State v. RobargeState v. Robarge
Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Shawn L. Briese and W. Brian Bayly, Asst. Attys. Gen., Daytona Beach, for petitioner.
Jаmes B. Gibson, Public Defender, and David A. Henson, Asst. Public Defender, Daytona Beach, for respondent.
McDONALD, Justice.
We accepted this case becаuse the district court‘s opinion in Robarge v. State, 432 So.2d 669 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983), appeared to be in conflict with State v. Thompson, 390 So.2d 715 (Fla. 1980), State v. Buchman, 361 So.2d 692 (Fla. 1978), and State v. Kahler, 232 So.2d 166 (Fla. 1970).
On January 19, 1982 a jury convicted Robarge of aggravated assault and manual possession of a firearm without а license. On appeal the district court reversed Robarge‘s conviction for violating
The state argues that the district court‘s construction of the “without a license” provision in
The general rule for determining whether a statutory exception is an element of a statutory offense or а defense is set forth in Baeumel v. State, 26 Fla. 71, 7 So. 371 (1890), which states that,
if there is an exception in the enacting clause, the party pleading must show that his adversary is not within the exception; but, if there be an exception in a subsequent clause, or a subsequent statute, that is matter of defence [sic], and is to be shown by the other party.
Id. at 75, 7 So. at 372 (quoting 1 J. Bishop, Criminal Procedure § 639 (2d ed. 1872)). Thus, for a statutory exception to constitute a defense under Baeumel, it must be in a clause subsequent to the еnacting clause of a statute. In Thompson we cited with approval Webster‘s definition of a “clause“: “A ‘clause’ is defined as ‘a word group formed by subject and predicate elements but constituting a member of a complex or compound sentence instead of ranking as a completed sentence.‘” 390 So.2d at 716 n. 3 (quoting Webster‘s New International Dictionary 497 (2d ed. 1947)).
Applying the above rule and definition to the text of
Conversely, the statutory exception we considered in Thompson appeared in a clаuse following the enacting clause. We found the statutory exception in
The case with whiсh there appeared to be the strongest likelihood of conflict is Buchman. In Buchman we held that the state did not have to prove the lack of an exemption to obtain a conviction for the sale of unregistered securities under
A court‘s main guide in construing a stаtute is the legislature‘s intent. Parker v. State, 406 So.2d 1089 (Fla. 1981). Accordingly, general rules of statutory construction, such as the one in Baeumel, are designed to help courts ascertаin the intent of the legislature. American Bakeries Co. v. Haines City, 131 Fla. 790, 180 So. 524 (1938). As stated above, however, Baeumel is a general rule, and in some cases the placement of a statutory exception is not determinativе of the legislature‘s purpose regarding a statutory exception.4
In Buchman application of the Baeumel rule would not have reflected the correct legislative intent. In
It shall not be necessary to negative any of the exemptiоns provided in this chapter in any complaint, information, indictment, or any other writ or proceedings brought under this chapter, and the burden of establishing the right to any exemption shall be upon the party claiming the benefit of such exemption.
Based on the legislature‘s clear directive, we construed
On the other hand, a court need not depart from a general rule of statutory interpretation if application of the rule will carry out the legislature‘s will. See American Bakeries Co.; 3 J. Sutherland, Statutes and Statutory Construction 454-62 (rev. 3d ed. 1974). An examination of
Finally, in Kahler we considered the validity of a statutory presumption, not whether an exception was an element of or a defense to a criminal offense. Thus, there can be no conflict between the district court‘s decision and Kahler.
Finding no conflict between Robarge and the above cases, we deny the petition for review.
It is so ordered.
ALDERMAN, C.J., and BOYD, OVERTON, EHRLICH and SHAW, JJ., concur.
ADKINS, J., dissents.
Notes
Whoever shall carry around with him, or have in his manual рossession, in any county in this state, any pistol, electric weapon or device, or Winchester rifle or other repeating rifle without having a license from the county commissioners of the respective counties of this state shall be guilty of a misdemeanor of the secоnd degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084; provided, this section shall not apply to sheriffs, deputy sheriffs, city or town marshals, policemen, or United States marshals or their deputies as to the carrying of concealed weapons.
It is unlawful for any person to own or to havе in his care, custody, possession, or control any short-barreled rifle, short-barreled shotgun, or machine gun which is, or may readily be made, operable; but this section shall not apply to antique firearms.
In Thompson we found that the antique weapon proviso in this statute constituted “an excеption in a subsequent clause” under Baeumel.
No securities except of a class exempt under any of the provisions of s. 517.05 or unless sold in any transaction exempt under any of the provisions of s. 517.06 shall be sold within this state unless such securities shall have been registered, as hereinafter definеd.
In a statutory offense, it depends very much, though not exclusively, on the words of the statute whether a particular matter is one of defense or whether the negative of the matter enters into the definition of the crime.
26 Fla. at 75, 7 So. at 372 (quoting 1 J. Bishop, Criminal Procedure § 639 (2d ed. 1872)).