State v. Ring.

Oct 16, 1906
Versions:142 N.C. 596
55 S.E. 194
1906 N.C. LEXIS 296
*599 WalKBR, J.,

after stating tbe case: Tbe defendant’s counsel, in their brief, contend that there was no evidence in tbe case that tbe prosecutrix was seduced under a promise of marriage. Tbe gravamen of this offense is seduction, induced by tbe promise which tbe defendant has failed to keep. There are other essential elements, but this is the principal one, and if there was no evidence of it, the defendant should have been acquitted. We think that there was not only some, but abundant evidence to warrant the verdict of the jury. It is not necessary to a conviction under this law that the State should show that the defendant directly and expressly promised the prosecutrix to marry her if she would submit to his embraces. It is quite sufficient if the jury from the evidence can fairly infer that the seduction was accomplished by reason of the promise, giving to the defendant the benefit of any reasonable doubt.

But in this case, the defendant admits in one of his letters to the prosecutrix that she had trusted in his honor and that he was deeply sensible of the great wrong that he had done her, and that she had sacrificed her virtue at his solicitation when they were engaged to be married. While under a promise of marriage to her, he told her that he would not believe that she loved him if she did not comply with his request, and she yielded to prove her love for him. Just before she did so, he promised never to forsake her, and boldly and shamelessly asserted that he did not ask her consent as a favor, but as something to which he was of right entitled by reason of their engagement. Is it possible for evidence to be stronger for the purpose of showing a seduction accomplished by a promise of marriage ? The mere fact that the promise existed long before the seduction can make no difference, if he afterwards took advantage of it in order to effect his nefarious purpose. His conduct, in such a case, would be the more reprehensible as showing a studied and deliberate purpose, first to engage her affections and then by taking advantage of her weak and confiding nature and the *600 trustfulness be bad inspired by bis perfidy to insidiously ensnare ber with bis wicked and faithless promises of love and constancy. Sucb base conduct is tbe legal equivalent of an express promise to marry if sbe would submit to bis lecherous solicitations, provided tbe jury found, as they did, that it bad tbe effect of alluring ber from tbe path of virtue. If be made bis promise to ber in good faith, why did be not keep it when be found that be bad ruined ber and when sbe most needed tbe protection of bis name? It being admitted that be made tbe promise, bis gross betrayal of ber was surely a fact to be considered by the jury in determining bis guilt. It is against the wily arts of tbe seducer that tbe law would protect tbe innocent woman, and be can effect bis purpose just as well by first gaining tbe confidence and affection of bis intended victim and then inducing ber to surrender ber chastity and finally debauching ber by means of persistent appeals to ber supposed sense of duty and obligation to him as her lover.

Tbe evidence in tbe case forces tbe conviction upon us that this unfortunate woman trusted to bis pledge that be would never forsake ber, and to bis promise of marriage, when in an evil moment sbe permitted him to accomplish ber ruin.

Tbe defendant’s counsel relied on State v. Ferguson, 107 N. C., 841, and quotes this passage from tbe opinion of tbe Court by Justice Davis: “If sbe willingly surrenders ber chastity, prompted by ber own lustful passions, or any other motive than that produced by a promise of marriage, sbe is in pari delicto, and there is no crime committed under tbe statute.” That is very true. But tbe principle there stated does not fit tbe facts of this case. If tbe evidence is trustworthy, there is hardly anything in it to indicate that sbe sacrificed ber chastity in order to gratify ber own lascivious desires. At least, tbe jury could well have found that sbe did not do so, but, on tbe contrary, that in tbe trustful and abiding belief that tbe defendant would not betray ber, but fulfill bis promise of marriage, sbe yielded at last to bis urgent ap *601 peals. Tbe case is rather to be governed by another principle stated in that case: “The purpose of this statute is to protect innocent and virtuous women against wicked and designing men, who know that one of the most potent of all seductive arts is to win love and confidence by promising love and marriage,” in return.

The case of State v. Horton, 100 N. C., 443, is authority for the position that the State is not required to show that the defendant, in so many words, promised to marry the woman if she would agree to submit to carnal intercourse with him, or, in other words, to show the causal relation between the promise of marriage and the seduction by any set form of words; but it is sufficient if the evidence is such as to convince the jury to' the exclusion of all reasonable doubt that the woman was influenced by the promise and the man intended that she should be, or so purposely acted as to produce the impression on her mind that he would keep his promise if she would comply with his request. The jury are to draw their own deduction from the testimony, provided there is even inferentially any evidence of a purpose to violate the statute. Besides all this, what the defendant said in his letters is, of course, evidence against him as to what his purpose or intention was and as to what he actually said and did. “I am deeply sensible of the great wrong that I have done. Don’t be deceived, and be sure that you know your friends. Have as little to say about it as possible. You have trusted to my honor in the past. While this is a very unfortunate affair, it is no worse than others have done.” These expressions, taken from the evidence, are much stronger in their tendency to establish the guilt of the defendant, or his vicious purpose throughout his intimate association with the prosecutrix, than were the words used by the defendant in his conversation with the woman’s father, which were held to be sufficient to sustain the verdict in the Horton case.

We can see no error in the ruling of the Court.

No Error.