*1 necessary computation of damages as set forth above. C.J.,
Brachtenbach, Rosellini, Stafford, Dolliver, JJ., Williams, Dore, Dimmick, Pearson, concur. Reconsideration denied March 1983. 48374-4, 22, 1982.] 48375-2. En Banc.
[Nos. December Respondent, Washington, The State of v. Daniel Appellant. Rice, Eldon Respondent, Washington, The State of v. Monte Appellant. Sanchez, *2 Marshall, M. C. Jackson and James for appel- Calvin lants. Herron, E. Prosecuting Attorney, Mack Call
Don Boyle, M. Deputies, and Kathleen respondent. for Services, Michael Mirra on Legal of Evergreen behalf appellants. curiae for amicus Defendants Danieland Monte San J. Rice
Pearson, of confinement length disposi chez of terms appeal by Superior tion orders issued division first, appeal twofold: The issues raised on Court. dispositions Legislature intended that whether the terms confinement which under RCW 13.40 include 9A.20.020; maximum sentences allowed exceed the intended, confining whether second, Legislature if the so allowed for than maximum juveniles periods longer adults equal protection violates the clauses of United States and Washington Constitutions. We hold that apply did not intend RCW 9A.20.020 to juvenile dispositions, imposing and that terms of longer confinement on than juveniles on adults does not violate requirement equal protection.
Defendant Rice was in the adjudicated guilty 6, division of the Pierce County Superior July Court on 1981, attempted trespass, criminal a misdemeanor. RCW 9A.28.020(3)(e). 9A.52.070, 17, 1981,
At the disposition hearing July parole Rice's officer recommended a 52- to 65-week commitment. Rice history prior had a offenses. He had been diverted from prosecution degree for third theft in June 1979 when he years was 14 He age. complete did not the terms of his diversion agreement. degree He was convicted of third theft possession property September stolen sentenced to a term of community supervision. He violated the terms of his probation April several times. he *3 was convicted of second degree burglary and was sentenced to 52 weeks' detention. He was released from this detention behavior) 9, on March 1981 (having good received leave for later, present and committed the offense about 2 months on 19, May parole reported 1981. The officer that Rice was mother, living beyond at home with his but that he was mother, her, control. He stole from his lied to smoked mar- ijuana, and failed to attend school. Rice's counsel conceded at the disposition hearing disposi- the standard range community tion of 20 to 35 hours of service or 3 months of community supervision inadequate light was of However, parole report. officer's argued he that Rice's sen- 90-day tence should be limited maximum allowed under RCW 9A.20.020 for an adult convicted of misde- found a manifest on Rice's injustice meanor. history, prior recent criminal violations of the terms of dis- positions, supervision, refusal to submit and the other factors in the file. Rice was committed to aggravating 52 weeks. Department period of Institutions for a 4, 1981, September on pleaded guilty Sanchez Defendant division, Court, Superior County Pierce Code, County the Pierce assault, a violation of unlawful 35.02.070, parole The juvenile a misdemeanor. PCC and and injustice a manifest sentence officer recommended Department of Institutions. Sanchez commitment history. In he was diverted from prior had a criminal subsequently prosecution possession marijuana, violation of the terms of remanded to the court for he was ordered to agreement. June diversion community and 120 hours of year supervision serve offenses, degree three two of second community service for degree theft. At the time and one of first burglary offense, 14 and at home present age living Sanchez was schooling with was in his year his mother. He behind incapable serious His mother was owing to absenteeism. him, authority was controlling unresponsive and he facility. at The court officials detention range disposition days' to 20 found that standard of 10 detention, service, year's community 80 to 110 hours' community supervision was insufficient for the defendant. It injustice ordered manifest sentence 52 weeks' con- finement; this was based on the short time since Sanchez' prior being community supervi- still offense and his under offense, parental sion time present at the lack of control, comply prior agree- his failure to awith diversion ment, community supervision fact that would not provide necessary for his structure rehabilitation correction. their on a
Defendants terms commitment argue exceed the maximum finding injustice of manifest cannot This sets terms laid down RCW 9A.20.020. section out imposed persons maximum sentences which *4 sentence for misde- convicted of offenses. maximum $1,000 fine or both. imprisonment days' meanor applies dispositions argue this section Defendants that (here- 1977, RCW 13.40 Justice Act of under the Juvenile They JJA), as criminal sentences. well as adult inafter argue that Legislature intended that RCW 9A.20.020 apply sentences, to all including juvenile dispositions. They argue further could not have legislated otherwise because to impose longer terms of confinement on children than on adults would violate the equal protec- tion clauses of the United States and Washington Consti- tutions. We disagree. We hold that the Legislature did not intend RCW 9A.20.020 apply to juvenile dispositions. equal protection And preclude does not the Legislature's mandating longer terms of confinement for children than for adults.
