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State v. Rhoades
820 P.2d 665
Idaho
1991
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*1 Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent STATE of RHOADES,

Paul Ezra Defendant-

Appellant. Nos. 18285. Idaho, Supreme Court of Falls, September Term. Sept. 12, 1991. Rehearing Sept. Denied 1991. *3 grounds for a

should have been mistrial. legislative

II. Whether the abolition of mental condition the defense the Ida- in criminal cases violates ho or United States Constitutions. the trial court’s failure III. Whether pretrial ruling on the to make a statutory constitutionality of the insanity defense abolition of the *4 was in error. prosecution’s failure IV. Whether exculpatory to turn over evidence reversible error. constituted trial should Whether the court V. testimony by jail- a have excluded house informant. inculpatory statements VI. Whether police by made Rhoades to the suppressed. should have post convic- VII. Whether accelerated capital cases procedures tion

are unconstitutional. erroneously court Whether

VIII. impact victim state- considered ments. Whether the death IX. Parmenter, Blackfoot, for de- N. David imposed. properly

fendant-appellant. in com- the court erred X. Whether Jones, Gen., Lynn Atty. E. Thomas Jim expert pre- to pelling a defense Gen., Boise, plaintiff-re- for (argued), Sol. report to pare or submit a written spondent. prosecutor an interview testifying. before McDEVITT, Justice. its Whether the trial court abused XI. from the of Sta- This case arises murder denying a motion discretion Ezra has been cy Baldwin. Paul Rhoades the at- continuance to allow for separate cases. in three murder convicted forensic of the defense's tendance Susan Michelbacher For the murders of expert. Baldwin, Stacy Rhoades was sentenced

and Proportionality of the sentence XII. death, Nolan for the murder of to imposed. life he received indeterminate Haddon I. plea. conditional based on a sentence Stacy Baldwin February On BY JUROR PREJUDICIAL STATEMENT store the convenience was abducted from court that the trial Rhoades asserts Blackfoot, working near she was where of a granted mistrial a because should have taken to a secluded Idaho. She was then allegedly made prejudicial statement died several times. She location shot jury was to After the juror another. one later. hour and a half approximately an Bingham selected, a sheriff from deputy appeal are: presented this The issues signed a state County came forward juror stating he overheard one ment prejudicial a statement I.Whether juror prejudicial remark another juror another make by one made enacting dep- repealing 18-209 and I.C. during jury process. selection I.C. § 18-207(a), “[mjental provides that which special proceeding outside uty testified in a § any condition shall not be a defense during presence jury, charge of criminal conduct.” eight away six to feet from recess he was say, jury juror he heard a box when trial, case, prior defense “you just look at him and tell that he’s can “Request for Declaration counsel filed a guilty.” 18-207, I.C., the that the Enactment of § 18-208, 18-209, I.C. and the Repeal of this, learning trial court Upon §§ 12(g), Repeal of Rule I.C.R. are Unconstitu inquiry into the undertook an extensive urged that the tional.” It was abolition permitted matter. Counsel was to examine deprives criminal defendants of the defense length. ques- deputy sheriff at Several process rights the state and due under concerning accuracy tions were raised federal constitutions. perceptions. supposed of his remark name, not mention the defendant’s did argued parties extensively Both the issue deputy any conver- sheriff did not hear is, there justiciability; that whether sation either before or after the statement showing on the record that factual the context in it to indicate which was authority grant would the court the to ren- *5 testimony then from made. The court took ruling declaratory in the of a der a nature Webster, juror supposedly who made the judgment on the issue. Rhoades had been statement, Hinrichs, juror prejudicial by psychiatrist pursuant the to examined a to his However, addressed, request. the remark and all counsel’s the defense whom was indicating the did not introduce evidence jury. other de- members Webster psychiatrist’s conclusions as to whether having nied made the remark. Hinrichs might suffering any Rhoades be from men- having sitting juror denied heard it. The tal defect. it, directly in front of Hinrichs did not hear any juror nor did other or officer in the showing The defense contended that no vicinity. inquired jurors if The court the required unique was under the circum- impartial still to fair and were able be capital stances of a case. defense their deliberations. Hinrichs and Webster jurisdiction asserted that the court did have ability both reassured the court of their to declaratory judgment, to render a in that impartial jurors judge fair be and to declaratory judgment the nature of a is to solely presented. the case on the evidence clarify legal uncertainty, having no testimony, Based on this the trial court legal insanity impossi- of made it definition denied defendant’s motion for mistrial. psychiatrist opinion render an ble for a to legally insane. on whether Rhoades was

Appellant has failed to the show that denying court abused its discretion in the argued if The defense further that even support motion. The record does not the showing required, prosecu- the some was any necessity contention that remark was made that had the tion and the court waived prejudice preliminary the defendant. The trial evidence on presenting would of finding supported by court’s the evi- Rhoades’s mental condition when a defense dence, accordingly, request psychiatric the assistance at state we hold that for expense granted prelimi- the prejudiced by jury not mis- without defendant was nary showing required. The defense ar- a mistrial. conduct and was not entitled to

gues constituted a of that this waiver showing might required in the later that be II.-III. request ruling for a on the existence of the THE IN- LEGISLATIVE ABOLITION OF insanity defense. AND PRETRIAL SANITY DEFENSE urged Finally, the defense that there was THE

