*1 trial was fair defendant’s Minnesota, Respondent, STATE Id. at 702. denied.” Henderson, we that In concluded misconduct not commit prosecutor did RICHARDSON, Appellant. Jamie Glenn intention two with the asking questions No. C9-02-815. evi prejudicial eliciting improper before dence, was answered one of which Supreme Court Minnesota. case, the Id. In the
objection. only question one asked prosecutor 23, 2003. Oct. question was sus objection to that The before the witness answered. tained line of not continue that
prosecutor did prop Additionally, the court
questioning. not they that were jury instructed the
erly posed by attor any questions
to consider be did not allow to that court
neys by the witness.
answered question arguable
It is also earlier clearly prohibited by court’s this issue with
ruling. court discussed than one occasion. parties more record
Additionally, review of the our medi- subject Dame’s
shows already had been after the offense
cation during the di- by Dame’s counsel
opened witness, expert of Dame’s
rect examination receiv- that Dame was not
who confirmed that he the various times
ing medication at jail. conclude him in the We
interviewed question was not single the state’s event, and, was not any
misconduct Henderson,
prejudicial. See
at 702.
Affirmed.
fairly exaggerated the seriousness of those vacate one first-degree offenses. We mur- conviction, der affirm the other convic- tions, and reduce the duration of Richard- Martin, Lynne Sara Assistant State prison son’s terms on the two first-degree Defender, MN, Minneapolis, Ap- Public for each, assault convictions to 120 months on pellant. mandatory minimum terms. Anderson, County Bruce L. Lake Attor- Harbors, MN, Hatch, ney, Two Mike I. General, Attorney Kelly Minnesota Susan General, Kemp, Attorney 8, 2001, Assistant Monday, January St. On Heather Paul, MN, Respondent. Nichols, wife, Richardson’s estranged left sought help
Richardson and from the local shelter, domestic violence which arranged for transitional housing a Two Harbors apartment. Nichols obtained a restraining OPINION against order Richardson because he had ANDERSON, A., threatened her life RUSSELL Justice. and called Robert Van Molen, husband, her former who said Appellant Jamie Glenn Richardson was get he would come to her and her first-degree (pre- convicted of one count of Molen, three children. Van Der who lived meditated) murder and one count of first- Iowa, arrived Two Harbors between degree (felony) shooting murder for the *6 p.m. 3:30 and 4:00 on Wednesday, January death of Robert Van Der Molen and was message 10. Nichols left a at the domestic sentenced to concurrent life terms. Rich- stating violence shelter that she would be ardson was also convicted of two counts of leaving apartment the day. next first-degree against police assault officers p.m., Sometime between 8:30 and 11:00 responded who shooting to the and two purchased Richardson two cases of 30-30 counts of kidnapping his wife and her shells from a Two gas Harbors station. daughter during police a standoff with and was sentenced to 672 consecutive months In early morning January hours of for these offenses.1 11, Nichols and Van Der Molen awoke to
In appeal, this direct argues banging Richardson pounding coming and noises from right he was denied his either the exterior or downstairs interior defense at testify trial and his apartment.2 door to Nichols’ When the his own behalf. He also claims that the banging stop, did not Nichols herded her by sons, trial court erred admitting hearsay seven, into ages two five and into a closet. evidence, by refusing to jury instruct the She then heard noises she later realized on lesser-included offenses to the joined first- were and boys shots in the degree assault charges, by imposing closet, two closet. From the Nichols heard concurrent life sentences for the murder say “daddy’s Richardson home” as he victim, by convictions of one imposing climbed the apartment. stairs to Nichols’ sentences for the other offenses that'un- way “daddy’s The he said home” reminded pleaded guilty posses- 1. Richardson also Fragments of the downstairs interior door's sion of a firearm a felon and received a deadbolt and door knob were admitted into concurrent sentence of 60 months. evidence. by stating them down tried to calm movie, heard Shining. She
her of boys re- okay,” floor. but the body hitting “maybe he’ll be and a another shot say, Richardson shot their dad heard that Richardson peated Nichols Then dead, again, him never call “brains all you’ll and that there were “Bob’s twice Kids, Rich- you?” are where come out. over.” door, bang- closet open the pushed ardson boys came out of the after the Soon point, At nose. on the
ing Nichols police arrived another officer apartment, noise from Van gurgling Nichols heard himself behind a truck. positioned Molen, apart- on the lying who he Richardson position, From his observed as boys and the watched She ment floor. yelling, “you at him and looking directly Mol- over to Van Der walked Richardson truck, get back or I’m there behind the head, en, and “blew gun against his put shooting.” The officer to start going apart.” his head that the a shot and estimated bullet heard Meanwhile, girlfriend a tenant and his within five feet of his head. passed a man apartment awoke to the downstairs apartment remained inside the Nichols door, climbing the at the shouting, banging 2-year-old and her with Richardson like cackling apartment, Nichols’ steps to three hours daughter approximately yelling “here’s person,” and “an insane time, During this boys after the left. apartment after They Johnny.” fled her, the rifle to punched held he left hearing gunshots. Before her, planned to kill her. and told her he heard Nichols’ building, tenant go Nichols to Richardson asked When and “I have to “don’t kill me” screams of which were get glasses, his downstairs outside, the the kids.” Once be here for door, by the of the stairs at the bottom police. Two called the girlfriend tenant’s appeared ran outside. She Nichols to the responded police officers Harbors “scared, according frightened, crying,” call. personnel. law enforcement began open the officers When they time, a.m., heard apartment, door to the exterior around At about this same *7 kers, (ERT) f—you say, “you Richardson Team hos- Emergency Response f— officers, here, kers, you best up members, come don’t ERT and other tage negotiator, gunshot heard a up here” and not come marksman, At about including a arrived. them.3 they thought was fired toward a.m., coming “I’m not yelled Richardson area, entry called fled the officers out, nego- holding I’m the child” which dialogue shouting a back-ups, and started that Richardson was meant tiator assumed back-up officer Richardson. As a with a shield. The daughter Nichols’ as using arrived, came out of Nichols’ two sons marksman, storage in a shed with who was building. apartment author- apartment, given was a view of the deadly force but did to use ization talking and boys, “very excited” Both Richardson was he believed shoot because fast,” person- told law enforcement “very daughter. When holding Nichols’ upstairs and that their “dad was dead nel saw Richardson without marksman Richard- by twice” that he had been shot Rich- child, fired a shot wounded he emergency An medical technician son. ardson, then surrendered. (EMT) who spoke boys. She also with into evidence. part were also introduced casings and shell 3. Recovered it, wall, a bullet hole in which had stairwell charged by grand jury Richardson was the hostile and violent relationship of Van Der Molen first-degree premeditated indictment with and Nichols toward one anoth- er which 609.185(a)(1) argued was murder, admissi- (2002); § Minn.Stat. ble under Minnesota Rules of Evidence murder, first-degree felony Minn.Stat. 404(a)(2) (b).4 and According to Richard- 609.185(a)(3) (2002); § two counts of at- son, prior evidence of the history of Van murder, tempted second-degree Minn.Stat. Der Molen and Nichols was admissible to 1(1) 609.19, (2002); § subd. two counts of show his state of in support mind of his assault, 609.221, first-degree § Minn.Stat. claim that he acting in defense of (2002); subd. 2 kidnapping, two counts of Nichols and the children and to establish 609.25, 2(2) § MinmStat. subds. 