62 P. 679 | Idaho | 1900
Lead Opinion
The defendant was informed against upon a charge of assault with intent to commit murder. He was convicted of an “assault with a deadly weapon likely to produce great bodily injury.” From the judgment, as well as from the order denying defendant’s motion for a new trial, this appeal is taken.
It appears from the record that the defendant and one Rice were or had been engaged in litigation in regard to some mining property. The defendant had been drinking hard for some time; in fact, as appears from the evidence, at one time shortly prior to the alleged assault, his debaucheries had brought him very near, if not quite, to the point of delirium tremens; but it does not appear that at the time he committed the assault he was delirious, although it is quite evident from the testimony that he was drunk. The theory of the defense is that the defendant was insane. There is no evidence to support such a theory. The kind of alcoholic insanity which simply tends to accelerate the party in seeking revenge for either a real or imagined injury, and which is directed solely against the author of such injury, is a very different disease from that which is motiveless, and results in a mere “delirious fancy and a muscle raised obedient to its impulse.” The defendant approached Rice while the latter was quietly reading a newspaper, with his feet elevated upon a table, and, calling Rice’s attention to the fact of the difficulty between them, informed him (Rice) that he (defendant) was going to kill him like a dog, and proceeded to carry his threat into execution by drawing and cocking his revolver; and Rice thereupon sprung up,
As to the other question raised by appellant, to wit, the impeachment of the verdict by affidavits made after verdict rendered, we have to say that such practice has never been recognized by this court. (State v. Davis, 6 Idaho, 159, 53 Pac. 678.)
Finding no reversible error in the record, the judgment of the district court is affirmed.
Rehearing
ON REHEARING.
We have carefully considered the petition for
rehearing filed on behalf of the defendant, who is appellant herein, and find that said petition presents no question for consideration which was not fully considered upon the original hearing. After such consideration of the petition for rehearing, we are still of the opinion that the judgment of conviction was properly affirmed, wherefore the petition for rehearing is denied.