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State v. Rinehart
617 N.W.2d 842
S.D.
2000
Check Treatment

*1 Durke, reverse the circuit court’s or- law enforce- We In State v. a valid traffic suppress. conducted motion to denying ment officers der Ballard’s Durke, motorcyclists. group of seven 39, 3, 593 N.W.2d 408. MILLER, Justice, Chief and motorcycles had handlebars Four of AMUNDSON, SABERS, Dakota too under South high that were GILBERTSON, Justices, concur. ¶ 2, N.W.2d at 408. After law. Id. at stop, officers accomplishing the registra- drivers’ licenses

checked the seven, finding problems. no tions of the ¶ 3, three at 408. The Id. at complied handlebars motorcyclists whose leave; however, the law wished to with the they free explain officers 2000 SD 135 noticed go. Id. One of the officers later to Dakota, Plaintiff STATE South pistol. marijuana pipe and a After Appellee, individuals were hand- discovery belongings searched. cuffed and their ¶¶ 4-5, at 408-09. We con- RINEHART, Paul Defendant Adam cy- detention of the cluded continued Appellant. compliance with the clists who were Id. at illegal. handlebar law was No. 20967. cyclists at 410. The were detained Supreme Court of South Dakota. stop when addi- after the initial traffic no suggesting facts a violation were tional on Briefs Oct. 1999. Considered here, course, observed. The distinction Decided Oct. suspi- Deputy is that Shafer had other cions, but he nonetheless told Ballard she leave, questionable

was free to maneuver employ ongo- in the midst of a claimed ing investigation. Once officers tell traffic they are free to leave with a violators warning, or a the Fourth Amend citation limit a ment intercedes to further deten $404,905 tion or search. United States v. (8th Currency, in U.S. 182 F.3d Cir.1999). give A refusal consent to search after the motorist is free to leave itself, rise, suspi to further give

cannot search; justification cion and other wise, the exercise of a Fourth Amendment meaningless. would be This case

right on when contin presents question close ued detention becomes unreasonable.

However, we are concerned with the dubi message

ous we send to law enforcement if we validate a public officers and the procedure allowing falsely officers to tell they go, only

traffic are free to offenders purpose eliciting for the their uncoerced agreement to search their automobiles. *2 posted

South Dakota. The speed limit was per 40 miles hour. DeBoer

[¶ 3.] followed Rinehart’s car paced its for six blocks. He estimated that Rinehart’s was be- tween 20 and 25 per miles hour. DeBoer any observe traffic violations.

[¶ 4.] DeBoer lights activated his red stopped Rinehart’s vehicle. The slow speed of Rinehart’s vehicle raised concerns for DeBoer that the driver might have problem medical such as a “My stroke. intention,” testified, whole DeBoer “was to stop him and see if he right.” was all Of secondary concern was the fact that in experience, DeBoer’s driving under speed limit “could” be an indicator aof possible drunk driver. approached

[¶ 5.] When DeBoer Rine- hart he detected the odor of alcohol and bloodshot, noted his watery eyes. Follow- tests, ing sobriety field DeBoer arrested influence, driving Rinehart for violation of SDCL 32-23-1.

ISSUE Did the trial court err when it suppress

denied Rinehart’s motion to following the evidence obtained stop of Rinehart’s vehicle? Dombrowski, In Cady (1973) L.Ed.2d the United States Barnett, General, Mark Attorney Mi- Supreme Court observed that local Bennett, chele K. Attorney Gen- Assistant eral, Pierre, “frequently investigate officers vehicle ac plaintiff appellee. for in which cidents there is no claim of crimi Timothy Bjorkman W. and Mike C. Fink what, liability nal engage for want Offices, Bjorkman Bridgewater, Law for term, may better be described as appellant. defendant and functions, community caretaking totally di

MILLER, detection, Chief vorced from the investigation, Justice or acquisition of evidence relating to the vio trial, Following a court Adam Paul lation of a criminal statute.” Consequent guilty was found of DUI and “[ujnder ly appropriate circumstances a third offense DUI. We affirm. may justified