We begin our analysis with very brief review of the his- tory of our justice system, so as to place the present legislation in a historical perspective. justice movement dates from the early
nineteenth-century development prison system as a substitute for physical punishment. Under common law, a child below age of seven could not be crimi- nally prosecuted, youth while a between the ages of seven and fourteen presumed was to lack capacity, criminal presumption only infrequently rebutted. Children above age the although punishment of fourteen bore full criminal responsibility, always could mitigated. Prior to century, nineteenth punishment criminal was swift physical nature, imprisonment was unknown. In the incarceration, absence of the "mixing" of juve- nile offenders with impossible. Equally, adults common facilities was physical absence of custody pre- cluded the implementation of rehabilitative programs tailored to the young transgressor, the hallmark of the twentieth-century juvenile justice system. early century, nineteenth reforms led to the prison
establishment of the system, resulting for the first time, youths the incarceration of with more hardened adult criminals.
(Footnotes omitted.) Sobie, The Juvenile Act: Offender Impact on the New York Juvenile Jus- Effectiveness tice System, L. 26 N.Y. Sch. L. Rev. 677-78
It in response was to this result the reforms which led to the system were initiated. *5 procedures by adult appalled early reformers were could be children by the fact that penalties,
and and hard- jails mixed in with sentences and given long prison that convinced They profoundly were ened criminals. by the confined child could be society's duty to the society's role They believed concept justice alone. "guilty" the child was to ascertain whether was not what he he, he become "innocent," how has but "What and in his interest be done is, what had best from a downward him of the state to save interest was to punishment . . . of crime and The idea career." and "rehabili- to be "treated" The child was abandoned. through apprehension from procedures, tated" and the institutionalization, rather than were to be "clinical" punitive. Gault, omitted.) 15-16, In re
(Footnote
18 L.
387 U.S.
(1967).
Ed. 2d
This reform was embraced state, in 1905 and 1909 to estab- legislation which enacted enacted a more lish a court. In 1913 the which was codified as juvenile court statute comprehensive 13.04, until substantially unchanged remained Wash- Becker, present legislation was enacted 1977. Introduction, ington New Code: An State's Juvenile L. Gonz. Rev. 289 country, stage
In in the Washington, as elsewhere what called "social- was thus set for an era of has been power in the justice" juveniles. for contrast to its ized adult criminal model, juvenile court could obtain youngster's status rather jurisdiction on the basis her involvement criminal than on the basis his or judicial discre- Legal rights acts. were subordinated tion, individualized punishment "replaced" was with in order de-emphasized plans. "treatment" Justice was for the diagnosis an instrument for the court to become delivery of social services. of social ailments and the omitted.) (Footnote at 14 Gonz. L. Rev. 291.
However, juve- idea of socialized the reformers' between delin- reality dealing with nile services and the justice fell of failure. The quents, there the shadow to be supposed who were system failing juveniles was protected system, rehabilitated and it was fail- public ing were supposed who having benefit from children steered gently but firmly from life of crime to a productive place in society. The Supreme United States pointed ways Court system out some of the in which the juveniles failed the subject who were to it. history Juvenile again Court has demonstrated discretion, motivated, unbridled however benevolently
frequently poor principle substitute and procedure. Failure requirements to observe the fundamental *6 process instances, due has in resulted which have might avoided, been of unfairness to inadequate individuals and or findings inaccurate of fact and unfortunate prescrip- remedy. tions of Gault,
In re at 387 U.S. 18-20. Accordingly, the Court required basic rights process provided due to be juve- represented nile proceedings. This a substantial modifica- informal, discretionary system tion the that had existed previously. However, safeguards, juve- even with these the system open nile was still to criticism that it did deal fairly young offenders, with imposing penalties that were proportion out of of the seriousness offense. Gonz. L. Rev. at 294-95. time,
At the widespread same there was feeling that the juvenile system justice failing public. feeling was This was no means peculiar to this state. The States United Congress recognized in the Juvenile Justice and Delin- quency Prevention Act of 1974 that communities experience directly
States and local which devastating juvenile justice system failures of the do not presently expertise have sufficient technical or ade- quate comprehensively prob- resources to deal with the lems . . delinquency . 5601(a)(6) (1976).
42 U.S.C. § report following The Senate which was prepared hearing Delinquency which led to the Juvenile Justice and pub- emphasized Prevention Act of 1974 the concern of the justice system. lic at the failure of to serious given attention be greater It essential in recent crime, significantly which has increased youth appropriate clients youth are years. These children A system. juvenile justice process of the for the formal mugging assailant. of his her age not care about victim does have it should not The victim believes be done. Juveniles something must happened and that the seri- arrested for nearly people half constitute increase out- rate of country, and the ous crime community is The cost to strips that of adult arrests. time, life, money, many ways. amounts high fear, resources, emotional costs plus the property, reasons confusion, compelling alienation anger, by juveniles being of crimes committed for the control priority. reprinted Sess., Rep. Cong., 2d
S. No. 93d Cong. & Ad. 5289. U.S. Code News justice clearly an effort The Juvenile Act inadequacies juvenile justice system. of the overcome the departed In has from whole this effort acceptance philosophy impelled which hearted system. sponsors legisla new prime old One of the wrote: tion philosophical polarities that have charac- terms of century, than a
terized the
the new law moves
court debate
more
parens
doctrine
away
patriae
from
*7
coercion,
to
classical
of
emphasis
and closer
a more
benevolent
deal
requires
The law
the court
justice.
