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State v. Richards
526 S.E.2d 539
W. Va.
2000
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*1 say I am authorized to Justice joins in opinion.

McGRAW Virginia,

STATE of West Plaintiff

Below, Appellee, RICHARDS,

Michael Defendant Von

Below, Appellant.

No. 26349.

Supreme of Appeals Court Virginia.

Submitted Oct. 1999.

Decided Dec. 1999.

Concurring Opinion of Chief Justice Jan.

Starcher *2 upon the revocation original

dant’s policy arguments favor- of Valid notwithstanding, ing flexibility in this area expressly that the Act forecloses we conclude action. such I. AND

FACTUAL PROCEDURAL

BACKGROUND pleaded guilty to two Michael Richards robbery under Va. aggravated counts W. of (1961), sentenced in Code 61-2-12 18-year to two October 1996 concurrent January imprisonment. terms of of sen- filed a motion for reduction Richards 35(b), P. pursuant W. Va. R.Crim. seeking placement either youthful program as authorized circuit court set the Act. The sentence, original and aside Richards’ or- Anthony to the dered that he be committed for offenders Correctional Center (1975). pursuant Va.Code 25-4-6 to W. successfully pro- completed the Richards gram Anthony, and return to the at February 1998, was circuit court However, years probation. three less than probationary period, five into the months alleging petition a revocation sev- State filed of his en violations of conditions Cosenza, George Esq., William Mer- J. O. court revoked Richards’ Cosenza, tion.1 The circuit riman, Esq., Underwood & Merri- 30,1998, probation on and sentenced Attorneys October man, Virginia, West Parkersburg, 25-year him to concurrent terms.2 Rich- Appellant. for challenges court’s deci- ards now the lower General, McGraw, Jr., Attorney Darrell V. original his sion to increase sentence. General, Attorney Warfield, Deputy Dawn E. Charleston, Attorneys Ap- Virginia, II.

pellee. MeGRAW, DISCUSSION Justice: Act forth a The Youthful Offenders sets a determination of This case involves proce- comprehensive and set substantive Virginia’s Youthful Offender whether West (the “Act”), governing §§ dural rules Va.Code Act W. age