RULING ON AVAILABILITY showing a sufficient factual on the record THE INSANITY DEFENSE OF bring sanity Rhoades’s into issue. Not- per- legislature ing insanity that the defense is 1982 the Idaho abolished where cases, lay by may by it be established testimo- insanity the defense in criminal mitted during pretrial ny, preliminary generally cited the hear- the defense be available stage of a ing arresting criminal case. testimony of one of offi- the night cers to the effect that on Rhoades However, require trial court did not was arrested he was unstable and incoher- opinion expert an present that defense ent. as to ultimate issue of Rhoades’s sani- expression ty. requested any court a hearing The trial court held on the opinion expert as to whether insani- request for a that defense “declaration” ease, might or ty in the an be an issue the Idaho statutes were unconstitutional. raising assertion counsel that he was hearing, During inquired the court insanity. the defense The court did of any counsel as to its assertion mental concerning require polished testimony ex- defect defense. cognitive processes precise act mental Gentlemen, had the THE COURT: I’ve abilities of defendant. It would have opportunity to read defendant’s brief and expert provide sufficed for sum- brief. I’ve had the plaintiff’s also also opinion, mary stating that in his affidavit Judge opportunity to review detail insanity there was in- a viable issue memorandum decision he entered Boyle’s Alternatively, volved the case. ex- Falls, case in companion in a pert might an have submitted affidavit I’ve where the same issue raised. impossible effect that it would be the Montana and also looked at cases opinion guiding him to render an without a argue. you my It’s under- those cases legal option might Yet standard. another Parmenter, standing, your Mr. client opinion to offer on the defini- based time tender defense of does not at this place had in insanity tion of that Idaho insanity? prior repeal legislative de- *6 Well, DEFENSE ATTORNEY: that’s fense, to an restricting the affidavit in correct, primar- Honor. And Your that’s protect the camera in order to de- review the status the law. ily because of of consequences premature- of fense from the saying is that if that we’re we had What ly offering opinion improperly from an an from, might elect we elect. But law to prepared expert. defense time, point in correct. as of this that’s trial the record The court found that did Okay. If the cor- THE COURT: that is controversy to sup- not create a justiciable situation, insanity there is rect ... no repeal port ruling a the issue of the of on I it tendered. Then must look at defense insanity agree. the defense. We an presents that issue that is as a matter declaratory The a authority to render court because the defense before is statute. The De- judgment bestowed actually claimed. We’re has never been Act, in claratory contained Idaho Judgment dicta, area get into the of or asked 12, 10, jurisdiction tit. ch. confers Code perhaps speculation this matter. upon option to “declare courts nothing indi- before court to There’s relations, status, legal rights, and other raised, has insanity defense cate an is or could or not further relief be whether upon act it. or the court should important An claimed.” I.C. 10-1201. § request denied the defendant’s The court that, jurisdiction is “a upon limitation this for a “declaration.” declaratory only rendered judgment can be justiciable or in a case where an actual difficulty of the defense perceive We controversy Harris v. Cassia exists.” opinion obtaining expert an on such a 988, County, 106 Idaho guiding frame- complex issue without (1984). concept precludes courts This recog- legal standard. We also work of a purely hypo- deciding from cases which are opinion men- psychiatric on the nize that a advisory. thetical or criminal tal of a defendant a condition very by their na- long Declaratory judgments forged by process a of interac- is case purely hypo- defense, ride a line between ture fine expert and the tion between the actually questions and or academic process that will not thetical the result of and that justiciable relief; Many may right cases. courts have noted it tive relate to a that justiciability suscepti- that test of is not only yet has either been breached or is formulation, any ble of mechanistic but dispute or a status undisturbed but grappled according must be with to the but, endangered; or in either threatened specific facts of each case. Harris v. Cas- event, it must involve actual and County, sia 681 P.2d 988 existing facts. (1984); Declaratory Judg- 22 Am.Jur.2d Education, Board State v. State of Court, Harris,

ments at 697. This § 210, 217, 52 P.2d adopted following language from the case, present In the there are no actual Supreme United States Court’s definition existing facts on the record. justiciability guiding as a standard in the court, record before the trial and before declaratory judgment context of actions: Court, nothing contains more than the A “controversy” in this sense must be statement of counsel that he desired to appropriate judicial one that is deter- defense, inquire viability into the of the justiciable controversy mination. A is although Rhoades had been examined distinguished thus from a difference or by psychiatrist, a opinion any no form as dispute hypothetical of a or abstract to Rhoades’s mental state could be forth- character; from one that is academic or coming provided opera- unless the court an controversy moot. The must be definite legal insanity. tive definition of concrete, touching legal relations testimony Rodriguez of Officer con- parties having legal adverse interests. cerning night Rhoades’s manner on the It must a real and substantial contro- his arrest likewise does not suffice to cre- versy admitting specific through relief justiciable controversy ate on the issue of character, a decree of a conclusive as insanity. during pre- The officer stated distinguished opinion advising from an liminary hearing night on upon hypotheti- what the law would be arrest: cal state of facts. Where there such a Paul acting Rhoades was either as if he admitting

concrete case of an immediate high narcotic, on some kind of or he legal definitive determination of the high on some kind of narcotics ... rights parties adversary pro- *7 really stability he didn’t have much ... ceeding upon alleged, judi- the facts the he helped swayed had to be to walk. He may cial function appropriately be exer- down, back and forth he sat when almost although adjudication cised the of the stupor. say a drunken Didn’t too rights litigants may require of the much, did, mumbled, and when he he as process the award of payment or the of if, it, I would take he was not in control damages. senses____ of his Haworth, Aetna Ins. Co. v. 300 U.S. Life 227, 240-41, 461, 464, 57 S.Ct. 81 L.Ed. 617 testimony Other confirms Officer Rodri- (1937) (citations omitted). guez’s impressions of Rhoades’s conduct on The same Court tion or contention based on an arise, upon cate a negative in form and effect.” templates state of “rights, provides: Declaratory Judgment [******] judgment status and other principle facts, some which the court out of which the specific as “either affirmative or pronounced adversary ques- legal Act ... con- may predi- relations” existing by this alleged the result of which was assumed trial court level of a of the defendant. such evidence alone does not rise to the evidence duct at cal establishes that Rhoades was difficulty night any showing of the the record as to abnormal con- appropriately other time. This on the drugs arrest, of the mental condition by or intoxication. The night the officers to be but there is no concluded that of his having physi- testimony arrest, “right” questioned argues or “status” The defense that show may preventa- ing might required by either remedial or that be waived invoke was 802 request Discovery Request, listing the items that it prosecution on the defense discovery re- expert provided pursuant of a at state