on
offenses.
consistently
youngsters who commit
more
with
youngsters
providing
The
services
responsibility
noncriminal,
troublesome,
is
is
behavior,
whose
while
and Health Services
Department
to the
of Social
assigned
and the
juve-
whom it
contract.
agencies
with
nile
is
as an instrument
primarily
to view itself
provider
of services.
rather than
a
justice
However, it be a mistake to assume would from the ideal of rehabil- completely has turned legislation clearly does legislation offenders. The new itating juvenile every which mirrors in up system rigidly punitive not set is system. particu- This justice adult criminal respect larly true the matter under consideration in this appeal, the disposition of the purposes offender. The underlying juvenile system procedures and the designed to effect purposes those significantly are different from the purposes and procedures system. of the adult true,
That in respect is at least disposition or sen- tencing, can be shown aby comparison of statements legislative purpose in the Sentencing Reform Act of 9.94A, and the JJA. RCW 9.94A.010 provides that sentencing of the reform act is to system
make the criminal justice pub- accountable to the by developing system lic for the sentencing felony structures, offenders which eliminate, but does not dis- cretionary decisions affecting sentences, and to add a new chapter to Title RCW designed to:
(1) Ensure punishment for a offense criminal proportionate is to the seriousness the offense and the offender's criminal history;
(2) respect punish- Promote for the law providing just; ment which is
(3) Be commensurate punishment imposed with the committing offenses; others similar (4) public; Protect
(5) Offer the offender an opportunity improve him herself; (6) Make frugal use the state's resources.
The purposes and policies underlying the JJA are rather complex more than these sentencing purposes the adult criminal justice system. formal statement of the intent of the in enacting the JJA found in RCW 13.40.010(2). This provision policies states first the act, second, policies of the act. The system responsi- twofold: to establish a having primary for, for, bility being accountable to the responding offenders; needs of youthful hold account- juveniles able for their offenses.
The critical distinction here that nowhere in RCW 9.94A.010, or anywhere else justice adult criminal system, expressed policy is there "responding needs" of offenders. policy Much less is such a stated as the *8 This system. the whole policies underlying first of the two system respond juvenile directive that legislative sig- one of considerable is therefore needs of the offender is to system clearly It nificance. indicates the needs the child. respond to geared some extent similar to of the JJA are Thus, policies the 10 while some of (compare RCW 13.40- system purposes the adult .010(2) (a) 9.94A.010(4), and RCW 13.40- with RCW beyond .010(2)(d) 9.94A.010(1)), go others with RCW RCW system. particular, in provided the adult anything 13.40.010(2)(f) of juve- for treatment (j) provide both given be lieu or nile offenders. Such "treatment" Nowhere punishment. 13.40.010(2)(j). in addition to defined; it limited to in the is "treatment" is not statute provision any particular kind of "treatment." appears way system to be which the can "treatment" one offender, and the respond to the needs of the. the nature appropriate treatment would determined of those needs.
Thus, system the while the JJA shares with the adult acts, pun- rendering a child accountable for his him, pur- him from such ishing exacting retribution way to, poses by, cases must tempered give some child. In other purposes of to the needs of the responding words, utterly the rehabilitative JJA has not abandoned justice system for impelled ideal which punitive or retribu- purely decades. It does not embrace Instead, equatorial it an philosophy. attempts tive to tread midway poles somewhere between the of rehabilitation line and retribution. hand, does not system, on the other sentencing adult purpose The fifth on rehabilitation.
place importance such Act of 1981 is Sentencing Reform "[o]ffer improve him herself". Offer- opportunity an offender us the suggest self-improvement does ing a chance as is to rehabilitation degree commitment same is the Punishment the JJA. expressed by system. sentencing paramount purpose the adult We have previously recognized the dichotomy of *9 in in In re Smiley, the JJA. We noted 96 Wn.2d 640 (1982) P.2d 7 the replaced JJA had parens patriae single the guiding principle of juvenile justice, with twin principles of punishment. Therefore, rehabilitation in resolving any legislative purpose issue which turns on the of act, this we must ensure our decision to effectuates the possible fullest purpose extent both the of rehabilitation See also State punishment. and the of Lawley, v. Wn.2d mind, With this in turn we to consider provisions the of the JJA which disposition deal with the juvenile of offen- Any ders. juvenile offender over whom is jurisdiction not (RCW 13.40.110) declined or is who not diverted from (RCW prosecution 13.40.070, .080) is subject juvenile procedures. plea court by After a of or a guilty finding the court that the prosecution proved has the of allegations the (RCW beyond 13.40.130), information a reasonable doubt a disposition hearing pur- is held. RCW 13.40.150. For the poses disposition, of may the court variety consider wide of including matters aggravating and factors. In mitigating most required cases the court disposition is to order a within the range standard the offense. RCW 13.40.160. disposition by standards are established the juvenile disposition standards committee to pursuant RCW 13.40- .030. The ranges may standards establish which include both, either community supervision, confinement or or on offense, the youth's basis age, instant and the his- tory and of previous pro- seriousness offenses. The statute upper vides both and lower on range. limits the standard Upper may may limits not exceed that to which an adult be 13.40.030(1)(a). subjected for the same offense. RCW And the minimum may percent term not be than less days less, per- maximum where the maximum is 90 or cent maximum where the maximum is 90 to 1 days year, percent and 80 maximum where maximum 13.40.030(5). may more than 1 In no year. RCW event by beyond court his committed birthday. RCW 13.40.300.
