ E. Watson E.

BARRY WATSON Appellant

Attorney for

Case Details

Case Name: State v. Robbins

Court Name: Idaho Supreme Court

Date Published: Feb 11, 1993

Citation: 850 P.2d 176

Docket Number: 18607

Court Abbreviation: Idaho