appointment psychiatric had Supreme including, County expense. quest, Bingham The United States “[a]ll 68, Court, Oklahoma, City reports” in Ake v. rela- Blackfoot Police and/or (1985), 84 held 105 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 53 tive to the Baldwin case. constitutionally the defendant enti- is to the Part of the materials submitted ex- psychiatric tled to assistance at state supplemen- exchange defense was a pense preliminary showing once a has been by of tary police report Detective Newbold that the of the de- made mental condition de- Department, the Blackfoot Police which likely to in the case. fendant is be an issue the confession of Kevin Buckholz tailed urges acqui- counsel Defense Stacy had killing of Buckholz Baldwin. prosecution by escence and the court by Police Officer arrested Blackfoot appointed expert for a the motion court 14, 1987, Love on March for drunk requiring showing any preliminary without report in- disorderly conduct. brief Love’s condition, on the defendant’s mental “killed that Buckholz stated he had dicated required show- amounts to a waiver of the Later, mini he girl at the barn.” while ing disagree. on the issue. We holding tank, initiated in the Buckholz Larry with conversation Officer Christian. Justiciability question a following report filled out the of Christian jurisdiction of the the matter at court over the conversation: State, v. P.2d 716 issue. Baird 574 (Utah 1978); Bur. in the prisoner holding Mountain Farm tank started West [A] Ins., (Kevin Buckholt) P.2d 706 talking Mut. Ins. v. Hallmark 561 to me said [sic] put (Wyo.1977). problems It is that a lack “had needed to axiomatic he jurisdiction may cured means cause he function away not be couldn’t world,” parties. Bowl he to tell stipulation regular proceeded waiver then Bowlden, girl 794 P.2d I v. 118 Idaho me he shot a the back. den twice (1990); girl he Marty, said “You know White v. said what (1975), other mini P.2d 270 overruled on from the barn.” I then asked one fire, he “I grounds by Magistrate many you Carr shots did said how times, Dish, I hit her First know I shot several Judicial don’t Therefore, him this defense in the twice.” I then asked back ... “a gun must be kind he and he said argument rejected. what used think____” a I then said no mm ‘38’ ‘9’ determination uphold We the trial court’s justiciable that the record does not create reported to Detec- the incident Christian controversy ruling on the is- support Newbold, who the state- summarized tive repeal insanity defense. pro- sue of the report. report ment That *8 so, Having we reach the consti- pur- done do not defense counsel for Rhoades vided to legislative repeal discovery tutional issue Black- request for suant to insanity defense. reports. foot Police report Christian’s mentions Newbold’s IV. in report report, outlines that written However, nor neither Christian’s detail. EXCULPATORY WITHHOLDING OF provided defense. report was to the Love’s EVIDENCE BY PROSECUTION prose- argues that the appeal, Rhoades On 15,1987, filed a May the defense On discovery re- compliance with the cution’s asking for discovery, request “[a]ll inadequate, in violation quest was City Po County Bingham and/or Blackfoot duty all excul- to turn over prosecutor’s materials rela reports investigative or lice to the defense. patory evidence which is Stacy homicide to the Baldwin tive measure test which to Bingham Coun have in alleged to occurred ? is the duty to evidence prosecutor’s filed disclose July prosecution ty.” On at issue. materiality of the information Defendant’s Response to Supplemental guid prosecuting attorney] couldn’t “materiality” The determination of is He [the any promises. Nobody ever the information tends to ever make ed whether They guilt, actually promise____ make it a create a reasonable doubt about did Brown, judges P.2d 880 what guarantee couldn’t State (1977), expect “obviously anyway____ of such I never did otherwise would do course, I anything hoped. value to the defense that ele out of it. Of substantial requires my position in a situa- mentary anybody fairness it to be disclosed I think hope specific request.” they’re put under even without United tion that would 97, 110, get Agurs, they States v. S.Ct. at least some favor- would 2401, 49 L.Ed.2d 342 But as far as a defi- able consideration. belief, I promise nite or a definite no. We don’t that the outcome of the believe just hope. My I did was the time. —all trial had the would have been different attorney hoped. And that’s about where police defense received the two other re- we’re at. ports. report provided Officer Newbold’s enough in- detail stimulate additional why misplaced hopes see on We fail to quiry if the defense had inclined to do been part of a would be reason to witness so. The defense had the information that grant a new trial. There is no evidence mur- there was a confession to the Baldwin any type the record that of reward was der, confessor, identity de- exchange testimony. promised for the confession, tails of the and the name of the addition, testimony Holm’s at trial would officer who heard the confession. With post differed. At the conviction have they that information could contacted have proceeding, Holm stated: Officer Christian and Kevin Buckholz to I don’t believe there would be determine whether the confession was change my testimony. As far as the pursuing. worth The defense claims that only change case I think the there itself. they had received the two additional re- would be as far as—I think would be ports prosecution they from the then would maybe under the influence. The influ- have made more of an effort to locate actually got ences. That me the cour- Buckholz. We believe that the defense know, age, guess. you just— I I I was— could have made that determination with- assured, know, I felt You I that what police reports. out the other two doing right thing. I was the And may that it in a sense was assured

V. doing I in essence that what was paying society. back a debt to JAILHOUSE INFORMANT TESTIMONY The trial court found that this situation Holm David testified at trial con fact. did not raise an issue of material We cerning conversations he had de with the agree. they fendant while were the same cell. time, At that he stated that he had not Appellant further asserts that anything exchange offered for his trial have excluded David court should Later, testimony. post at a conviction testimony altogether. argues Holm’s He hearing, Holm testified that he was dissat jailhouse inherently are informants isfied with the sentence he received in his Holm, unreliable, particular, and that *9 case, and that had he known the sentence reputation had a for untruthfulness. receive, going he was to he not have would We hold that it was not error for the trial testified at the Rhoades trial. testimony court to admit the of David change Appellant asserts that this is fact up Holm. It is to the trier of to grounds disagree. for a trial. new We credibility determine the of witnesses: post hearing, appellate may An its At the conviction when court not substitute regarding thought judgment jury he he for that of the questioned about what witnesses, exchange credibility weight the of receive for his testimo- of would testimony, infer- ny, Holm said: their or the reasonable reported be drawn evidence. the state- enees to from the Both Shires and Miller 705, Campbell, supplemental reports v. 718- filed several State ment 19, 1149, (Ct.App.1983). 1162-68 months after arrest. The statement also not recorded Officer Shaw was 263, Clay, 731 P.2d State report. his Rhoades made no further state- (Ct.App.1987), denied. review ments. Allowing grounds to testify Holm is not argues appeal on that the Rhoades this jury’s responsi- trial. It for a new was the those trial court should have excluded weigh the testimo- bility credibility to of his (1) ques- for three statements reasons: ny. evidence, reliability given of tionable that several claimed the fact officers who VI. failed to record overhear statements SUPPRESSION OF INCULPATORY reports them in their until months after the STATEMENTS arrest; (2) police tape the failure (3) statements; record the the state- Rhoades was arrested March 1987. ments were the the violation of result of being sought suspect He as a an rights. Miranda Rhoades’s investigation, Idaho murder his car when High- A Nevada was identified Nevada. point, On the the defense first McIntosh, Officer, George way Patrol process due state argues that under the to the scene two officers from drove with en requires and federal constitutions Idaho, Rodriguez Victor and Dennis Shaw. degree during guilt of reliability hanced officers, Trooper Two Nevada Neville stage prosecu capital determination of a Miller, holding Officer were Rhoades at reject argument. tion. We Shires, officer, Another ar- scene. Nevada Supreme States has The United up. rived at the scene as back Shaw testi- procedural imposed many protections for Rodriguez approached fied that as he Ohio, 438 capital cases. See Lockett v. against being Rhoades where he held 98 S.Ct. 57 L.Ed.2d 973 U.S. Miller, by Neville Rhoades the car However, go do not so these cases of, spontaneous “I did made a statement types to alter the evidence or far as of it,” being directly without addressed reliability degree a minimum establish by any questioned officer. Miller claims during is the fact evidence that admissible statement, although heard that first it have potential case. finding phase capital of a report was not included his initial prove prosecution required in a arrest. Miller did include that fact higher by any standard than the crime supplemental report filed two months later. “beyond a standard reasonable doubt” McIntosh that he did not Officer testified criminal used in other cases. Admission statement, hear the nor was it overheard governed separate by any evidence is not by Trooper Neville. capital cases. applicable only to rules being rights, read Rhoades was After his Therefore, there is to conclude no reason transported Highway to the Patrol Substa- testimony must questionable which is Wells, did not make tion in Nevada. He during guilt determination excluded Shires, en Officers statements route. credibility of phase capital of a case. The Neville, Shaw, Miller, McIntosh, and Rodri- case, in first as degree evidence murder present Shaw guez were at the station. others, is an for the trier in all issue to the a statement to the defendant made fact. if he’d earli- apprehended effect that Likewise, accept er, might still be we cannot the victims of crimes admissible, response order to be Rodriguez that in contention alive. testified tape statement, stated, custody “I made in must be did statements to that Rhoades cites police. The defense station *10 This second at the recorded it.” statement case, State, Stephan 711 P.2d report, al- Alaska part of initial was not Miller’s 1985), (Alaska holding custodial that it. though he claims to have overheard insufficient evi- found that there was tape recorded order court must be confessions support the inference in the record to process dence under the due to be admissible right asserted his to remain that Rhoades Alaska State Constitution. clause of the during the arrest and any at time silent than the represents no more That case testify that booking. McIntosh did Officer to extend the prerogative of each state reading Mi- finished Rodriguez after beyond protections its own constitution Rhoades nodded as if to indi- rights, randa constitutional parameters of federal Then McIntosh cate that he understood. adopt guarantees. We decline to Alaska’s something Rodriguez said testified that standard Idaho. hear, else, could not which McIntosh now turn to the issue of whether We shook his head. McIn- whereupon Rhoades rights by Rhoades’s Miranda were violated gesture to mean that tosh took the custody. police during his arrest and asserting right his to remain Rhoades was There is some conflict the record silent. his Mi as to whether Rhoades was read in the Those facts are the sole basis custody rights while in the of Neva randa that Rhoades did record for the contention Neville, if he Miller and or da Officers right to remain silent. There is assert his warnings the first given the Miranda to what no evidence in the record as Rodriguez Rodriguez, after time Officer responding Rhoades was to when he shook Shaw, and McIntosh arrived at the scene. strength negatively. On the his head Although support the the record does not alone, the trial court declined this evidence finding trial that the first statement court’s to infer that the shake of the head indi- preceded by Miranda Rhoades was That find- cated a desire to remain silent. warning, that factual issue does not affect erroneous, ing clearly given the abso- is not our conclusion that statements were both contrary. lute lack of evidence to properly admitted into evidence. that, warnings Miranda teaches “[o]nce statement, “I it” The first did while given, subsequent procedure have been parking Rhoades was handcuffed in the lot any If indicates in is clear. the individual apparently spontaneous. spontane- So time, manner, any prior during at or fact, according ous that to uncontested questioning, that he wishes to remain si- accounts, police Rhoades made the state- lent, interrogation must cease.” Mi- being questioned other- ment without 473-74, randa, 384 U.S. at 86 S.Ct. at 1627. by any wise addressed of the officers case, In this based on the statement, present. spontaneous As a it us, Rhoades did not assert record before was admissible whether it occurred before had, right silent. If he to remain or after Rhoades was read his Miranda comment, by the properly found Shaw’s rights. equivalent trial court to be “the functional “Any given freely statement and volun- improp interrogation,” would have been is, compelling tarily any without influences er, would not and the second statement evidence____ course, admissible Vol- requirement have been admissible. The any unteered statements of kind are not into interrogation must cease comes by the Fifth Amendment.” Mi- barred play when the accused indicates Arizona, randa v. manner that he or she does not desire to 1602, 1630, S.Ct. 16 L.Ed.2d 694 police, pres converse with the or that the Although any context the statement lacked attorney After ence of an is desired. meaningful, it the trial court cor- to make rights acknowledged by are read to jury rectly concluded that it was for the right to silence or detainee and until the decide to what Rhoades referred when he asserted, police may initiate counsel is “I the scene of the arrest. said did it” at questioning. that Rhoades was statement at the sta The record indicates second house, rights second state- response read his before the tion made to Shaw’s ment, acknowledged he under- comment, is also admissible. The trial *11 806 Although safeguards