21st disposition within case order a The court must each category offender unless the limits established injustice." RCW 13.40- do so would effectuate "manifest 13.40.020(12): injustice is in RCW .160. A manifest defined penalty an impose excessive disposition "a that would light pur- of the danger society a clear concept injus- It is manifest poses chapter". this The statute before us. tice central issues which 13.40.030(1) (a) that the standard requires in clearly maximum may exceed the adult range disposition But the exceed the RCW 9A.20.020. specified clear necessary maximum where avoid "a range standard of" JJA. RCW danger society light 13.40.020(12). is, therefore, The issue whether adult *10 applies injus- of the manifest maximum RCW 9A.20.020 to disposition as well as to the standards. disposition tice The has its intent that RCW manifested injustice juvenile apply should not to manifest 9A.20.020 dispositions. provides RCW 13.04.450 RCW, chapters provisions
The of 13.04 and 13.40 amended, now or hereafter shall be the exclusive author- ity disposition adjudication juvenile for offen- except expressly provided. ders where otherwise ours.) (Italics place only one does RCW 13.04 13.40 expressly provide that the maximum sentences RCW juvenile apply disposition shall to offen- 9A.20.020 13.40.030(1)(a), provides ders. This is RCW which range dispositions. limit But this upper standard apply dispositions does not outside stand- provision no that RCW express provision ard There range. being range, apply dispositions outside standard 9A.20.020 requires RCW 13.40 clearly 13.04.450 RCW offenders. authority disposition for the exclusive injustice" provide that "manifest And RCW does not 13.40 be limited to dispositions range the standard outside meaning of plain 9A.20.020. The provided terms RCW is therefore that and RCW 13.40 RCW 13.04.450 apply 9A.20.020 does juvenile dispositions.
This result is consistent legislative with the intent discussed, underlies RCW 13.40. As we have rehabilitation JJA, is one of the of the and in certain cases com- mitments provided excess the maximum for adults may be necessary respond to the needs offender. The cases before us are good examples. Both prior offenses; indeed, defendants have records of records before us convince us that both defendants are in danger clear of becoming adult offenders unless rehabilita- tion is effective. A number of factors common to both defendants' suggests histories that a term of confinement longer than the adult maximum any is essential reason- attempt able to prevent these from defendants reoffending. case, In each the record indicates a of parental lack control over juvenile. disciplined structured and environ- ment of detention can be beneficial if to such children children are exposed to that environment for sufficient A duration. second common factor is that both defendants are substantially peers behind their in school work. In detention, juveniles provided with education services. recently We need of recognized the detainees in Tommy Comm'rs, P. v. Board such Cy. services Wn.2d availability educa- tion in detention reinforces aspect rehabilitative juvenile dispositions and contributes to the benefits that a juvenile may Third, from receive detention. both defend- substances, ants had some with involvement controlled may keep confinement temptations beyond such their *11 reach, least It temporarily. only hoped at can be that the positive help benefits of detention would then the defend- temptations upon ants resist such society. their return to Finally, both defendants have extensive criminal records previous attempts to reform them were inefficacious. Rice reoffended 2 months being after released from deten- tion; Sanchez reoffended still under community while supervision Clearly, for previous his offenses. both defend- prolonged ants in more the need of detention than apply. us they urge to days' maximum which disposition maximum to the the adult apply If we to were courts JJA, juvenile leave the we would provisions the needs responding to the obvious means of without a be, effect, telling in It would like the defendants. juveniles until juvenile the needs of the ignore court to the more offense. an even serious committing he is convicted in system necessary the adult approach an under Such the and where punishment paramount purpose is the which is inimical to the fit the But it punishment must crime. system. It juvenile justice rehabilitative into the destroy flexibility built would cases, to court, appropriate in fit system to allow the offender, to the offense. disposition to the rather than and the language we conclude that both the Accordingly, sen- require the adult maximum purpose of JJA dispositions under apply tence does injustice provisions. manifest by heavily on
Defendants' relied a statement arguments Rhodes, in State v. this court 92 Wn.2d P.2d case, injustice" upheld In that we the "manifest a chal- exception range disposition against standard unconstitutionally lenge grounds vague. on the it was injustice" We that a sufficient definition of "manifest held in guide the court sentenc- was contained the statute ing juvenile offenders. enacting code legislative intent 13.40.010(2). pur-
set forth
poses
RCW
addition
section,
out in this
there are other standards
set
discriminatory
prevent arbitrary
which
statute
application
exception.
of the manifest
injustice
13.40.030(1)
any period of
provides that
confinement
which
adult
supervision must not exceed that
an
limits
offense. RCW 13.40.300
subjected
same
can extend
that no confinement
sentencing period so
birthday. RCW
21st
13.40-
beyond
the offender's
(i)
.150(2)(h),
factors
aggravating
mitigating
forth
set
disposition hearing.
court at a
to be considered
limited
consideration
Moreover,
. .
is not
.
the court
*12
probation
these
factors. Evidence such as
officers'
reports
psychological
psychiatric
studies is
determining
available to the court to
it in
assist
whether
society
13.40.150(1).
danger
a clear
to
RCW
exists.
