State v. RicchettiState v. Ricchetti
Defendant Carl Ricchetti appeals from his conviction for unlawful restraint, in violation of
*729 I
On August 29, 1989, defendant was indicted for kidnapping, in violation of
The state’s evidence established that on the evening of January 31, 1989, defendant approached fifteen-year-old Jason Wallace in a blue automobile, and told Wаllace to get into the car. Wallace then walked away from the area, and again noticed defendant’s vehicle make a U-turn, then turn around in an adjacent alley. As Wallace approached defendant’s car, defendant rolled down his window, and asked Wallace if he wanted to make some money. Wallace responded that he did not, but then got into defendant’s vehicle.
The state’s evidence next established that as defendant began to drive away, a car approached. Defendant asked Wallace if he knew the people in the approaching car. Wallace said that he did not, and defendant sped away. The police activated a siren and followed defendant’s vehicle. Wallace asked defendant to stop, but he did not do so until he was apprehended, a few blocks away. Finаlly, Wallace testified that defendant instructed him to run away, after the police stopped the vehicle.
At the close of the state’s сase, defendant moved for a judgment of acquittal pursuant to
Defendant elected to put on evidence and presented three character witnesses who testified to his good reputation for truth and veracity. In addition, defеndant testified on his own behalf and stated that he is a school psychologist who works at various schools in the area of W. 65th and Lorain, and is therefore very involved in helping children and is very familiar with the area.
Defendant’s version of the events of the evening was that, at approximatеly 8:40 p.m., he decided to go to K-Mart to buy a few items. As he did not have enough cash to purchase the items he needed, he first stopped at a fast cashier located at W. 117th Street and Lake, before proceeding to the K-Mart on W. 65th Street.
While en route, defendant passed Wаllace, who, due to a birth mark on his face, appeared to be bruised or bleeding. Defendant then noticed three men watching Wallace from a car parked approximately twenty-feet away, so he returned to the area to determine if Wallace was all right. Dеfendant got no response from Wallace, however, so he returned to W. 65th Street, but then noticed the car he had seen earlier was following him. Defendant then turned *730 around in order to be certain that he was being followed, and as he approached Wallace for the third time, Wallace gestured to him as if to indicate that he was in trouble. Next, defendant approached Wallace and asked him if he knew the mеn in the car. Wallace said that he did not, then got into defendant’s car. Defendant proceeded to Lorain Road, and Wallace asked to be let out of the vehicle. Defendant admitted that he did not immediately comply because he did not think it was a safe place, аnd instead continued to W. 65th and stopped near an emergency telephone.
II
In his first and second assignments of error, defendant contends thаt the trial court erred in denying his motion for a complete acquittal, and in convicting him of unlawful restraint.
Pursuant to
However, pursuant to
“An offense may be a lesser
included
offense of another if (i) the offense carries a lesser penalty than the other; (ii) the grеater offense cannot, as statutorily defined, ever be committed without the lesser offense, as statutorily defined, also being committed; and (iii) sоme element of the greater offense is not required to prove the commission of the lesser offense.” (Emphasis
sic.) State v. Deem
(1988),
“Unlawful restraint” is defined in
“(A) No person, without privilege to do so, shall knowingly restrain another of his liberty.
“(B) Whoever violates this sеction is guilty of unlawful restraint, a misdemeanor of the third degree.” (Emphasis added.)
“Kidnapping” is defined in
“(A) No person, by force, threat, or deception, or, in the case of a victim under the age of thirteen or mentally incompetent, by any means, shall *731 remove another from the place where he is found or restrain him of his liberty, for any of the following purposes:
« * * *
“(B) No person, * * * shall knowingly do any of the following * * *:
“(1) Remove another from the place where he is found;
“(2) Restrain another of his liberty;
“(3) Hold another in a condition of involuntary servitude.
“(C) Whoever violates this section is guilty of kidnapping, an aggravated felony of the first degree. If the offender releases the victim in a safe place unharmed, kidnapping is an aggravated felony of the second degree.” (Emphasis added.)
Applying the foregoing, we hold that unlawful restraint is a lesser included offense of kidnapping. That is, unlawful restraint carries a lesser penalty than kidnapping, the еssential conduct proscribed by
Moreover, the evidence presentеd in this matter was such that reasonable minds could reach different conclusions as to whether defendant unlawfully restrained Wallace by speеding away when Wallace asked to be let out of the car.
Accordingly, we hold that the trial court could properly grant defendant’s motion for acquittal of the offense of kidnapping, but deny this motion with respect to the lesser included offense of unlawful restraint.
Defendant’s first and seсond assignments of error are overruled.
Ill
In his third assignment of error, defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction for unlawful restraint.
Our inquiry with respect to the sufficiency claims must focus upon whether the record evidence could reasonably suppоrt a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
Jackson v. Virginia
(1979),
Reviewing the evidenсe presented in this matter in a light most favorable to the prosecution, we find that a rational trier of fact could properly conclude that defendant was guilty of unlawful restraint beyond a reasonable doubt, as the state’s evidence established that defendant did not stop his vehicle when Wallace requested that he do so, and further established that defendant continued to flee from the police notwithstanding this request.
Defendant’s third assignment of error is overruled.
Judgment affirmed.