391 A.2d 184 | Conn. Super. Ct. | 1977
The defendant was convicted by a jury of negligent homicide with a motor vehicle in violation of General Statutes
The briefs indicate no disagreement concerning the essential facts, which are as follows: On January 24, 1976, at about 1:40 a.m. the defendant was driving at about thirty miles per hour on Ocean Avenue, New London, when her car skidded upon an icy portion of the road and slid to the other side where it struck an oncoming car. The collision resulted in the death of a passenger in the defendant's car. There was evidence that the posted speed limit on Ocean Avenue was twenty-five miles per hour.
The defendant was taken to the hospital by a police officer. After it was learned that the victim had died, the defendant was given the standard Miranda warning and was then questioned. She stated that she, the victim, and another passenger had been drinking at a restaurant from about 8:30 p.m. until a short time before the accident. She admitted that she had had five drinks of peppermint schnapps and that she had been traveling at about thirty miles per hour. She was placed under arrest. At 4:06 a.m. the medical examiner took a blood sample from the defendant as she was lying in a bed in the hospital emergency room in the presence of two police officers.
At the trial the defendant objected to evidence of the results of the blood test upon the ground that the requirements of General Statutes
The claim of the defendant that the failure to meet the requirements of
It is also argued that the juxtaposition of General Statutes
At the trial the only constitutional argument raised by the defendant was, in the words of her counsel, "the standard objection that one would assert in the taking of blood from [the defendant's] body to be used in a trial against her without her consent and without the voluntariness of it." In this appeal the defendant recognizes that Schmerber v. California,
We think the record amply demonstrates that there was not only probable cause to arrest the defendant upon the charge of negligent homicide with a motor vehicle but also a "clear indication" that a blood sample would probably produce evidence highly pertinent to that charge. The admission of the defendant that she had consumed five drinks of an alcoholic beverage in the course of the evening was sufficient to indicate that even two hours after the accident her blood stream would contain some quantity of alcohol, measurement of which would be useful in determining the extent to which her driving ability was affected. Gulia v. Ortowski,
The decision in this case is limited to the record before us, which does not include all of the testimony at the trial. The only constitutional basis under Schmerber v. California, supra, 769-70, for taking a sample of the defendant's blood was the "clear indication," provided by the defendant's admission to the consumption of an alcoholic beverage, that a measurable quantity of alcohol would be detected in her blood if a sample were taken. That admission *516
was made to the police officers. The blood sample was taken by the medical examiner in the presence of the officers. At the trial the defendant waived her right to have the medical examiner testify and at no time has she raised the question of whether the medical examiner was requested by the officers to take the sample or whether the defendant's admission was communicated to him. Under General Statutes
There is no error.
In this opinion A. HEALEY and PARSKEY, Js., concurred.