State v. RiveraState v. Rivera
BOSSON, Justice.
{1} In this opinion, we clarify our rules and judicial precedent that pertain to the authorized practice of law in all courts of this state. Specifically, the practice of law in any court is limited to duly licensed attorneys who are members of the State Bar or otherwise authorized by this Court‘s rules in specific, limited circumstances. Because the Court of Appeals relied on statutory expressions that appear to permit the unauthorized practice of law in our magistrate courts, wе reverse the Court of Appeals while affirming the conviction below.
BACKGROUND
{2} Zirachuen Rivera (Defendant) drove through a DWI checkpoint in Bernalillo County, New Mexico, and an officer suspected he had been drinking alcohol. Defendant showed signs of impairment on the standard field sobriety tests and was arrеsted on suspicion of driving while intoxicated.
{3} Defendant‘s bench trial began in Bernalillo County Metropolitan Court (metro court), where assistant district attorney Rachel Bayless entered an appearance for both herself and Chris Mills, a purported attorney, on behalf of the State. At the conсlusion of trial, Defendant was found guilty of driving while intoxicated. Upon leaving the courtroom, defense counsel overheard Mills telling Bayless that he had decided not to take the New Mexico bar exam. Upon learning that Mills was not a licensed New Mexico attorney, Defendant filed a motion for a mistrial and a new trial. In that motion, Defendant declared, “[u]pon information and belief, Mr. Mills is a law student . . . .” Defendant later attached a certificate from Kathleen Jo Gibson, Chief Clerk of the New Mexico Supreme Court, affirming that Mills was not on the official roll of New Mexico attorneys.
{4} Defendant then aрpealed to the district court because the motion for a new trial was denied by operation of law when it was not granted within twenty days. See
{5} Defendant then appealed to the Court of Appeals. In a formal opinion, State v. Rivera, 2010-NMCA-109, ¶ 9, 149 N.M. 406, 249 P.3d 944, the court focused on
{6} Accordingly, the Court of Appeals “affirm[ed] the denial of Defendant‘s motion for mistrial and for a new trial.” Id. ¶ 12. We granted certiorari to clarify the important question of who may practice law in our lower courts. We also discuss the consequences of practiсing law when unauthorized in the context of a criminal prosecution like this one.
DISCUSSION
{7}
{8} With regards to rule-making, however, judicial authority is not necessarily exclusive; we have previously recognized legislative statutes that regulate procedure. See Sw. Cmty. Health Servs. v. Smith, 107 N.M. 196, 198, 755 P.2d 40, 42 (1988) (discussing the judiciary having “shared procedural rule-making with the legislature“). But, whether such a statute is ultimately given effect depends on the degree to which it conflicts with the rules of this Court. See Albuquerque Rape Crisis Ctr. v. Blackmer, 2005-NMSC-032, ¶ 13, 138 N.M. 398, 120 P.3d 820 (“The question in this case is whether the [legislatively created privilege] conflicts with, or rathеr is consistent with, rules promulgated by this Court.“).
{9} In 1987, this Court saw fit to limit
{10} Even before our express rule, this Court had limited
{11} Ultimately, Norvell limited the magistrate court exception in
{12} Our holding in Norvell, later supplemented by rule, could not be clearer. Only attorneys properly admitted to the Bar may practice law in any court of this state, subject to those few exceptions provided in our rules, such as clinical law students under prescribed circumstances. Accordingly, we reverse the Court of Appeals to the extent that its opinion relied on state statute to allow non-attorneys to practice law in magistrate court.
{13} This holding, however, does not end our inquiry. By rule, we have created limited exceptions that allow certain individuals without a bar license to practice law in New Mexico courts. For example, under
{14} Finally,
{15} Returning now to Mills, the only evidence in the record regarding Mills’ status is the letter from our clerk, Ms. Gibson, сonfirming that as of the time of trial he was not on the
Error Does Not Warrant Reversal
{16} We assume, without deciding, that Mills’ particiрation at trial as a purported prosecutor constituted judicial error. We now determine what effect, if any, this had on Defendant‘s conviction.
{17} With the exception of structural error, we require that an error prejudice the accused in some way before we will consider reversal. See State v. Dominguez, 2007-NMSC-060, ¶ 13, 142 N.M. 811, 171 P.3d 750 (“[J]udicial error by itself is not necessarily grounds for reversal in the absence of actual prejudice.“); State v. Gallegos, 2007-NMSC-007, ¶ 18, 141 N.M. 185, 152 P.3d 828 (“Even when the trial court abuses its discretion in failing to sever charges, appellate courts will not reverse unless the error actually prejudiced the defendant.“); State v. Gonzales, 2000-NMSC-028, ¶ 32, 129 N.M. 556, 11 P.3d 131 (“In order to warrant reversal, the еrroneous admission of evidence must cause prejudice to a defendant.“).