1 and Nichols’ motive and intent for his assertion (2002); possession felon in of a fire- second, fatal, that she fired the shot to Van arm, 624.713, 1(b) § Minn.Stat. subd. Der Molen’s head.5 The court did not rule (2002). on the admissibility of the evidence before trial, Before brought state a motion trial nor did the court rule when asked limine, seeking to again exclude evidence of before the state’s opening state- * * * 4. Richardson’s memorandum’s offer of Heather Nichols Bob [told] Van Der * * * * * * specific allegations, included a list of 36 out[.]”; in- you Molen "I will take * * * * * * cluding: evening August [0]ne charged Heather Nichols was with domestic phone there were coming every calls against assault Robert Van hours, Der Molen in minutes for two all from Robert Van Montezuma, Iowa[;] Der Molen. One time Joe Rinne [Richard- * n * * * n Heather Nichols wanted [Kevin phone son's answered the friend] and Robert arrange Blackston] for Bob’s death with said, you’re pretty Der Molen ’’think had[;] acquaintance and [sic] he huh?”[;] tough, Kevin Blackston received confirmation from by Tim Blake was told Heather Nichols that Robert Van Der Molen that Heather had tried Robert Van Der Molen beat her and that she before[;] poison him once him[;] was scared of On 10-23-96 Robert Van Der Molen was ar- * * * [Nichols] disliked [Van Der Molen] rested for and convicted of domestic abuse of great anywhere deal and did not want him * * * Heather po- Nichols. Ms. Nichols told * * * around[;] lice [at this that she time] was scared of * * * [Richardson] met [Nichols] with gets Robert Van Der Molen and that when he Mr. principal LaCour [the at J.A. Johnson her[;] jail out of he will kill Elementary School in Two Harbors] and told In 1999 Robert Van Der Molen was arrested him that posed Robert Van Der Molen [against for domestic abuse Nichols] in Dako- * * * children[;] threat to her County. ta There were also a number of Van Der Molen was known to have lots of alleged protection violations of orders for guns, always gun carried a and was feared [against domestic assault incidents Nichols] *8 police[;] townsfolk and Lakeville, 1999[;] Minnesota in Heather Nichols warned Jamie Richardson Robert Van Der Molen had threatened to kill that Robert Van going Der Molen was to Nicholsf;] Heather * * * * * * up come and kill Jamie Richard- restraining against Nichols had orders Robert * * * son[;] Van Der Eagan, Molen in both Iowa and * * * * * * Minnesota[;] Van Der Molen beat Heather Nichols kids[;] and beat the charged Mr. Van Der Molen was with two against incidents of domestic assault Heather Nichols had Heather shot one of Forrest Knoxville, guns Nichols in 1996 and 1998 in Richardson’s and also had moved them Iowa[;] in the house. Mr. charged Van Der Molen was in Marion Harassment, Abuse, head, County with Van Der Molen was shot twice in the Domestic Assault and Violation aof No Contact Or- and the medical examiner testified that either der[;] of the two shots would have been fatal. Nichols asked for Richardson’s proof, of ment.6 him, later brought a rifle to protection, and be- its case the state rested After buy him to ammunition for went with statement, opening fore helped plan entry his into the gun, and counsel not that defense requested state character to this her and the children. apartment to refer to rescue permitted be yet had not Richardson because evidence the door and Richardson shot the locks off admissibility. Defense its demonstrated entered, firing a shot when Der Molen Van court to rule asking the responded, counsel daughter throw Nichols’ threatened the character evi- admissibility of on the indicated over banister.7 Richardson’s claim of dence in the context “pretty recitation was accu- that counsel’s upon a defense relying he was it on the and that he would add to rate” counsel made defense. Defense others that, if Rich- The court ruled even stand. that Richardson proof, indicating offer of consistent with his offer ardson testified he knew from Nichols testify that would jury proof, the court would not instruct previously had abused Der Molen that Van thus, others, and, character on defense of attempted to children and had her and the sup- would not be admissible her; told Richardson on that Nichols kill claim. Defense port his defense of others ar- Der Molen had January 10 that Van Der not to use either Van agreed counsel was gun; a and that she in town with rived or Nichols’ character evidence Molen’s and the children. would hurt her afraid he opening offer his statement. counsel’s verbal According to defense 6. Because the court had 7. Counsel by defense son Molen. ine her whether she admissibility of the character Nichols record: was someone who Mr. Richardson Robert He knew pulled Mr. Van Der Molen bordered together, town. He was that there was * * * ert Van Van Der Molen had frantic. 7th Avenue On the * about her * * instances in which she regarding what she [that] was Molen; [and] Defense counsel Van Der Molen evening over made the offer counsel, Der Molen and his going apart. ** that Robert Van ever touched the rifle subjected to cross examination he had a by past his wife because she * attempting she denied She over pulled long history relationship * * * counsel could not January had abused his children liquor store. gun told him that Robert had done come Heather. He knew There was * * * knew lot with had told Richard- it. had told him that did ask Nichols Der Molen yet *9 10th, appeared to be evidence, up by kill her from his wife. with Van between him, ruled on wife from his wife things that he came a number * * * that shot that she on the getting exam- * * about when Iowa, * * Rob Der He on to *. * was afraid come and buy and the kids. In had lot. His wife return after children from Mr. Molen was devised a hands Van Der from Heather. And Molen has the child balcony[.] Robert Van * * * started son put [T]hey more child throw Autumn after he shot down, ing the rifle Autumn taken from his father’s some shells standing by * * * at him. they met He shot the locks off. may middle menacing. as if [went] to the home to walk had told Molen, plan. help he held Autumn can see Heather standing at the middle that he was be thrown * * * Der Molen and Robert trying down, up landing. him, brought out a rifle that she over her up put n * * essence, to the him, * * Mr. Richardson n * * Van Der Molen. it also that he protect herself and her Autumn that he was Autumn in one of banister and that the keep *. He was then liquor about 1:00 o’clock. And while or tossed over steps banister, * * * Holiday Station to going It she asked him appeared was not away the child they n * * appeared house. down, he was store fighting with Mr. Van Der Mr. Richard to hurt her met he fired becoming stairway, When he going to told Mr.' Van Der going to parking put point again [*] away They that her [*] his he [*] and counsel addressed steady pres- The court the Molen as “the one reliable admissibility of Der Molen’s Van and Nich- ence” Nichols’ life. again ols’ character evidence before Rich- pled guilty Richardson to the firearm testify. ardson recalled Nichols to De- charge, jury acquitted and the him of the argued fense counsel that order to show attempted charges. jury murder Richardson’s state of mind at the time guilty found Richardson of the remaining incident, he needed to ask Nichols charges. The court entered judgments of about what she had told Richardson about conviction and sentenced to Richardson point, Der Molen. At this the court imprisonment two terms of life concurrent ruling made its definitive on the admissi- for the murder offenses and a concurrent