stood them. there adequate is evidence dural in are Mathews 319, heavily Eldridge, 893, that Rhoades was influenced v. 424 96 S.Ct. U.S. 47 arrest, (1976). of the L.Ed.2d 18 narcotics at the time The three factors Officer to be weighed (1) private searching per- Shaw testified that while are: the his interests at stake; (2) interest; son, government’s engaged he Rhoades in the conversation to (3) procedures the risk that the used test alertness and found will his that he had lead to erroneous results. U.S.C.A. capacity to Const. sufficient understand what was 5, employed Amends. 14. This Court has going on around him. process this due v. Ankney, test State sum, In Rhoades had been instructed (1985). 1, 109 Idaho 704 P.2d 333 upon rights and understood his at the time First, obviously, the defendant’s interest arrest, of and there is insufficient evidence being adequate opportuni- is afforded an to indicate that he asserted right to ty present to legal and factual issues in his remain silent. For the foregoing reasons Second, defense. government’s inter- we conclude that the second statement 19-2719, est in enacting I.C. stated by response “interrogation” § made in to Shaw’s legislature, accomplish pur- is “to is subject suppression to under Mi- pose eliminating unnecessary delay of randa v. Arizona. carrying out a valid death sentence.” This legit- determined this Court to be a VII. goal Beam, 208, imate v. 115 Idaho State ACCELERATED POST CONVICTION focus, (1988). then, 766 678 The of

PROCEEDINGS present inquiry, prong our is third of test, Eldridge Mathews v. we must requires Idaho Code 19-2719 § determine whether or not I.C. 19-2719 § cases, capital post relief conviction provides adequate process prevent an to requested 42 days must be within after erroneous ensure that results and to death filed, judgment completed is within 90 sentences are not carried out so as to arbi- days Appellant that. urges after this trarily deprive a defendant of his life. Court to reconsider our decision in v. State Beam, 208, (1988), 766 requires P.2d 678 'statute the defendant to file which held that 19-2719 petition post-conviction I.C. did not vio relief for within § late rights days filing judgment the defendant’s constitutional 42 im- analysis. equal protection posing under We de sentence of death. These chal- cline do lenges judicial to so. arise proceeding out of the just point, concluded. At this counsel has Defendant also claims that 19- I.C. § closely the case involved with for process rights, 2719 violates his due which time, trial, present some at has been Beam did not address. Procedural due appro- has had notice of all issues that are process per- issues are raised whenever priate day be raised within this limit. being life, son deprived liberty, risks required All that do is counsel is governmental property interests because organize challenges all and issues that is requirement action. The that there must during appropriate arose trial and are ensure that process some the individ- appeal days. That is not within 42 arbitrarily deprived rights ual is not of his unduly The statute pro- burdensome task. the state or violation of federal constitu- adequate vides notice to the defendant of requirement tions. This met when him, exactly required what is suffi- provided defendant is with notice and an challenges opportunity cient for all to be opportunity to be heard. Armstrong addition, purpose heard. In it serves Manzo, 380 U.S. S.Ct. legislature by preventing unneces- (1965); Mullane L.Ed.2d 62 v. Central delays sary occur with so much fre- Co., Hanover Bank & Trust quency capital cases. 70 S.Ct. 94 L.Ed. 865 State, Supreme provides United us Stuart v. States (1990), P.2d 1283 court remanded a balancing proce- with a test to if determine