law enforcement officer assistance, FACTS provide vehicle to needing any without reasonable basis to July At 1:05 a.m. on Offi- Brown, suspect activity.” cer DeBoer saw Rinehart south on (N.D.1993). If police Sertoma Avenue near its intersection with Falls, 26th Street southwest Sioux officer has a demonstrable reason to be- traffic or adverse factors such as other be unfit to drive driver lieve that a reasons, temporary attributing to his slow weather conditions medical or other purpose of inves- the limited justified way. these circum- pace any Under well-being. Mc- person’s tigating stances, justified in Officer DeBoer was (Tex. State, Donald v. 759 S.W.2d else, such as a *3 assuming something that 1988). App.-Fort Worth mal- emergency or an automotive medical fact, function, occurring. In may be court did the trial In this case [¶ 8.] con- initially that he was more indicated suppression Rinehart’s denying in not err possible might that Rinehart have cerned Rinehart, De- stopping motion. Before having than a sus- problem, medical rather slow excessively his Boer observed De- picion might that he be intoxicated. raised, experience in his at 1:09 a.m. which in that his whole intention Boer stated over the driver’s knowledge, concerns all stopping Rinehart was to see he was court in v. As the State medical condition. 521, 1016, right. Garbin, A.2d N.J.Super. 739 325 (N.J.Super.A.D.1999) noted:

1019 recognize “[t]he We [¶ 10.] person of a police A observation officer’s ‘community caretaking’ exception should in a manner a motor vehicle operating narrowly applied in or cautiously be wrong be something may that indicates be to minimize the risk that will der or its driver is one with the vehicle conducting pretext abused or used as a in which the recognized circumstance for criminal evi investigatory an search in appropriate take action Waters, 285, Va.App. v. 20 dence.” Com. community care- performance of their (1995). 527, 456 S.E.2d 530 example, in responsibilities. For taking however, trial court did not find fault Martinez, 75, 78, N.J.Super. 260 v. State motives and was able to with DeBoer’s (App.Div.1992) A.2d 279 we stated 615 credibility judge the officer’s as he testi police officer’s observations of a that a Halter, 11, 1999 fied. See Geraets v. SD driven at less than being motor vehicle 231, (stating “the 234 a number of ob- m.p.h. “suggest[ed] 10 position trial in the best to assess court is concerns,” including jectively reasonable witnesses, credibility weigh the con with “something might wrong observe the witnesses flicting evidence and the car ... its driver.” Conse- [or] hand.”) first and evidence these concerns quently, we held justified “the minimal intrusion involved pre- Based on the circumstances Similarly, simple inquiry stop.” in a Id. sented, DeBoer, part of his role as 362, N.J.Super. 209 State community earetaking, justified was upheld (App.Div.1986), A.2d 751 we 507 everything Rinehart to make stopping sure community care- validity Therefore, the trial court right. was person of a who taking doctrine motion to denying did not err Rinehart’s slowly the shoulder of a suppress. turn di- highway with his left state judgment is affirmed. The concluded signal flashing. We rectional opera- that observations of such unusual KONENKAMP, and provided a reasonable tion of vehicle GILBERTSON, Justices, concur. to believe that basis for the something wrong with the there was AMUNDSON, [¶ 14.] SABERS 507 or its driver. vehicle Justices, dissent. A.2d 751. SABERS, (dissenting). Justice Here, 20- may stop a ve- Although officers night hour late at on desert- per 25 miles “community exercising while their hicle limit of 40 posted ed street with function,” justi- do not the facts were no extraneous per miles hour. There concept Cady person’s here. See intrusion on a Fourth fy applying Amend Dombrowski, 93 S.Ct. rights against legitimate ment governmen (1973); 2523, 2528, 706, 714-15 37 L.Ed.2d Prouse, tal interests. Delaware v. v, Catlette, also 88 S.D. see State U.S. 99 S.Ct. (1974). An officer’s 28 n. 3 (1979). L.Ed.2d To these balance subjective explanation or de- interests, law enforcement must have control Fourth taining a driver does not reasonable of a violation to make analysis. required are Courts Ohio, a brief traffic Terry v. of the to “make assessment 1, 31-32, U.S. determining officer’s actions” when if a (1968); L.Ed.2d v. Cuny, stop was reasonable. United States v. (S.D.1995). An officer *4 Cir.1990) Cummins, (8th 498, 920 F.2d 501 support must a stop with an articulable States, 128, (citing Scott v. United 436 U.S. suspicion of a violation. State v. Herrb 56 L.Ed.2d S.Ct. oldt, (1978)). 177 DeBoer’s of Rinehart’s vehicle is not Applying community the caretak- supported by an articulable ing exception to the facts of this case unjustified violation and was aas matter of ignores requirement objective the rea- law. assessing sonableness when an officer’s ac- join I also Justice AMUNDSON’S “pri- tions. Id. Officer DeBoer’s stated dissent. Rinehart, mary justification” health, sufficiently is not his borne out AMUNDSON, Justice (dissenting). motives, the record. DeBoer’s held, honestly no matter how do not affect The majority adopting is now protections. Fourth Amendment It is vital exception new to the Fourth Amend- recognize ‘community care- “[t]he community caretaking excep- ment—’the exception cautiously should and taking’ be tion. Under the facts of this this narrowly applied to minimize the risk that exception should not be embraced. The pretext it will be abused or used as for majority relies on three cases: State v. an conducting investigatory search for Brown, (N.D.1993); 509 N.W.2d 69 criminal evidence.” Commonwealth v. Garbin, N.J.Super. 739 A.2d Waters, Va.App. 456 S.E.2d (1999); and State v. (1995). (1986), N.J.Super. 507 A.2d 751 which the absence of [¶ 17.] Given dispositive In persuasive.1 are neither nor justify community the record to the care- fact, cases, reviewing these it becomes taking exception, we must determine the they clearly distinguish- are evident validity of this under our traditional able. analysis. pur- Fourth Amendment The police dispatched 20.]'In Garbin [¶ pose of the Fourth Amendment is “not to to defendant’s residence because smoke police all contact eliminate between emanating ga- from the defendant’s citizenry, prevent arbitrary but the ‘to fire, rage Believing area. there to be a the oppressive interference’ enforcement police garage entered the to find defendant privacy personal with the officials se- car Defen- spinning inside his the tires. curity of individuals.” States v. United noticeably drunk and was arrest- Mendenhall, 544, 553-54, dant employed by The ed DUI. standard S.Ct. 64 L.Ed.2d (1980). balancing determining applicability There must court in of. reviewing upon by performing community caretaking 1. In the' authorities relied or she is majority, Thus, no decision defines what con- community caretaking function. "community duct does or does not constitute caretaking.” exception swallows the rule for Fourth assume, however, It is fair to protection. duty, on whenever officer is the vehicle pulling cer’s reason for over caretaking exception was and, therefore, ba a DUI investigate officer had “reasonable was to whether the Garbín, In the officers Amendment standards for concern.” traditional Fourth sis scene, they personally to the the Brown were called While governed con logically and could recognize observed smoke the commu- willing court was sup present. These facts clude a fire was exception, pre- on the facts nity caretaking basis for concern.” port a “reasonable exception apply. such an sented cir these “[u]nder The court found Garbín, Brown all Goetaski cumstances, have officers would that an officer must reinforce the notion performance in the of then- been remiss As this investigate dangerous situations. responsibilities community caretaking there are certain circum- recognizes, Court investigate further.” had failed to they include where an officer’s duties stances Garbin, at 1019. based 739 A.2d investigation acting outside the had a standard the officers objective nonetheless, duty, But call to context. for concern. reasonable basis safeguards does not diminish constitutional Goetaski, an officer observed a Thus, it persons. could inalienable to than ten miles an traveling at less vehicle there must be an be said that *5 public highway a hour on the shoulder