(Citations omitted.)
Nor does our case affect the validity injustice exception. of the manifest Even without being injus máximums, limited the adult the manifest exception vague. injustice tice is not The manifest standard applied arbitrarily discriminatorily. cannot be It can be only impose disposition beyond used a the standard danger society light maximum when there is clear purposes act. of the act are set out 13.40.010(2). in RCW The court consider a vari wide ety danger of factors determine whether such a clear 13.40.150(1), (2). writing exists. RCW It must set forth in finding injustice any dispo reasons for a manifest range appealable. sition outside the standard RCW uphold disposition In order 13.40.160. outside the range, appellate standard find court must that the rea supplied by disposition supported by judge sons clearly convincingly record, and that those reasons support disposition the conclusion that a stand within the range injustice. ard would constitute manifest 13.40.230(2). injustice standard, therefore, The manifest requirements Rhodes, meets the set even our forth after holding in case. this
turn We now to consider the second issue raised on longer for than confining juveniles whether appeal, state or for adults violates provided maximum sentence Essentially, requirements equal protection. federal periods of juveniles to argue subjecting defendants provided adults for the those longer confinement than offense, equal protection juveniles JJA denies same *13 United to the by the fourteenth amendment guaranteed 12 1, of the state and article section States Constitution constitution. is analysis, it nec any equal protection
At the outset of
to test
against which
essary
define the standard of review
to
Smith,
329,
State v.
93 Wn.2d
challenged legislation.
(1980).
mea
judicially
used to
869
Two tests are
610 P.2d
equal protection:
violate
alleged
sure classifications
to
Smith.
relationship
scrutiny
strict
and the rational
tests.
scrutiny
statutory
if
The strict
test is used
classification
equal protection
as
discriminatory
attacked
under
"suspect"
class or involves a "fundamental
clause involves
explicitly
implicitly guaranteed
the United
right"
involved,
scrutiny is
States Constitution. When strict
if
makes a
upheld only
will be
the State
classification
interest
to
the classifi
showing
compelling
justify
state
(1975).
Gould,
859,
cation. Darrin v.
P.2d
85 Wn.2d
540
882
State,
in Houser v.
803,
pointed
As we
out
Wn.2d
805,
(1975),
discriminations
are not inher
age
540 P.2d
ently
Legislature's
"suspect," and therefore
differential
in
a suspect
treatment of
does not
this case create
juveniles
require
scrutiny
of the classification.
class so
strict
However,
in
one
involved
the classification is
interest
juveniles'
It is
less than the
nothing
which is fundamental.
explicitly preserved
which is
liberty.
right
This is
right
United
amendment
States
in both
fourteenth
1,
state, article
constitution
of this
Constitution
and the
rec
United States has
Supreme
Court
section 3.
vote,
freedom of
right
as fundamental
ognized
v.
See Darrin
procreation.
right
and the
expression,
Gould,
rights
any meaning
of these
have
at 866. None
restraint.
physical
the freedom from
liberty,
the absence of
Accordingly,
recognize
we
liberty
the individual's
interest
is a
right
purpose
fundamental
for the
of equal protection
rel.
People
ex
v.
analysis.
Wayburn
Schupf, 39 N.Y.2d
682,
(1976).
906,
350 N.E.2d
The enactment will not be unless the state estab- compelling And, so, lishes a interest. to do state must purpose show its or interest the enactment both constitutionally permissible substantial, and that use necessary of the classification is accomplishment its interest. Ass'n, v.
Nielsen
State Bar
820,
818,
90 Wn.2d
585 P.2d
(1978).
We find that the State has satisfied this test.
State's
and interest
in the confinement of
in part
offenders
at least
to achieve some mea
sure of
clearly constitutionally
rehabilitation. This is
permissible.
v. Pennsylvania,
iver
McKe
403 U.S.
29 L.
Ed. 2d
Juvenile Delinquency Crime, and Youth at 9. opinion
We have discussed earlier in this the reason we that, cases, in in excess of the consider certain confinement necessary adult maximum is to achieve the State's substan- Therefore, purpose rehabilitating tial offenders. scrutiny we find that the State has satisfied the strict test. provision juveniles The for confinement of excess of maximum terms for adults does not violate the state or equal protection federal clauses.
We have considered the other issues raised defendant Sanchez and find them Accordingly, without merit. we affirm the disposition Superior orders of the Court. C.J.,
Brachtenbach, Rosellini, Stafford, Utter, Dimmick, JJ., Dolliver, Williams, concur. J.
