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State v. Rivera
102 P.3d 1044
Haw.
2004
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*1 spondent Sonson also shall reimburse the

Disciplinary Board for the costs associated proceeding,

with this as determined timely

court submission of a bill of after

costs.

IT FINALLY IS ORDERED Re- shall,

spondent days within Sonson ten suspension

after effective date of

order, with this file affidavit full 2.16(d).

compliance with RSCH Hawai'i, Plaintiff-Appellee,

STATE

Larry RIVERA, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 26199. Court Hawai'i.

Dec. *2 presiding, filed on October

H.M. Chan sentencing him 2003, convicting of and him following promoting offenses: in viola- drug degree, third dangerous in the (HRS) *3 Statute tion Hawaii Revised of S, defender, Tabe, deputy public James (1993 (2) Supp.2003);1 § unlaw- & briefs, defendant-appellant Larry for the of drug paraphernalia, in violation ful of use Rivera. (3) 329-43.5(a) (1993);2 promot- § and HRS Anderson, degree, in ing drug in the third deputy prosecuting a detrimental James M. (1993).3 § 712-1249 On briefs, of violation attorney, plaintiff-appel- on the for the circuit court appeal, Rivera contends of Hawaii. lee State (1) granting in the motions as follows: erred LEVINSON, MOON, C.J., [hereinafter, of Hawaii “the of the State ACOBA, J., NAKAYAMA,33.; and (a) for term of prosecution”] DUFFY, joins. dissenting with whom J. offender,” pur- imprisonment “persistent as a (1993 Supp. § & suant to HRS LEVINSON, Opinion J. of the Court (b) 2003),4 imprison- of extended terms Larry ap- offender,” defendant-appellant to pursuant The “multiple ment aas (1993 706-662(4)(a) judgment Supp.2003), § circuit court & see peals from the of the circuit, as did not note inasmuch first the Honorable Derrick any marijuana knowingly possesses provides: person 1. HRS 712-1243 any any V substance in amount. or Schedule (1) person promot- A the offense of commits drug (2)Promoting in the a detrimental degree ing dangerous drug third if the a in the degree petty is third a misdemeanor. any knowingly possesses dangerous person drug part: provides amount. relevant 4.HRS (2) drug Promoting dangerous in the third a imprison- for extended terms of Criteria degree felony. a class C may subject is defendant be ment. A convicted (3) Notwithstanding any contrary, law to the imprisonment under extended term of to an except sentenced under for first-time offenders if the convicted defendant section 706-622.5, following if section the commission of the one or more of the criteria: satisfies (1) promoting dangerous drug persistent in the a offender offense of The defendant is imprisonment degree for an extended term third under this section involved the whose public. necessary protection possession methamphel- of for or distribution finding amine, make un- The court shall not this person convicted shall be sentenced previously been less defendant imprisonment term of to of at differ- of felonies committed victed two years mandatory minimum of five imprisonment, with a eighteen the defendant was ent times when length which of shall be not years age or older. thirty days greater less than and not than two- years, at the of the sen- and-a-half discretion person dangerous is a The defendant tencing person The convicted shall not court. imprisonment for an extended term whose eligible during mandatory parole be for public. necessary protection for period imprisonment. finding un- not make The court shall this subjected to has been 329-43.5(a) less psychiatric provides: 2. HRS psychological or evaluation use, any person It is for to or to unlawful danger- history significant documents use, drug paraphernalia possess to with intent criminally resulting ousness others harvest, cultivate, grow, plant, propagate, conduct, history and this makes the violent convert, manufacture, compound, produce, danger to others. a serious defendant Nothing test, analyze, pack, repack, process, prepare, precludes intro- this section store, conceal, inhale, contain, ingest, inject, in order of victim-related data duction body human introduce into the otherwise dangerousness in with the accord establish chap- controlled substance violation evidence. Hawaii rules of Any person ter. who violates this section is multiple is a offender whose The defendant guilty upon of a class C conviction were so extensive criminal actions pursuant imprisoned to section 706- imprisonment an extended for and, appropriate provided 660 706-641, if section pub- necessary protection of the term is pursuant section fined 706-640. finding shall not make this lic. unless: provides: 3. HRS 712-1249 (a) being The defendant is sentenced two (1)A already sen- person promot- commits the offense or more felonies or felony; degree drug if tence of in the third detrimental (2003)”;5 imprison- that such Hawaii 79 P.3d decide extended terms mandatory him minimum necessary ment were and four and, therefore, term of three public, the extended term months conviction unlawful use for his imposed by circuit sentences court ran pursuant § 329- drug paraphernalia, to HRS afoul the United States Court’s 43.5(a), drug as unlawful use of inasmuch Jersey, Apprendi New decision v. U.S. paraphernalia is not one the enumerated (2000), 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (1993 class C in HRS 706-606.5 & felonies compelling this court to “strike down Ha- Supp.2003).6 waii’s extended term scheme Kaua, alia, counters, v. prosecution overrule State 102 Hawai'i inter (2003)[,] Hauge, properly P.3d 473 to extend- and State Rivera was *4 (b) expression imprisonment gender-related The maximum terms of is different die traditionally authorized for each of crimes, defendant’s with from that associated consecutively, if made to run person's sex at birth. equal length would exceed in the max- or imposed imum of the extended term or 5. We Kaua decline Rivera’s invitation to overrule equal forty years would or exceed if the Hauge in and for the reasons discussed infra extended felony. is for a A class Section III.A. (5) against defendant is an offender provides part: 6. HRS in relevant 706-606.5 elderly, handicapped, a minor or under the age eight, imprisonment (1) repeat of whose for an Sentencing Not- offenders. necessary protec- extended term is any withstanding other section 706-669 and public. tion of the The court shall not contrary, any person law convicted to the finding make this unless: degree, any in class A felo- murder the second (a) any attempts The defendant or commits ny, felony, following any any B or class murder, following crimes: man- relating to class C felonies: section 188-23 slaughter, a sexual offense consti- electrofishing possession explosives, or use chapter tutes a bery, under rob- devices, poisonous in state wa- and substances assault, burglary, felonious or ters; negligent relating 707-703 to section kidnapping; and relating degree; homicide in the first 707-711 defendant, (b) The in the course of commit- degree; 707-713 relat- to assault in the second ing crime, ting attempting or to commit the endangering degree; reckless in the first to bodily inju- inflicts serious or substantial threatening relating to 707-716 terroristic ry upon person a who is: relating degree; unlawful 707-721 to first older; (i) Sixty years age or imprisonment degree; first 707-732 re- Blind, (ii) paraplegic, quadriplegic; a or a lating rape third assault in the to sexual or or sodomy degree; relating in the 707-735 to (iii) younger; Eight age or and degree; relating abuse third 707-736 to sexual (c) reasonably disability known or Such is relating pro- degree; to in the 707-751 first should be to the defendant. known degree; moting 707- abuse the second child (6) The a hate crime defendant offender degree; relating extortion in the second to whose extended term relating burglary to in the second 708-811 necessary pub- degree; relating property 708-821 to criminal finding this lic. The court not make shall damage degree; relat- 708-831 in the second unless: ing degree in the first as amended to theft (a) The crime defendant is convicted 1981; Act Laws of 708-831 Session Hawaii 707, 708, 711; chapter or and degree; relating 708- theft in the second to (b) intentionally selected a livestock; relating theft 708-836 835.5 to victim, property or in the case of propelled relating unauthorized control of to crime, property object that was vehicle; relating forgery in the 708-852 to crime, hostility because toward degree; relating 708-854 to criminal second race, perceived religion, actual or ability, dis- device; forgery possession relat- 708-875 origin, ethnicity, gender national counterfeiting; 710-1071 re- trademark to identity expression, or or sexual orienta- witness; intimidating lating 711-1103 re- to purposes person. tion of For of this riot; relating promoting lating 712-1203 to subsection, identity "gender expres- prostitution degree; second 712-1221 person’s per- sion" actual or includes degree; relating gambling in the first gender, person’s gen- ceived well as a possession gambling relating rec- identity, self-image, gender-related der relating degree; ords in the first 712-1243 gender-re- gender-related appearance, or degree; promoting dangerous drug third in the expression; regardless lated of whether relating promoting a detrimental gender identity, gender-related that image, gender-related appearance, self- relating drug degree; first (a) ed terms of because down on 2004 and June cited pass §§ prosecution answering and constitutional in its brief and which (b) Kaua, Apprendi muster and Apprendi .under affirms focuses the defects Supreme the United States Court’s decision sentencing guidelines. Thus, of determinate — U.S.-, Blakely Washington, v. present question matter addresses (2004), 159 L.Ed.2d does not Blakely continuing viability whether calls the Kaua, holding in alter this court’s analysis question.7 of our into Kaua proper- record Rivera was demonstrates We hold that Hawai'i’s extended term sen- ly repeat sentenced as a offender. tencing incompatible is not scheme responds “pursuant Blakely v. Washington, inasmuch as United States Court’s recent deci- Blakely only statutory addresses “determi- Blakely Washington, sion in the Hawai'i schemes, sentencing “guideline” nate” scheme, extended term which al- analysis court’s “intrinsic-extrinsic” cul- facts, judge lows a to find enhancement de- minating in compatible Kaua with both right nied to a [him] his trial.” Blakely Apprendi. Additionally, we hold properly that the circuit court sentenced Riv- analysis We note that this court's and deci- repeat era as a offender. dispose point sion Kaua of Rivera’s first Accordingly, appeal. error on we would not *5 I. BACKGROUND argument address Rivera’s Kaua is un- 2002, published opinion September 27, constitutional prosecution another On Blakely, it charged complaint were not for which was by handed Rivera with the follow- Frank, ownership possession siding, or of firearms or ammu- filed an order Kaua v. Civ. No. crimes; SOM/BMK, 848, persons F.Supp.2d nition convicted certain 03-00432 350 2004 etc., relating ownership, prohibited (D.Haw. 9, 2004), granting WL 2980265 Dec. weapons; relating permits carry, petition, pursuant Kaua’s to 28 United States attempting or who is (U.S.C.) 2254(d)(1) (2003), convicted to commit § Code to vacate his degree, any murder in the second class A 2254(d)(1) felo- § pro- sentence. U.S.C. ny, any felony, any B class C class vides: felony above offenses enumerated and who has application An corpus a writ of habeas prior conviction or convictions for tire custody person pursuant on behalf of a felonies, following including attempt judgment of a State court shall not be murder, commit the murder in same: the first granted respect claim that was degree, felony, or second class A a class B adjudicated pro- on merits in State court felony, any felony of the class C offenses enu- ceedings adjudication unless the of the claim— above, any felony merated conviction of (1) contrary resulted decision in a that was jurisdiction another shall be sentenced to a to, of, application or involved an unreasonable mandatory period imprisonment minimum law, clearly established Federal as determined parole possibility during peri- without such Supreme Court United States[.] od as follows: The district court held that this court’s conclu- Kaua, 1, 473, sion in (b) 102 Hawai'i "that prior felony Two convictions: Appren- Kaua's extended did not violate to, contrary di (iv) was involved an unreasonable Where the instant conviction is for a of, law, application clearly felony established federal as class C offense enumerated months; Supreme determined the United States years, four above—three Frank, F.Supp.2d Court.” Kaua v. (2) (3), 2004 WL 2980265. The district court Except person also noted as in subsection "[wjhile 'persuasive mandatory circuit law shall not be to a au- mini- thority' purposes determining period imprisonment mum whether a under this sec- applica- state court tion unless the offense decision is unreasonable instant was com- law, during Supreme only tion period mitted such as follows: Court holdings binding Court's on the state courts (d) prior felony only holdings reasonably ap- Within ten after a those need be Frank, prior felony plied.” n.6, F.Supp.2d viction where the conviction Kaua v. at 856 felonyf.] (quoting Murphy, was for a B class 2004 WL 2980265 Clark v. cert, added.) denied, (Emphasis (9th Cir.)), 331 F.3d (2003). U.S. 124 S.Ct. 157 L.Ed.2d 313 9, 2004, Accordingly, 7. We on further note that December we decline to follow the district analysis, substantially United States Court for the court’s District District of which mirrors Jus- Hawai'i, Mollway pre- Old tice Honorable Susan Acoba's. (1) dangerous drug fy marijuana promoting vegetable offenses: matter and that (Count I), § crystal-like crystal violation HRS substance was meth- (2) 1; supra drug see amphetamine. note unlawful use (Count II), paraphernalia violation HRS 11, 2003, July jury On returned a 321M3.5(a), 2; supra pro- see note guilty charged verdict of as on all three moting drug third de- detrimental counts. (Count gree III), in violation of 712- supra following see note 3. The facts 6, 2003, August prosecution On filed trial, were adduced at Rivera’s following motions: motion for ex- July commenced on 2003 and on ended imprisonment multiple as a tended terms July offender, 706-662(4)(a), pursuant to HRS 4; supra see note a motion for extended 19, 2002, September On approximately persistent term of as a offend- a.m., Basuil, security guard 8:55 Reeardo er, 706-662(1), pursuant supra to HRS see (the posted Colony at the Island Ho- Hotel 4; note a motion for as a tel), responded report ato Hotel’s offender, repeat pursuant to HRS front sleeping desk that there was someone 606.5, see note 6. twenty-sixth proceeded floor. Basuil twenty-sixth floor found where he sentencing' The circuit court conducted a sleeping hallway. ap- Rivera in the Basuil 8, 2003, hearing during on October which it and, him, proached Rivera within two feet prosecution’s two considered the motions for plastic bag observed a small and an “ice extended terms of and the mo- pipe” on the two floor inches from Rivera. repeat tion for as a offender. Upon drug par- recognizing the two items motions, opposed prosecution’s aphernalia, Basuil directed front the Hotel’s expressly but stated that understood that he notify Depart- desk to the Honolulu Police repeat applies “the offender statute here and *6 (HPD). ment Choy, HPD Officers Naka- that an to obligation [c]ourt has sone, and Ho'okano thereafter arrived mandatory The circuit court minimumf.]” Rivera, Choy approached Hotel. who Officer granted prosecution’s all three of motions sleeping hallway, was still in ob- and orally and as follows: glass pipe served a with a bulbous and a end [Although you THE COURT: come plastic marijuana “baggy” clear with a leaf say today you making good and that [are] design printed iton on the floor him. beside efforts, you that, and I do I commend Choy photographs Officer took of Rivera and believe, instance, particular in this glass plastic they pipe baggy and where [prosecution’s] motion for extended term lay. training experience, Based on his and So, therefore, [prosecu- warranted. Choy glass pipe Officer identified the as be- motions for tion’s] term[s] extended [are] type crystal of to heat metham- used granted. I will not the terms to order be phetamine vapors. and inhale its Officer consecutive, I think has to but there be a Choy portion also observed the bulbous your point you step in life for take a pipe contained a black and white resi- just applying pro- than [rather] forward due, judged crystal metham- he trial, your you grams step after take a and phetamine after it been heated. history, criminal I further. extensive placed Officer ar- Ho'okano Rivera under think it has to and be cheeked double promotion dangerous drugs rest for of checked, system, by your- but degree, Choy proceeded the third and Officer you try, really and this is self to make sure to conduct a incident to ar- search Rivera’s you what want to do. plastic Choy rest. Officer recovered a small So, 1, bag leafy you containing vegetable and in Count I’ll to 10 matter 2,10 3, bag crys- years; plastic containing years; a second small Count Count pocket. days. mandatory mini- tal-like from Rivera’s front In Counts and substance that, Stacy HPD criminalist Riede testified mum sentence three four through testing, she determined that the lea- months. Dangerous Promoting the circuit court filed the offense October

