30 Conn. App. 523 | Conn. App. Ct. | 1993
The defendant appeals from the judgment of conviction, rendered after a jury trial, of the crime of sexual assault in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-70 (a) (l).
The jury could reasonably have found the following facts. After a night of bar hopping, drinking, and using cocaine, the defendant engaged in sexual intercourse with the victim. Although the defendant did not testify at trial, he introduced a statement that he had given to the police in connection with the incident. In the statement, the defendant acknowledged that he had engaged in sexual intercourse with the victim, but claimed that the victim had consented. The jury did not accept the defense of consent and found the defendant guilty of sexual assault in the first degree.
The defendant neither requested a charge on the issue of consent nor objected to the charge as given.
The defendant also claims that the trial court improperly marshaled the evidence by weighting the charge to the jury so as to favor the state. We are not persuaded that the court unfairly emphasized the state’s evidence.
Because the defendant did not raise the issue of the charge in the trial court, our review is limited to whether the court’s conduct so deviated from the
The trial court’s general comments on the evidence during jury instructions simply summarized a limited portion of the victim’s testimony to explain the elements of the crime. Since the state primarily relied on the victim’s testimony, the court’s reference to some of the evidence presented by the state was proper and did not unreasonably emphasize the state’s evidence. The trial court’s specific comments on the element of compulsion simply advised the jury that if such evidence was believed and established beyond a reasonable doubt, then such evidence relating to the use or movement of a knife would satisfy the element of compulsion.
The trial court’s charge adequately guided the jury in its consideration of the elements of the crime charged. In addition, the trial court instructed the jury at least eight times that the state had the burden of proving each element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Viewing the charge as a whole, we do not find
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.
General Statutes § 53a-70 (a) provides in pertinent part: “A person is guilty of sexual assault in the first degree when such person (1) compels another person to engage in sexual intercourse by the use of force against such other person ... or by the threat of use of force against such other person . . . which reasonably causes such person to fear physical injury