807 immediately trial petition post- pro for a se subsequent petition second after claim, court for an assistance to the district the raising conviction relief ineffective only evidentiary hearing. through had no omitted Stuart but claim was which facts in the second own, learned the raised had not the defendant his fault of had petition the first petition after subsequent peti- his claims and waived pursuant to I.C. 19- We held that filed. § tion not barred. was 4908, petition not barred.1 second was I.C. 19-2719 we hold that Therefore § to court hold necessary It for trial opportunity to one provides a defendant hearing if evidentiary to determine challenges to the conviction raise all rights were violated. Stuart’s constitutional petition post-conviction for in a sentence Dermitt, Stuart, cited v. In we Palmer except in unusual cases where relief those 591, (1981) P.2d for the 635 955 that the issues it can be demonstrated that, appropriate proposition under the sole reasonably not known raised were circumstances, 19-4908 did not bar I.C. § within the time could have been known not ' for re- petitions post-conviction successive legisla- the statute. The frame allowed important it is to under- point, lief. At this limit the appropriately ture fit to has seen important facts. very some stand bring to chal- time within which frame pursuant decided to the Palmer was lenges are known or which reason- which provisions 19-4908. waiver of I.C. Sub- § process ably encom- should be known. Palmer, legislature to sequent enacted providing for re- passed in I.C. 19-2719 § post- in 1984. modified I.C. 19-2719 This § Court, then by the trial court and this view in death proceedings conviction adequate present to provides opportunity 19-2719(3)requires a cases. Idaho Code § ade- raised and to have them the issues factual legal defendant “file or chal- to Therefore, 19- quately reviewed. I.C. § lenge that as the sentence or conviction pro- under due 2719 is not unconstitutional reasonably known or should be known.” analysis. cess post-conviction Idaho Code 19-2719 limits § petition unless it is demon- relief one VIII. trial judge to the satisfaction of the strated being subsequently raised issues STATEMENTS VICTIM IMPACT reasonably not should be were “known now turn to the issue known.” Ineffective assistance of counsel We rea- contained in impact is one of those claims that should be victim statement immediately upon report. sonably presentence Maryland, known com- Booth v. 2529, in a pletion 496, 107 of the trial and can be raised 96 440 L.Ed.2d S.Ct. post-conviction proceeding.2 (1987), the introduction of victim prohibits sentencing during the impact statements reading A careful Palmer reveals capital as violative of phase of a case raised an ineffective assist- the defendant Eighth Amendment to the United States corpus ance of claim in a habeas counsel Booth, there two were Constitution. post-con- petition as a petition [treated in the vic types presented information subsequent ap- direct viction relief] con type The first impact tim statement. post-conviction proceeding. peal and first description of the emotional sists of “a petition appeal and first After direct family and the by the results, trauma suffered produce de- failed to favorable of the victims.” personal characteristics appellate new counsel and fendant obtained “family mem type contains the This second brought subsequent petition. opinions characterizations had bers’ held that because defendant filed Deland, (Habeas (1988) Corpus); Bundy v. not 996 noted that Stuart was decided 1. It must be State, (Utah 1988); 100 pursuant I.C. This statute Daniels v. § 19-2719. 763 P.2d 803 State, 579, (1984); either Stuart or the State. cited Sims v. 295 688 315 Nev. 1980); (Iowa Commonwealth 420 N.W.2d Cordero, Cal.Rptr. 46 Cal.3d 249 2. In re Russell, Pa. A.2d 866 (1988) (Habeas Corpus); People v. P.2d 1370 Bean, Cal.Rptr. 760 P.2d 46 Cal.3d types crimes.” Both of information family are and friends. She stated that the because, excluded “its admission creates family Baldwin is satisfied with the out- constitutionally unacceptable risk that the come of the trial. She they related that *13 jury may impose penalty the death in an favor a death sentence in this case. arbitrary capricious Booth, manner.” mother, Taylor, victim’s Verna re- 503, 508, 482 U.S. at 107 S.Ct. at called in an emotional interview that her 2535. types Both of information are daughter’s “biggest murder was the present here. shock of her life.” She indicated that the victim siblings had seven all of case, who still present In the portion grieve at the loss of their presentence sister. She investigation report containing explained “Stacy everything did impact the victim statements is as follows: right in her life and didn’t deserve to die victim, Stacy Baldwin, Dawn who like that.” She indicated that she has to age death, was 21 at the time of her feeling Stacy’s deal with her about death employed night as a clerk at the Mini- everyday. Taylor Mrs. “I hope stated he Blackfoot, Barn Convenience Store in in burns hell for Stacy. what he did to Idaho. It was discharging while she was I’m glad fought she him.” She added “I her in capacity, duties that she was approve capital punishment.” of robbed, kidnapped and shot to death on 2/28/87. Mrs. Baldwin was married and undoubtedly This is impact a victim state- resided with Myron her husband Bald- contemplated Booth, ment of the kind win, Blackfoot, Idaho. She and her such, and as it was error for the trial court husband were active members of the to admit it. LDS Church. She was athletic and main- The next inquiry level of is to determine physical by tained her fitness exercise impact if the victim statement constitutes swimming. Myron, He husband [sic] Paz, harmless error under the State v. Stacy indicated that he and had met in (1990), exception. In high They planned school 1981. had Paz, the Court wrote: marry completed after he a Mission This interpreted decision should not be for the LDS Church. He stated that he permit fashion to condone or victim was sent on his mission to Canada in impact in capital statements cases. Vic- spent where he years. two He impact tim clearly pro- statements are April returned in and he and scribed Maryland Booth v. and State Stacy were married on 8/1/86. He indi- capital v. Charboneau. It is a rare ease cated that he still suffers emotional impact where the inclusion of a victim stress caused the senseless murder of fatally statement will not flaw the entire his wife. He stated that he wants the sentencing procedure. given maximum sentence to the man who Paz, 118 Idaho at 798 P.2d at 17. Stacy. killed He added that he believes apply in the death The test to sentence. Mr. Baldwin fur- to determine if the use ther “I of such indicated don’t want him to ever statements was harmless is wheth- anyone have the chance to do er this to this Court is assured that “it was harm- else.” Mr. Baldwin beyond indicated that on the less Chap- reasonable doubt.” night killed, 18, 24, she was abducted and California, he man v. stayed should have 824, 828, with her at the Mini- S.Ct. 17 L.Ed.2d 705 usually Friday Here, Barn as he did on nights, family three members the victim’s he had ill but with influenza and explicitly commented. All three said that she told him she would be OK and for they favored the death in this case. stay him to home. The victim’s husband stated that “he wants Baldwin, given Evelyn Myron’s the maximum sentence to the man mother indi- Stacy,” cated that for who killed and “that he Stacy several months after