On Drug Degree, an offense granting prosecution’s the Second a written order offender, felony repeat as a motion for which constitutes class B following: which stated the Hawaii Code. The defined Penal February committed on offense was having [T]he [c]ourt [Rivera] found offender, 1995.... repeat pursuant is a to Section Stat- Hawai[’]i 706-606.5 of the Revised 15, 1996, in No. d.On Cr. October (HRS) ], prior] based [ [Rivera’s utes 96-1456, convict- Defendant Rivera Promoting a conviction for the offense of Promoting a Dan- ed the offense Degree, Dangerous Drug the Second Drug Degree, gerous the Second pursuant Section B a class felo- offense which constitutes [HRS], No. under Criminal ny as the Hawaii Penal Code. defined prior] offense conviction for the [Rivera’s on October was committed offense Dangerous Drug in the Promoting a 12.1995.... 712- Degree, pursuant Second Section 2. The further finds Defen- [c]ourt [HRS], 1242 of the No. under Criminal “persistent is a offender” dant Rivera prem- being fully advised for an term is whose commitment orally granted Motion having said ises necessary public protection of the for the Offender, Repeat Sentencing following facts: because IT IS HEREBY ORDERED his- criminal a. Rivera’s Defendant is[,] be[,] aforesaid and the same motion tory eighty-two re- included arrests hereby granted, and is sentenced [Rivera] sulting prior felony convic- in three impris- mandatory minimum term tions in addition to convictions for (3) years and four onment three (27) misdemeanor, petty twenty-seven possibility parole. months without the and violations. misdemeanor circuit court On November b. Rivera has exten- Defendant (FOFs), findings its con- filed written fact history, sive criminal the characteristics (COLs), granting clusions of law order involved a convic- of which have prosecution’s motion Rape act tion the violent offender, persistent as a (2) separate and two Degree Second follow- wherein circuit entered the Dangerous Promoting victions for COLS, FOFs, ing relevant and order: *7 Drug Degree. in the Second 1. finds that Defendant [c]ourt criminality c. Defendant Rivera’s a “persistent Rivera is offender” within the being pe- despite to continued meaning of Section probation riods of and incarceration both following facts: [HRS] because of the prior instant in his convictions. In the a. Rivera was born on Defendant case, found Rivera Defendant eighteen March and methamphet- guilty possession age or older the time amine, marijua- drug paraphernalia and commission of the listed below. offenses Riv- It na. is evident Defendant 20, 1977, January b. On No. Cr. with the criminal era’s involvement Rivera was convicted Defendant justice him system has not deterred Rape the offense of the Second activity. from further criminal Degree, an which constitutes a offense has failed to d. Defendant B Act felony class as defined justice system. from criminal benefit 1972. The was commit- S.L.H. offense Rivera has demonstrat- e. Defendant ted on March 1976. At all relevant rights disregard ed total for the during proceedings, Defen- times these poor has a towards others and attitude represented dant coun- Rivera was law. sel.... 27, 1996, f. Rivera has demonstrat- c. No. 95- Defendant On June Cr. pattern criminality indi- Rivera was convicted ed Defendant that said likely IT IS ORDERED cates that to be recidivist FURTHER he concurrently. run conform his behavior to terms to he cannot requirement of the law. added). (Emphases g. quantity Due to the serious- Also on circuit November past ness Rivera’s convic- Defendant COLs, FOFs, its and order filed written of the tions the seriousness instant granting prosecution’s motion for extend- offenses, poses a Defendant Rivera seri- multiple of- imprisonment as a ed terms of communityU his ous threat to the fender, the circuit court wherein entered necessary long term for incarceration FOFs, COLS, following and order: relevant public. of the [cjourt finds 1. that Defendant consideration 3. Pursuant “multiple Rivera is a offender” within other HRS Sec factors 706-662(4)(a) meaning be- HRS Section [cjourt [(1993) ],[8] tion 706-606 fur for two cause has been sentenced he ther term sentences that extended finds felonies, to wit: need to be to reflect the serious Cr. No. 02-1-2128 offenses, promote respect of the to ness law, provide just punishment for the I: Count offenses, adequate afford deterrence Promoting Dangerous Drug in the conduct, public protect criminal (HRS 712-1243; Degree Third Section Rivera, crimes farther of Defendant felony) a class C provide Defendant Rivera needed ed Count II: training, ucational or vocational medical Drug Paraphernalia Unlawful Use care, or other treatment in the correctional (HRS 32íM3.5(a); class C Section most effective manner. felony) [cjourt above, this

4. Based on the fur- “per- finds ther Rivera is a Defendant Upon consideration of the nature offender”, eligible for sistent and the of the offenses circumstances (10) years imprisonment of terms of ten history and characteristics of Defendant Rivera, each class C offenses as mandated HRS Section [cjourt 606(1), 8,] I and II. Counts fur- supra note [see is a that Defendant Rivera ther finds ORDER “multiple whose commitment offender” pro- necessary for the terms ACCORDINGLY, IT HEREBY IS OR- follow- public tection of the because [prosecutionj’s DERED that Motion ing facts: Imprisonment For Extended Term Of Of be[,J his- a. Rivera’s criminal A same Defendant Persistent Offender is, tory eighty-two re- hereby granted. IT arrests IS FURTHER included (3) prior felony convic- sulting in three Rivera be sen- ORDERED Defendant tions addition to convictions imprison- tenced the extended terms *8 (27) misdemeanor, (10) petty twenty-seven years of for of class ment ten each I and and violations. felony II. misdemeanor C offenses Counts (c) public protect crimes provides: To 8. 706-606 from further defendant; and imposing Factors to be considered a sen- of (d) court, provide with needed determining particular the defendant The To tence. imposed, training, to be consider: medi- shall educational or vocational (1) care, The and circumstances of the of- nature treatment cal or other correctional history and the and characteristics of the manner; fense defendant; effective in the most available; (3) kinds of sentences The (2) imposed: The need for the sentence need to avoid unwarranted offense, (a) To of the reflect the seriousness disparities among rec- defendants with similar law, promote respect pro- for and to to vide guilty similar have been found ords who offense; just punishment for conduct. (b) adequate To deterrence to crimi- afford added). (Emphases conduct; nal 154 tiple offender,” eligible

b. Defendant Rivera has an for exten- extended terms history, years sive criminal characteristics of ten for each felony felony which involved convic- have the class C offenses in Counts I act Rape tion for violent and II. Degree separate and two

Second Promoting Dangerous viction's for ORDER Drug Degree. in the Second ACCORDINGLY, IT IS HEREBY OR- criminality Rivera’s e.Defendant has [prosecution]’s DERED that Motion being despite pe- continued sentenced to Imprisonment For Extended Terms Of Of probation riods both and incarceration be[,] is, Multiple A Offender and the same prior in his convictions. the instant , hereby granted. case, found Defendant Rivera IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that De- guilty possession methamphet- fendant to Rivera be sentenced the extend- amine, drug paraphernalia marijua- ed terms of of ten It na. Defendant evident Riv- each of the class C offenses in era’s involvement with the criminal Counts I and II. justice system has not deterred him IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that said activity. from further criminal concurrently. terms are to run has, d. Rivera Defendant failed to justice system. added). criminal benefit from (Emphases e. Rivera has Defendánt demonstrat- 2003, 4, timely On November filed a disregard rights ed a total appeal. notice poor others attitude towards the law. II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW f. Defendant Rivera has demonstrat- A. Sentencing pattern criminality ed a indi- likely cates that he is to be a recidivist sentencing judge general [A] conform his he cannot behavior to ly has in imposing broad discretion requirement of the law. Gaylord, sentence. State v. 78 Hawai'i g. quantity 127, 143-44, to the 1167, Due serious- P.2d 890 1183-84 past (1996); Valera, ness of Defendant Rivera’s 424, convic- v. 74 State Haw. 435, 376, (1993). tions and the seriousness the instant 848 P.2d 381 ... offenses, poses Defendant Rivera applicable seri- standard review for sen community!,] ous threat and his tencing resentencing matters long necessary term incarceration is plain whether the court committed public. manifest of discretion in abuse its deci Gaylord, sion. Hawai'i 890 Pursuant consideration 1184; Kumukau, P.2d at other State under HRS Sec- factors 218, 227-28, Haw. 8], 787 P.2d tion see note 706-606[ (1990); [cjourt [,] Murray State v. Haw. extended term further finds (1980); 621 P.2d State v. sentences need to be to reflect the 226, 231, Fry, offenses, 61 Haw. 602 P.2d promote seriousness (1979). law, just respect provide punishment offenses, adequate for the afford deter- State, 281, 284, Keawe v. Hawai'i conduct, protect rence criminal (1995). “[Factors which public crimes plain indicate a and manifest abuse of dis- fuHher of Defendant *9 Rivera, provide Defendant Rivera with arbitrary capricious cretion are or action or training, needed educational vocational judge rigid and a refusal to consider care, medical or other correctional treat- Fry, defendant’s contentions.” 61 “ ment in the most effective manner. 231, And, Haw. '[gen- at 602 P.2d at 17. above, erally, this [c]ourt Based fur- an ap- abuse it must constitute pear ther finds that clearly Defendant Rivera is a “mul- the court exceeded the