bility of the character evidence. The court possession months for the crime of of a explained that not said he had that Rich- by firearm a felon. The court sentenced testify ardson could not in accord with his him to proof.8 offer of consecutive terms for the Nor had the court said assault that testify kidnapping Richardson could not offenses and departed up- Richardson met with Nichols twice that ward from sentencing guidelines evening, brought gun, that Nichols him a double the sentences for these offenses for they together went to the store where a total of 672 consecutive months. The ammunition, bought and that court indicated that sup- several factors apartment Richardson was at the because ported upward departure: the invasion him Nichols told she was afraid of Van Der privacy, of a zone of fact that children Molen and wanted him to rescue her and terrorized, present were the duration the children. The court said that if even incident, and the fact that Richard- Richardson testified in accord with his of- give son did not up himself until he was proof, fer of he would not be entitled to a shot. The court identify did not the fac- others, jury instruction on defense but supporting upward tors double dura- preclude that did not him from testifying tional departure for each sentence. as to his version of events. As for the theory shot, that Nichols fired the second II. repeated pre-
the court that it would not telling clude Richardson from his version We first address argument of the facts that Richardson could but not that the trial court violated Richardson’s “get into may may what he or not have process right due a defense heard from concerning [Nichols] the basis allowing him to introduce character for it.” evidence tending prove that he was others, testify.9 acting Richardson did not In in defense of closing he did not argument, the state premeditation characterized Van Der act with and that Nichols Honor, 8. The solely court said: ruling Your based on the yesterday, testify I I do not feel I’ll be able to preclude don’t know how the Court can saying happened, him completely they from this is what to the facts as stand in this telling his events. I version of the don’t ruling case. Because this has now forced you go why know that that means can into I important part my me to omit the most way really, felt that but I don’t think there’s testimony, I do not feel the truth can be told anything preclude you saying from what placed with the limits that the Court has you your proof. said in offer of me and other witnesses that would have So, going been called in this case. I am not testify 9. Richardson chose not to after counsel testify based on that fact there. thoroughly explained testify: his
277 error, denying the defendant the such as Der Molen’s shot to Van the second fired defense, present a our standard of right to head. of evidence whether the exclusion review is every requires process Due “ a beyond ‘harmless reasonable was “ op meaningful a ‘afforded defendant be ” Delaware v. (citing Id. at 102 doubt.’ ” complete defense.’ present portunity 683-84, Arsdall, 673, 106 475 U.S. Van Richards, 187, 191 495 N.W.2d v. (1986), 1431, L.Ed.2d 674 S.Ct. 89 (Minn.1992) v. Trom (quoting California analysis); accord impact error harmless 2528, 479, 485, betta, 104 81 S.Ct. 467 U.S. Juarez, 286, 291 State v. Const, (1984)); accord U.S. L.Ed.2d 413 (Minn.1997) (citing Chapman Califor Const, I, § XIV, 1; art 7. § Minn. amend. 824, nia, 18, 24, 87 S.Ct. 386 U.S. has the the defendant This means (1967)). The error cannot be L.Ed.2d 705 of the defendant’s version present right beyond to be harmless reasonable said wit testimony through facts reversible, doubt, where therefore and is (cit Richards, N.W.2d at 194 nesses. that the possibility a reasonable “there is Texas, 14, 19, 388 U.S. Washington v. ing complained may have contribut- [error] (1967)). 18 L.Ed.2d 87 S.Ct. Chapman, 386 U.S. ed to the conviction.” is not with a defense right S.Ct. limitations, exercising this out however—in that he was de- argument and the state must right, both the accused present a defense is nied the evidentiary comply procedural with that the trial argues three-fold. He first “both fairness designed to ensure rules excluding in character evi- court erred guilt in ascertainment of reliability ad- this was dence because information (citing Id. at 195 Cham and innocence.” relevant to his defense of missible and 284, 302, 93 410 U.S. Mississippi bers v. apart- came to the others defense—he (1973)). 35 L.Ed.2d S.Ct. the children rescue Nichols and ment to complains a defendant Where fired danger they were because error, of evidence was that the exclusion shot, striking Der Molen the first evidentiary provides the offer Second, Richardson contends the head. Santiago a trial court’s decision. basis for was rele- 'character evidence the excluded (Minn.2002). State, 425, 442 N.W.2d Ad- premeditation. the issue of vant to rulings absent a will not reverse such We contends that ditionally, Nunn, State v. abuse of discretion. clear it ruling error because trial court’s (Minn.1997). Un 906-07 tended excluded character standard, is warranted “[reversal this der intent to motive and Nichols’ establish substantially influ only when the error Der Molen’s shot to Van fire the second In Id. at 907. jury’s decision.” ences head. words, when there is we will reverse other homicide justify or To excuse that, had the erro possibility a reasonable §§ 609.065 609.06 and under Minn.Stat. admitted, been neously excluded evidence done (2002), “killing must have been been more favor might have
the verdict necessary to avert that it was the belief Post, State v. to the defendant. able harm”; “judg bodily grievous death or (Minn.1994). 99, 102 n. 2 gravity to the defendant as ment of the exposed must to which he was peril rul evidentiary
If a trial court’s circum under the erroneous, have been reasonable and the to be ing is determined to kill stances”; election the “defendant’s of a constitutional reaches the level error *11 278
must have been such as reasonable man argues nonetheless in light danger would have made of the evidence Van Der Molen’s charac apprehended.” Boyce, be State v. 284 premedita ter was relevant to the issue of 242, 254, 112 Minn. If specific tion. instances of conduct of the (1969); LaFave, Wayne R. see Substan- by victim are offered the defendant 10.5(b) (2d ed.2003) § tive Law Criminal prove ap the defendant had a reasonable (even when defendant’s beliefs as to the harm, prehension of may the evidence be gravity peril necessity of force prior if the conduct admissible indicates a reasonable, may are “he not use more violent or quarrelsome disposition and if reasonably force than he believes neces- prior the defendant is aware of the con harm.”). sary to relieve the risk of “[J]us- Bland, duct. State 337 N.W.2d in tification for homicide defense of anoth- (Minn.1983) (citing Taylor, parallels er defense of self.” State v. (Minn.1977)). N.W.2d 615 In that Rich Granroth, 491, 492, Minn. testimony ardson offered no as to his (1972). Ordinarily, 399 n. 2 the one prior awareness of the specific victim’s in aggressor, provoking who is the the diffi- misconduct, cidents of no there was error in culty necessary which he finds it to use in excluding the evidence. State v. Cf. force, deadly has no to claim self- Irby, 368 N.W.2d (Minn.App. 22-23 State, defense. Bellcourt v. 1985) (prior incidents of victim’s miscon (Minn.1986). 269, 272 duct admitted to show defendant’s state where, prior mind ruling, to court’s defen Here, the trial court considered dant in testified chambers that he was offer and concluded incidents; aware of the other incidents of that evidence of Van Der Molen’s charac which defendant was not aware were ex in support any ter was not admissible cluded). claim that Richardson defending was Nich Nevertheless, we take a dim view of the ols and her children. According to Rich state’s elicitation of evidence of Der Van proof, ardson’s offer of he and Nichols good Molen’s character. After requesting purchased evening ammunition the of Jan the trial court to pertain- exclude evidence 10; uary he apartment arrived Nichols’ ing relationship the tumultuous between early morning in the January hours of Nichols, Van Der Molen and the state rifle; with a pursuant loaded to their why you asked Nichols: “And did call Van plan, he shot the off locks the door. After Der Molen? I why you spe- mean was it allegedly Van Der Molen kicked Richard cifically prompted called him?” This Nich- stairs, son causing down the Richardson to reply: always ols’ “Because he my came to glasses, lose his Richardson started up the having successfully rescue.” After exclud- stairway; and as Van Molen was hold ed the character by evidence offered Rich- ing two-year-old, Richardson fired at ardson, Molen, closing argument, the state re- believing Van Der he hit had ferred to Van Der Molen as only Der Molen in the chest. “the one Not steady presence aggressor, Richardson the reliable [Nichols’] but also the use of deadly totally force was without the kids’ fives.” We believe reason. the state’s have no elicitation of difficulty concluding We evidence of Van Der Molen’s the trial court concluding good “opened did not err in character the door” to the that the defense was not available under evidence offered the defense to rebut proof. the offer of the same. *12 that either one of the in the head and in the twice assuming error even