believes killed, out,” Myron the death sentence.” The “Shut the world victim’s mother- tempered pain family but time has said that the some- in-law Baldwin favors again socializing what and he is with a death sentence this case. The victim’s case, we record in this reviewing for stated, hope in hell “I he burns mother doubt beyond a reasonable fought convinced glad I’m she are Stacy. he did to what him____ in the impact statements that the victim capital punishment.” approve I report, describ- investigation presentence if from the record cannot determine We their rec- victim and ing family these or relied on judge the trial considered sentence, did not influence ommendation sentence. imposing the death statements imposition in its of sentence. the trial court court allowed the victim the trial Since harmless, and the therefore The error was for considera- impact statements to be filed sentencing. be remanded case need not tion, that he did consider we must assume *14 them. IX. impact statements In that the victim the court were considered presented to DEATH PENALTY THE WHETHER Maryland, under the rule of Booth v. error IMPOSED WAS PROPERLY 496, 107 2529, 96 L.Ed.2d 440 482 U.S. S.Ct. that the trial Appellant asserts Charboneau, 116 Idaho (1987), v. and State consider alterna adequately failed to court (1989), 129, must consider P.2d 299 we 774 v. penalty. death State tives to the requires if error reversal. this (1989), 285, Leavitt, 775 P.2d 599 116 Idaho Court, Paz, This State v. the imposition the this Court reversed (1990), 542, relying Chap- on 798 P.2d remanded, because: penalty death California, 386 87 S.Ct. man v. U.S. adequate give failed to trial court [T]he (1967), 17 L.Ed.2d 705 and Satterwkite of the alternatives which consideration Texas, S.Ct. poles of ‘reha exist the distant between (1988), impact L.Ed.2d 284 held that victim probation,’ or the possible bilitation and presentence included in the re- statements penalty. Clearly, alternatives death could, appropriate under port while error sentencing are available to a were and circumstances, be harmless error. court, a fixed life sentence. such as carefully The trial court in this case at Leavitt, Idaho at 775 P.2d 608. evidence, including aggravat- weighed the specify did not what The Court Leavitt ing mitigating There is no factors. “adequate consideration constitutes impact the state- indication that victim alternatives,” exactly the trial what pri- diverted the trial court from its ments say to show that the court have to would considering person mary function of the adequately considered. alternatives were being the or the sentenced and not victim Here, Findings of the Court Con- the family. victim’s Penalty the trial court did sidering Death penal- alternatives to the death not discuss Obviously, the trial court does not make However, findings those were ty. after By judge in a time a decisions vacuum. the issued, parties allowed to file the were sentence, upon the is called to decide on a hearing evidentiary response briefs testimony judge has heard the and evidence raised the issue of alter- and the defendant trial, put impact of the on at has seen the penalty required as natives to the death family crimes on the victim’s and communi- The trial court then addressed Leavitt. ty, closely with the and has been involved Memorandum Supplement in the case, years. the sometimes for It details of He stated: Decision and Order. findings trial is evident from the objec- the carefully considered The court court that the nature of this crime statements, sentencing expressly finds if impact victim tives such that the possible is all, any rehabilitation that is not a they considered at were were pro- outweighed by the need to heavily impose in the decision to decisive factor of murder society, tect deter the crime The facts recited penalty. death for punish and obtain retribution facts that and to passing sentence are court wrong The court con- committed. judge to the trial have been known would death, and penalties less than impact sidered the victim statements. without found, imposi- singularly determines that in this case the collectively, both against each of penalty statutory aggravat- tion of the death would not ing factors. unjust imposition any but seriously depreci- other sentence would statement, plus This the extensive sec- ate the seriousness of the crime commit- detailing mitigating tions factors and ted. If situation ever warranted the circumstances, aggravating is sufficient penalty, clearly death it is manifest completed show that the trial court this case. weighing process satisfactorily. It would repetitive be tedious and for the court to We hold that this is sufficient to indicate mitigating state each factor over and over that the trial court did consider alternatives aggravating five circumstances against death and decided to, case, enough It is in this found. as imposing contemplating them after setting mitigat- have one section forth all unique circumstances of this case. ing setting factors and one section forth all argues Defendant next that he is aggravating circumstances. presentence report entitled to a new and a As for the defendant’s claim that *15 sentencing hearing new in order to have engaged impermissible specu- trial court in opportunity present mitigating the to new overemphasized aggravating lation and circumstances, attesting such as witnesses factors, appellant specific examples cites no cooperation prisoner. to his as a findWe brief, says only in his but that “certain support no argument. for this predisposed negative comments indicate a In his Petition for Post Conviction attitude towards the defendant.” We find Relief, argued defendant the that trial argument. no merit in this weigh mitigating court did not the circum presented by final issue the against aggravating stances each circum concerning imposition defendant the of the Leavitt, State v. required by stance as 116 improperly death is that he was 285, (1989), and State v. 775 P.2d 599 judge jury input. sentenced without Charboneau, 129, 116 Idaho 774 P.2d 299 This Court has held “that there is no feder (1989). Charboneau set out the require requirement partic jury al constitutional of ment: sentencing ipation process the and that [Tjhat mitigating all the circumstances jury participation the decision to have presented weighed against must be each sentencing process, the as contrasted with aggravating of sepa- the circumstances judicial sentencing, discretion is within the rately. may We hold that the trial court policy the determination of individual death, only sentence the defendant to if Creech, 362, State states.” mitigat- the trial court that all the finds denied, 373, 463, (1983), cert. 670 P.2d 474 ing outweigh circumstances do not 1051, 1327, L.Ed.2d 465 U.S. 104 S.Ct. 79 gravity aggravating of each of the cir- addition, the United States 722 imposition and make cumstances found Missis Supreme Court held Clemons v. unjust. of death 738, 745, sippi, S.Ct. Charboneau, 116 Idaho at 774 P.2d at (1990), “[a]ny L.Ed.2d 725 that 323. argument requires the Constitution Here, the trial court set forth four and a or jury impose the sentence of death that a pages mitigating circumstances in half imposi findings prerequisite to make the Findings Considering soundly tion of such a sentence has been Penalty. the Death He was well aware of prior of this Court.” rejected by decisions — Leavitt and Charbo- requirement Arizona, U.S.-, In Walton v. neau and stated: (1990), the Unit- 111 L.Ed.2d 511 S.Ct. Ari- Supreme Court held that weighing process,