155 disregarded bounds of or in reason rules or construe it consistent manner principles practice purpose. its of law or to the substan- ” party litigant.’ tial of a detriment doubt, When there doubleness of Keawe, 284, 79 Hawai'i at 901 P.2d at 484 meaning, or indistinctiveness uncer- (quoting 144, Gaylord, 78 at 890 statute, tainty expression an used Hawai'i Kumukau, P.2d (quoting at 1184 71 Haw. ambiguity exists.... 227-28, 688)). at 787 P.2d at construing statute, ambiguous meaning ambiguous “[t]he words 7, Kaua, 1, 473, State v. 102 Hawai'i 72 P.3d may sought by examining context,, be (2003) Rauch, (quoting 479 State v. 94 Haw words, ambiguous with which phras- 315, 322, 324, (2000)) ai'i 13 P.3d 331 es, may compared, and sentences be (brackets ellipsis original). points order to meaning.” ascertain their true Questions B. Constitutional Law (1993) Of Moreover, § [ ]. may courts resort to extrinsic aids in questions of “We answer constitu determining legislative intent. One ave- tional ‘by exercising indepen law our own legislative history nue is use of as an judgment dent based on facts of ” interpretive tool. case,’ and, thus, questions of constitution 148, Gray, 84 Hawai'i at P.2d al law 931 at 590 appeal are reviewed on “under the (iquoting 8, Toyomura, v. 80 Jenkins, State Hawaii ‘right/wrong’ v. standard.” State (brack 18-19, 893, (1995)) 87, 904 100, 13, (2000) P.2d 903-04 93 Hawai'i 997 26 P.2d (footnote (citations omitted). ellipsis points original) ets and omitted). may This court also consider Kaua, 7, (quot 102 72 at 479 Hawai'i P.3d law, spirit “[t]he reason 17, 22, Aplaca, v. State 96 Hawai'i 25 legislature cause which induced the en- 792, (2001)). P.3d 797 meaning.” act it ... to discover its true 15(2)(1993). Statutory Interpretation pari C. “Laws in 1— materia, subject matter, upon the same interpretation “[T]he of a shall be construed with reference each question is a statute of law reviewa-. other. What clear one statute Arceo, ble 84 de novo.” State v. Hawai'i n upon explain called in aid to what is doubt- 1, (1996) 10, 843, P.2d (quoting 928 852 (1993). ful in another.” HRS 1-16 Camara, 324, 329, v. State 81 Hawai'i Kaua, 7-8, 102 Hawai'i 72 P.3d 479-480 (1996) (citations 1225, 916 P.2d 1230 Rauch, 322-23, (quoting 94 Hawai'i at 13 omitted)). Toyomura, v. See also State Kotis, 331-32(quoting P.3d at v. State 91 8, 18, 893, 80 Hawai'i 904 P.2d 903 (1999) 327, 319, 78, (quot Hawaii 984 P.2d 86 (1995); Higa, 1, 3, v. 79 Hawai'i State 262, Dudoit, 266, ing State v. 90 978 Hawai'i 928, (1995); 897 930 P.2d v. Naka- State 700, Stocker, (quoting P.2d 704 v. State ta, 360, 365, 699, 76 P.2d Hawai'i 878 704 85, 90-91, 399, 90 Hawai'i 976 P.2d (1994).... (1999) (quoting Leftwich, Ho v. 88 Hawai'i Gray v. Administrative Director 251, 793, 965 P.2d Court, 138, 144, 580, 84 Hawai'i 931 P.2d (quoting Korean Buddhist Dae Won Sa Tem (1997) (some 586 brackets added some Sullivan, 217, 229-30, ple v. 87 Hawai'i 953 Soto, original). See also State 84 1315, 1327-28(1998))))))). P.2d (1997). Hawai'i 73 P.2d Furthermore, statutory our construction is D.Plain Err.or “ guided by established rules: plain may recognize ‘We error statute, construing

When our foremost when affects substan the error committed ” obligation give rights ascertain and tial effect the defendant.’ State v. Cordeiro, 390, 405, legislature, the intention 99 Hawai'i P.3d denied, primarily is to be obtained reconsideration Hawai'i language (quoting contained the statute itself. 58 P.3d State v. Jenkins, 87, 101, statutory language And we must read 93 Hawai'i Cullen, (quoting the context statute entire State v. Hawai'i *10 (1997))). 955, right by jury. sixth to trial also ed his amendment See view, Blakely analysis HRPP Procedure] vis-a-vis Rules of Penal In our the [Hawai'i (“Plain 52(b) (1993) meaning of Apprendi Rule error or defects the confined the affecting rights may noticed “statutory substantial be within construct maximum” the although they brought “guideline” were context determinate sen- court”). tencing attention Inasmuch as Hawaii’s schemes. ex- sentencing is indeter- tended term structure Hauge, at 141 103 Hawai'i 79 P.3d minate, Blakely we that does not believe Matias, (quoting 102 Hawai'i State v. analysis that the “intrinsic-extrinsic” (2003)). affect 75 P.3d court articulated Kaua. this III. DISCUSSION majority that Blakely explained “the Sentencing Term A. Hawaii’s Extended ‘statutory Apprendi purposes maximum’ Incompatible With The Scheme Is Not judge maximum im- is the Supreme Deci- United States Court’s solely pose the basis on facts reflected Blakely Washington. sion In v. jury by or admitted verdict defen- - at-, dant.” U.S. argues that the United words, (emphasis original). “In other Court’s recent decision States ‘statutory maximum’ is not the max- relevant Blakely Washington renders Hawaii’s ex judge may impose imum sentence a after sentencing unconstitu tended term scheme facts, finding but maximum additional he right to tional insofar’ as it denied him his may impose any without additional facts.” by jury imposing trial sen extended term original). Accordingly, (emphasis Id. upon by based facts found the sentenc tence Apprendi ie., any that oí essential mandate by jury. court but not Rivera sub — prior must fact other than a conviction be have mits that the cireúit court could not beyond jury proved submitted to a his based terms doubt —is unaffected reasonable solely beyond jury on the facts that the found Blakely. Blakely can Court’s decision rea- trial, his it was a reasonable doubt at because construed, then, sonably gloss as a be on posttrial circuit find court that made the clarifying upward Apprendi, that the limit ing that sentences were “nec extended term sentencing any given presumptive range Riv essary public.” for the statutory utilizing prescribed in a scheme that, ‘public propounds inasmuch as “this era sentencing system “guideline” “determinate” pun protection’ finding was ‘essential to the “statutory constitutes the maximum” received, it had to made [he] ishment’ be ” upon that a whom a sentence ex- jury Apprendi Blakely. We dis ceeding “statutory maximum” agree. procedural protections is entitled to all of the Blakely perceived on the defects of focused Apprendi articulates. Washington sentencing state’s determinate foregoing, In connection scheme, applying the rule the Court had majority Blakely reasoned as follows: i.e., Apprendi, previously crafted that, conviction, argues than fact of a Justice O’CONNOR be- “[o]ther penalty sentencing schemes in- fact increases the cause determinate judicial judi- beyond statutory volving factfinding maxi- less prescribed entail crime schemes, jury, cial than mum must submitted to a discretion implies Ap constitutionality of proved doubt.” the latter a reasonable Post, constitutionality of former. rendi, 120 S.Ct. 2348. U.S. Thus, majority argument flawed Blakely held that a Wash- at 2543-2548. This on First, ington court’s a number of levels. the Sixth a defendant than 53-month its terms is not limitation more three above the Amendment statutory prescribed judicial power, but a maximum of the “stan- reservation offense, judicial only to range” power. power limits dard for his on the basis of It judicial power in- finding claimed judge’s that the defen- extent jury. cruelty, fringes province violat- dant had acted with on the Inde- deliberate

157 13, holding, sentencing It P.3d at In this does not do so. at 72 so terminate discretion, sure, judicial but increases to be court noted expense jury’s traditional not at the fundamental distinction between finding function of facts essential predicate facts described nature imposition penalty. lawful Of course (4), 706-662(1), (3), §§ ... in and HRS judicial involve indeterminate schemes hand, in one and those described on the (like factfinding, parole in that a judge 706-662(5) (6), §§ ... on and HRS board) may implicitly on those facts rule Specifically, facts at issue in other. important of his deems to the exercise he sentencing rendering an extended term sentencing But facts do discretion. §§ 706- determination under HRS pertain to whether has a not the defendant (3), 662(1), implicate and consider- right legal to a lesser sentence —and completely to the ele- ations “extrinsic” judicial all as makes the difference insofar which the de- of the offense with ments upon impingement traditional role of charged was which he and of fendant jury is concerned. convicted; they accordingly, should was at-, (emphasis 124 at 2540 -U.S. judge by sentencing found added). Thus, Blakely majority’s decla- [, with v. Huelsman [State accordance 'J ration that indeterminate does (1979),] its 588 and 60 Haw. P.2d 394 jury’s factfinding abrogate the traditional pur- at progeny. The facts issue effectively function excises indeterminate 706-662(5) (6), §§ and poses of HRS sentencing schemes such as Hawaii’s from are, nature, however, by very “in- their analysis. sixth the decision’s amendment See to the with which the trinsic” offense People Claypool, v. Mich. 684 470 which he charged was and of defendant (“[T]he majority N.W.2d convicted; they accordingly, has been [Blakely did ] made clear that the decision found a reasonable must be sentencing sys- not affect doubt of fact order trier tems.”). such, analysis As Kaua court’s constitutional afford the defendant his vitality respect its retains Rivera’s procedural process and a rights to due 706-662(1) present challenge §§ and HRS by jury. Tafoya, Hawai'i at trial (4)(a) disposes of his claim that the cir- Schroeder, 900-01; P.2d at imposing cuit court erred extended term 880 P.2d at 203. Hawai'i sentences. 12-13, (emphases 72 P.3d at 484-85 Id. at Kaua reaffirmed the “intrinsic-extrinsic” added). analysis first this court articulated at 152- Hawai'i Hauge, 103 Schroeder, 517, 880 v. 76 Hawai'i State deleted) (brackets original). (emphases (1994), and P.2d 192 reaffirmed State Kaua, Hauge held Based we Tafoya, 91 Hawai'i 982 P.2d 890 706-662(1), note is not see (1999), rejected argu- the defendant’s allows unconstitutional. HRS Apprendi a “mul- mandated that ment “defen- if the for extended determination, purposes tiple offender” imprison- persistent is a offender whose dant 706-662(4)(a), §HRS must be made necessary for for an extended term is ment fact, holding that HRS the trier public” protection of the and the defendant passed un- § 706-662 constitutional muster of two felo- “previously been convicted der the Hawai'i United States Consti- times when the committed different nies facts foundation- “[t]he tutions age or old- eighteen years of was terms of al to ar- Hauge, defendant-appellant 706-662(4)(a), ..., er.” pursuant to fell now, Ap- that “under thus, gued, Rivera does rule, and, as Apprendi outside the finding term of prendi, the that an extended finding was a defendant] that [a ultimate ‘necessary imprisonment is ‘multiple crimi- offender’ whose extensive ‘separate apart [the public’ prison nal actions warranted extended facts’ findings predicate properly province court’s] within the terms therefore, Kaua, and, submitted ‘should have been sentencing court.” 102 Hawai'i *12 proven beyond imprisonment. to a and minimum of reasonable mine terms ” 59-60, 258-52, amended, Hauge, doubt.’ 103 Hawai'i 79 as Section was recodi- Nevertheless, 711-76, P.3d at § 152-53. we to pursuant concluded fied 1968 HRS that, Kama, (1968).. argument 1972, light Hauge’s § Act 16 In HRS 711-76 § by HRS unconstitutional was repealed was Act 9 which enacted the without merit. Hawaii Penal Code. Code, part As of the Hawaii Penal HRS Blakely’s gloss The bottom line on (1993) § provides, [ 706-669 ] now inter

Apprendi, only statutory which addresses alia: “guideline” “determinate” schemes, ongoing does undermine the § 706-669 for Procedure determin-

viability of this court’s in Kaua. decision (1) imprisonment. minimum term of person When a has been sentenced to an term,

