STATE OF MONTANA, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. LEVI BRANDON RICHESON, Defendant and Appellant.
No. 02-600
Supreme Court of Montana
Decided May 3, 2004
2004 MT 113 | 321 Mont. 126 | 89 P.3d 958
Submitted on Briefs October 30, 2003.
For Respondent: Hon. Mike McGrath, Attorney General; Tammy K. Plubell, Assistant Attorney General, Helena.
JUSTICE WARNER delivered the Opinion of the Court.
¶1 Levi Brandon Richeson (Richeson) was convicted by a jury of four counts of sexual intercourse without consent,
¶2 We address the following issues on appeal:
¶3 1. Did the District Court properly exercise its discretion when it
¶4 2. Was Richeson‘s trial counsel ineffective because he did not rely on the statutory provision defining guardian-ward relationship to challenge potential Juror Arndt for cause?
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
¶5 On September 20, 2001, the State of Montana filed an Information charging Richeson with four counts of sexual intercourse without consent, felonies, in violation of
¶6 The District Court conducted a sentencing hearing on June 19, 2002, and thereafter sentenced Richeson to four ten-year consecutive sentences for the convictions of sexual intercourse without consent and three six-month consecutive sentences for the convictions of unlawful transactions with minors.
¶7 According to trial testimony, over a two-day period, on April 17 and 18, 2001, Richeson, then age twenty-two, supplied beer and marijuana to two minors, then ages thirteen and fourteen, both runaways at the time. Richeson also rented rooms at two hotels over this same two-day period and engaged in sexual intercourse twice on April 17 and twice on April 18 with the thirteen year old girl (K.W.).
¶8 On April 19, K.W. returned to school. The school immediately notified K.W.‘s parents of her whereabouts. K.W. eventually confided in her parents that she and Richeson had engaged in sexual intercourse. K.W. thereafter reported this information to Detective Scheele of the Great Falls Police Department, which led to Richeson‘s arrest.
¶9 During voir dire proceedings the State notified the District Court that potential juror, Jessica Arndt (Arndt), was employed as a guard at the detention center and could potentially know Richeson through hеr employment. Upon questioning by the State in open court as to whether Arndt knew anybody involved in Richeson‘s case, Arndt responded, “I know the defendant.” The District Court then conducted a sidebar conference and decided that further questioning of Arndt should be in chambers, outside the presence of the entire jury panel.
¶10 In chambers, the following dialogue occurred between Arndt and Richeson‘s counsel:
Q: Thank you. First of all, for the record, would you state how you know Levi Richeson?
A: I am a detention officer.
Q: With your employment are you aware of his current status?
A: Just that he‘s on trial now, that he‘s being held in the jail.
Q: You‘re aware that he‘s in custody? Do you know anything about the details of his custody?
A: No, I don‘t.
Q: Does the fact that he‘s in custody interfere with your ability as you see it, to be able to sit as a juror in this case?
A: I don‘t think it would.
Q: You think you would have the ability to proceed even with the knowledge that he is being held in custody?
A: Uh-huh.
Q: If you were sitting in Mr. Richeson‘s place and you were sitting on the jury knowing what you know about Mr. Richeson, would you want yourself on the jury?
A: No.
¶11 Richeson‘s counsel then moved the District Court to remove Arndt for cause. Prior to the District Court ruling on the motion, the State questioned Juror Arndt. The following dialogue took place between the State and Arndt:
Q: Have you dealt with him personally?
A: No.
Q: Have you ever talked, spoken with him or talked with him at all?
A: No.
Q: You just know he‘s in custody?
A: Uh-huh.
....
Q: You wouldn‘t want yourself as a juror. Does that apply to any criminal defendant, not specific to this?
A: No.
Q: There‘s no reason for you saying thаt other than just your own?
A: Uh-huh.
Q: You just say that because of your job and duties and everything else?
A: Uh-huh.
Q: Good. If you‘re picked as a juror, you would have to pay attention to the facts and testimony and be impartial. Can you do that?
A: Yes.
Q: Okay. So when you say you wouldn‘t want yourself as a juror, that‘s basically because of your personality trait that basically you‘re giving us, not something that you cannot separate yourself from; is that correct?
A: Correct.
Q: So is there any reason you could not be a juror today, why you couldn‘t be fair?
A: No.
Q: Could you take that oath to be honest and weigh the facts fairly?