In the the court care- ed States Idaho’s, which, provides “stacking” like “duplicating” or zona’s statute fully avoids sentencing judge capital cases is aggravating by a statutory factors and for mitigating unconstitutional. weighs every each and factor not may defendant undisputed that the It X. existing ex- any required to disclose TO EXPERT DEFENSE COMPELLING he intends to use at trial. pert’s report A REPORT OR PREPARE WRITTEN However, say rule does not BEFORE TO BE INTERVIEWED report required make a expert to can be TESTIFYING opposing party. request at the no claims that written Defense counsel hired a The defendant ballistics or requested, received reports have been evi expert hair to examine State’s rule language The clear written. pro expert prepare or dence. The did not re- court to not the trial does authorize reports to the defense. written vide experts prepare to quire the defendant’s prosecutor sought an order from they when reports the State written “provide the the defense to requiring court prepared for the defen- have not been copies reports of examina State with dant. experts ... tions conducted the defense tri Hutchinson, intends to call at whom the defendant 111 Wash.2d at al,” prose alternative to allow the or in the at 450. if experts; cutor to “interview the defense However, this do not believe that we not, yet pre reports or have not are prejudice to the defen- resulted error objected The defense pared____” Hutchinson, case differs from dant. This that the

procedure. The trial court ruled here, anticipate the defense did because provide report expert must either a written having prepare report, told expert but prosecutor prosecutor allow prosecutor that it be avail- would 16(c)(2) pursuant Rule him interview *16 prose- until a week before trial. The able Rules, provides: which the Idaho Criminal this would not be cutor was concerned that Upon request prosecuting the written of to enough in which to use the evidence time the attorney, permit the defendant shall managing the trial prepare for trial. inspect photograph or copy State to court set a deadline for the procedure, the reports physical men- or of or results expert report, the which was production of or tal examinations and of scientific tests authority. within experiments made the in connection with case, thereof, particular copies or within XI. possession or defen- control dant, to in- which defendant intends OF FOR DENIAL MOTION trial, troduce in evidence at the or which CONTINUANCE prepared were a witness whom call planned The defendant to trial intends to call at defendant witness, Fox, expert to an Mr. counter reports results relate to when the or He evidence. was unable State’s ballistic testimony of witness. prior The to attend to commitments. due 16(c)(2) clearly al- Idaho Criminal Rule continuance, a motion for a defense filed reports to that the defendant lows access The defense which the court denied. trial or were intends to introduce at trial arrangements made with then alternative the defendant prepared by a witness whom Stuart, findings expert, Ned whose another However, in intends call at trial. order- as Fox’s conclu covered the same area ing expert prepare report a defense trial, During the of the one sions. course counsel, an inter- opposing or to submit to care Mr. commitments was taken Fox’s counsel, by opposing the court over- view of, testify. he Defen available of the The stepped the boundaries rule. Fox, he called dant contends that had an Supreme interpreted Court Washington then have called Stuart. State would rule, discovery analogous criminal State Hutchinson, Rhoades that it was abuse 766 asserts Wash.2d v. deny the court to (1989), situa- discretion for the trial which involved similar it resulted for continuance because They held motion that: tion. prejudice cases, new, to the We defendant. dis- set forth more definitive agree. concerning sentencing rules where the penalty sought death imposed. to be grant A decision deny or a motion for purpose The codify of this bill is to into continuance is vested the sound discre present requirements Idaho law these im- tion of the trial court. v. State Richard posed on the states these most recent son, (1973), 511 P.2d 263 cert. Supreme United States Court decisions denied, 94 S.Ct. capital punishment on so we will (1974). Here, L.Ed.2d 117 the defendant expression conform with this latest has not shown that the trial court abused the law. by denying its discretion the continuance. proportionality, There is no mention of purpose expert witness’s testi any expression by legislature that we mony was to counter the State’s ballistics required proportionality are to review the evidence. This was done. We do not find special of sentences with a standard or prejudice resulting to the defendant in an requirement test. The that the death sen- testimony unfair trial as a result of the disproportionate tence not penal- to “the being given by expert op one witness as ty imposed cases,” in similar is one of posed to another. several considerations this Court must ex- penalty amine each death case. The XII. legislature did not see fit to establish a PROPORTIONALITY separate standard for proportionality re- 19-2827(c)(3) Idaho Code re view of sentences when § I.C. 19-2827 was § quires this Court to capi determine each enacted. case, tal “whether the sentence of death is This proportionality Court looked at the disproportionate penalty excessive or to the Creech, of death sentences in State cases,

imposed considering in similar both (1983), 670 P.2d 463 and re- the crime and the defendant.” viewed several cases which the death imposed had perusal been or could have legislative history Our re- imposed. compared garding proportionality of sentences *17 facts of the crimes with the facts of the guidance. does not offer much The State- they reviewing case were to Purpose determine ment of and the committee min- dispropor- whether or not the sentence was eventually passed utes for the bill that was procedure tionate. This is the that has expressed and codified as I.C. 19-2827 § this followed Court. We must do only a concern that the Idaho statute be likewise. updated ruling by to reflect recent Supreme

United States Court: case, In this Paul Ezra Rhoades kid- napped Stacy Baldwin from the conve- STATEMENT OF PURPOSE working, nience store where she was pickup forced her into a truck and drove Only years ago, fewa the United States attempted her to a secluded he area where Supreme Court made new “rules” con- to attack her. The trial court found that cerning imposition penalty of the death back, fought Baldwin and: for serious crimes. So that we con- Supreme [Fjinally formed with this U.S. as she hands Court was on and knees Constitution, interpretation trying get away, of the federal he shot at her with Legislature pistol. the Idaho enacted in 1973 The shots her first missed present glancing our death Sections 18- and made marks in the snow. 18-4004, Then, Finally 4003 and Idaho Code. his shots hit her. One ricochet- year, Supreme ing lodged last in her United States bullet elbow and one again changed relating through the rules bullet went her back and states, capital punishment through lungs. many her The tread on the —after Idaho, response imprint like as he had acted to its soles of his boots left their Court, previous Stacy, but then he left decision. five walked towards

813 were companion cases which citing to lived for she still alive. She while referring one and proportional, one and half hours facially about to one not at all in the cold. Windsor; then died alone v. Fetterly and State v. State Scroggins; v. Beam and State crime and this defen- v. considering In this State dant, and sim- compared to similar crimes and State v. Sivak. Bainbridge v. State defendants,3 case and the record in this ilar v. Also, my dissent in upon revisiting State findings and conclusions the district court’s is seen as another case which Major, it sentence, we hold that imposing citing. from As to refrain majority should dispro- sentence is not excessive death Beam, cases, Fetterly, and companion portionate. execution; Windsor, awaiting are Sivak suffer Bainbridge will not Scroggins, and XIII. readily enlightenment is fate. Further CONCLUSION 236, 766 115 Idaho at Fetterly, available reviewing the record independently After enlightening are more at 706. Even P.2d describing transcript the character sentencing Kar- at court’s remarks the trial defendant, nature of the crime executed, at 110 Idaho la Windsor convicted, circum- he which has been 1197-99, under 425-27, 716 P.2d at has been stances of the crime of which he Argu- “Findings of Facts and heading of convicted, that there existed we hold Mitigation,” and ment Found in Possible imposing pen- adequate the death basis imposition death concluding with the of the alty. sentence, sen- plus the remainder of the im- judgment entered sentence B Appendix tencing remarks set out Upon of the posed are affirmed. issuance 444, at P.2d at “Sentencing,” 110 Idaho remittitur, a new the district court shall set sentencing For the views 1216. 19-2719(11). execution date. I.C. § following Supreme opin- Court’s judge the sentence of death ion which vacated BAKES, J., WINMILL, Pro C.J. resentencing, I see Part remanded for Tem, concur. 232-33, 115 Idaho Fetterly, v. at of State Justice, BISTLINE, concurring in the at 766 P.2d 702-03. concurring to Part specially result and as XII. sum, Justice it is submitted that first opinion for the Court is a McDevitt’s generally in