-12, adult-jurisdiction under the a defen- offenders permits trial court to increase (1) designated by halfway his petition alleged out at house that Richards was 1. curfew; (2) company was in the after individual he officer. had instructed not to associ- officer; with; (3) ate consumed lied to his 25-year ap- term court chose the The circuit alcohol; (5) marijuana; was used parently it was maximum sentence non-compliance due to removed misbehavior under co-defendant could receive Richards’ treatment that he was from substance-abuse plea agreement. his required complete probation; as a condition refused to attend an additional treatment discretionary quently twenty grants placed on Va.Code one. The Act W. (1975).3 authority suspend circuit courts to to the Richards contends place qualifying prohibits provision a court from increas- in a rehabilitation at a defendant ing a defendant’s sentence in the *3 youthful-offender Following center. success- probation agree event is revoked.4 We completion program, ful of the the circuit Richards that the circuit court’s final sen- mandatory place the obligation has a to court § tencing action violated 25-4-6. probation. At all defendant on times rele- appeal “Where the issue on an from case, specified Act that in the vant to this the clearly revoked, question the circuit court is of law subsequently the probation event is statute, involving interpretation or an of a given we defendant “shall be the sentence he a de novo apply Syl. pt. of originally have received had he not standard review.” would A.L., 1, Chrystal R.M. v. Charlie been committed to the center and subse- 194 W.Va. amendment, facility by 3.Prior to its W. Va.Code back to such commissioner of recent the institutions, provided § public proper as follows: if he deems it for the youth’s detention and rehabilitation. judge any original The of court with criminal added.) (Emphasis jurisdiction may suspend the of sen- effectively during any youth plead- This section was rewritten of convicted of or male session, offense, legislative the recent see W. ing guilly Va. to a criminal other than an 64, provides, part, punishable by imprisonment, Acts ch. who and now in relevant offense life birthday probation event the "[i]n has attained his sixteenth but has not the offender’s is revoked, twenty-first birthday subsequently judge impose of reached his at the time the shall the crime, young the the commission of the and commit him adult offender would have custody Virginia originally to the of the West commis- received had not been the offender public assigned subsequently placed center sioner of institutions to be to committed to the period § center. The of confinement the cen- on recent amendments 25- in months, period substantially language ter shall be for a of six or 12-6 did not alter the at longer by the in if it is deemed advisable center issue this case. superintendent, any period but in event such of If, years. not exceed confinement shall 4.Richards contends that the circuit court’s ac- (1955), opinion superintendent, § the of the such male tion also violates W. Va.Code 62-12-10 proves person part an states be unfit remain which relevant that when a defen- center, in such a he shall be returned to the dant violates the terms of "the court judge imposi- suspension court which committed him to be dealt with revoke the event, sentence, according impose further In such the tion or execution of sentence if law'. may place imposed, court him on or sentence none has been and order that sentence points for he He to the him the crime for which has been con- be executed.” United States discretion, judge Supreme v. United victed. In his the allow Court's decision Roberts 264, 113, States, 320 64 S.Ct. 88 L.Ed. 41 the defendant credit on his sentence for time U.S. (1943), spent analogous has in the center. where the Court held that an When, increasing previously opinion superintendent, prohibited of the federal statute any boy satisfactorily completed the the of which has center execution had previously training program, suspended. While this Court has such male offender shall be jurisdiction to the of the court which indicated that the Youthful Act and returned Offenders (like originally eligible general governing probation statutes committed him. He shall be more 62-12-10) for for the offense with he is- should be read and considered to- Reel, charged, judge gether, and the of the court im- see State v. 813, 152 W.Va. shall (1969), mediately place probation. we stated that him on have also the by statutory all event his "the two schemes do not coincide in revoked are, doubt, judge, given he shall be the sentence he areas and no the embodiment Martin, purposes,” separate legislative v. would have received had he not been State 376, 822, 3, subsequently placed 196 W.Va. 380 n. 472 S.E.2d 826 n. the center and committed to shall, however, curiam). (per give We need not The court therefore issue, some credit reach this since even if there were the defendant on his sentence for statutes, spent discrepancy between the two time he in the center. controlling Any youth ages specific is the and thus law male between the of ten more subject. Syl. pt. by eighteen judge any UMWA Trumka v. committed See causes, competent jurisdiction any Kingdon, of the 174 W.Va. 325 S.E.2d five, ("The general statutory prescribed re- and in the manner in article rule construction code, quires specific given precedence chapter forty-nine may, be of this if such that a statute sixteen, age general relating youth over a statute to the same sub- is or has attained the ject cannot be recon- in a or transferred from the matter where the two center ciled.”). facility industrial school or like to a center and (1995). Thus, upheld the circuit court’s refusal to once 459 S.E.2d exclusively upon interpre- again turns sentence the defendant as a this case 25^4-6, requirements of legal offender, Va.Code, 25-4-6, tation of the stating that “W. plenary of the circuit we undertake review does not allow a trial court discretion to court’s action. impose any less than defendant, when a male who has served at a Syllabus point one As we stated youth facility, correctional violates his Huffman, 191 W.Va. of Sowa Patterson, Syllabus, agreement.” tion su- (1994), statutory provision “‘[a] S.E.2d 262 ' Martin, pra. also See State unambiguous plainly which is clear and curiam) (per expresses legislative intent will not be (holding mandatory imposition origi- interpreted by given the courts but will be *4 § pursuant following nal sentence to 2, Syl. pt. full force and effect.’ State v. pro- revocation did not violate 877, Epperly, 135 W.Va. 65 S.E.2d 488 Const, portionality requirement of W. Va. (1951).” case, language § In this the of 25- 5). Ill, § art. clearly precludes imposing 4-6 a court from a post harsher sentence based' conduct reasoning applies The in Patterson the dating the defendant’s commitment to the present In ease: the event is re- youthful program. offender The use of the following voked a defendant’s successful com- the requiremént word “shall” makes statute’s pletion youthful program, of the a offender mandatory Syl. directory. rather than See § circuit court has no discretion under 25-4- 3, pt. Compensa Bounds v. State Workmen’s anything impose^ 6 to do but the sentence Comm’r, 670, tion 153 W.Va. 172 379 S.E.2d was, been, orig- that or otherwise would have (1970) (“ “shall”, ‘The in word the absence of inally previous handed down. While our language contrary in showing the statute a involving subject only cases this have dealt part legislature, intent on the of the should the with circumstance of where a defendant ”) mandatory be afforded a connotation.’ seeks a lesser sentence than im- Sencindiver, Syl. 2, (quoting pt. Terry v. 153 posed, rigid ap- the command of 25^4-6 651, 171 (1969)); 1, Syl. pt. W.Va. S.E.2d plies equal present with force in the context. Virginia Employees Nelson West Pub. least, very At the the statute a removes as Bd., 445, (1982). Ins. 171 W.Va. 300 S.E.2d 86 permissible sentencing factor conduct that question We a in confronted similar State completion follows a defendant’s successful Patterson, 721, 170 W.Va. youthful program placement the offender (1982). Patterson, pleaded the defendant probation.5 guilty shoplifting, to and was sentenced to argu- policy State advances sound years imprisonment. one-to-ten Sentence . justifying ments the circuit in court’s action suspended was later and the defendant com- case, present asserting the youthful that “if a defen- mitted the offender dant is made pursuant aware that his but to the Act. Like in Richards the .case, present suspended the be increased should defendant Patterson successfully violate completed he the terms and conditions of his the however, probation; likely after he later will be less to violate pleaded guilty shoplifting petit proba- these terms than if he larce- knows ny, probation only was revoked and the tion violation will result in incarceration executed. This Court suspended for the term of the sentence.” As initially imposed precludes considering The circuit court in this case court from placement which was later vacated when the conduct that follows a defendant’s granted notes, program. defendant’s motion for reduction the however, The Court 35(b). imposes sentence under W. Va. R.Crim. P.> that the Act no such limitation course, may, There be circumstances where in situations where a defendant is returned to the suspended pro- of sentence is under the circuit court as unfit for 'inclusion in the Act, gram. only and the Legislature, defendant receives no initial sen- We can surmise that the prior (In- creating disparity, provide to the revocation of this intended to deed, disposition complete pro- this is the normal mode of as incentive gram individuals to the prescribed Act.) cases, the In these of rehabilitation. Germain, Oregon Supreme similarly 249, 253-54, the Court ob- 503 U.S. 112 S.Ct. served, possibility pun- of an increased 391, (1992)). “[t]he 117 L.Ed.2d As ishment deterrent violation of occasions, we have stressed on numerous “[i]t tion. It is in the best of all interest province is not the of the courts to make or probationer, agencies, law enforcement supervise legislation, not, and a statute public probationers do not violate guise interpretation, under the be modi Holmes, the terms of State v. fied, revised, amended, distorted, remodeled, 619, 613, 1213, (1979); 287 Or. 601 P.2d or rewritten[.]” State v. General Daniel State, 510, 514-15, see also Smith v. 261 Ind. 548, V.F.W., Morgan Post No. 144W.Va. (1974)(“[I]f 307 N.E.2d courts are to 145, 107 (citation S.E.2d omit sentences, encouraged give suspended ted). Syl. pt. part, See also Virgi they given must be the latitude allowed with- nia Health Care Cost Review Auth. v. Boone plain wording of the statute to insure Hosp., Mem. accepting that a defendant pro- the terms of (1996) (“If language of an enactment is bation will do so full realization of the clear and within the authority constitutional gravity consequences of the of the violation of lawmaking body it, passed probation.”). of that However compelling courts must read the according relevant law be, argument may wording of 25- to its meaning, any judi unvarnished without *5 simply support 4-6 does not it.6 embroidery.”). cial previously We have indicated that Consequently, we hold that a where plain meaning legislation “[t]he should be criminal defendant has placed proba been on conclusive, except in the rare in which eases successfully completing tion after a application the literal pro of a statute will of rehabilitation under the Youthful Offend demonstrably duce a result at odds with the Act, probation ers and such is intentions of the drafters.” v. Hutchison revoked, 139, 150, the circuit court City Huntington, has no discretion (1996) (citation under impose anything 25-4-6 to 5.E.2d other and internal omitted). quotation than Although marks the sentence that the it would defendant would speculate Legisla- be reasonable to that the have received had he or she not primary ture’s in wording intent been a as committed to offender center merely it predictable did was to ensure that subsequently placed probation. on repercussions following would ensue a defen- circuit increasing court’s action in Richards’ probation, dant’s violation of our literal inter- upon probation the revocation of his pretation of the statute in this instance does was therefore erroneous. produce illogical not such or absurd conse- quences compel so as to some alternative III. “ presume ‘[CJourts