A. Yes.
¶12 Following this exchange, the State objected to Richeson‘s counsel‘s motion to remove Arndt for cause. The District Court then questioned Arndt:
Q: All right. Well, Ms. Arndt the bottom line here is whether or not you‘ll be able to give both the State and the defendant a fair trial here. [Do you think] that‘s something you can do ...?
A: I can. I can do it if you ask me to, yes.
Q: If you are selected you‘ll be given instructions to do that. Is that something that you can follow?
A: Yes.
¶13 The District Court denied Richeson‘s motion to remove Juror Arndt for cause. Richeson then requested that the Court instruct Arndt to refrain from any conversation with other jurors about her work capacity or any relationship she may have with Richeson stemming therefrom. The District Court granted the motion and instructed Arndt accordingly. The State and Richeson each used their allotted peremptory challenges, Richeson using his last peremptоry challenge to strike Arndt from the panel.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶14 We review denial of a challenge to dismiss a juror for cause for abuse of discretion. State v. Falls Down, 2003 MT 300, ¶ 17, 318 Mont. 219, ¶ 17, 79 P.3d 797, ¶ 17 (citation omitted). Because of the right to a trial by an impartial jury,
¶15 To determine whether to dismiss a juror for cause, trial courts are
(2) A challenge for cause may be taken for all or any of the following reasons or for any other reason that the court determines:
....
(b) standing in the relation of guardian and ward, attorney and client, master and servant, landlord and tenant, or debtor and creditor with or being a member of the family or in the employment of the defendant or the person who is alleged to be injured by the offense charged or on whose complaint the prosecution was instituted.
....
(j) having a state of mind in reference to the case or to either of the parties that would prevent the juror from acting with entire impartiality and without prejudice to the substantial rights of either party.
¶16 Challenges for cause asserted pursuant to
DISCUSSION
ISSUE ONE
¶17 Did the District Court properly exercise its discretion when it denied Richeson‘s challenge of a juror for cause based on the juror‘s employment as a detention officer?
¶18 Richeson contends that the District Court erred in failing to properly assess the circumstantial evidence, which, Richeson argues, revealed that Arndt was inherently prejudiced against him because she was a detention officer. Richeson thus asserts that the District Court abused its discretion in failing to remove Juror Arndt for cause.
¶19 Richeson first alleges that Arndt would have encountered Richeson in jail clothing rather than civilian clothing, and asserts that Richeson‘s appearance in such clothing may have a prejudicial effect on Arndt‘s judgment during the course of the trial. Richeson relies оn the United States Supreme Court decision in Estelle v. Williams
¶20 In Estelle, the defendant, unable to post bond, asked an officer at the jail for his civilian clothing prior to appearing at trial. Denied by the officer of his civilian clothing, the dеfendant was compelled to wear his prison-issued clothing throughout the trial, whereupon he was convicted as charged. Estelle, 425 U.S. at 503, 96 S.Ct. at 1692, 48 L.Ed.2d at 130.
¶21 The defendant thereafter petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus, arguing that standing trial in his prison-issued clothing was inherently unfair. Id. at 503, 96 S.Ct. at 1692, 48 L.Ed.2d at 130. The United States Supreme Court examined numerous cases that, with few exceptions, determined that a defendant should not be compelled to go to trial in prison or jail clothing because of thе possible impairment of the presumption of innocence. Estelle, 425 U.S. at 504, 96 S.Ct. at 1693, 48 L.Ed.2d at 130-31 (citations omitted). The Supreme Court recognized, however, the inappropriateness of a “mechanical rule vitiating any conviction, regardless of the circumstances, where the accused appeared before the jury in prison garb.” Estelle, 425 U.S. at 507, 96 S.Ct. at 1694, 48 L.Ed.2d at 133.
¶22 Relevant to the instant case, Arndt made clear in her responses to defense counsel, the State and the Court, that she believed her employment as a detention officer would have no effect on her ability to render a fair judgment. Richeson‘s counsel did not inquire as to whether Arndt actually did see Richeson in jail clothing, the frequency that Arndt may observe Richeson in jail clothing, nor as to what effect such observation, over time, may have upon her ability to offer a fair judgment. Given the lack of such evidence in the record, this Court could only speculate whether аny such observation, if indeed it occurred, would prejudice Arndt against Richeson. What the record does reveal is that Arndt believed, from the time that the question was first asked of her, that her employment would have no effect on her ability to render a fair judgment:
Q: Does the fact that he‘s in custody interfere with your ability as you see it, to be able to sit as a juror in this case?