But fatal. shots would have been prior the victim’s of evidence exclusion misconduct, case under our incidents of prosecution, evi In a criminal his version of law, proffered alleged crimes to have been dence of other ammunition, ar including buying inadmissi by conduct— the defendant is committed armed several apartment riving at 404(b) prove R. under Minn. Evid. ble Nichols, and meeting with hours after in to show character order the defendant’s apart enter the conformity the locks to therewith shooting off that he acted may case. evidence be of the el Such overwhelming evidence ment —is motive, admitted, however, “to establish murder, including first-degree ements of accident, intent, of mistake or absence See, e.g., premeditation. the element plan.” or identity or common scheme 241, 247-48, Voorhees, v. 596 N.W.2d State Slowinski, 107, 113 v. 450 N.W.2d (Minn.1999) to es (bringing rifle 253 (Minn.1990) 272 (citing Spreigl, State v. approach and place of work tranged wife’s 167, 488, 491, 169 139 Minn. N.W.2d to smoke she went outside ing her when (1965)). admissibility determining In premeditation); inference of supported 404(b) evidence, or Spreigl of Rule Moore, (removing N.W.2d at 361-62 481 (1) that the evidence must find trial court bed, loading storage under shotgun from par convincing and that defendant is clear it, shelf be living it on room placing (2) offense, that the ticipated Spreigl in the If the killing planning). showed fore the and material evidence is relevant Spreigl to the “surely unattributable” verdict is (3) case, proba that the to the state’s beyond a error, error is harmless then the is not Spreigl evidence tive value Juarez, 572 N.W.2d doubt. reasonable prej unfair by potential for outweighed its words, must be satisfied In other we DeWald, 500, 464 v. N.W.2d udice. State if the reasonable doubt “beyond a Norris, (Minn.1991) 428 (citing State v. 503 and the dam admitted evidence had been (Minn.1988)); 61, see also State N.W.2d fully real of the evidence aging potential (Minn. 191, Bolte, 196-97 (i.e., ized, a reasonable average jury 1995) requirements (detailing procedural the same ver have reached- jury) would other-crimes ev governing safeguards (footnote Post, at 102 idence). dict.” N.W.2d omitted). of this rec thorough A review entitled to of The defense is also ord, of all together with a consideration aby or acts of other crimes fer evidence factors, the conclusion compels
relevant reasonable doubt person third to cast exclu doubt the beyond a reasonable guilt. claim of the defendant’s the state’s character evi Der Molen’s sion of Van Bock, 449, 458, 39 229 Minn. State v. impact on significant have a did not dence (1949). evidence is Such in this case. On different the verdict “reverse-404 referred to as sometimes course, case, of we in a different record “third-par (b),” “third-party perpetrator,” conclude otherwise. might “al perpetrator,” “alternative ty culprit,” or perpetrator,”
leged alternative argues Richardson also e-Spreigl” evidence. “revers Minnesota erroneously excluded evidence trial court Johnson, See State it was prior McCord, misconduct because (Minn.1997); of Nichols’ The Admissi David fired defense that Nichol’s a Criminal relevant to his Evidence bility Offered Else Suggest medical That Someone fatal shot. The the second and Defendant (1996); L.Rev. Guilty, 63 Tenn. shot is Richardson was was that evidence, however, B. Kirk- Christopher Mueller & Laird C. crimes does not mean § patrick, Federal Evidence at 684 that the “defendant should be allowed to (2d ed.1994). speculation throw strands of on the wall 404(b) any and see if of them will stick.”
Rule makes no distinction be- McCord, tween or of a the other crimes acts defen- supra at 984. At the preliminary *13 another, dant and those of we have fact stage, to avoid the consideration of admissibility indicated that the same basic crime, matters collateral to the the trial analysis applies in either situation. State court must be satisfied that there is a (Minn.1995). Robinson, 1, direct connection party between the third recognized But we have also that “Sixth charged and the crime: (right Amendment concerns to confront (evidence acts) “The rule is that of such right present one’s accuser and to evi- person against a third may the victim dence) picture enter into the when it is the coupled be shown unless with other seeking defendant who is the 2; McCord, having evidence an inherent tendency evidence.” Id. at see also (“If supra at 985 the constitutional person connect such other with the actu- opportunity against a fair to defend the al of commission the crime.” Marrone charge anything, empower means it must a State, (Alaska 1961). 969, 859 P.2d court to override a state evidence rule that Accord, Lilja, State v. 155 Minn. presenting would bar the defendant from (1923); N.W. Annota- reasonable, evidence that could create a tion, is, 121 A.L.R. 1363. That non-speculative about doubt the defen- tending evidence to incriminate another guilt.”). dant’s the defendant When offers is inadmissible in the proof absence of relating other-crimes evidence to a third person facts to connect that with the party, pragmatic “the relevance standard requirement crime. This avoids the use in apply, embodied should [Rules 401-403] suspicion bare and safeguards the and the focus should be on whether the person third from indiscriminate use of evidence is relevant” cast reasonable past differences with the deceased. doubt on the state’s case prejudice
since of unfair risks do not Hawkins, 159; McCord, at see appear very or take on a shape. different (“direct supra at 921 connection doctrine” possibility There is no of arousing the provides third-party perpetrator evi- jury in ways that would be harmful to dence is not admissible “unless the defen- person, the third and the remaining risk establishes, dant prelimi- as matter of jury may is that the overvalue the evi- fact, nary a direct connection between the acquit guilty dence and defendant. [alleged perpetrator] alternative and the Giving more leeway defendants this crime so as to raise more than a mere setting appropriate, although seems the suspicion [alleged alternative easily result is not so squared with the perpetrator], defendant, not the was the 404], terms of admitting [FRE since perpetrator.”). such evidence under the pragmatic rele- vancy may infringe princi- standard Certainly credibility matters of ple barring general propensity evi- are jury; inference for the but dence. determining preliminary questions of fact Kirkpatrick, Mueller & supra at 685. evidence, admissibility in the the trial court disregard need not al
That defendants should
af
be
leeway
Here,
forded
in the admission of other-
ready
days
admitted.
two
before
brought
hours later
tion and several
a domestic
obtained
shooting, Nichols
rifle,
loaded,
apartment
into Nichols’
now
against Richard-
restraining order
abuse
mission.” Under
part
from the
as
of a “rescue
son,
the children
with
moved
law,
charged as
housing and Minnesota
a defendant
into transitional
family home
Iowa,
murder is not
requesting
accomplice
first-degree
Der Molen
called Van
compan-
children.
that a
predicted
her and the
have
get
required
come and
that he
Molen,
Rather,
shooting
ion would murder
victim.