1. Hawaii’s indeterminate extended indeterminate or an extended term sentencing scheme imprisonment, paroling the Hawaii au- shall, system govern our thority practicable “Under as soon as but ment, power appropriate to determine no than later six months after commit- punishment legis for criminal acts lies custody ment to the of the director Bernades, lative branch.” department State 71 Haw. of social and services 485, 490, (1990) 842, (quoting 795 P.2d 845 housing hearing, hold a on the basis Freitas, State v. 61 hearing fixing Haw. 602 P.2d make an order (1979)). 914, 923 Hawai'i utilizes mandato imprisonment minimum term of to be ry scheme. prisoner See served before the shall become Bemades, Haw. at eligible parole. 795 P.2d at 844. for An “[a] indeterminate sentence is to commentary § As 706-669 imprisonment period for the maximum de states, policy “This section continues the law, subject by by fined to termination previous vesting law of the Board parol agency board or other [authorized] authority Paroles Pardons & the exclusive peri time service of after the minimum to determine the minimum time which by od” ordinarily paroling authority. set prisoner must be served before the will be (4th 1968). Dictionary Black’s Law ed. eligible parole.” for jurisdiction, In this a convicted defendant’s legislature has also restricted the culpability individual characteristics and judiciary’s authority respect with to the by Paroling considered the Hawai'i Authori kinds of may impose. sentences which it ty, impris the minimum sets (1976) provided: Section onment, (1993). pursuant § to HRS § imprisonment Sentence Bemades, 71 Haw. at 795 P.2d at 844. felony; for ordinary person A terms. Kido, In Haw.App. State v. 654 P.2d who felony has been of a convicted (1982), Ap- Court of Intermediate to be sentenced an indeterminate term (ICA) peals explained history of leg- imprisonment provided except as power islature’s allocation sentence: relating section 706-660.1 to the use paroling Prior authority felony firearms in certain offenses. judiciary recommended set ordering sentence, When such a minimum sentence which the convicted de- length court shall maximum required fendant was serve before be- imprisonment which shall be as fol- coming eligible parole discharge. lows: (RLH) [Revised Laws of ] Hawai'i felony years; For a class A —20 (1955). RLH 258-52[ ] was felony years; For a class B away amended Act 102 to take —10 judiciary give parol- and instead

ing authority authority years.191 the sole deter- For class C —5 provides: 9. HRS 706-660 now Sentence for class B Cand (or length Washington ten-year The minimum at 2537. codified 120-month) parol- shall Hawaii be determined maximum class B ing authority in accordance section Washington felonies Revised Code of (RCW) 706-669. 9A.20.021(l)(b). Nevertheless, Id. range” Apparently referring “presumptive guideline the amendments a class (1965), commentary forty-nine made Act B felony set between (1976) states, fifty-three HRS 706-660 inter alia: Id. months. at 2535. As noted *13 III.A, Blakely in Legislature In Section construed the enacted a law upward of designed judicially imposed presumptive guideline limit to end incon- range, imprisonment. ten-year sistent of and not the maximum sentences This sen- policy felony, as B “statutory true indeterminate tence for a class as the —known sentencing continued. The Blakely majority explained, court’s The maximum.” —is choosing discretion is limited between Apprendi, per- consistent with fact imprisonment and other modes of sen- mitting sentencing in upward excess tencing. has Once court decided to range limit of presumptive guideline imprisonment, sentence a felon to by must fact be found the trier of at trial by actual of is time release determined beyond a doubt. Id. at 2537. At reasonable parole Having authorities. decided on Blakely issue in was the fact the sen- imprisonment, the court must then im- tencing finding aggravating court’s of an pose the maximum term authorized.... i.e., that the had defendant acted with fact — [Footnotes omitted.] cruelty subjected deliberate the defendant — Id, 524-25, at 1357-59. to an Washington’s More- enhanced sentence under over, commentary scheme, sentencing guideline determinate footnote, contains a which states that “[i]t notwithstanding had not must, however, be remembered guilty in plea, admitted the fact nor had a grants court power impose Code found at trial it reasonable imprisonment” pursuant an extended of term doubt. lies Therein the distinction between (1993 Supp.2003).10 to HRS 706-661 & structure, sentencing Hawaii’s enhanced set 706-662, Washington’s forth in HRS and In contrast to Hawaii’s indeterminate sen- scheme, sentencing guideline tencing determinate scheme: Blakely issue in (1) Hawai'i, sentencing In Washington’s sentencing scheme inde- determinate struc- terminate, and, presumptive particularly, sentencing ture and there no court’s (2) imposition guideline thirty-seven range; of court a sentence months subjected fifty-three-month could not upward excess have the defendant to an statutorily imprisonment limit based on enumerated “standard term — at-, range.” Blakely, Blakely submitting U.S. same facts without felonies; ordinary felony may person terms. A who of a be to an extended has felony been convicted a class B or class C imprisonment. term of When may be sentence, sentenced to indeterminate term of ordering such the court shall im- imprisonment except provided for in as section pose length imprisonment the maximum relating 706-660.1 use firearms which as shall be follows: felony certain offenses and section 706-606.5 (1) degree For murder in the second —life relating repeat ordering When offenders. parole; possibility without sentence, impose such a the court shall (2) felony A For a class life —indeterminate length imprisonment maximum which shall imprisonment; term of be as follows: (3) felony class B For a —indeterminate felony years; B For a class For —-10 twenty-year imprisonment; term of felony years. C a class —5 For a class C ten- —indeterminate length imprisonment shall minimum be year imprisonment. term authority paroling determined the Hawaii length imprisonment The minimum accordance with section 706-669. (2), (3), [paragraphs] shall be deter- added). (Emphasis paroling authority mined the Hawaii provides: 10. HRS 706-661 accordance with section 706-669. felony; Sentence of ex- added.) (Emphases designated tended In the terms. cases sec- 706-662, person tion who has been convicted fact, which he to the offenses of facts to the because the extrinsic

those trier and, therefore, out- cruelty” presently been factor en- convicted aggravating of “deliberate factfinding purview jury’s “inextricably an “intrinsic” so en- side tailed fact function. actions in commit- meshed the defendant’s ting charged ... that the Hawai'i the offense Huelsman, two-step out a court set requires findings that these Constitution must process Kaua, 102 by the trier of fact[.]” made engage in order Tafoya, (quoting Hawai'i P.3d at P.2d at 398. 60 Haw. at sentence. 900-01). Hawai'i at 982 P.2d at step requires finding beyond a first within doubt that the defendant reasonable not err sen-

2. The circuit court did particular which the class of offenders to tencing extended terms Rivera to applies. Id. In of HRS 706-662 subsection persistent sentencing court finds that that the the event multiple offender. persistent *14 is a offender under defendant (1) under multiple or offender subsection “It is settled that an extended term (4), step requires the subsection the second sentencing hearing separate criminal is ‘a sentencing court to whether “the apart determine proceeding trial of the under offense,’ for an extended lying substantive ‘all rele defendant’s commitment wherein pub- necessary protection of the is for vant issues should the state term be established ” Kaua, lic.” Id. beyond a doubt.’ reasonable 9, (quoting Hawai'i at 72 P.3d at 481 State 8, 2003 course of sen- the October Kamae, 632, 56 Haw. 548 P.2d orally hearing, ruled tencing the circuit court (1976)). multi- persistent was both a and that Rivera may subject ple whose term sentences A convicted defendant offender extended necessary pub- protection if for of the imprisonment “[t]he an term of were extended lic, I, pertinent supra. crimi- Section multiple is a whose see based defendant offender history. part criminal nal actions were so that a sentence on Rivera’s extensive extensive reaffirmed, court in its No- imprisonment circuit then for an extended term COLs, FOFs, necessary protection public[,]” and for and vember written prosecution’s for granting for two motions being defendant orders “[t]he 706-662(4)(a). sentencing persistent and § term as a or more felonies....” HRS extended offender, subject “long multiple that term A convicted defendant also be Rivera’s necessary protec- if imprisonment “[t]he [was] an incarceration extended term of public” “quantity im- persistent is a whose tion of the due to the defendant offender past an convictions prisonment for term neces- seriousness Rivera’s instant offenses.” sary protection public[,]” and “the and the seriousness of the of the previously Accordingly, the circuit court adhered been convicted times mandate set forth in Huelsman two felonies committed at different eighteen years sentencing court “shall into the record when the defendant was enter 706-662(1). Thus, necessary to its findings of fact which age § or older.” all HRS Haw. P.2d at 407. subjected at what to an extended term decision.” Rivera Moreover, complied circuit with the imprisonment multiple as offender under court 706-662(4)(a) two-step finding that process, his cur- the fact of Huelsman was multiple persistent or offend- convictions of for two Rivera was rent felonies, that his ex- of each of which er and commitment more the elements protection necessary was prosecution had found term for the that the had tended at at 398. We public. Id. 588 P.2d proved doubt. Similar- reasonable in an subject say that the court acted ly, term of cannot circuit Rivera manner, it “arbitrary capricious” such that persistent as a or offender or “clearly of reason upon two felo- exceeded the bounds based or principles or of law ny disregarded times rules convictions committed at different older, eighteen years practice substantial detri- age [Rivera’s] at the facts III.A.1, commentary Kaua, to HRS 72 P.3d 102 Hawai'i Section ment[.]” See Thus, court’s discre- explains “[t]he circuit court’s at 479. inasmuch imprison- choosing imposition tion is limited to between of extended term sentences and, sentencing” passed under both the United States and other modes muster ment Constitutions, imprisonment, and Hawai'i the circuit court “[hjaving decided granting prosecution’s mo- did not err maximum author- must term then Kido, Haw.App. 654 P.2d tions for extended term sentences. ized.” See at 1358. Comparison judicial determina- 3. Thus, imposed upon had the circuit court protect public” ordinary tion “to falling “stan- within the sentencing and extended term sentenc- felony in I range” for a class C Counts dard II, probation it would chosen either have Acoba, dissent, in his Justice contends imprisonment, pursu- five-year or a determining crucial factors in whether mandatory § 706-660. For ant to HRS applies Blakely to HRS determining impose a guidance in whether to present matter were the circuit court’s imprisonment, probation Rivera to ex- determination looked to the circuit court would then have terms of was “neces- tended imposing “traditional” factors considered public” sary sentence, see pursuant to HRS subjected pronouncement fact that such a note “greater punishment than that Rivera to *15 matter, exercising general its As a when imposed on basis of the which could be the impose any particular broad discretion opinion guilty only.” Dissenting verdict punishment to so as to fit the the sentence 172,102 P.3d at 1070. of as well as to the needs the offense analogue It said that of Blake- could be the community, and individual defendant the by ly’s statutory range” prescribed “standard obligated sentencing bec[omes] court the sentencing Hawaii’s indeterminate scheme § “factors” 706-606 to consider the HRS statutory is the alterna- class C making process. part of its decision as probation and a a sentence of tive between imprisonment, pursuant to five-year term of (1993) (1993 man- § ] Supp.2003)11 [ ... HRS §§ 706-605 &