A: I don‘t think it would.
Q: You think you would have the ability to proceed even with the knowledge that he is being held in custody?
A: Uh-huh.
....
Q: All right. Well, Ms. Arndt the bottom line here is whether or not you‘ll be able to give both the State and the defendant a fair trial here. [Do you think] that‘s something you can do ...?
A: I can. I can do it if you ask me to, yes.
Q: If you are selected you‘ll be given instructions to do that. Is that something that you can follow?
A: Yes.
¶23 This Court has previously concluded that the bare fact that a potential juror is connected with law enforcement, does not, without more, necessitate a finding of bias resulting in a dismissal for cause. See State v. Radi (1978), 176 Mont. 451, 460, 578 P.2d 1169, 1175 (holding that а potential juror‘s status as a public official, and thus legal advisee of the county attorney, does not alone disqualify a public official as a juror); State v. Thomson (1976), 169 Mont. 158, 163, 545 P.2d 1070, 1073 (holding that the defendant was not entitled to remove a juror for cause because of his status as a officer for the Montana Fish & Game Department without a showing of actual bias) (citing State v. Cadotte (1895), 17 Mont. 315, 316, 42 P. 857, 858).
¶24 We have stated that the “widest possible examination should be allowed such person in his examination as a potential juror, and should there be any doubt in the evеnt of a challenge for cause, the trial court should resolve the doubt in favor of allowing the challenge.” Radi, 176 Mont. at 460, 578 P.2d at 1175. In the instant case, the District Court did grant Richeson wide latitude to question Juror Arndt, allowing questioning to occur in chambers. In chambers, Arndt testified that she had never spoken to Richeson nor had any personal dealings with him, but was merely aware of his current status as a detainee and, notwithstanding her employment, could nonetheless follow the law and render a fair judgment. Although this Court has stated that when voir dire examination discloses a serious question about a juror‘s ability to be fair and impartial, that such question should be resolved in favor of excusing that juror, Arndt‘s testimony simply does not reveal a state of mind in reference to Richeson that would prevent her from acting with entire impartiality and without prejudice to the substantial rights of Richeson. See State v. Williams (1993), 262 Mont. 530, 539, 866 P.2d 1099, 1104 (overruled on other grounds).
¶26 Based upon all of Arndt‘s testimony, we conclude that the District Court properly exercised its discretion in refusing to dismiss Arndt for cause based solely on her duties as a detention officer. There exists nothing in the totality of Arndt‘s testimony demonstrating that she had formеd an opinion on the guilt or innocence of Richeson based upon her employment, nor that her employment would cause her to harbor any actual bias one way or the other. See Freshment, ¶ 12; Heath, ¶ 16.
¶27 Richeson further alleges however, that through her employment, Arndt may also see Richeson shackled, observe his conduct and interaction with other jail guards, feel pressure from her workplace peers should she vote to acquit, and, unlike other jurors, could have continued contact with Richeson if he was convicted and returned to the detention center, knowledge that could affect her judgment and deliberations.
¶28 While bias must sometimes be revealed by circumstantial rather than direct evidence, see State v. Chastain (1997), 285 Mont. 61, 64, 947 P.2d 57, 59-60 (overruled on other grounds by State v. Herrman, 2003 MT 149, ¶ 33, 316 Mont. 198, ¶ 33, 70 P.3d 738, ¶ 33), Richeson here attempts to interchange circumstantial evidence with speculation. The record reveals no reason to conclude that such observations and аssociations would lead Juror Arndt to have a unfavorable rather than favorable opinion of Richeson. In short, Richeson‘s speculation falls short of establishing bias via circumstantial evidence. We thus agree with the State that the mere fact that Juror Arndt was a detention officer did not make her automatically biased against Richeson, nor does the record reflect
¶29 It must be remembered that the purpose of voir dire is not only to establish grounds to dismiss a juror for cause, but also to enable counsel to intelligently exercise peremptory challenges. See DeVore, ¶ 30 (citing Great Falls Tribune v. District Court (1980), 186 Mont. 433, 440, 608 P.2d 116, 120). This is a case where no prejudice was shown but there was sufficient information for counsel to decide to use a peremptory chаllenge. Based on the foregoing, we hold that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying Richeson‘s motion to remove Arndt for cause.