After
daughter
and her
murder
rea-
held Nichols
whether the
question
is
police
who surrounded
shooting
probable
as a
conse-
hostage,
sonably foreseeable
killed once and
yelling “I
building
appar-
crime which
quence
of the intended
Ordinarily, more than
again.”
I’ll do it
was at
ently by the offer of
here
*14
crime scene is need-
at the
presence
mere
v. Pier
felony-level assault. State
least a
requisite
(Minn.1995)
nexus between
784,
to establish the
son,
ed
789
530 N.W.2d
for
charged
the
crime
party
third
and
(murder
conse-
reasonably foreseeable
was
third-party crimes.
admitting
purposes of
robbery
as to
quence
aggravated
of
so
136, 137-
Phelps,
v.
E.g., State
first-degree
for
permit accomplice liability
(Minn.1982)
nexus established
(requisite
38
co-defendant);
by
committed
murder
that victim’s brother
(2002).
on forensic
609.05,
2
§
Minn.Stat.
subd.
the victim’s
dragged
and the defendant
theory
alternative-perpetrator
proffered
found,
it was
place where
body to the
prompted an amend-
arguably could have
knowledge
of
feigned lack
brother
include,
in-
or
ment to the indictment to
death, and
victim’s
surrounding
events
on,
abetting first-
aiding and
structions
manslaugh-
to
pleaded guilty
later
brother
Ostrem,
535
murder. See State
degree
girlfriend
killing
to
his former
ter related
(sua
(Minn.1995)
916,
sponte
N.W.2d
immunity in the death of his
in return
aiding
abetting,
and
where
instruction on
the defen-
testimony against
and
sister
abetting
originally
was not
aiding and
dant).
impermissible
not an
amend-
charged, was
complaint). Accordingly,
ment to the
Moreover,
proffered other-
Richardson’s
reasonably
could
have conclud-
trial court
crucial nor
was neither
crimes evidence
and
confusing
risk of
issues
ed that the
According to
exculpatory.
likely value
outweighed the
wasting time
that Nichols
proof,
of
he was aware
offer
inference that could
any
of
and tried to
to Richardson
Der Molen
had assaulted Van
drawn from Nichols’
conceivably have been
death;
he
but nevertheless
arrange his
theory
the defense
where
prior
from
misconduct
that Nichols’ took
accepted the rifle
Richardson
not have absolved
house,
her to the would
accompanied
his father’s
murder.10
liability for the
accomplice
purchased ammuni-
where he
gas station
concern,
countervailing
prelimi-
at the
considerations
as the concur-
does not
10. This case
McCord,
stage.”
The Admis-
nary
David
fact
suggests,
types
two
of alterna-
rence/dissent
by
De-
sibility
a Criminal
differing
Evidence
stan-
evidence with
tive-perpetrator
Offered
is
Suggest
Someone Else
That
admissibility. This case concerns
dards for
fendant
917,
(1996). The
Guilty,
63 Term. L.Rev.
third-party-crimes evi-
admissibility
404(b)
ev-
requirement that other-crimes
to cast
Rule
by a criminal defendant
dence offered
convincing”
primarily
is
reasonable,
"clear and
idence be
nonspeculative doubt as to
safeguard for
providing procedural
aimed at
analyzing
admissi-
guilt.
In
defendant’s
evidence,
the state
offers
when it is
that
long
the defendant
has
bility
Minnesota
of this
Bill-
See State v.
evidence.
the other-crimes
doctrine
the direct connection
relied on
178-79,
174,
strom,
276 Minn.
specialized application of
"really a
which is
(1967).
very
may
well be
It
284-85
probative value and
between
the balance
ments,
III.
admitted
the trial
excit-
court as
utterances, were
ed
inadmissible because
argues
Richardson next
personal knowledge.
the declarants lacked
process right
court violated his due
trial
803(2).
R. Evid.
testify
See Minn.
Richard-
testify by
allowing
not
him to
as to
not argue
dispute
intent. Richardson does
his
son does not
that the statements
voluntary
that his waiver was not
qualify
themselves
as excited utterances.
States,
knowing.
Brady v.
See
United
appeal,
On
Richardson bears the burden of
742, 748,
1463, 25
U.S.
90 S.Ct.
L.Ed.2d
proving that the admission of
state-
these
(1970). Indeed,
Richardson’s counsel
erroneous;
ments
we
will not reverse
explained
thoroughly
testify
his
“absent a clear abuse of
discretion.”
record, and
chose not
Richardson
Rhodes,
(Minn.2001).
Instead,
testify.
argues requires
Rule 602
evidentiary
supra
court’s
see
witnesses
ruling,
prevented
testify
which
him from
knowledge
note
have firsthand
does
as to Van Der Molen’s and Nichols’
ing
specifically
hearsay
refer to
declarants
evidence,
prior
including
character
bad
statements. Minn. R. Evid. 602. Courts
acts,
potential testimony
emasculated his
require
hearsay
that declarants of a
state
testify.
caused him to
decide not
ment have firsthand
knowledge before
*15
hearsay
admissible,
statement is
however.
right
testify
The
to
does not mean
824,
v. Ferguson,
See State
581 N.W.2d
testimony
that
the defendant’s
is unre
(Minn.1998)
602,
(citing
832
Minn. R. Evid.
Arkansas,
See Rock v.
483
stricted.
U.S.
comm, cmt.);
Keating,
see also Miller v.
55,
44,
2704,
107 S.Ct.
IV. Here, is indisputable boys turn it that We now to Richardson’s the that argument boys’ hearsay apartment the state- were the at the the time of defense, may in certain situations this rule have the a but that is potential operate unconstitutionally upon the case here. closet, requested ed when shooting. From the inside offense is reversible properly error unless the trial court exer- fire the first shot at they heard Richardson its cised discretion and the defendant suf- Der Molen’s head. Nichols testified Leinweber, fered no prejudice. See the closet boys came out of before that Minn, at at fired, 228 N.W.2d that they shot was could the second they from where were see Van Molen case, parties In this dispute whether standing, they and that watched Richard- jury on the instructions two firearm shot. It was not an son fire second charges given. have been Richard- should the trial judge abuse of discretion for argues charges son that the firearm are re- personal knowledge conclude determining lesser-includeds because “[i]n was and to admit the quirement satisfied a necessarily whether an offense is includ- statements excited utterances. boys’ as offense, ed we must look at the elements than offense rather the facts of the
V.
Roden,
particular case.”
Next we consider Richardson’s 457. The state contends
there
no
is
should
jury
contention
have been
rational
acquittal
basis for an
on the of-
instructed
on two lesser-ineluded of
a
charged
fense
and conviction on the less-
a
discharge of
firearm er
v. Murphy,
fenses—intentional
offense. State
(Minn.1986).
discharge
and reckless
of a firearm —for
first-degree
offenses. Richard
assault
requires
offense
that:
assault
jury
timely request
son made
instruc
(1)
officer;
assaulted
peace
defendant
offenses,
tions on the lesser
which the trial
(2) the
officer
peace
engaged
his
denied.
court
duties
an officer at the time of the
as
assault;
(3)
deadly
defendant used
*16
court, having
A trial
the ulti
force
against
officer. Minn.Stat.
that
responsibility
mate
to ensure
all es
(2002).