Dore, (dissenting)—Daniel Rice was a 16-year-old guilty trespass who was found of criminal in the degree, defendant, first 13-year- misdemeanor. other Sanchez, pleaded assault, old Monte guilty to unlawful also If juveniles adults, misdemeanor. had been the maxi- they mum sentence could have received would have been 90 days. they however, Because were juveniles, the court sen- tenced them to confinement a correctional institution for year. majority, by opinion, its sanctions this uncon- remand, stitutional sentence. I would with instructions days. reduce the sentence to 90
I statutory require Traditional rules of construction give the court ascertain and effect to the intent and pur- pose v. Legislature expressed of the the act. State Eilts, 489, 493, 94 Wn.2d The stated enacting the Juvenile Justice (Juvenile Act) Act of 1977 Justice is set forth in RCW 13.40.010:
(2) system legislature It is the intent of the that a for, capable having primary responsibility being for, youthful to the needs of responding by accountable offenders, chapter, as defined be established. It is
the further intent of the legislature youth, turn, be held accountable for their offenses and that both communities and the juvenile carry courts out their functions consistent with this intent. To effectuate these policies, it shall be the of this chapter to: (a) citizenry Protect from behavior; criminal (b) Provide for determining whether accused juveniles have committed offenses as by defined this chapter; (c) Make offender accountable for his or behavior; her criminal (d) Provide punishment for commensurate with the crime,
age, history and criminal offender; of the juvenile (e) Provide due process for juveniles alleged to have offense; committed an (f) Provide necessary treatment, supervision, and cus- tody juvenile offenders; for (g) Provide for the handling of juvenile offenders communities whenever consistent public safety; with (h) Provide for crime; restitution to victims of (i) Develop effective standards goals for oper- ation, funding, and evaluation of components all of the related, juvenile justice system and services at the state levels; and local
(j) Provide for a policy clear to determine what types of offenders shall punishment, receive treatment, both, and to determine the jurisdictional limitations of the courts, institutions, community services. Among the enumerated legislative statements of purpose, 13.40.010(2) (d) emphasizes that designed act is "[pjrovide punishment for commensurate with age, crime, history and criminal This offender".1 Representative Becker, Mary Kay prime sponsor 1 State of House Bill Legislature, 45th which became the Juvenile Justice Act of has written extensively about act and how it from differs the former act of 1913. Gonzaga Review, In an philosophical article Law Becker summarized the difference between the old act and the new. fairly From this narrative the broad of House bill 371 should be philosophical polarities juve- clear. terms of the that have characterized the century, away nile court debate for more than a the new law moves from the parens patriae coercion, doctrine of benevolent and closer ato more classical emphasis justice. requires consistently The law the court deal more with youngsters responsibility providing who commit offenses. The services to youngsters behavior, troublesome, noncriminal, assigned whose while
403 certainly does not contem- legislative purpose of expression allow punishment which would plate statutory scheme of his offender until 15-year-old juvenile incarceration of a trespass criminal attempted of birthday 21st for offense similarly 18-year-old situated in while a degree, the first only pen- a maximum would be subjected codefendant pos- scenario is incongruous in Such an alty days jail. of 90 maximum sentence if 9A.20.020 does not set the sible RCW juvenile for a offender. evidence of
Perhaps persuasive legislative the most 13.40.030(l)(a), intent in RCW which authorizes is found for disposition juvenile the establishment standards offenders: establish,
The standards purposes shall accordance with the chapter, may which include terms ranges community supervision estab- of confinement and/or offense, youth's the instant age, lished on the basis of but offenses, history previous and the and seriousness case may period supervi- in no confinement that to an adult bemay subjected sion exceed which for offense(s). the same (Italics mine.) Rhodes,
In State v. 755, 759, 92 P.2d Wn.2d 1264 13.40.030(1) (1979), pointed language we of RCW as injustice exception evidence the manifest is not unconstitutionally vague: enacting juvenile intent code is legislative 13.40.010(2). In pur-
set forth addition to the there are other standards in section, in this poses set out prevent arbitrary discriminatory the statute which injustice application exception. RCW manifest 13.40.030(1) provides any period confinement must exceed that to an adult supervision which may subjected the same RCW 13.40.300 offense. period limits the so that no confinement can sentencing Department agencies with whom it of Social and Health Services and the primarily an instrument of court is to view itself contract. provider justice services. rather than as a Introduction, Becker, Washington State's New Juvenile Code: An L. Gonz. Rev. 307-08 beyond
extend birthday. offender's 21st (Italics mine.)
Additionally, appellate our courts of state have applied adult criminal proceed- statutes court Norton, State v. ings a consistent basis. Wn. App. 377, 380, (1980), Appeals the Court of held 10.22, compromise that RCW statute, of misdemeanors applies court, proceedings. The giving effect to the intent of the Legislature, reasoned:
The essence of compromise of misdemeanors stat- ute is restitution to crime victims and avoidance pros- *17 These are consis- ecution minor offenders. functions Act purposes tent with the Juvenile Justice of of 1977, the 13.40.010(2) (h). (g) and Because specifically RCW consistent, the two statutes are
purposes of we hold where, here, designated as an offense a misdemeanor criminal statutes is used to invoke the under the adult court, mis- jurisdiction juvenile compromise of the of statute, 10.22, applied juve- demeanors RCW nile proceedings.
(Footnote mine.) omitted. Italics Bird, State v.