of or “reasonable concern” reasonable basis 4 a.m. The blinker on at with its left-turn justi- stop legally a is by the officer before a followed the vehicle for one-tenth Amendment, the re- fied under Fourth driving making stop. a While mile before of the situation.2 gardless is not a violation of a on the shoulder previously dis- This Court has [¶24.] statute, “designed emergency for use it is for rights vehi- cussed Fourth for vehicular ordinarily not to be used but stops. cle 39:1-1. The Court found travel.” NJSA facts, had a de stop that on these the officer of an automobile and the based “The something that was out reasonable belief a with occupants tention of its is seizure ordinary, “[p]eople that don’t of the of the Fourth and Four meaning the road, especial- the shoulder of the drive on City Spenner teenth Amendments. v. of signals left turn on the ly with their Falls, 13, 580 Sioux in a rural area if night middle of the (citing Delaivare v. N.W.2d something wrong.” there’s not Prouse, 99 S.Ct. U.S. Thus, had a 507 A.2d at 752. the officer (1979)). L.Ed.2d 660 Law enforcement concern,” car had that “reasonable a rea “may stop not a vehicle without ” malfunctioned, making stop. (cit suspicion doing sonable so. Ohio, ing Terry v. Brown, the North Dakota Su- [f 22.] (1968)). 1868, 20 “Howev L.Ed.2d 889 preme community addressed the Court er, emphasized that it should be exception and found that it did caretaker to make suspicion required reasonable of apply when the officer’s assertion not probable than the cause re stop is less merely pretex- was to issue a warrant or make quired trial court discounted the offi- tual. The Lownes, (citing arrest.” Id. thought he had testimony cer’s (1993)). 896, 898 “The existence N.W.2d from Brown’s vehicle coming seen smoke of suspicion question is a of reasonable traveling that Brown’s vehicle was at by fully law which is reviewable Dakota speed. rate of The North slow Lownes, at 499 N.W.2d determined that the offi- Court.” Supreme Court only majority’s does the "objective tive standard. Not 2. An reasonable basis” or "reason- "community caretaking” opinion support with concern" should not be confused able exception, because of the deficient suspicion. If but also legal standard of reasonable stop, adopts "community basis to make such a adopt caretak- factual the Court is to standard, solely what relying on objec- ing” exception, then it must have some required factual basis [T]he -intervention is warranted. “The fact stop for a “routine traffic check” is mere that a driver is at a slower than usual required roadway minimal.... All that is is does not itself create a reasonable stop product be not the under whim, the influence of alcohol caprice, mere or curiosity. or idle illegal activity.” Brown, other State v. stop It enough upon is is based (N.D.1993). N.W.2d In other “specific and articulable facts which words, Officer DeBoer must have had an together taken with references from basis to Rinehart’s vehicle. facts, reasonably those warrant [the] This is true part whether the is of the intrusion[.]” community caretaking function or to inves- Spenner, 1998 SD 56 at tigate activity. extrinsic (alterations at origi- 610-11 objective evidence must demonstrate that nal) Krebs, (quoting State illegal activity is afoot or community care- (S.D.1993)). taking is needed before an officer can Turning our attention to the case a constitutionally permissible make hand, Officer DeBoer stated that he was [¶ 28.] Because Officer DeBoer had no concerned have been independent articuable facts Rine- experiencing a or that stroke the vehicle hart’s car had malfunctioned or that Rine- assumption had malfunctioned. Neither hart in physical peril, legal he had no reasonable. If Rinehart experiencing justification pull him over. “[H]owever any type physical- onset, the vehicle well-intentioned the may have within would not have remained the lane been in this the risk for abuse is which driving. Rinehart was Some sort of Comm, real.” Doheny v. Safety, Public erratic movements of the car would have 2 (Minn.App.1985). The *6 been observed Rinehart under phys- abuse, risk of this cannot be over- impairment. ical The record does not indi- by come mere whim no matter how heart- cate such circumstances existed. Nor did felt the officer be. An stan- rely the trial court on a of violation SDCL dard, proffered, where articuable facts are stop 32-25-5.1 a basis to Rinehart.3 only is the benchmark for which we judge Likewise, Officer DeBoer had no whether a search or seizure is consistent objective reasonable belief that Rinehart’s with auspices of the Fourth Amend- car had malfunctioned. coming Smoke ment. An officer’s can- motive observed; from the car was not parts auto supplant objective not “reasonableness” of not dropping from underneath the the Fourth Amendment. car; Rinehart did not have his flashers on gone [¶ This Court has 29.] too far. indicating flag- trouble nor was Rinehart pronouncement This Court’s all but viti- ging down request help. the officer to All any protection. ates Fourth Amendment Officer DeBoer moving saw was car at a training Officers in taught will be to use pace within prescribed speed limit. magic language at “I acting trial: A vehicle within my community caretaking capacity posted speed mph but 15 below the stopped when I the defendant’s vehicle.” Court, limit is not a reasonable indication that As employment endorsed this actually Officer DeBoer later claimed he to violate traffic ordinances. Nowhere in the thought. potentiality statute does it read that the impeding traffic is a violation. the ma- indicate, 3. As the facts it was a.m. and the jority is left with reasonable of DUI only vicinity traffic in the was Officer DeBoer stop as its sole basis to Rinehart’s vehicle. nothing and Rinehart. There is in the record majority's holding, driving mph Under that the was reasonable be- equates under the limit to reasonable impeding actually cause no occurred. Like- suspicion. agree I with other courts that wise, itself, potentiality of a violation of a statute speed, by enough have held slow is not were, is not the test. If legally justifiable stop then almost all to make a stops potentiality would be valid based on the Fourth Amendment. See infra. such a maneuver would allow carte a crime or tigating helping elderly lady cross the street. announced time, The rule to- power any anyone, blanche day begs question: when is an officer any con- Certainly, reason. citizen’s acting not within its caretaking right stitutional to be unreason- free from function? depend search and not able seizure should Therefore, I dissent. phrase arresting on a catch officer. rule, adoption With the under these

facts, away. state not too far is always An a com- acting within inves- munity function whether

Case Details

Case Name: State v. Rinehart
Court Name: South Dakota Supreme Court
Date Published: Oct 18, 2000
Citation: 617 N.W.2d 842
Docket Number: None
Court Abbreviation: S.D.
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