609.221,
§
2
Deadly
subd.
force
given,
are
must submit
sential instructions
includes
fire-
discharge
the intentional
of a
an instruction on a lesser-ineluded offense
arm
of a
Minn.
person.
the direction
(1) the
in question
when:
offense
is an
(2002).
609.066,
§
1
Stat.
subd.
Intention-
offense,
§
included
Minn.Stat.
609.04
requires proof
al
of a firearm
discharge
Leinweber,
(2002);
414,
State v.
303 Minn.
intentionally discharged
defendant
421-22,
120,
(1975);
228
125-26
N.W.2d
a
endangered
firearm in a manner
(2)
jury
a rational basis exists for the
safety
person.
another
Minn.Stat.
convict the
defendant
lesser-in
la(2) (2002).
609.66,
§
dis-
subd.
Reckless
acquit
cluded offense and
the defendant of
municipality
charge
a firearm within a
Minn,
Leinweber,
greater
crime.
303
requires proof that
defendant inten-
422,
228
at 125-26.
no
N.W.2d
There is
tionally discharged weapon
in munici-
acquittal
rational basis for an
on the of
pality in a manner
the defendant
charged
fense
and a conviction
the less
“
should
known
unreason-
have
created an
‘proof of
er offense where the
the ele
able
harm to
Minn.Stat.
risk of
others.
which
the two
ments
differentiate
crimes
la(a)(3)
609.66,
(2002);
§
10A Minn.
subd.
dispute
sufficiently
not]
so that a
[are
Ass’n,
Dist.
Practice—
Judges
Minnesota
jury’ may make this distinction.” Bellc
Criminal,
Guides,
Jury
Instruction
State,
(Minn.
269,
ourt v.
390 N.W.2d
273
(1999).
CRIMJIG 32.10
1986)
Adams, 295
(quoting State v.
(Minn.1980)).
527,
case,
A trial
of this
we
court’s fail
Given the facts
which
above,
jury
ure to instruct
on a lesser-includ-
have summarized
are satisfied
we
jury
departures unduly
that no rational basis existed
durational
exaggerat-
—
to convict Richardson of the lesser-includ-
and,
ed the seriousness of his offenses
ed
him of the
acquit
greater
offenses
therefore, should be reduced.
Minn,
Leinweber,
crime. See
at 421-
22,
Thus,
Richardson also contends that second-de- his re- maining aggregate gree separate sentence —which in- assault of five victims. 428 (Minn.1988). upward cludes consecutive sentences and N.W.2d 70-71 We said: McIntosh, Thus, at 8. we have 641 N.W.2d is techni- given Norris The sentence that: he conceded said cally permissible, of the cases leads review
this is so. Our departure no for are stat- 1. If reasons however, conclude, that the consec- us to on the record at the time of ed five terms application of utive departure no will be al- sentencing, months, for a total of 300 months each lowed. imprisonment of life to a sentence added supporting departure If the 2. reasons on the degree, in the first for murder stated, are this court will examine case, un- of this facts and circumstances if the rea- the record to determine criminality of de- exaggerated the fairly given justify departure. the sons modify the sen- We fendant’s conduct. justify the de- given 3. If the reasons the five holding that three of tence al- parture, departure will be aggravated assault be for sentences lowed. concurrently. served improper are or given 4. If the reasons facts and at 71. Given the
428 N.W.2d there is sufficient inadequate, but case, say we cannot of this circumstances justify in the record to evidence in im- abused its discretion the trial court departure, departure will be af- sentences. posing consecutive firmed. Additionally, Richardson chal improper or given If the reasons are departures, durational lenges upward and there is insufficient inadequate cited in no factors were asserting that justify of record to the de- for sentencing departures support of the parture, departure will be re- for departures the assaults and versed. each improper. For kidnappings were (Minn. Getter, v. 665 N.W.2d State offense, must be substantial there State, 2003) v. (quoting Williams from the depart compelling reasons (Minn.1985)). 840, 844 N.W.2d pre Sentencing Guidelines’ Minnesota Getter, In we held that “absent state- McIntosh, sumptive State sentences. sentencing of the reasons for ment (Minn.2002); time on the record at the departure placed (Minn. Williams, 837, 840 al- departure will be sentencing, no 2000). (“[T]he rely on may trial court Getter, at 517. While lowed.” sup underlying one conviction conduct that the rationale the record reflects sepa for a departure on a sentence port kidnap- for each sentencing departure * * *.”). According to the rate conviction case, sep- no appropriate in each ping was Guidelines, judge shall Sentencing “[t]he sentencing de- justifying reasons arate provided presumptive utilize the sentence *18 part were made partures for the assaults in unless the sentencing guidelines in the sentencing. at the time of of the record com substantial and dividual case involves does not establish the record Since * * * de When pelling circumstances. circum- separate aggravating presence of sentence, presumptive parting from the departure a durational justifying stances pronounce a sentence the court should assault, we reduce duration on each severity of the proportional to the which is to 120 months prison term * * Minn. Sen of conviction offense conviction, mandatory each assault to the II.D. look tencing Guidelines We minimum term. rationale to determine sentencing court’s as modified. Affirmed abused its discretion. whether the court MEYER, there, (dissenting). get Justice out of I wanted him to come protect always protected me like he respectfully I dissent. While I concur me. majority’s conclusion that Rich- with added.) (Emphasis Nichols then testified ardson not entitled to claim defense of plans that she and Van Der Molen made others, agree I cannot that it was harmless for Van Der Molen to come for her and the about error to exclude evidence the nature bring children and them back to Iowa. The past, relationship violent between 10, 2001, evening January Der and Nichols. I believe this Van Molen apartment, came to the shot the locks off evidence was relevant to Richardson’s door, of the downstairs and then shot Van question premedi- state of mind on the Der Molen twice. tation and should have been allowed for purpose. I would conclude that the state’s version of the events leading up to error was not harmless because the exclu- Van Der Molen’s death was that apart- sion of relevant evidence Richardson had driven this allowed the Nichols’ ment, car, saw unfairly Van Der Molen’s state characterize the relation- became extremely upset, ship premeditated and then between Van Der Molen and Nichols Van Der Molen’s death to ensure that and denied Richardson his to a fair Nichols would never return to Van Der trial. explained Molen. As the state its clos- trial, presented At the state the follow- ing argument, story ing through testimony. Nichols’ [i]f [Richardson] couldn’t have Heather Richardson and Nichols had a brief mar- Nichols, nobody certainly could. And riage filled with incidents of violence. not Heather’s ex-husband Robert Van Richardson, When Nichols decided to leave Der put Molen. So the Defendant two very possessive jealous, he became through bullets Robert Van Der Molen’s if telling stay her that did not with she head to make darn sure he couldn’t have him, In spite she would die. of Richard- her. Van Der Bob Molen didn’t know threats, son’s Nichols left him and sought day. what he was for that He came help shelter, from a local domestic violence to Two Harbors desperate because of a and moved into a transitional housing unit. phone call from his ex-wife. She had Nichols testified that filing after a re- nobody except to turn to the one Richardson, straining against order she steady presence reliable in her and the called Der Van Molen and told him that “I kids’ lives. expect didn’t Der [Van to come to Molen] added.) (Emphasis my again rescue but that gotten we had away from According [Richardson].” sought The defense a signifi- Nichols, this was the second time that cantly different version of the events lead- Nichols had asked Van Der Molen to “res- ing up to through Van Der Molen’s death Richardson, her from cue” the first occur- following proof. offer of On the eve- ring of 2000. During October cross- ning January flagged Nichols Rich- examination, when why asked she had ardson him down and told Der Van Molen, called Van Der Nichols testified: up Molen had come from gun, Iowa with a * * * always Because I called Robert. and that she was afraid that *19 things any When went in wrong going situa- Molen was to hurt her and the chil- throughout tion years, always I dren. Nichols asked Richardson to come called And I him apartment Robert. called because to the evening get her I was scared and because I wanted to and away the children from Van Der Mol- in Der Molen convicted 1996 of agreed to Van was Richardson Nichols and en. met, against domestic abuse they misdemeanor evening. When later that meet police report regarding In the asked Nichols. gun and gave Richardson Nichols incident, police told that she Richard- this Nichols it. She told buy shells for him afraid of Der Molen and that Der Molen was Van was afraid of what Van son she jail he out of he will kill her. gets After when and the children. might do to her shells, Nichols and Richardson buying the for misde- Van Der Molen was arrested to the would come agreed that Richardson in meanor domestic abuse Dakota Coun- purpose of evening for the apartment that Police De- ty in 1999. The Lakeville Van Der Molen. When rescuing her from on partment had a number records he found evening, arrived that Richardson Van Der Molen and Nichols from locked, agreed, and as orders, the downstairs door protection alleging violations of that he off the door so he shot the locks incidents. and domestic assault Nichols and the enter and retrieve could charged Der with two Van Molen was defense, there According to the children. against assault incidents of domestic kill Der Mol- any intent to Van was never on the Nichols 1996 and based and, therefore, be- premeditation, no en from handwritten notes on court records apart- came to the cause when Richardson County the Marion Clerk Court gun he had not intended to use ment Knoxville, Iowa.