HRS classic 706-660, of the four swpm in consideration supra see note 9. As noted dates para- provides part: payment § fine in accordance in relevant of 11. HRS 706-605 (b), graph payment restitution and the of disposition of convicted defen- Authorized priority compensation have fee shall (1) parts Except provided in II and dants. as fine; payment payment over the chapter IV of this or section 706-647 pay- priority over shall have restitution section and of this subsections fee; compensation or ment of subject applicable provisions of this (e)To community perform for the services Code, may a convicted the court sentence defen- supervision governmental under disposi- following to one or more dant agency or charitable or- or benevolent tions: community ganization service or other (a) placed probation as authorized To he supervisor; provid- group appropriate or by chapter; part II of this per- person who ed that the convicted (b) by part pay authorized III To a fine as be deemed services shall not forms such chapter; and section 706-624 of this governmental employee of the to be an (c) imprisoned for a term as author- To be any assigned agency work site for chapter; part ized IV of this per- persons purpose. All (d) in an amount To make restitution community shall be service form pay; provided appropriate defendant can afford to and assessed screened placement may agency restitution governmental the court order pursuant paid place- coordinating public to victims to section work to be service compen- the crime victim 706-646 or to ment as a condition sentence. special a defendant fund in the event that the not sentence sation The court shall except au- given probation as an award for com- victim has been and, chapter. by part II of this chapter thorized pensation if the under added). orders, restitution, (Emphases in addition to court objectives retribution/just penal punish- quirement sentencing court consider — ment, deterrence, incapacitation, and re- all the factors set forth HRS 706-606 habilitation^] determining particular when imposed. Gaylord, 78 Hawaii 890 P.2d at (footnotes omitted). and citations matter, present the circuit court 706-606(2)(c) Specifically, provides HRS required was first to consider the factors set court sentencing shall consider the forth in in imposing HRS a sen- “protect need tence; so, doing circuit obviously court public from further crimes the defen- determined that the indeterminate maximum dant!;.]” of imprisonment each Rivera’s 706-606(2)(e) penal felonies, HRS reflects the class probation, C rather than objective “incapacitation.” appropriate sentence. See Section Furthermore, I. expressly circuit Incapacitation simple is the idea FOFs, COLs, noted its written and orders rendering

restraint: the convicted of- granting prosecution’s motions for time, ex- incapable, period for a fender persistent tended terms of as a offending again. Whereas rehabilitation multiple that it had offender considered changing person’s involves habits or factors enumerated attitudes so or she he becomes less § 706-606 inclined, and had determined that extended criminally incapacitation pre- appropriate term sentences were “to Instead, order supposes change. no such ob- protect public from further interposed crimes” com- impede stacles are Thus, mitted Rivera. Id. the circuit court person’s carrying out whatever criminal determined 706-606 that inclinations or she he have. Usual- penal objective classic “incapacitation” ly, prison, the walls of a obstacle primacy took Rivera in but ineapaeitative techniques other goal order to accomplish rendering possible exile house arrest. —such him incapable offending again for the inde- Ashworth,] A. [A. von Hirsch and Princi- period terminate maximum of time. As the pled Sentencing 101 [ ]. For the *16 circuit court findings, demonstrated in its probably latest and most empiri- definitive analysis § such an HRS under 706-606 was study relationship cal of the between inca- the basis for prison its determination that for pacitation reduction, and crime see F. term, maximum indeterminate rather than Hawkins, Zimring Incapacitation and G. probation, was appropriate the sentence for (1995). Rivera. Gaylord, 78 at 148 n. Hawai'i 890 P.2d at Therefore, n. explained as this court Admittedly, sentencing imposition a court’s Gaylord, sentencing required courts are to of an requires extended term sentence the penal objectives consider four the classic “necessary em- determination that is pro- it for 706-606(2) §

bedded HRS imposing public.” § when tection of the HRS 706-662. sentence, any ordinary Nevertheless, for whether ex- such a determination .or is effec- present tively tended terms. Most relevant to our sentencing the same one that the court analysis, sentencing courts must upon concluding evaluate has the made that a defendant imposed “need the ... pro- [t]o sentence should be to an indeterminate for public tect the crimes the maximum imprisonment term of rather than farther 606(2)(e)(emphasis probation § “ordinary” HRS sentencing prin- defendant^.]” 706— added). Consequently, in ciples. justifies case sen- The factor that the enhance- tencing statutory a defendant to our prison ment to sentence terms, range” therefore, scheme’s “standard a class prior C felo- is the fact of or multi- ny, jury’s ple verdict alone authorizes a sen- convictions. See Almendarez-Tor probation five-year States, tence of or a either res v. inde- United 523 U.S. term of

terminate maximum (noting L.Ed.2d § traditional, under HRS and that that authoriza- “recidivism ... if is not the jury’s traditional, tion verdict includes the re- most sentencing basis sentence”). increasing s court an offender’s Apprendi, senteneed. See 530 U.S. at Thus, sentencing judge acquires au- (reasoning 120 S.Ct. 2348 that both the “cer- thority impose to term sentence tainty procedural safeguards that to attached 706-662(1) only upon finding under HRS conviction, prior reality ‘fact’ of and the Apprewcfó-approved “additional fact” of a challenge that did not [the defendant] ... Moreover, prior §§ conviction. HRS ‘fact[,]’ mitigated process the due 662(1) 706-662(4) expressly mandate that and Sixth Amendment concerns otherwise sentencing court “shall make such a implicated allowing judge to determine finding” that an extended term is sentence increasing punishment beyond ‘fact’ max- “necessary protection public” un- range”). imum of statutory prior less the defendant or multiple felo- that, point, To our underscore we note Hence, ny convictions. “necessary range within the of discretion that Ha- public” determination alone imposing waii Penal affords courts in Code subject is insufficient defendant to ex- sentences, (1993)12 §HRS 706-668.5 author- contrast, imprisonment. tended terms of sentencing izes courts sentences sentencing finding in Blakely court’s consecutively under certain circumstances. cruelty, acted with deliberate aggravating was the sole factor that extend- permits HRS 706-668.5 consec- ninety ed the defendant’s sentence months sentencing multiple if utive terms of im- fifty-three-month statutory from the maxi- prisonment imposed de- criminal range. mum the standard legislative fendant at the same time. The purpose give is recapitulate, To the statute inasmuch both the sen- require tencing §§ 706-606 and 706-662 court discretion to the determi- de- nation whether fendant to a term to run protect public, concurrently consecutively. needed the sole either Dis- deter- mining remaining cretionary factor increases use consecutive sentences penalty properly imposed under Hawaii’s extended term sen- in order to deter future tencing defendant, the fact of a criminal behavior to in- conviction, a fact public safety, just pun- and to sure assure expressly sentencing Court authorized the ishment for the crimes committed. Absent again in Apprendi find in Blake- contrary, pre- clear evidence to it is factor, Similarly, ly. the sole those sumed that a court will have already enumerated in HRS 706-606 and imposing all considered factors before already court, considered imprison- current or consecutive terms of prison extends an (1993). ment under HRS *17 706-662(4)(a), § pursuant to is HRS the fact Tauiliili, 195, 199-200, State 96 Hawai‘i multiple a that defendant is a offender. The (footnotes and cita- determination, multiple pursuant offender to omitted). tions 662(4)(a), § mirrors the con- HRS 706— matter, present circuit had exception court Apprendi viction in because the § to the discretion HRS 706-668.5 already pleaded under guilty, either serve two thereby guilt, or sentence Rivera to consecutive admitted the trier of five-year maximum fact has found indeterminate terms reasonable doubt imprisonment that the defendant has for his convictions of class C committed two or currently being is in II “multiple more felonies for which he felonies Counts I and because rently provides: §HRS or 706-668.5 unless the court orders the statute consecutively. terms mandates that run Multiple imprisonment. sentence of If imprisonment Multiple imposed at terms of multiple imposed imprisonment terms of are consecutively time, different times run unless the on a or if defendant at the same a term of concurrently. run court orders that the terms imprisonment imposed on a defendant who court, determining already unexpired The in whether the subject to an term of imposed imprisonment, to be ordered concurrently terms are to run con- run terms consecutively, consecutively. currently Multiple imprison- or terms of or shall consider the ment at the same time run concur- factors set forth in 706-606. section Properly B. Sentenced imprisonment imposed on CouH [were] Circuit terms Repeat Again, As A circuit Rivera [him] time[.]” the same Offender. required to court would been consider have court erred argues that the circuit Rivera § in factors set forth HRS 706-606— offender, pur- repeat sentencing in him as public” including “protect to the need 706-606.5, § note suant see to HRS 706-606(2)(c) in § contained de- HRS —when II, use of for his Count unlawful conviction termining to whether consecutive drug violation of HRS paraphernalia, imprisonment. concurrent terms 329-43.5(a), § inasmuch unlawful use as § [B]y plain language of HRS felony drug paraphernalia is not a class C subject, pursuant to 668.5(2) although § 706-606.5 and — under HRS enumerated 706-668.5(1), presumptively § HRS trigger operation of cannot therefore sentencing in connection with mul- current basis, Rivera contends statute. On prison “imposed at tiple the same terms must and remanded his be vacated , obligated [is] court time” — disagree. proceedings. for further We forth in [HRS to “consider the factors set present mat- prosecution moved in the determining § 706-606” whether ] when repeat as a ter for Rivera be sentenced prison multiple terms were indeterminate 706-606.5(l)(b)(iv), offender, § under HRS concurrently consecutively. run mandatory minimum term of upon four based months three charged in his conviction of the offense § ... [T]he fact that HRS I, drug in dangerous promoting Count incorporated by reference into HRS third “an class C degree, enumerated profound significance. § 706-668.5 has 706-606.5(l)[.]” (in- It was Rivera’s under HRS Bearing in that all mind indeterminate drug promoting dangerous consecutive) conviction of cluding prison terms in- eligibility degree triggered his the third herently incapacitative, legislative sen- repeat offender tencing philosophy permeating ch. HRS 706-606.5(1). §HRS general par- and HRS 706-606 in discretionary ticular dictates that consecu- part provides 706-606.5 relevant HRS sentences, prison pursuant tive ... “any person convicted of 706-668.5, imposed only may properly felonies,” including following class C sought penal objectives if the to be relating a dan- promoting “712-1243[J (i.e., “just achieved des- include retribution gerous drug degree[,] third shall erts”) and deterrence. peri- mandatory to a minimum be sentenced pa- Gaylord, possibility 1190 od of without 78 Hawai'i at P.2d at ” (footnotes omitted). period.... (Emphasis add- during court role such Had circuit ed.) granting prosecution’s terms of im- In its order sentenced Rivera to consecutive II, sentencing, repeat prisonment I and motion for offender Counts the effect repeat ten-year circuit found that was a would have been upon his imprisonment, prior convictions maximum term of a term offender based ten-year two Nos. 95-2564 and both equal to the concumnt extend- Criminal *18 promoting danger- a involving that circuit the offense ed terms actually degree, in violation of imposed drug in this ous in the second court case. See su- Thus, felony. logic I. that a class B pra It the circuit HRS Section defies could, mandatory under Blakely, legiti- with Rivera’s minimum sentence court consistent 706-660.5(l)(b)(iv) sentence, ten-year prior mately impose for two felo- the same convictions, convic- ny instant comprised five-year “[w]here inde- two consecutive terms, ordinary tion for a class C offense enumerat- terminate maximum above[, year's, months.” three four sentencing principles, is] but run afoul of Blake- ed that Riv- ten-year court ordered ly imposing concurrent circuit therefore mandatory minimum finding to “a on era sentenced terms based be (3) years imprisonment of and multiple concurrent convictions. term of three expressly repeat that possibility conceded “the four months without Rivera parole.” applies statute here and that this offender [cjourt obligation a man- presumably grounds his Rivera assertion added). (Emphasis datory minimumU” a that circuit court him as Moreover, Rivera a motion for reconsid- filed upon his repeat offender based conviction 6, 2004, January his on eration sentence II, charged offense in unlawful use Count part: in which stated relevant drug paraphernalia, on the circuit court’s appeared this 2. The defendant before ruling, granted prosecution’s oral which [cjourt 8, sentencing on 2003 for in October sentencing repeat a motion for offender. time, motion, At case. that hearing prosecution’s the above-entitled At the on the following [e]ourt granted prosecution’s circuit court upon the defendant: of imprisonment motions terms 1, you that and stated “in Count I’ll sentence (as years persistent In Count one—10 years; years; to 10 in in Count Count offender) concurrent, multiple with a days. mandatory Counts mandatory three minimum sentence of years four minimum sentence of three years and months. four added). However, (Emphasis in months.” (as persistent In Count two—10 granting its October 2003 written order offender) multiple concurrent. prosecution’s repeat motion for offender days In Count three —30 with credit sentencing, specify court the circuit did not time served. mandatory count to minimum which the added). so, being That Rivera imprisonment applied. (Emphases cor- term Appel- comply Hawaii rectly cannot with Rules notes that the offense of unlawful use (HRAP) 28(b)(4) (2004), Rule drug paraphernalia among is not late Procedure those in requires show 706- which that he “where class C felonies enumerated 606.5(1), objected was to or possi- alleged error the conviction of which would i-eeord alleged error subject repeat the manner bly him to sentenc- offender 706-606.5(1), Riv- brought of the eourt[.]” to the attention ing. §HRS note 6. See Nevertheless, position regard now arguendo cannot “take assuming era repeat that] Riv- sentence as a offender orally [his circuit erred directly contrary what he repeat with to” asserted as a offender connection era II, point sentencing, nor raise as imposition its he error addition to oral Count object at appeal did not which he repeat offender sentence connection Roxas, I, sentencing. 89 Hawaii at any error was harmless. Count 28(b)(4). 1242; Rule For P.2d at HRAP matter, a preliminary As we note infra, discuss we decline reasons we judicially estopped chal Rivera is error, plain any error recognize inasmuch as lenging repeat his as a offender. orally circuit court in sen- committed tencing not affect his “substantial Rivera did judicial Pursuant to the doctrine of Hauge, 79 P.3d at rights.” 103 Hawaii estoppel, permitted party to main- [a] will positions tain inconsistent take grant if circuit court’s oral Even which is