construction. must that legislature says a in a statute what it means CONCLUSION ” says and means in a statute it what there.’ Educ., stated, judgment For the reasons Randolph County Martin v. Bd. of County hereby W.Va. 414 the Circuit Court of Wood is (1995) (quoting remanded, Connecticut Nat’l Bank v. reversed and and the circuit court suspension The State also cites several from cases other or the jurisdictions support argument of its that impose any might originally sentence which have permit 25-4-6 can be construed to Commonwealth, imposed”); been Hord. v. upon of a harsher sentence revocation of (statute (Ky.1970) providing S.W.2d 530 that However, markedly tion. these cases involved upon "may revocation trial court statutory language, clearly different autho- impose any might sentence which have been Turner, People Ill.App.3d rize such action: 449, conviction”); imposed Appli- at the time of In re 599 N.E.2d 174 Ill.Dec. 558 White, cation 18 N.J. 114 A.2d 261 (construing providing statute trial court (statute providing revocation a court "may impose any other sentence that was avail- "may cause the sentence to be executed sentencing”); able ... at the time of initial Smith impose any might originally or sentence which State, 261 Ind. 307 N.E.2d 281 imposed”). have been (statute providing that "the court revoke the on offenses

is sentence defendant Richards but his that violated directed to his aggravated robbery on were non-violent. the two offenses imprisonment, 18-year to be terms course, judge. I Of am not the concurrently. served sentencing judge And the is entitled to sub- my impression But stantial deference. with and remanded directions. Reversed put that the have defendant should participate did not SCOTT Justice months, so, jail for 6 again or and tried ease. decision in this probation. STONE, sitting by B. Judge ROBERT discretion, has Where as this temporary assignment. ease, long, long prison imposing sentences years generally like 18 should be reserved Justice, STARCHER, concurring: Chief people dangerous who are so that we 6, 2000) (Filed Jan. protected need from them. Our West Virginia taxpayers, ought not be required to fully majority’s legal I rea- agree with unnecessarily house non-violent offenders at separately I I soning. But write $20,000per year. Perhaps a cost of this was understanding why have hard time it made Richards, the case with Michael Von but it young sense defendant to 18 to sentence way doesn’t seem that to me from the record. taxpayers’ years expense. at the prison judge originally thought that Mi- The trial good enough

chael Richards was risk Von Anthony qualify to be sent Center. comply that he

There showed could

Unfortunately, the defendant did do not well

Case Details

Case Name: State v. Richards
Court Name: West Virginia Supreme Court
Date Published: Jan 6, 2000
Citation: 526 S.E.2d 539
Docket Number: 26349
Court Abbreviation: W. Va.
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