40 Conn. App. 318 | Conn. App. Ct. | 1996
The defendant appeals
The group sat around the apartment, watching television and talking. Later in the morning, Suarez, Conception, Miguel Morales and the defendant left the apartment and went down to the first floor of building C. The four men went outside onto the plaza. The defendant walked off by himself. None of the men saw in which direction he went. The other three men decided to return to the apartment.
As the three men entered the building, Suarez saw Richard Morales
As Suarez and Richard Morales stood talking, the defendant entered the lobby from the hallway and stood against a pillar in the lobby area. The defendant and Richard Morales did not speak to each other. Richard Morales’ back was turned toward a set of glass doors, and his right side was exposed to the defendant. The defendant was wearing a black jacket, black jeans and
After he spoke with Richard Morales, Suarez started to walk toward the elevator. No one else was in the lobby other than the defendant and Richard Morales, and no one was outside the doorway. As Suarez walked down the hallway toward the elevator, he heard a loud bang and began to run. Suarez ran upstairs to the apartment occupied by Miguel Morales’ girlfriend.
Several minutes later, the defendant knocked and entered the apartment. The defendant had the nickname “Sick.” The defendant said, “I’m sick, that’s why they call me Sick.” The defendant then said, “I busted that nigger” or “I bust him.” The word bust, used in that context, means to shoot.
The defendant, Suarez, and Benjamin Morales then went to the lobby and observed a number of police officers as well as other persons in the lobby. The victim, whom the police identified as Richard Morales, was lying on the floor in front of the glass doors. The police were taking photographs of people in the lobby area.
Officer Christopher Miller responded to an emergency call regarding the shooting and, when he arrived at the scene, he found the victim lying on the floor in the southeast comer of the lobby. The victim was lying on his back with his head toward the wall and his feet toward the lobby. Miller observed that the victim had suffered a gunshot wound to the head. The victim was breathing and was bleeding from his forehead. Soon after Miller’s arrival on the scene, ambulance personnel transported the victim to Lawrence and Memorial Hospital.
The next night, the defendant again went to Suarez’ house. The defendant told Suarez several times that “he was no joke,” and also said several times that he “ain’t nothing to be messed with.” He also said that he “got his propts,” an expression that means he “got his respect.” The defendant also asked Suarez: “Are the brothers mad at me for I had to do what I had to do?” Suarez asked the defendant if he felt bad about “busting” someone, and the defendant answered that “he wasn’t thinking about that.” The defendant and Suarez went into the bathroom and Suarez asked the defendant how he had killed the victim. The defendant answered, “I blasted that nigger.”
The victim died on January 3, 1994, at Lawrence and Memorial Hospital. An autopsy established that the victim died as a result of a gunshot wound to the head with extensive injury to the brain. The bullet had entered the back of the head in the occipital region on the right side. A forensic examination of the distribution of numerous particles of gun powder residue on the back of the victim’s sweatshirt indicated that the bullet that killed the victim was fired from a distance of one to two feet.
On January 5, 1994, detectives interviewed the defendant. He admitted that he was at 40 Crystal Avenue on the day of the shooting, and said that he was there visiting with Benjamin and Miguel Morales at their apartment. He said that Suarez and Conception were also at the apartment. He stated that at the time of the shooting, he was in the apartment and that someone in the apartment noticed a commotion in the parking
Following a jury trial, the defendant was convicted of murder in violation of General Statutes § 53a-54a. On appeal, the defendant asserts as his only claim that the trial court improperly refused to permit the victim’s mother to testify about statements that the victim made to his mother concerning his fear that something was going to happen to him because he owed a debt to his girlfriend’s mother. We are unpersuaded.
Certain additional facts are necessary to an understanding of our resolution of this issue. Prior to resting his case-in-chief, the defendant made an offer of proof consisting of a statement made by Eugenia Morales, the mother of the victim, to the New London police on January 3, 1994. The defendant asserted that he had Eugenia Morales under subpoena, and that he was offering her statement as indicative of what she would testify to if called as a witness. According to the defendant’s synopsis of her statement,
The trial court questioned the defendant regarding the relevance of the proffered testimony, and the defendant responded that it was admissible to show “at the least, the victim’s mother suspected that somebody other than the defendant committed the crime.” The defendant further asserted that the mother’s testimony was admissible under the state of mind exception to the hearsay rule. The defendant also argued that the testimony has “a strong indicia of reliability” because the conversation at issue took place in the context of a mother-son relationship as opposed to a relationship between strangers. The defendant maintained that, therefore, the trial court should admit the evidence, “because it suggests to the jury that somebody other than the defendant committed the crime.”