position regard to matter prosecution’s repeat motion offend with, to, directly contrary or inconsistent manda misstated Rivera’s er him, previously assumed at least one to both prison applied minimum tory with, had, chargeable full he or was where II, is not viewed I and to be “[e]rror Counts facts, knowledge of will be another ab purely in the [or] in isolation considered prejudiced by his action. 25 P.3d at Aplaca, 96 Hawaii stract.” *19 (citations omitted). 124, Marcos, 91, with Hawai'i 969 800 “Consistent Roxas v. 89 (1998) (citation omitted). doctrine, 1209, frequently we At error have 1242 harmless 8, light hearing prosecu- that error ‘must be examined 2003 on the stated the October given proceedings and the effect sentencing, tion’s motions for extended term of the entire 166 obligation

to which the shows it is cireuit “an whole record enti- court had mandatory Id. imprison- tled.”’ minimum” term of ment 706-606.5 under HRS as a result error, case, impli- The fact that in this promoting his dangerous conviction of [Riverajs cates and not his I, drug, charged as in Count had viction does not render harmless error the. imposed very mandatory fact that minimum inapplicable. contrary, doctrine To the such, in connection with Count I. As hold we expressly HRS 641-16 states that (1) that possibility there is no that reasonable order, judgment, “[n]o or sentence shall be slip tongue the circuit oral court’s of the reversed or unless court modified is of that contributed Rivera’s sentence and opinion was committed error any resulting beyond was error harmless injuriously which affected the substantial' doubt. reasonable rights appellant.” (Emphasis add- ed). addition, In [Hawai‘i Rules of Penal IV. CONCLUSION (HRPP) 52, pro- ] Procedure Rule error, defect, “[a]ny irregulari- vides that foregoing analysis, Based on the we affirm ty!!,]or does not variance which affect sub- conviction, judgment the circuit court’s rights disregarded!!,]” stantial shall be sentences, repeat extended term offend- applicable penal proceedings, to all includ- er sentence. added.) (Emphasis sentencing. See 54(a) (2000) (“These HRPP Rule rules J., by ACOBA, Dissenting Opinion apply penal proceedings shall to all in all DUFFY, J., joins. whom courts except Hawaii State as — light Blakely In Washington, v. U.S. (b) rule.”). provided in subsection 2531, -, (2004), 124 159 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 403 Moreover, Supreme the United States Kaua, I prior believe our decisions in State v. Court has stated that most constitutional 1, (2003), 102 Hawai'i 72 P.3d 473 and State errors, including sentencing, those at can Hauge, 38, (2003), 103 Hawai'i 79 P.3d 131 See, e.g., be harmless. Arizona v. Fulmi view, my must In reexamined. Blake- nante, 306, 279, 1246, 499 111 U.S. S.Ct. ly, Supreme the United States Court further (1991). 113 L.Ed.2d 302 explicated holding Apprendi v. New (brackets original). Id. Jersey, 120 U.S. (2000), In its October written L.Ed.2d 435 and emphatically order reaf- granting prosecution’s repeat motion for firmed that the States United Constitution’s sentencing, right offender circuit court im- Sixth Amendment trial man- “ only mandatory posed prison one minimum dates that than fact ‘[o]ther of a conviction, years any term three and four months. In penal- fact increases the addition, ty the circuit court beyond prescribed crime statuto- years ry term sentences of Counts I jury, ten maximum must be submitted to a concurrently. II to run Accordingly, any proved reasonable doubt.’” — at-, Blakely, error the circuit committed U.S. S.Ct. at 2536 orally stating mandatory (quoting Apprendi, minimum U.S. at 120 S.Ct. 2348).1 imprisonment applied term both to applicable Counts The Sixth Amendment is harmless, is, I and II was through because Rivera to the States the Fourteenth fact, serving only mandatory one apply minimum Amendment and we are bound to given of three construction it four the United States Moreover, Court, express Supreme months. his own ad- it extent establishes mission, clearly understood that minimum against standard prosecution Supreme Blakely. Both the and case, opinion 1. Defendant cite tion of the Court Blakely. Garcia, In the court Defendant's filed its State v. Hawaii 29 P.3d Cf. (2001). event, judgment premises conviction and on October the core in Blake- . ly Apprendi, Blakely 2003. The Court decided on derived from which was decided Thus, 26, 2000, June premises inasmuch as Defendant’s June and insofar as such pending Blakely Blakely, Blakely case was review on direct when are set forth in references to decided, applica- encompass Apprendi. he is entitled retroactive would

167 Adrian, (the court), State v. government action. See II. The first circuit court exercis- (1969) (hold- discretion, ing granted Haw. pursu- its the motions § that the (Supp.2002).4 confrontation clause of the Sixth ant to HRS 706-662 HRS applicable § Amendment to the states and provides part in relevant as fol- interpre- therefore the U.S. Court’s lows: provision upon tation of the is binding this impris- Criteria for extended terms of court). Applying Blakely import of plain onment. A defendant convicted be qualified, it is unless otherwise it would subject imprison- to an extended term of appear proce- “the State’s 706-661, the convict- ment under section if comply [in dure this ease] did ed one or more defendant satisfies — Amendment,” Blakely, Sixth U.S. at following criteria:

-, 2538, and, thus, the sen- persistent tence on is a Defendant-Appellant Lar- The defendant offend- invalid[,]” id., (Defendant) ry for an ex- imprisonment “is er whose necessary protec- tended term is the case should be remanded for resentenc- for Blakely ing.2 I forth public. ap- set as it tion rule The court shall plies majori- case first this and discuss the finding not make this unless the de- rationale, ty’s second. previously fendant has been convict- of two ed felonies committed at dif- times when the ferent defendant was I. eighteen years age or older. trial, Following Defendant I, Promoting Dangerous victed Count Drug in Degree, the Third Hawai'i Revised multiple is a The defendant offender (HRS) 712-1243; II, § Statutes Count Un- were so ex- actions whose criminal of Drug Paraphernalia,

lawful Use imprison- tensive that a sentence of 329-43.5(a); III, Promoting and Count an ment extended term is neces- for Drug in Degree, Detrimental the Third sary public. 712-1249, except all C class felonies finding court shall not The make this III, petty Count which is a misdemeanor. unless: Thus, (1993),3 under HRS the “or- (a) being sentenced dinary” and “maximum” as to for two or more is al- felonies II, years, Count I is five as to Count five ready imprison- under sentence of III, years, days. thirty and as to Count Per- felony[.] ment here, Plaintiff-Appellee tinent of Ha- State wai'i moved have Defendant sentenced added.) (Emphases imprisonment an extended term of as a mul- tiple persistent offender and to term of Defendant imprisonment offender, persistent following as a offender the court made the “find- ings each of class I C felonies Counts of fact”: 2. The United States District Court for the District Sentence of for class ... C felonies; Hawai'i, ordinary person A Mollway, terms. who has Judge Oki Susan has ar- felony may been ... class C convicted of a be application Apprendi rived at a similar Kaua impris- Frank, F.Supp.2d Civ. No. sentence, ordering onment. ... When such a (D.Haw. 9, 2004). 2004 WL 2980265 Dec. Sub- length the imprisonment shall court maximum Kaua, sequent on court's decision De- be which shall as follows: granted cember district Kaua’s petition U.S.C. vacate extended years. a class C For —5 upon a determination Kaua’s ex- length shall maximum to, "contrary tended sentence was involved paroling Hawaii authori- determined application Apprendi.” an unreasonable Id. at ty in accordance with section 706-669. (29) 856, added.) (Emphases 2004 WL 2980265. binding light 4.In of the fact that Kaua was pertinent part court, 3. HRS 706-660 states as fol- following the court was correct precedent. lows: *21 Degree Rape is violent act of the Second 1. The finds [Defendant] Court meaning separate for Pro- two convictions “persistent a within the offender” moting Dangerous Drug of the a in the Second because [HRS] Section following Degree. facts: of the a. was born on March [Defendant] criminality has contin- c. [Defendant’s] (18) years age eighteen 1952 and was periods despite being to ued commission of the older the time of the probation in his and incarceration both offenses listed below. case, In instant prior convictions. 20, 1997, January No. b. On Cr. possession guilty of [Defendant] found was convicted of the [Defendant] drug paraphernalia methamphetamine, Degree, an Rape in the Second offense marijuana. It is evident [Defen- felony a class B offense which constitutes with the crimi- dant’s] involvement by Act 1972. The as defined S.L.H. justice system has detemd him nal not was on 1976. offense committed March activity. criminal from further during proceed- At all relevant times these has to d. [Defendant] by ings, represented was failed benefit [Defendant] justice system. the criminal counsel, wit, to Ed Marie Worth and/or Milks. has demonstrated to- e. [Defendant] 27, 1996, e. No. 95- On June Cr. disregard rights others and tal for of the of- was convicted [Defendant] poor toward the laiv. has attitude Promoting Drug in Dangerous fense pat- f. has demonstrated [Defendant] Degree, an the Second offense criminality which indicates he tern of felony by stitutes a as defined class.B likely that he can- to be a recidivist in was com- Hawaii Penal Code. The offense require- behavior to the his 1,1995. confim February on At all mitted relevant law. ment proceedings, during [Defen- times these wit, counsel, represented was to dant] quantity g. and seriousness Due Deputy Loy. Public Defender Debra past convictions [Defendant’s] 15, 1996, d. No. 96- On October Cr. offenses, the instant seriousness [Defen- of- was of the [Defendant] convicted poses a serious threat to the commu- dant] Drug Promoting Dangerous fense nity long teivn and his incarceration Degree, an which con- the Second offense necessary protection public. for felony B stitute class defined oth- 3. Pursuant to consideration Hawaii Penal was com- Code. offense sentencing factors under HRS Section er 1995.At all relevant mitted October finds ex- the Court further during proceedings, times [Defen- these to be tended term sentences need counsel, wit, represented dant] offenses, reflect the seriousness Deputy Loy. Public Defender Debra law, just provide promote respect for [Defen- 2. The further finds thát Court offenses, punishment to afford for the ade- “persistent is a com- dant] offender” whose conduct, quate to criminal deterrence necessary mitment an extended term protect public from further crimes of public for the because of [Defendant], provide [Defendant] following facts: training, needed educational vocational history in- a. [Defendant’s] criminal care, treat- medical or other correctional resulting eighty-two cludes arrests ment in the most manner. effective (3) prior felony in addi- three convictions twenty-seven above, tion to convictions on the this Court fur- Based misdemeanor, and vio- petty “persistent misdemeanor finds that is a [Defendant] ther offender,” lations. eligible for terms of (10) years for each of imprisonment of ten crimi- b. has [Defendant] extensive I felony class history, of which C offenses Counts nal characteristics II. have involved a conviction added.) demonstrated a to-