against Der Molen. Van County of Court records Marion Clerk defense, charges against Van contain numerous
According to the official Der Molen for interference with solely because Nich- apartment at the was abuse, acts, harassment, as- domestic Richardson to come ols had asked sault, of no contact order. Although and violation her from Van Der Molen. save Molen, (ex Richardson had never met Van parte) pro- order for emergency An that Van Der 7, 2000, Nichols had told Richardson September tection dated children, abused Molen had abused County District Court entitled Lake her, strangle to kill or her. and threatened L. “Heather L. Nichols v Robert Van Der Molen.” prepared testify
Richardson was rela- understanding his the violent about offer of for this evi- Despite an tionship between Van Der Molen dence, refused to admit the district court Nichols, prepared to attorney and his Rich- respect with to what any evidence killing premeditat- that the was not argue Der Molen ardson knew about Van ques- prepared was also ed. defense he arrived at relationship when Nichols’ what she had told Rich- tion Nichols about January even apartment on violent about Der Molen’s ardson Van explained that “the though the defense past. evidence, The defense offered evidence pri- of this only purpose of most * * * charged with or Der Molen had been evidence, Van client’s goes my to show or against of domestic abuse Nich- mind, convicted is the reason or at which state occasions, Nichols multiple and that ols upon which he went least is the basis against orders Van Der restraining had restricted apartment.” The court sought In the defense particular, Molen. testify, ability apparently claim, following: to admit the a self-defense believing that without evidence was irrelevant. Without with domestic as- charged Nichols was “I the court stated: theory, Der Molen in Monte- self-defense against sault any theory other know that there’s zuma, Iowa, don’t in 2000. *20 288 you ing credibility
that under those circumstances that on the of a confession when get that evidence in.” The court such evidence is central to the could defendant’s innocence”). explained why proffered evi- claim of never dence was inadmissible to attack the It is “fundamental that criminal defen- premeditated state’s that process right explain dants have a due to the murder. Brechon, jury.” their conduct to a v. 745, (Minn.1984). majority applies a harmless error 352 751
The
N.W.2d
Even
that
analysis
though
though
right
and concludes
even
this
is limited
of
rules
evidence,
ruling may
the district court’s restrictive
we have concluded that “the de-
discretion,
an abuse of
the error
fendant’s
right
give
have been
constitutional
to
testi-
mony regarding
was harmless because even under Richard-
his intent and motivation
Buchanan,
“overwhelming
very
there was
evi-
son’s version
is
broad.” State v.
431
(Minn.1988).
542,
premeditation.” I
dence of
would conclude N.W.2d
“Courts
exclusionary
district court’s
ruling
greatest
any
must scrutinize with the
care
testimony
reaches the level of constitutional error
restrictions on a defendant’s
of-
* * *
and calls for a
heightened standard of
fered
defendant’s own behalf as to
review; i.e., whether the exclusion of
his or her intent and
evi-
the motivation under-
beyond a
lying
jeopardize
dence was “harmless
reasonable
intent
lest we
Juarez,
286,
doubt.” State v.
federal and state
right
constitutional
to a
(Minn.1997).
Brechon,
The error
harm-
fair trial.”
is not
at 752
N.W.2d
(Wahl, J.,
beyond
less
a reasonable doubt where
concurring).
right
give
The
to
possibility
testimony
“there is a reasonable
that the
on one’s own behalf has sources
complained might
provisions
of
have contrib-
in several
[error]
Constitution.
Arkansas,
52,
Chapman
44,
uted to the conviction.”
v.
v.
Cali Rock
483 U.S.
18, 24,
824,
2704,
(1987).
fornia, 386
U.S.
S.Ct.