The state objected to admission of the evidence, asserting that it was double hearsay and irrelevant. The state argued that, at best, the proffered testimony consisted of speculation that an unknown third party may have had a possible motive to kill the victim. After the state’s argument, the trial court questioned the defendant in an effort to clarify the defendant’s theory of admissibility of the proffered testimony. The defendant indicated that his principal claim for the admissibility of the testimony was the state of mind exception to the hearsay rule. The defendant also reiterated that the victim’s statement to his mother “bears great indicia of reliability.” The trial court sustained the objection
The defendant claims that the trial court’s ruling was improper, and that the trial court should have admitted the proffered testimony in accordance with either the state of mind exception to the hearsay rule or the residual exception to the hearsay rule. We do not agree.
“Our standard of review regarding challenges to a trial court’s evidentiary rulings is that these rulings will be overturned on appeal only where there was an abuse of discretion and a showing by the defendant of substantial prejudice or injustice. ... In reviewing claims that the trial court abused its discretion, great weight is given to the trial court’s decision and every reasonable presumption is given in favor of its correctness. . . . We will reverse the trial court’s ruling only if it could not reasonably conclude as it did. . . . State v. Leonard, 31 Conn. App. 178, 190, 623 A.2d 1052, cert. granted, 226 Conn. 912, 628 A.2d 985 (1993), appeal withdrawn January 7, 1994.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Rogers, 38 Conn. App. 777, 796, 664 A.2d 291 (1995).
We first address the defendant’s assertion that the proffered testimony should have been admitted under the state of mind exception to the hearsay rule. “ ‘Hearsay is an out-of-court statement offered into evidence to establish the truth of the matters contained therein. State v. Cruz, 212 Conn. 351, 356, 562 A.2d 1071 (1989).’ State v. Rinaldi, 220 Conn. 345, 359, 599 A.2d 1 (1991). As such, it is inadmissible.” State v. Duntz, 223 Conn. 207, 232-33, 613 A.2d 224 (1992). “An out-of-court statement is not hearsay, however, if it is offered to illustrate circumstantially the declarant’s then present state of mind, rather than to prove the truth of the matter asserted.” State v. Blades, 225 Conn.
“Whether the victim’s state of mind is relevant depends, however, on the nature of the issues at trial. A defendant’s articulated or implied theory of defense may make the victim’s state of mind material to the determination of the defendant’s guilt or innocence.” State v. Crafts, 226 Conn. 237, 253, 627 A.2d 877 (1993). Furthermore, we note that although “a victim’s fear of another individual is admissible when relevant to the issues at trial . . . such cases have generally involved the testimony of a witness’ personal observations of the victim’s fear of the defendant.” (Emphasis added.) State v. Blades, supra, 225 Conn. 633.
The defendant’s primary theory of defense, as indicated by his own testimony, was that he was upstairs in building C visiting with friends at the time of the shooting. He did not raise a defense that implicated his or the victim’s state of mind. Moreover, neither the defendant nor the state put the victim’s state of mind into issue at trial. Therefore, the proffered testimony, offered to illustrate circumstantially the victim’s then present state of mind, was not relevant. Cf. State v. Crafts, supra, 226 Conn. 254 (victim’s state of mind relevant because defendant’s assertion throughout trial was that he was not guilty of murder because “victim” still alive); State v. Blades, supra, 225 Conn. 635 (victim’s state of mind relevant because defendant invoked defense of extreme emotional disturbance to charge of murder asserting that his conduct resulted from provocation by victim).
If the defendant had introduced evidence at trial that another individual possessed the motive and intent to
We next address the defendant’s assertion that the proffered testimony was admissible under the residual exception to the hearsay rule. “An out of court statement is hearsay when it is offered to establish the truth of the matters contained therein. ... As a general rule, hearsay evidence is not admissible unless it falls under one of several well established exceptions. . . . The purpose behind the hearsay rule is to effectuate the policy of requiring that testimony be given in open court, under oath, and subject to cross-examination. . . . The residual, or catch-all, exception to the hearsay rule allows a trial court to admit hearsay evidence not admissible under any of the established exceptions if: (1) there is a reasonable necessity for the admission of the statement, and (2) the statement is supported by the equivalent guarantees of reliability and trustworthiness essential to other evidence admitted under the traditional hearsay exceptions.” (Citations omitted; emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Oquendo, 223 Conn. 635, 664, 613 A.2d 1300 (1992).
“The reliability of a witness’ hearsay statement is essential because the opposing party does not have the
We thus conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the proffered evidence was not admissible under either the state of mind exception or the residual exception to the hearsay rule.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.
This appeal was taken originally to the Supreme Court. Pursuant to Practice Book § 4023, the Supreme Court transferred the appeal to this court.
Richard Morales' last name is spelled “Moralis” in the trial transcript. We use the spelling that appears in the substitute information.
The statement was not offered as an exhibit at trial. The content of the statement comes from the defendant’s synopsis made during the offer of proof.
The shooting took place on December 31, 1993.
The defendant appears to have invoked both the state of mind exception to the hearsay rule and the so-called residual exception to the hearsay rale.