(Emphases Defendant e. [Defendant] offender, disregard 'rights other and multiple as a the court made the tal following “findings of fact”: poor toward the law. has a attitude *22 [Defendant] 1. finds that The Court pat- demonstrated a f. has [Defendant] “multiple meaning within a offender” criminality that he which indicates tern of 706-662(4)(a) he of HRS Section because he can- likely be a recidivist in that to (2) felonies, for two to has been sentenced require- to the his behavior confirm wit: ment the latv. No. 02-1-2128 Cr. quantity and seriousness g. Due I: Count past convictions of [Defendant’s] Drug in Promoting Dangerous a offenses, of the instant seriousness [Defen- (HRS 712-1243; Degree Third Section the commu- poses a serious threat to dant] felony) class C long term incarceration is nity and his II: Count protection public. necessary Drug Paraphernalia Unlawful Use of oth- to consideration 3. Pursuant (HRS 32£M3.5(a); a class fel- Section C Section factors under HRS er ony) 706-606, further finds the Court Upon 2. of the nature consideration im- to be term sentences need and the and circumstances of the offenses of- posed to reflect the seriousness [Defendant], history and characteristics law, fenses, pro- respect for to promote to 796-606(1), as mandated HRS Section offenses, just punishment for the vide finds that [Defendant] further Court adequate to criminal afford deterrence “multiple whose commitment offender” conduct, protect public from further necessary for terms is [Defendant], provide crimes Defen- public because needed educational or dant Rivera with following facts: care, training, or other medical vocational history in- criminal a. [Defendant’s] treatment in the most correctional effective (82) resulting in eighty-two arrests cludes manner. in addi- prior convictions three above, this Court fur- on the twenty-seven Based convictions for tion to “multiple misdemeanor, is a vio- petty [Defendant] misdemeanor and finds ther offender,” eligible lations. terms for extended (10) years each ten crimi- has an extensive [Defendant] b. I and felony offenses Counts class C of which history, nal the characteristics II. Rape felony conviction for involved a have (2) separate Degree and two in the Second added.) (Emphases Promoting Dangerous convictions Degree. Drug in the Second attempts distinguish majority grounds on the Blakely from this case criminality has contin- c. [Defendant’s] sentenc- Blakely “determinate” addresses periods despite being ued sentenc- ing, opposed to an indeterminate in his probation and incarceration both case, scheme, majority opinion 102 P.3d In the instant ing convictions. guilty possession jury Blakely a fact [Defendant] found concerned drug paraphernalia methamphetamine, (a cruelty”) of “deliberate determination marijuana. is evident that It “intrinsic” jurisdiction [Defen- would be in our rvith the crimi- 'prior involvement dant’s] sentencing paradigm charge under our to a not deterred him justice system has nal and “extrinsic” distinguishing “intrinsic” activity. criminal and, hence, by our would be decided from further facts accept- respect, juries, With all due id. d. [Defendant] benefit failed Blakely majority in language of the justice system. the criminal value, original). I (emphasis do not believe that Id. face defendant.” Consequently, parsed narrowly.5 can be so decision “statutory is not maximum” may impose judge maximum sentence II. facts, finding maxi- after additional but the Blakely, “second-degree kidnaping may impose mum without addition- he felony” punishable class B “a term [was] a findings. judge punish- When al inflicts years” Washington stat- of ten jury’s ment that verdict alone does not — -, U.S. at at 2535. ute. allow, has not all found facts however, Sentencing guidelines, established pun- law ivhich the makes essential to *23 range’ “a ‘standard of 49 to 53 months” of ishment, judge proper and the exceeds his imprisonment “for ... offense of [the] sec- authority. Id, ond-degree kidnaping with firearm.” original (emphasis emphasis Id. add- plea agreement, to [a] “Pursuant the State ed) (internal quotation citation marks and Washington] [of recommended sentence omitted). Supreme The Court indicated that range the standard of 49 to 53 within judge in not “[t]he this case could have [then] However, rejected judge Id. months.” “the imposed exceptional the 90-month sentence imposed State’s recommendation and an the solely on basis of the facts admitted exceptional months —37 sentence 90 guilty plea[ justify an ]” because “to ex- beyond the Id. months standard maximum.” ceptional sentence ... factors than other law, Washington judge may im- “[a] Under computing which are used in the stan- those pose range if a sentence above the standard range dard sentence for the must be offense” compelling he finds substantial and reasons (internal quota- “take[n] into Id. account[.]” Id, (in- justifying exceptional sentence.” omitted). tion marks and citation fact The omitted). quotation marks and citation ternal arriving that discretion is at exercised “justified judge on the sentence sentence is not inas- enhanced determinative ground petitioner had acted ‘delib- judge judg- much as the “cannot make that cruelty,’ statutorily enumerated erate finding support ment without it some facts to ground departure” 'for from the standard beyond the bare elements of the offense.” range. hearing, judge Id. aAfter “issued Hence, judicially “[w]hether Id. deter- findings support 32 of fact” in of his sen- require mined facts a sentence enhancement Id. tence. it, merely allow not the verdict alone does (emphases authorize sentence.” Id. Supreme The United States Court “re- Thus, original). judgment. that “[t]he versed” the It noted “ acceptable do not afford an supporting finding” answer[ ] labels facts ‘deliberate ” ... ... by constitutionally novel and cruelty’ petition- “were neither admitted -, distinction by elusive between “elements” jury.” found er nor Id. at “sentencing rejected factors[ ]” [because] 2537. It S.Ct. at conten- State’s form, inquiry is not but relevant Apprendi tion “that there was no violation required expose finding ‘statutory the relevant maximum’ is because effect—does greater punishment to a months, 10-year not but maximum by guilty than that authorized jury’s B felonies[.]” class Id. The Court made clear verdict? ‘statutory Apprendi “that the maximum’ purposes judge the maximum Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 120 S.Ct. added) (internal may impose solely on the basis (emphasis quotation marks facts omitted) (brackets omitted).6 jury in the by verdict or admitted and citations reflected agree J.) ("I Blakely "gloss" might thought 5. I not do is a mere would have have Court Apprendi, majority Majority as the contends. Apprendi underlying principle limited so that its opinion Ap- at 102 P.3d at 1054-55. See would undo not reform efforts. To- prendi, 530 U.S. at 497 n. 120 S.Ct. 2348 illusion.”). day’s dispels case (before Blakely, "expressing] no view on the schemes”); subject” of "determinate "sentencing 6. The between facts” and distinction — at -, Blakely, also 124 S.Ct. see U.S. way by "elements crimes” was the J., O’Connor, (Breyer, dissenting, joined explained public beyond Court that “when the based on facts estab- those guilty lished enhancement’ is used to verdict. ‘sentence de- scribe an increase the maximum au- Blakely, Similar “factors than other sentence, statutory junc- thorized it is the computing those which are used in stan- equivalent greater tional an element range dard the offense” were jury’s than the one covered — offense at-, “considered.” U.S. guilty Apprendi, verdict.” 496 n. U.S. then, Tellingly, 2537. the court could not 19,120 added). (emphasis S.Ct. 2348 simply have the extended sentence rather, strength jury’s verdict;

on the III. required supplemental it was find- make ings justifying a sentence double that which “ordinary” this ease “maximum” could authorized under the verdict. term for each of the offenses under Counts I case, Consequently, the instant “the ver- years’ imprisonment. and II is five dict [did] alone authorize the sentence.” 706-660(2); Upon see convic- note Id. judge punishment But inflicts “[w]hen then, tion, years’ imprisonment five would be allow, jury’s that the verdict alone does not maximum,” statutory “prescribed Blake- *24 jury the has not found all the facts ‘which the (inter- at-, ly, 124 at 2536 -U.S. S.Ct. punishment’ law ... makes essential to the omitted), nal quotation marks and citation judge proper authority,” and the exceeds his years the crime involved because five is “the id., and the sentence must be vacated. a [judge] impose maximum [sentence] any at-, findings,” without additional id. IV. (emphasis 124 at in original). S.Ct. 2537 An Although Blakely concerned a “determi- extended sentence under HRS scheme, sentencing Supreme nate” the Court beyond an “describe[s] increase the maxi- nowhere limited the Amendment’s Sixth sentence,” i.e., statutory mum authorized be- Blakely only approaches.7 reach to such yond imposed simply one that can on the Thus, may gen- sentencing that our structure verdict, jury “is and thus the functional erally an be denominated “indeterminate” equivalent of an greater element of a of- distinguishing Blakely. is basis one not a by jury’s fense” that was not “covered the in- Contrasting sentencing from determinate guilty Apprendi, 530 at 496 verdict.” U.S. n. sentencing response Jus- determinate to 19,120 S.Ct. 2348. dissent, majority Blakely tice O’Connor’s the sentence, i.e., extending In ordinary apparently posited sen- the as an indeterminate increasing years’ tencing jury’s penalty procedure, the im- one in which five the prisonment guilty judge’s years pursuant to to would ten verdict authorize the counts, finding on '706-662 each one the the sentence without the addition- (after required establishing system says judge al court was thresh- facts: “In that facts) doubling may punish burglary years, old to with 10 to 40 determine “necessary every burglar risking years knows 40 he is — jail.” at-, public.” Blakely, 124 HRS 706-662. As in S.Ct. at 2540. U.S. then, Ordinarily, an judgment the court “cannot make that with- own, finding support beyond to it out some facts scheme of such our Blakely, imposed by ordinary the bare elements indeterminate sentence offense.” — subject jury 2538 n. 8 the court is not U.S. at-n. S.Ct. at further added). Thus, (emphasis decision the court made because the indeterminate sentence support “judgment” by “findings jury’s of fact” its is verdict. That is authorized here, necessary protect not the sentence was the case however. The extended said, "[tjhis "legislatures judge majority 7. As the is not could indicate whether a or Court’s case consti- must make the relevant factual determina- about whether determinate is - -, tutional, Blakely, only implemented about can be tion.” U.S. at 124 S.Ct. at how it O’Connor, (Breyer, dissenting, joined way respects Sixth J. in a Amendment.” -, J.). Blakely, 2540. -.U.S. S.Ct. at pursuant As the distinguishing to a the instant case. sentences have been out, non-jury pointed separate proceeding, “[w]hether Court years authority sen- tacking judge’s five to the enhanced on additional ..., depends specified finding on fact indeterminate sentence of five each tence ..., specified ... facts I and II. one several Count Count “case aggravating fact” does not alter the us, Hence, in it is the the case before jury’s not author- [did] that the verdict alone court, findings based on facts -, id. at S.Ct. ize the sentence.” jury, factors not submitted to the that result- ... as ... [such] ‘elements’ “Labels simply in a at- prison term ed ” then, factor,’ ‘sentencing not the imposing guilty tributable verdict. 466, 494, 120 Apprendi “answer.” 530 U.S. sentences, the court was reiterate, 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435. To S.Ct. deciding statutory a sentence within fixed inquiry [the] “relevant effect—does (as limits, example in the of indeterminate finding required expose the majority sentencing provided by Blakely than that authorized greater punishment stupra), impose an referred to but whether to guilty (emphasis Id. jury’s verdict?” By rough of imprisonment. additional term added). Therefore, required whether analogy, range of presumptive standard “necessary protection of finding of for the forty-nine fifty-three months of- for the public,” as an viewed five-year Blakely akin to fense factor,” “sentencing fact or “elemental” case, in the indeterminate sentence instant or that U.S. the “sentence enhancement” by the supporting subsidiary facts found judge extending Washington the sentence factors, part facts court constitute of such ninety upon findings of months based “delib- *25 “it the case” that the of the remains effect cruelty” equivalent is the erate the extend- pronouncement court’s under HRS persistent proceeding ed term based on subjects greater punish- 606 the defendant to multiple findings in offender this case. imposed on ment than that which could be logic proceeding extended under term the only. guilty the basis of the verdict proceeding subject Blakely be a to the would right jury trial the Sixth Amend- under