{18} Before we can assess the effect of Mills’ unauthorized trial participation, we must examine what Mills actually did at trial. The trial transcript shows that Bayless, a duly licensed assistant district attorney, was present for the entire trial and personally conducted most of it, including witness examinations, evidentiary objections, and sentencing. Over the course of the two-day trial, Bayless appeared to step aside only twice. First, she allowed Mills to examine the State‘s first witness, whose testimony helped establish the constitutionality of the DWI checkpoint. Second, Bayless did not make the State‘s closing argument, but neither did Mills; closing was given by another assistant district attorney. In short, it does not appear from the record that Mills did much at trial, and even what little he did was uneventful and subject to the direct supervision of the lead prosecutor, Bayless.
{19} As a result, Defendant has not claimed any actual prejudice from Mills’ participation at trial. The trial transcript shows no irregularity in Mills’ questioning of his sole witness. Moreover, even if Mills had done more, Mills was not Defendant‘s attorney, he represented the State. As a general rule, defense counsel‘s duties and obligations remain unchanged, whether opposing counsel is the attorney general, a district attorney, or a clinical law student. In any case, defense counsel must zealously advocate on behalf of the client, which
{20} Notwithstanding the lack of prejudice, Defendant argues additional grounds for reversal. First, Defendant urges us to assume рrejudice, essentially arguing that the unauthorized practice of law by a representative of the State is structural error that warrants automatic reversal. This argument, however, fails to persuade us. Structural error exists “only in a very limited class of cases.” State v. Padilla, 2002-NMSC-016, ¶ 16, 132 N.M. 247, 46 P.3d 1247 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “Such errors infect the entire trial process, and necessarily render a trial fundamentally unfair.” Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 8 (1999) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Structural errors include such pervasive defects as racial discrimination in the selection of a grand jury, complete denial of the right to counsel, a signifiсant defect in the reasonable-doubt instruction, and denial of the right to a public trial. Padilla, 2002-NMSC-016, ¶ 16. We are not persuaded to expand this limited class of cases to include Mills’ participation under the circumstances of this case.
{21} Defendant maintains that lack of prejudice is immaterial becausе an unauthorized prosecution deprives the trial court of jurisdiction. Defendant relies on State v. Hollenbeck, 112 N.M. 275, 814 P.2d 143 (Ct. App. 1991) and State v. Baca, 101 N.M. 716, 688 P.2d 34 (Ct. App. 1984) for this proposition. In both Hollenbeck and Baca, the accused was prosecuted by a private attorney who the district attorney had failed to properly appoint or otherwise authorize to conduct the prosecution. Hollenbeck, 112 N.M. at 276, 814 P.2d at 144; Baca, 101 N.M. at 717, 688 P.2d at 35. Once it was еstablished that the private attorney lacked authority to prosecute, our Court of Appeals concluded in each case that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, thereby reversing the convictions. Hollenbeck, 112 N.M. at 277-78, 814 P.2d at 145-46; Baca, 101 N.M. at 718, 688 P.2d at 36.
{22} Hollenbeck and Baca are vastly different from what took place in Defendant‘s prosecution. Defendant was prosecuted by a properly-appointed assistant district attorney, Bayless, who—it is clear from the trial transcript—was in charge of the prosecution and personally conducted most of it. In contrast with both Hollenbeck and Baca, Defendant was lawfully prosecuted. The authority to prosecute was vested in Bayless, an assistant district attorney, and that authority provided the court with the very jurisdiction over Defendant‘s case that the court lacked in both Hollenback and Baca. See
Clinical Law Program
{23} While there is nothing in the record to confirm it, even defense counsel believed that Mills was a law student, and under the circumstances he likely was. This Court сreated
{24}
CONCLUSION
{25} We affirm Defendant‘s conviction and reverse the opinion of the Court of Appeals to the extent it is inconsistent herewith.
{26} IT IS SO ORDERED.
RICHARD C. BOSSON, Justice
WE CONCUR:
CHARLES W. DANIELS, Chief Justice
PATRICIO M. SERNA, Justice
PETRA JIMENEZ MAES, Justice
EDWARD L. CHÁVEZ, Justice
Topic Index for State v. Rivera, No. 32,677
AE APPEAL AND ERROR
AE-HE Harmless Error
AE-PJ Prejudicial Error
AT-AG Attorneys, General
AT-UP Unauthorized Practice
CA CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
CA-MP Misconduct by Prosecutor
CA-PJ Prejudice