In 83, 89, (1980), 95 Wn.2d Supreme 9.92.060, Court held that RCW which grants sentences, to trial authority suspend appli- courts the to is In proceedings. opinion, cable court its the court approval Appeals cited with the rationale of the Court of Norton, supra: State v. analysis
The same applicable purpose is here. The of a suspended appropriate disposition sentence is to order an conditions, which, violated, with clear if empowers the to commit Among the offender. of RCW 13.40 are to:
(d) punishment Provide for commensurate with the crime, age, history and criminal of the of- fender;
(g) handling Provide for the of offenders safety; public communities whenever consistent with A sentence 13.40.010(2)(d) suspended is (g). RCW these In the absence lan- purposes. consistent with of guage reasoning to the Norton contrary, therefore, RCW sentences under suspend the trial court permits 13.40. mine.)
(Citation Italics omitted. and Bird appli- is also in Norton analysis contained 9A.20.020 purpose of RCW present case. The cable for misdemeanor punishment term of a maximum to set purpose stated This is with the consistent offenses. juris- to determine policy a clear provide 13.40.010(2)(j). of the courts.
dictional limitations statutory Bird, rules upon relied two In at we page First, literal criminal statutes: peculiar construction Second, to criminal statutes. interpretation given must be statutory lenity" problems applicable "rule len- "rule of statutes. Under the construction of criminal so as to ity," will not a criminal statute interpret the court legis- clear evidence penalty imposed increase the absent Carle, 31, 33, re Wn.2d intent so. lative do P.2d 1293 literally, contains no clear indication
Read
RCW 13.40
juve-
a trial
incarcerate a
legislative intent
to allow
court to
a term
than an adult could receive
greater
nile offender for
contrary,
interpreta-
On
such an
for the same offense.
Act
of the Juvenile Justice
tion conflicts with the
13.40.010(2)(d)
(j). In the absence
forth in RCW
set
contrary,
intent
any
expression
legislative
clear
*18
lenity
recognize
the rule of
to
required
under
9A.20.020 to RCW 13.40.
applicability
RCW
does not conflict with
Since RCW 9A.20.020
13.40.010(2),
nor with the
as stated
RCW
of RCW 13.40
13.40,
RCW
injustice exception
purpose of
manifest
case.
applicable
present
RCW 9A.20.020 should be
II
Smith,
342,
(1974),
In Reanier v.
In Reanier, Justice Hamilton stated at pages 346-47:
Fundamental fairness and the avoidance of discrimi- nation possible multiple punishment dictate that an person, accused to or precluded posting unable from bail or otherwise his conviction and commitment procuring prior release from confinement should, upon to trial to a penal facility, state as against credited a maximum mandatory minimum term with all time served in prior Otherwise, detention to trial and sentence. such a person's in custody total time would exceed that of a defendant likewise sentenced but who had been able to pretrial obtain . release. . . Aside potential from the implications of situation, double jeopardy such it is clear that process principles equal protec- due tion of the law are breached without rational reason. (Footnote omitted.) Trambitas,
In In re (1981) 96 Wn.2d 635 P.2d Smith, supra, we applied the rationale of Reanier v. juveniles, saying process equal protection that due guaranties require juvenile's prior detention dis- position be credited term against the maximum of confine- imposed ment under guidelines. standard range We Reanier pretrial stated time detention served adults must be against mandatory credited maximum and minimum I terms avoid constitutional violations. see no reason to deny protection similar to juveniles.
Ill Juveniles equal protection are entitled to of the laws with regard to sentencing. The new Juvenile Act Justice shifts policy emphasis considerations from an on rehabilitation to an emphasis accountability, punishment, pro and the society.2 offenders, tection of Consequently, espe- Lawley, majority 654, 656, in State v. (1979), 2 The 91 Wn.2d trial, although denying juveniles shift, right jury recognized to a as did Rhodes, (1979), in that case. State v. dissent 92 Wn.2d P.2d 1264 dis-
407 of manifest a declaration dally sentenced under those similarly counterparts their adult are situated to injustice, sentencing. for purposes Justice under the Juvenile
Allowing juveniles sentenced incarceration than could longer Act to terms of receive promote offense does not a imposed on for the same adults is, therefore, violation compelling state interest Const, 1, 12. art. § fundamental, is order
Assuming involved not right equal protection satisfy scrutiny minimal under very at least clause, must statutory classification San purpose. rationally promote government a valid 1, 33-40, Rodriguez, Sch. v. 411 Indep. Antonio Dist. U.S. Gould, v. Darrin 16, (1973); 85 L. S. Ct. 1278 36 Ed. 2d 93 859, 866, Wn.2d P.2d 882 many the Juvenile Justice Act purposes of of sen- arguably very
varied and similar of the tencing in this The obvious adults state. however, protection of injustice exception, is the manifest society. 13.40.020(12); 13.40.160. While is RCW is rational objective, there no certainly government valid longer offenders to terms sentencing juvenile reason for imposed incarceration than could be adults convicted offense, theory gen- of the act the same unless the basic exception particular manifest injustice eral and the If sentencing is account- objective rehabilitative. ability, with the offense punishment commensurate basis protection society, there no rational age, determining juvenile, simply by that a reason of his longer than the to a term of incarceration subject should be earlier, clearly recognizes this shift. cussed Erickson, 808, (1979), Appeals In App. re 24 Wn. the Court In pun- criminal statutes as constitute found RCW 13.40 to be so similar adult exception to the constitutional involun- ishment for crime sufficient fall within tary servitude. Frederick, (1980), 28, Supreme Court held In re P.2d 953 93 Wn.2d degree escape 9A.76.110 convicted first under RCW that a could not be literally felony. be convicted because a could adult maximum for the same offense. Olivas,