ment. VI. analogy, Even outside that the manifest then, begs question, Appren- It find the hearing purpose of the term con- extended inapplicable on the that an di basis extended enlarge ducted was to here the indeterminate hearing “step” procedure, is a two sentence years of five to ten on each of sentence requiring first II. Counts I and Insofar as term finding a doubt reasonable ordinary is in addition to the inde- offender, a multiple the defendant jury’s by authorized terminate sentence finding may not be made unless the defen- verdict, not fall does being for two or more dant is judge within maximum sentence a felony or is under for a felonies impose by guilty virtue verdict. Conse- and the maximum terms quently, respect to extended sentences for the crimes met authorized defendant’s sentencing struc- under our “indeterminate” second[,] requisites[ ... ] [and the] certain ture, required finding[s by court] “the ... determine whether defendant’s expose greater punish- to a the defendant for an is nec- commitment extended term by jury ment than that authorized ver- essary protection publie[,] for the 494,120 at dict[.]” Id. S.Ct. 2348. subject dealing] with the [the latter] ordinary sentencing[,] matter of V. (inter- Kaua, 9, Blakely, “peti- That 102 at 72 P.3d 481 judge found the Hawai'i at omitted). cruelty,’” quotation marks citations tioner had acted with nal ‘deliberate at-, only dispos- not id. at was not The criteria for extended terms rest S.Ct. not on foundational facts as felonies itive that case and does afford basis sentences, majority in favor of a focus on “the effect” pending past see HRS finding and on such facts as court’s ultimate supra, but also that an such a support question would the determination ex- to the whether the answer particular greater in the case neces- “finding expose[s] tended term the defendant to sary public. Be- by for the punishment than authorized subsidiary required facts are cause such Id. record jury’s guilty verdict[.]” On the prescribed foundational ones addition to the case, affirma- would be the answer finding, findings see to arrive at the ultimate Court, it tive. As indicated court, supra, subsidiary facts or these brought court’s about is the “effect” findings” “additional are “essential rather than the action that determinative — ——, Blakely, at punishment,” U.S. sentencing proce- “labels” attached result, must found and as S.Ct. “a Id. This case involves dures. doubt, id., by jury beyond reasonable greater than what state law authorized subject merely as matter of treated “the — Blakely, alone.” the basis the verdict Kaua, ordinary sentencing[,]” 102 Hawai'i at at-, at 2538. Inasmuch S.Ct. U.S. Carvalho, (quoting 72 P.3d at 484 does, Blakely, the extended sen- it 419) (quoting Hu Hawai'i at 63 P.3d infringe on the “reservation tences 400). elsman, Haw. at 588 P.2d at at-, in the power[,]” id. Appren- appear It inconsistent with would Amendment. Sixth then, hold, Blakely, example, di and finding that [a defendant] that “the ultimate VII. ‘multiple whose was a offender’ extensive prison criminal actions warranted extended majority’s ratio- agree I with the cannot province properly within the [one] terms was distinguishing our “intrinsic-extrin- nale for sentencing court.” Id. at 72 P.3d implications of paradigm from sic” Hence, emphasis on “ex- at 485. Kaua’s respect, I Blakely. With all due believe factors in such an trinsic” nature of involved two majority’s position on at least rests being “separable finding” as “ultimate First, majority main- faulty premises. “involv[ing] con- because the offense itself’ equation between tains there exists or information” of collateral events sideration public” “protection of the sideration *26 (quot- 72 P.3d at 483 Id. at incorrect. sentencing con- part general of factor as the 261, 271, Tafoya, Hawai'i ing State § 706-606 and the under HRS siderations (1999)). For such or events public” un- “protection of the determination findings basis for information constitute the § 706-662 such that HRS der necessary Be- for an extended sentence. determining sentencing factor “the sole term do, they they Blakely, are the cause under penalty” are remaining that increases by a very that must considered matters be not sub- prior conviction[s]” which are “the then, finding, is not sus- jury. ultimate Apprendi ject determination “ordinary procedure. ceptible to an sentence” 162-63, Majority opinion at Blakely. or Id. at 72 P.8d at course, fallacy, P.3d at 1060-61. framework re- The “intrinsic-extrinsic” not the same. the determinations analogue is an ferred to Kaua (1993) face, § sets HRS 706-606 its and ‘sentenc- On “distinction between ‘elements’ guide generally factors’,” multiple factor list forth a Apprendi, 530 U.S. at sentencing.8 It not author- does by court Court eschewed the of- reflect the seriousness of To § as follows: 8. HRS 706-606 states ial law, fense, respect promote imposing a considered sen- Factors to be just punishment provide for the of- court, determining particu- tence. The fense; imposed, shall consider: lar sentence to be (b) adequate crim- deterrence to To afford circumstances of the of- The nature and conduct; inal history and characteristics fense and (c) public defendant; protect To further from defendant; and imposed: crimes the sentence The need for any particular length § ize sentence. HRS 706-606 for each class of prefer does not felony.... direct court to give one consideration other or to over the Once the court has decided to weight more to one factor than the other. imprisonment, felon to actual time Among options arriving available in at an by parole release is determined authori- appropriate probation, sentence is HRS Having imprisonment, ties. decided § (Supp.2003),9 suspended 706-620 sen- the court must then the maximum tence, (1993),10 § imprison- HRS 706-622 term authorized. ment, § e.g., applicable 706-660.11 As HRS here, authorizes, alia, §HRS 706-660 inter policy [T]his section embodies a of dif- “ordinary” an prison term ferentiating exceptional problems calling felony. Applying five for a class C extended terms problems majority which the vast deciding sider number those factors presentí.] offenders imprisoned whether defendant should be added.) (Footnotes omitted.) (Emphasis given an particu- alternative sentence in a Quoting from an American Bar Association pursuant lar ease. While to HRS study, commentary as follows: continues protection the court must consider factors, public multiple as one of other it is [M]any sentences authorized statute required upon express facts that are, country comparison to other find protection public mandates indeter- countries and in terms of the needs of the sentence, required by minate as is public, excessively long majori- for the vast § 706-662 for an extended sentence. ty length undoubtedly eases. Their product concern for Thus, commentary to HRS against cases, exceptional most most “ordinary” draws a distinction between notably particularly dangerous offend- indeterminate sentence under HRS professional er and the criminal. It would 660 and an provi- enhanced sentence under penal be more desirable for the code to sion like HRS 706-662: explicitly differentiate between most of- exception special problems With cases, exceptional fenders and such pro- calling lower, terms of viding incarceration more realistic sentences for sections, provided subsequent pro- it authorizing special former only possible vides one maximum for the latter. (d) provide To repeat the defendant with needed The defendant is a offender under training, 706-606.5; educational or vocational section care, medical or other correctional The defendant is a firearm offender treatment ner; in the most effective man- 706-660.1(2); as defined in section (5) The crime involved the death of or the *27 available; The kinds of sentences bodily infliction of serious or substantial injury upon (4) The need to avoid unwarranted sentence child, person, an elder or a disparities among defendants with similar handicapped person under section 706- guilty records who have been found of sim- 660.2 ilar conduct. added.) (Emphasis added.)

(Emphasis § 10. HRS 706-622 states as follows: 706-620, "Authority § 9.HRS entitled to with- imprisonment,” hold sentence of states as fol- Requirement probation; exception. lows: person When a who has been convicted aof felony imprisonment, is not sentenced to A who has been convicted defendant place person probation. court shall probation crime be sentenced to a term of Nothing prohibit pan in this shall the court unless: suspending imposed upon degree The crime is sentence first or second murder from persons attempted degree or der; or convicted of a crime other first second mur- than a felony. felony, added.) except (Emphasis The crime is a class A Aclass IV, chapter part felonies defined in 707-702; section 11. See note 3. section, 'provided in Accordingly, sentences it “the determination that is when compared to the extended sentences ‘necessary protection public[,]’ of the subsequent authorized in sections seek to 662[,]” § is decidedly HRS “effec- 706— explicit achieve the recommended tively sentencing the same differen- one tiation. upon concluding has made defendant 2.5.) § (Quoting (Ellipsis ABA Standards should be sentenced to an indeterminate (Footnote points original.) and brackets in maximum term of rather than omitted.) Hence, in “subsequent sec- probation[,]” majority as the contends. Ma- to, 706-661, tions” § such referred as HRS opinion jority at P.3d at This felony term[ ]” “extended for a class is C misapprehension contextual of the standard 706-661(4) years, (Supp. § set ten HRS in fallacy majority’s leads to the conclu- 2003).12 applied term That would be on con- §§ sion as both that “inasmuch 706-606 HRS viction of a class C those cases require and 706-662 the determination of designated where, § in HRS imposed is whether sentence needed to here, persistent the court finds a protect public, determining the sole fac- offender, 706-662(1), § multiple or HRS remaining penalty tor that increases un- offender, 706-662(4). §HRS sentencing Hawaii’s der extended term term, then, An is intended § prior fact HRS “explicitly] differentiat[e],” commentary to viction, expressly ... ... Ap- authorized 706-660, cases,” id., § “exceptional prendi again Blakelyl [and simi- ] “ordinary” indeterminate terms that determination, larly multiple t]he offender 706-660, § are set forth in HRS for “most 706-662(4)(a), pursuant § to HRS mirrors Thus, offenses.” in contrast with HRS exception Apprendil.T conviction 706-606, § which treats 162-63,102 Majority opinion 1060- public as among consideration one others (emphasis in original). generally guiding court as to ordinary whether to sentence code, then, penal our Under there is a an- under HRS or choosing substantial difference between be- other proba- alternative such as probation ordinary tween and the indetermi- sentence, or a suspended tion sentence, nate and between an indeterminate 662(1) upon focus protec- whether the and an extended For sentence sentence. public beyond tion warrants a term Blakely, purposes Apprendi dis- then, ordinary Generally, pro- sentence. apparent tinction even more inasmuch public tection of factor HRS 706-606 category, as in the both former a sentence of among one several considerations in decid- probation or an sentence indeterminate ing whether to a defendant to an verdict, jury authorized in the latter ordinary imprisonment term under HRS only category suspension probation 706-660 or sen- (and sentence) legiti- not the can tence, as contrasted to HRS mately product be of a verdict. question proteo which the is not whether the prison public tion warrants term

not, requires length but it whether VIII. served to be which would premise major- majority second mistaken is the ease[s].” in “the vast *28 Commentary ity’s § circuit proposition “[h]ad to HRS 706-660. the court § 12. HRS states as follows: felony-indeterminate imprisonment felony; ten-year ex- Sentence For a class C designated tended terms. tion In the cases in sec- imprisonment. term of 706-662, person has who been convicted length imprisonment The minimum of a be sentenced an extended [paragraph] shall be determined the imprisonment. indeterminate term of When authority paroling Hawaii in accordance with sentence, ordering such a the court shall im- section 706-669. pose length imprisonment the maximum shall as follows: who im- in eases. defendant same both Rivera to consecutive terms II, faces a must an extended sentence prisonment I and the effect serve Counts ten-year greater HPA minimum sentence determina- would have been a than defendant who must serve imprisonment, a term the maximum term of tion13 terms, both equal ten-year even when sentences two concurrent extend- consecutive quantitatively equal. imprisonment circuit ed terms of are case[,]” and, actually imposed in this court setting a defendant’s minimum sen- When thus, logic that the circuit court “[i]t defies tence, “aggravating” the HPA six considers sentence, ten-year could ... same “may weight be accorded factors that comprised 'five-year two inde- consecutive im- longer minimum sentence of favor of terms, ordinary terminate maximum under including the “inmate prisonment!!,]” whether sentencing principles, run of Blake- but afoul criminal, persistent offender, professional is a ten-year ly by imposing concurrent extended dangerous multiple offender, or of- person, imprisonment[.]” Majority opinion terms of against elderly, handicapped or fender (emphases origi- at 1062 minor, period extended and sentenced to an nal). imprisonment.”14 Hawaii Administrative (HAR) (emphas- § Obviously, not De- Rules the court did 23-700-25© added). Thus, two ordinary five-year pris- a sentence of fendant to serve es unlike terms, I, five-year ordi- on term in Count consecutive consecutive ten-year to run concur- nary five-year prison II. And two extended term Count terms just higher clearly rently exposes it do so as had the discretion to Moreover, § minimum because the 706-668.5. See also note sentence. HRS 706-668.5(1) “[mjulti- “prisoner’s HPA criminal his- § 3. directs that considers HRS determining mini- ple imposed tory at the and character” terms § concurrently imprisonment, same run the court mum term of time unless 669(8) 706-668.5(2) (1993), orders,” prior it is and HRS free consider states 23-700-23(a) determining HAR “[t]he court terms. See whether (requiring HPA to the “nature terms to be to run consider ordered concurrently consecutively, offense and the shall consider and circumstances inmate”) history the factors set 706-606.” and characteristics forth section Establishing prosecution and Minimum That both the court be- and Guidelines Paroling Imprisonment, Hawaii imposition prison lieved of consecutive terms Terms of 1989) (establishing Authority (July one appropriate I II was under Counts guidelines majority’s in the infirmity of areas focus” underscores the “three ” history (empha- argument. is “the offender’s criminal added)). a defendant who sis Should per- parties apparently be convicted of served an extended term ceived what be manifest —that there should future, HPA would another crime is a two ordi- substantial difference between part consider extended term nary consecutively five-year terms served history.” “criminal The ef- the defendant’s ten-year terms two extended served fect, then, is that the defendant currently. The fact that the two consecutive on his record faces or her extended term five-year a ten-year terms amount to indeter- greater consequences than the defendant ten-year two minate term merely terms. who serves consecutive concurrently, terms run does not mean that Therefore, actually year such “ten sentences” are the minimum terms to be served as majority main- authority in fact same” as the paroling set would be the not “the authority which shall take into account both HRS 706-669 vests the HPA with sentences to fix "the minimum to be degree prisoner of the offense of the nature and eligible prisoner shall served before become history prisoner's and charac- and the criminal 706-669(1) (1993). parole.” 706-669(8) (1993) (emphasis add- ter.” HRS ed). *29 authority guide- HPA has "establish 14. minimum lines for the uniform determination of defense, prosecution, tains. and the not, accurately perceived they

as should this court. Because the court did hypothetical and not extended terms terms,

five-year consecutive such extend- only findings

ed could terms verdict, covered

Blakely resentencing would mandate a in this

case.

102 P.3d 1075 Hawai'i, Plaintiff-Appellee

STATE of ELENEKI, Defendant-Appellant.

Jasmine

No. Court Hawai'i. 22, 2004.

Dec.

Case Details

Case Name: State v. Rivera
Court Name: Hawaii Supreme Court
Date Published: Dec 22, 2004
Citation: 102 P.3d 1044
Docket Number: 26199
Court Abbreviation: Haw.
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