20 N.W.2d 673 | Minn. | 1945
In 1923, defendant Oak Hill Cemetery Association was incorporated under G. S. 1913, §§ 6268 to 6315, which, with some amendments not here material, now are Minn. St. 1941, §§
There has never been a body buried in the land thus platted and dedicated as a cemetery, because such burial was prohibited by city ordinances. At the time the corporation acquired the land, a city ordinance was in force prohibiting the establishment of any new cemetery without a permit granted by the department of health. An application for the removal of a body from another cemetery for interment in Oak Hill Cemetery having been made by an undertaker and denied by the department of health, a mandamus proceeding was commenced to compel the granting of the permit. Pending the proceeding, an ordinance was adopted in 1924 prohibiting the establishment of any new cemetery or the enlargement of an existing one without the consent of the city council and providing that no permit for the interment of a body should be issued except in existing cemeteries or those established pursuant to the ordinance. This ordinance was sustained as a valid police regulation *581
in State ex rel. Oak Hill Cemetery Assn. v. Harrington,
Defendants claim that some burial lots were sold, but the record fails to sustain their claim. Apparently arrangements had been made between either the incorporators or the corporation on the one hand and some friends and relatives of the incorporators on the other for the sale of some cemetery lots, but there is no evidence to show what the arrangements were, except that the purchase price had been paid; that any deeds conveying the lots were ever executed and delivered; or any other details of the arrangements, including those relating to the identity of the lots. So far as the record is concerned, the lots in question still belong to the corporation.
From 1923 to the time of trial in June 1943, the land was used by the incorporators. They occupied a house on the land as their home and used part of the land for truck gardening and part for pasturage. They asserted that these uses were for the benefit of the corporation and for the maintenance and protection of the land as a cemetery.
The state contends that, because the land had not been used for burial purposes, it was not a public burying ground within the meaning of the provisions of the constitution and statute exempting such grounds from taxation. Defendants contend that such use is not necessary, because of the ownership of the land by a *582 cemetery association; that, regardless of such use, the land was exempt from taxation under the statute relating to the incorporation of cemetery associations which provides that the lands and property of any such association shall be exempt from public taxation; and that, if such use were required in any of the respects mentioned, there was such use in the instant case.
The trial court held the land not to be exempt from taxation and ordered judgment registering the state's title. The only question presented by this appeal is whether the land is exempt from taxation.
1. Use of property for burial of the dead is essential to constitute it a burying ground within the meaning of the constitutional and statutory provisions (Const. art. 9, § 1, and Minn. St. 1941, §
2. Whether the land in question is exempt as land of a cemetery association under Minn. St. 1941, §
"The lands and property of any such cemetery association shall be exempt from all public taxes and assessments, * * *."
In determining the legislative intent, the purpose of such legislation should be kept in mind. The basis of tax exemptions is the accomplishment of public purposes and not the favoring of particular persons or corporations at the expense of taxpayers generally. For that reason, absent other tokens of legislative intention, a statute providing that the property of a corporation shall be *584
exempt from taxation should be construed as applying only to the property used for the purpose or object for which it was created. The exemption does not apply to property not so used. Bank of Commerce v. Tennessee,
"It has been frequently decided that a general exemption of the property of a corporation from taxation is to be construed as referring only to the property held for the transaction of the business of the company."
In County of Ramsey v. C. M. St. P. Ry. Co.
It has been said that cemeteries are granted exemption from taxation in order to give effect to the almost universal sentiment of mankind that a burial place is not only a sacred and hallowed one, but also truly a final one, to be perpetually protected against desecration. Cypress Lawn Cemetery Assn. v. City and County of *585
San Francisco,
The case of People ex rel. Oak Hill Cemetery Assn. v. Pratt,
"* * * So long as Oak Hill cemetery exists as a corporation, it must hold its property exclusively for cemetery purposes, and while burials cannot now be made therein, the ordinance prohibiting them may be repealed or modified at any time so as to allow them. There is no provision in the statute that its land shall be exempt from taxation only so long as burials are authorized to be made therein. The exemption is absolute."
In construing our statute, we are not bound by the decision of the New York court construing the statute of that state, because that decision was rendered after we adopted our statute. We refuse to follow the cited case notwithstanding the high standing of the court rendering it and our deep deference to its decisions. We deem the decision unsound, because,first, it leaves out of view the necessity of use of the land for cemetery purposes, which the words "and occupied" following the word "held" seem to require. The decision in effect holds that land of a cemetery association is exempt from taxation if "held," even though it is not "occupied," for cemetery purposes. Thus, effect was given to one requirement of the statute and denied to another. We think that we should give effect to every part of our statute. Second, the decision fails to consider the objects and purposes of ever granting such an exemption. If these had been considered, it is hard to see how the result mentioned could have been reached. Third, the result reached was unsatisfactory, because of the fact that the court suggested that the tax exemption might be terminated by proceedings to dissolve the corporation for nonuser of the property for burial purposes. *587 It seems better to us to hold that the exemption never came into existence at all because of the nonuser. Fourth, our statute is not now in all respects the same as the New York one, and the history of those changes reflects a legislative intention to preclude here the result reached in New York.
The decision in the New York case was rendered in 1891. In 1901, when our legislature amended our statute, it apparently took notice of the decision in the Pratt case. Prior to 1901, the corresponding provisions of our statute were identical with those of New York. In 1901, G. S. 1894, § 3096 (which, as amended, now is §
This construction of the change effected by the 1901 statute is confirmed by the changes wrought in the 1905 Revision. There, the word "held" before the words "actually used and occupied" in the 1901 statute and the word "cemetery" before the words "lands and property" in G. S. 1894, § 3107 (which as amended now is §
3. Intention to use land for burial purpose at some future time, which of necessity here could be only when and if the city council of Minneapolis should give its consent thereto or amend or repeal the ordinances in question, is not sufficient to satisfy the requirement of an actual and present use for such purpose. Ramsey County v. Macalester College,
Nor does the instant case come within the rule of cases like Village of Hibbing v. Commr. of Taxation,
4. The use made of the land was not such a use as to constitute it a public burying ground. Aside from the incorporation of the association, and the acquisition, platting, and dedication of the land for cemetery purposes, no use was made of the land except for agricultural purposes. Hence, this is merely a case of platting and dedication without actual use as a public burying ground. "A mere dedication or appropriation on paper is not enough." Woodlawn Cemetery v. Inhabitants of Everett,
Our conclusion is that the land in question is not exempt from taxation and that the decision below was correct.
Affirmed.