In People v. Cal. 3d 551 P.2d 131 Cal. *20 Rptr. (1976), 55 Supreme California Court a voided statute that allowed the of youths incarceration between 16 years 21 and of age for terms that were longer than the maximum imposed on An adults. extensive review of the judicial historical liberty basis for the interest led personal liberty court to conclude that ais fundamental interest, itself, only second to life protected as an interest under both the California and United States Constitutions. assuming
Even provides that the State substantial "treatment" to juveniles, Washington benefits court has rejected the proposition sufficiently that these benefits compensate liberty dispense for the loss of with the need for strict A scrutiny. juvenile still shares with an adult offender the one dif- feature that overwhelms the ferences between their incar- circumstances—they are both against cerated their will. While conceding the rehabilita- tion of the Washington juvenile system even 1976, Supreme Court said:
However, liberty involved, where a restraint beneficent, fact civil nature of the code its significance. may loses be Although proceedings "civil," "rehabilitative," "remedial," deemed they subject would be if scrutiny to the same strict they constitutional
they
proceedings.
were deemed "criminal"
Morris,
Johnson v.
87 Wn.2d
922, 929,
(1976). The
Supreme
United States
Court made the same
will,
point.
against
"It is
it is
incarceration
one's
whether
Gault,
In
re
50, 18
1,
called 'criminal' or 'civil.'"
U.S.
L.
387
Jones,
v.
527,
See also Breed
S.
Ed. 2d
87
Ct. 1428
Peo
519,
346,
(1975);
421
44 L.
95 Ct.
U.S.
Ed. 2d
S.
1779
Olivas,
Scott,
v.
(7th
ple
supra;
v.
Vann
Cir.
Analyzing whole, and the test, held the act as a we vagueness particular, contained suffi- exception manifest injustice arbitrary prevent mandatory sentencing cient standards decision, its discriminatory reaching enforcement. 13.40.030(1)(a), which part relied on RCW this of confinement provides may period that "in no case sub- supervision exceed that to which an adult offense(s)". analysis same jected Under Rhodes, all clearly applied limitation should be juveniles, including those sentenced under declaration *21 manifest injustice. bar, urges only
In the the absolute case at the State upon limitation the of a sentence outside length juvenile's birthday. max- range of the standard or her 21st The his any imum for each of offense sentence convicted discriminatorily then determined arbitrarily would be juvenile's age alone, younger the with the that the result child, more the maximum sentence. The the the severe way would in no correlate potential maximum sentence severity juvenile's the of the current offense nor the crimi- involving liberty. in a case the loss of incarcerated at Western test McCarter was Hospital psychopathy program, pursuant The in its sexual to RCW 71.06. State beyond expira- issue was his continued incarceration and treatment whether offense, underlying sentence on without further commit- tion of the maximum his Appeals hearings, equal protection him the of The of ment denied the law. Court holding proposi- Appeals for held that it did not. The State cites the Court scrutiny judicial appropriate strict is not an review when tion that standard However, deprivation liberty purposes. has the State State's for treatment that, review, Supreme note further Court reversed the Court failed to McCarter, actually State Appeals. v. case Wn.2d liberty contrary proposition—that for the is fundamental and that stands deprivation, strictly are reha- will its even if the State's scrutinize "nonpenal" hospital or other and even if the incarceration occurs bilitative that, presumably, rigors Washington's prisons. setting adult does not share 13.40.010(2)(d). nal history required by Under Rhodes, analysis arbitrary discriminatory such punishment determination would cause statute to be unconstitutionally vagueness. void for
Conclusion Examination Act law Juvenile Justice and case interpreted clearly its various provisions demonstrates the Legislature did not intend vest court with power to incarcerate a for a juvenile offender greater term than that an which adult could receive for By same offense. Daniel ordering Rice and Monte Sanchez prison year, arbitrarily for the trial court exceeded its 13.40, authority under RCW and rendered four sentences Further, times that of an adult the same offense. I don't believe United States and State Washington Constitu- tions can 18-year-old boy, tolerate a situation where an convicted of carrying a misdemeanor a minimum term jail days, of 90 days, can sentenced to 90 while a boy day younger, misdemeanor, convicted of a similar sen- can be tenced to a confinement of 1 period year, four times longer. This constitutes a process equal violation due protection. defendants, Sanchez, Rice con- cannot stitutionally days. be sentenced to more than 90
I would reverse and sen- remand the trial court and tence each days' defendant more than 90 con- finement. 22, 1982.] 48409-1. En Banc. December
[No. *22 Corbray, Petitioner, v. A. W. Stevenson, Rose al, Respondents.
et