ISSUE TWO
¶30 Was Richeson‘s trial counsel ineffective because he did not rely on the statutory provision defining guardian-ward relationship to challenge potential Juror Arndt for cause?
¶31 In considering ineffective assistance of counsel claims on direct appeal or in postconviction proceedings, we apply the two-pronged test set forth in Strickland v. Washington (1984), 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674. Pursuant to the Strickland test, the petitioner must show that counsel‘s performance was deficient. This requires a showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the “counsel” guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. at 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d at 693. In attempting to demonstrate deficient performance, the defendant must show that counsel‘s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88, 104 S.Ct. at 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d at 693. Second, the dеfendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. This requires showing that counsel‘s errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. at 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d at 693.
¶32 Richeson alleges that counsel‘s actions were deficient because he “failed to utilize the statutorily implied bias challenge for cause based on the guardian-ward relationship between a jailor and inmate” pursuant to
¶33 Richeson thus contends that no tactical reason could exist for failing to use a statutorily defined bias to help remove a juror where defense counsel has already moved to strike the juror for cause. Richeson asserts that a citation to
¶34 We agree with Richeson that the statutes and case law requiring correctional facilities to meet the basic needs of prisoners serve to benefit the prisoners and society as a whole. However, notwithstanding that the law requires certain standards from correctional facilities and individual guards and detention officers, such standards, no matter how strict, do not create an implied guardian-ward relationship between prisoners and individual guards.
¶35 A guardianship is a creature of the law and a guardian maintains no authority, rights or duties except those conferred or imposed by the law. Montana law authorizes numerous types of guardianships. See
¶36 Nowhere does Montana law authorize, much less create, a guardian-ward relationship between individual guards or officers and detainees. Moreover, the basic nature of a guardianship of an incapacitated person requires court involvement, as a determination
“Incapacitated person” means any person who is impaired by reason of mental illness, mental deficiency, physical illness or disability, chronic use of drugs, chronic intoxication, or other cause (except minority) to the extent that he lacks sufficient understanding or capacity to make or communicate responsible decisions concerning his person or which cause has so impaired the person‘s judgment that he is incapable of realizing and making a rational decision with respect to his need for treatment.
¶37 Not only may the legislature regulate and define duties and obligations of guardians, but the guardian must also submit personally to the jurisdiction of the court in any proceeding relating to the guardianship, and the guardianship continues even if the guardian moves. See, e.g.,
¶38 In the case of a prisoner, there is no prior judicial determination as to whether such person falls under the statutory definition of “incapacitated person,” nor is there an appointment of a guardian who is under the direct supervision of the court. A prison guard or detention officer may not apply to the court for instructions or aid in constructing a legal document on behalf of any detainee, nor is there any process by which a guard, detention officer or prisoner may apply to thе court for a termination of such alleged guardianship duties.
¶39 We thus conclude that, notwithstanding any constitutional or statutory responsibilities a detention officer or guard may have toward a detainee, such responsibilities do not meet the requirements of a guardian-ward relationship. Given this conclusion, we hold that Richeson‘s counsel did not fall below an objective standard of reasonableness, and thus, did not provide ineffective assistance of counsel in not moving to challenge Arndt for cause under
¶40 The decision of the District Court is affirmed.
CHIEF JUSTICE GRAY, JUSTICES NELSON and REGNIER concur.
¶41 I dissent on the question of whether the District Court erred in denying Richeson‘s challenge for cause to juror Arndt.
¶42 During voir dire examination, prospective juror Arndt was asked: “If you were sitting in Mr. Richeson‘s place and you were sitting on the jury knowing what you know about Mr. Richeson, would you want yourself on the jury?” Her unequivocal answer was “No.” We have held that “should there be any doubt in the event of a challenge for causе, the trial court should resolve the doubt in favor of allowing the challenge.” State v. Radi (1978), 176 Mont. 451, 460, 578 P.2d 1169, 1175.
¶43 Arndt‘s negative answer, particularly given that she was employed as a detention officer at the facility where Richeson was jailed, is more than sufficient to raise a doubt as to whether she had a state of mind in reference to Richeson that would prevent her from acting with entire impartiality and without prejudice to his substantial rights.