17 S.Ct.
289 kill court to such an he did not intend to district conduct evidentia- that his claim that ry hearing. be Der Molen would unbelievable Van place to it opportunity the within without Alternate-Perpetrator A. Evidence. As defendant
meaningful context. the court, noted to the district without himself majority does not opinion adequate- The fully challenge to Nichols’ opportunity the two ly distinguish types between the he rescue story, his claim that went alternate-perpetrator by evidence offered com- from Der Molen was Nichols (1) proposed testimony Richardson: his as in and he was pletely lacking believability, eyewitness took an that Nichols the rifle from whole unfairly prevented telling his shot; him and from fired the second and evidentiary story. The unfairness the (2) character evidence that both Nichols argu- closing was intensified ruling committed other bad and Van Molen state, to the that Van ment of the effect acts, offered show Nichols’ motive and one steady Der Molen “the reliable was intent to fire shot. former second The in her and the kids’ lives.” presence properly is not “re- evidence considered ” and its verse-Spreigl evidence admissibil- sum, In of the court’s the effect district only ity requires ordinary that it meet ruling deprive was to for and foundation. standard relevance on the to cast reasonable doubt Bock, 449, 458, v. 229 Minn. 39 State case, pros- fact despite the that the state’s 887, (Minn.1949); 892 v. N.W.2d State opened key ecution’s witness the door (Minn. Hawkins, N.W.2d fairly say I we the evidence. believe can 1977); Flores, v. State probability there was a reasonable (Minn.1999). prop latter evidence is The tending to that the exclusion of evidence erly “reverse-Spreigl considered evidence” may state Richardson’s of mind establish if it only and is admissible meets the verdict, jury’s in a have contributed to the heightened “clear-and-convincing evi- first- case where the difference between Williams, dence” standard. State murder degree second-degree murder (Minn.1999); entirely on the state is based defendant’s (Minn.1997). Johnson, mind. I reverse Richardson’s would proffered testimony as an Richardson’s grant murder him a new conviction eyewitness shooting would be based trial. knowledge clearly satis- on first-hand requirements. It is any fies foundation HANSON, (dissenting). Justice dispute in the med- relevant because of join Meyer. I dissent of Justice whether the second ical evidence about proffered fatal. re- shot was HANSON, part, (concurring Justice was verse-Spreigl evidence relevant dissenting part). and intent. show Nichol’s motive Although join I in the of Justice dissent Third to the Connecting Party I I Meyer, separately write con- because Offense. prejudicial clude that it was also error acknowledges majority that Nichols the district court exclude alternate- conducting scene of the crime at without was perpetrator fired, hearing to time the second shot but evidentiary determine beyond Rich- sufficiency implies At a mini- that some evidence of that evidence. mum, testimony proffered eyewitness this should be remanded to ardson’s case *22 necessary presumably regarded to connect Nichols to ords that would be
would be First, shooting. disagree. convincing. I we have as clear and Other evidence of the involved acknowledgement by held that statements Van Der Molen or who, person persons was at the Nichols to third third she Richardson provides adequate represented, prepared crime foun- testify. scene of the were to Hawkins, See, e.g., appropriate process at dation. for the district (“We 160; Flores, court employ have to to evaluate the offer of proof e-Spreigl held that sufficient evidence is offered of this revers evidence party key evidentiary when the third was a witness for would be to conduct an hear- testimony ing, presence and was his own out of the jury, state of the crime.”). proffered connected the scene determine whether the evidence Thus, testimony sup- Nichols’ alone would “clear convincing.” State v. De- Second, Wald, (Minn.1991) ply the needed foundation. Rich- proffered only consider, ardson’s testimony (stating “the trial court should in scene, case, places Nichols at the it an requiring evidentiary describes close hear- participation ing her direct the offense.11 to determine the admissibility of Spreigl evidence rather than on relying Reverse-Spreigl 2. Evidence. also, proof procedure”). the offer of See Henry Nordby, McCarr & Jack Minnesota proffered on Based Richardson’s evi- Practice —Criminal Law and scene, Procedure connecting dence Nichols to the (3d ed.2001) 32.20(C), § n. 21 (suggesting satisfied the foundational re- can “[m]uch be said for a rule that would quirements for the admission of reverse- require testimony upon request of the Spreigl e-Spreigl evidence. The revers evi- it, defendant. Without it is difficult in dence was relevant to claim Richardson’s many cases see how the elear-and-con- that Nichols fired the second shot because made.”). vineing determination can it that an be relationship showed abusive had existed between Nichols and Van Der Mol- Richardson’s offer of described previously en and Nichols had assault- which, several items of evidence on their him, attempted him, ed poison made face, appear adequate prove Van Der him death threats to and solicited someone participation Molen’s or Nichol’s in each of to kill him. alleged ap- incidents. There does not pear any to be reasonable basis to deter-
Because the district court focused exclu- mine that sively evidence is not clear and relating on issues to the defense of issue, convincing evidentiary without an hearing. and not e-Spreigl others the revers the court did not Rich- determine whether 3. The State’s Character Evidence. proffered ardson’s evidence could meet the clear-and-convincing required Although standard state’s motion limine to e-Spreigl preclude e-Spreigl revers evidence. Some of Rich- the revers con- evidence was cerning ardson’s based on court rec- Van Der Molen and Nichols was background true support It is that the district court did not information to the mo- preclude testifying Richardson from as an tive and intent of Nichols to fire the second eyewitness that Nichols fired the second shot. Thus, any shot. I would conclude that error But, agree I with Richardson that the exclu- excluding district court the reverse- revers&-Spreigl sion of the evidence had the Spreigl testimony prejudicial had the effect of practical preventing testimony effect of his as preventing testimony eye- an as eyewitness. His claimed observations witness to the event. carry weight provide would no if he could not trial, He was even did Der Molen Nichols. court district prior made Nichols, already asking had from on cross- precluded it until the state not rule examination, regard- why had left Van Der character evidence she positive elicited through protec- Nichols such a Der Molen and Molen if he was wonderful ing Van Thus, in addi- of Nichols. testimony tor. analy- e-Spreigl normal revers tion to the reasons, these I con- For all of would obliged to con- sis, court was the district *23 in ex- that the district court erred clude the opened had the state sider whether the revers evidence de- cluding e-Spreigl proffered character to Richardson’s door offer of scribed Molen and Van Der regarding evidence n without conducting evidentiary hearing an testimony painted that by eliciting Nichols if it and convinc- to determine was clear false, perhaps picture and positive, ing. Van Der Molen relationship between the dis- Defense counsel alerted Nichols. Analysis. B. Harmless-Error ground for court to this additional trict to apply It difficult a harmless-error is evidence, revers e-Spreigl of the admission evidence analysis alternate-perpetrator to stating: the benefit a determination without credibility point to out the also want We court of meets the district what evidence has testi- judge, because she question, Thus, clear-and-convincing standard. her Mr. Van Molen is fied that question I refer harmless-error would that also And we believe that protector. part the district court as of a remand. able up the box that we should be opens of in- every Because bit go behind. of the evi- e-Spreigl If the bulk revers Mr. my client has about formation admissible as dence is determined be And Molen comes from her. Van Der error convincing, clear and then the being claiming, claimed that she’s and she now it even excluding prejudicial, would be protector, I’m boxed he’s been her the lesser standard under harmless-error being any able to information out of use evidentiary rulings that do applicable prior with Mr. her involvement about amount violations. not constitutional and I do it on Der Molen can’t even Van requires if there is That standard reversal credibility issue. the verdict possibility that a reasonable to the have been more favorable would positive evi- In addition to character erroneously excluded had defendant in the dissent of Justice dence recited Blasus, been admitted. State evidence also tes- Meyer, I would note that Nichols (Minn.1989); stayed had in close contact that she tified (Minn.1994). Post, I divorce, their with Der Molen after a reasonable conclude there is for would always provided support that he had have verdict would children, possibility they joyful had a re- their on the more favorable to Richardson at the been Der Molen arrived union when Van charges if the bulk of two murder apartment. Richardson Two Harbors’ had been admit- e-Spreigl of a evidence precluded presenting from evidence revers different, relationship between Van ted.12 hostile first-degree as recognize partial validity ma- him of murder to convict I proffered jority’s rejoinder accomplice that Richardson's But this acts of Nichols. exculpato- evidence was “neither crucial nor requires greater speculation hypothetical far ry” provided it would have evidence because
Accordingly, if Richardson’s murder
convictions are reversed on the
grounds forth in the set dissent of Justice I
Meyer, evidentiary would remand for an
hearing e-Spreigl on Richardson’s revers determine, first,
evidence to which items of have been should admitted be- they
cause satisfied the clear-and-convinc- and, second,
ing standard whether the ex-
clusion of the admissible evidence was error,
prejudicial necessitating a new trial.
MEYER, (concurring Justice in part,
dissenting part). join
I in the concurrence and dissent of
Justice Hanson. Minnesota, Respondent,
STATE of
WOHLSOL, INC., Appellant.
No. A03-521. Appeals
Court of of Minnesota.
Oct. appropriate
than is ysis. for a harmless anal- error