Concurring most Ad step in a better direction. hoc assess- opinion, question propriety I do Court’s (1984); Pizzuto, State v. P.2d 293 Idaho 810 P.2d 680 107 Idaho 3. State (1984); McKinney, Enno, 687 P.2d 570 (1991); State v. Paradis, *18 P.2d 31 106 Idaho 676 320, State v. (1983), Sivak, (1991); v. 119 Idaho 806 610 State 1220, denied, S.Ct. cert. 468 U.S. 104 542, Paz, (1990); 798 P.2d 413 State v. 118 Idaho Gibson, 3592, (1984); v. 82 L.Ed.2d 888 State Smith, 891, (1990); 1 v. 117 Idaho P.2d State denied, 54, (1983), P.2d 33 cert. 106 Idaho 675 (1990); Lankford, State 116 P.2d 916 v. 792 1220, 3592, 888 S.Ct. 82 L.Ed.2d 468 U.S. 104 860, 197, stay granted, U.S. P.2d 490 Idaho 781 Sivak, 900, (1984); Idaho 674 P.2d State v. 105 2058, (1989); 1061, 109 S.Ct. 104 L.Ed.2d 623 1220, denied, (1983), U.S. 104 S.Ct. 468 396 3591, cert. Charboneau, 129, 116 774 P.2d v. Idaho State Creech, (1984); State v. 82 L.Ed.2d 887 1125, State, (1989); McKinney v. Idaho 115 299 362, (1983); v. P.2d 463 State 105 Idaho 670 (1989); Fetterly, Ida State v. 115 772 P.2d 1219 4, (1983); v. Major, P.2d 703 State 105 Idaho 665 231, (1988); Scroggins, v. ho 766 P.2d 701 State 493, 1336, Mitchell, cert. 104 Idaho 660 P.2d 380, (1985), de P.2d 1152 cert. 110 Idaho 716 934, 2101, denied, 77 L.Ed.2d 461 103 S.Ct. U.S. 989, 582, nied, 585 107 S.Ct. 93 L.Ed.2d 479 U.S. 917, Carter, (1983); 103 655 v. Idaho 308 State 410, Windsor, (1986); 716 110 Idaho State v. 391, Olin, (1981); Idaho 434 State v. 103 P.2d denied, 964, (1985), 107 U.S. P.2d 1182 cert. 479 Osborn, (1982); 102 Idaho 203 State v. 648 P.2d 463, (1986); Fetter 408 State v. S.Ct. 93 L.Ed.2d 405, (1981); Griffiths, v. 101 State 631 P.2d 187 766, (1985), cert. ly, Padilla, 710 P.2d 1202 163, 109 Idaho (1980); State v. 610 P.2d 522 Idaho denied, 870, 239, 713, (1980); 107 S.Ct. 93 L.Ed.2d 479 U.S. v. P.2d 286 State Idaho 620 101 616, Beam, (1986); 341, (1979); 710 Fuchs, 109 Idaho 164 State v. 227 State P.2d 100 Idaho 597 163, Stuart, 883, (1979); (1985); Needs, v. 110 Idaho P.2d 526 State 591 P.2d 130 v. 99 Idaho 766, (1985); Bainbridge, 101 Lindquist, 108 State v. v. 589 715 P.2d 833 State 273, (1985); (1979). Aragon, State v. Idaho 698 P.2d 335 814 JOHNSON, capital right Justice,

ments of a concurring murderer’s to live and specially. confinement, concurring perpetual or be executed prior (literally, should eschew all notions parts opin- I in all of concur the Court’s figuratively) proportionality, of in ion, part except (Proportionality), XII has, citation, by which this Court al- rote specially. which I concur McDevitt, indulge. lowed itself to Justice legislature The has directed us to deter- opinion, correctly close of at the ob- “[wjhether mine the sentence of death is Shepard authoring serves that Justice disproportionate penalty excessive or to the opinion,4 the 1983 Creech reviewed several cases, imposed considering in similar both penalty death cases which in time were the crime and the defendant.” 19- I.C. § subsequent to the legislative 1977 amend- 2827(c)(3). legislature copied pro- this of sentencing provi- ment Idaho’s death sentencing vision from death scheme Shepard sions. Justice cited found and to Georgia following enacted in the decision Creech, Lindquist, Needs, and Osborn.5 Supreme of the States United Court Georgia, 238, The 1979 Creech case was distinct from the 408 Furman v. U.S. 92 S.Ct. 2726, case, 33 346 Ann. Shepard L.Ed.2d Ga.Code 1983 Creech and Justice de- 17-10-35(c)(3) (1982). imposi- § tailed the salient to facts which led sentences, tion of death and concluded that Harris, 42-43, 37, Pulley v. Creech’s murder of Dale was on a Jensen 871, 875-76, 29, 104 79 35-36 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d par by with murders committed Os- (1984), Supreme Court differentiated Needs, born, Lindquist. The recitation between proportionality traditional cases having 19-2827(c)(3) which he as proportionality stated to which I.C. § refers: unnecessary.6 reviewed Traditionally, “proportionality” has been high comply It is also time to with our used reference to an with abstract evalu- Idaho put Constitution and the awesome the appropriateness ation of sen- of life decision or death back in the hands particular Looking tence for a crime. tried jurors. of twelve and true It was gravity of the offense and the severi- prior adoption ever thus Idaho ty penalty, imposed to sentences years ago, Just Justice Constitution. three crimes, prac- sentencing for other and to Johnson, 247, v. Idaho Young, Steed jurisdictions, tices in other has 717, (1988), 766 P.2d cited occasionally punishments struck as down Hollingsworth, Christensen disproportionate, inherently and there- (1898), proposition P. for the unusual, imposed fore cruel when that, “art. simply 7 of our Constitution § particular category for a crime or right jury secures the trial it existed ‘as penalty The death all crime. is not in adoption date of the at the of the Constitu- disproportionate in this penalty cases a ” Justice Huntley tion.’ has stated the sense. same, and added that in the context of a proportionality sought review capital jury case the at the time of state- Harris, required by Appeals, the Court of power hood had to decide between the stat- provided numerous state death, imprisonment, life utes of a different sort. This sort of *19 degree the of murder declared the ver- proportionality presumes the review that along His perpetuated,

dict. views are disproportionate death is not sentence own, Creech, my 105 Idaho with State v. in the It the crime traditional sense. 375-412, inquire purports at 670 P.2d at instead whether 476-513. Osborn, Creech, 374, (1979); 362, 102 4. State v. 105 Idaho 670 P.2d 591 P.2d 130 State v. 405, 463, (1981). 631 P.2d 187 475 Idaho Creech, 779, lengthy recitation of the cases in Justice 5. State v. 99 Idaho P.2d 114 6.The 589 2, 766, (1979); Shepard’s opinion Lindquist, will be found in footnote State v. 99 Idaho 589 375, Needs, 883, (1979); 101 Idaho Idaho at 670 P.2d at 476. State v. 99 105

815 disproportionate pen- to the “excessive and penalty unacceptable is nonetheless cases, considering imposed in similar particular disproportionate alty case because imposed con- the defendant.” 110 punishment to the on others both the crime and 387, 1159. The Court victed of the same crime. at 716 P.2d at Idaho said: omitted). (Citations and footnotes considered the painstakingly haveWe Pulley, Supreme In ruled that Court record, doing, and in so have focused man- statutory proportionality review only crime and the circumstances on the 19- by dated statutes such as I.C. § surrounding commission but on the its 2827(c)(3) required by eighth is not characteristics, age, criminal record and Kemp, In McCleskey amendment. Id. v. personal of this defendant. involvement 279, 306, 1756, 1775, 95 107 S.Ct. that the death sen- We must conclude 262, (1987), Supreme Court L.Ed.2d imposed in tence should not have been proportional- statutory

reaffirmed that this light following this case because constitutionally required ity review is not considerations, ap- the death sentence as procedures adequate- statutory “where the plied to this defendant was excessive. ly channel the sentencer’s discretion.” original). (emphasis in Id. Recently, District United States Among by discussed the considerations for the District of Idaho noted that Court Scroggins Scroggins the Court in were that proportionality review is not constitutional- history did not have a of violent criminal ly required Pulley McCleskey but that conduct, proportionality age only his mental 13.8 “make clear that review that may implemented by years, psy- considered and under tremendous that he was safeguard against chological pressure, states as an additional and that he had failed arbitrarily imposed death sentences.” develop responses mature to stressful Paskett, 958, F.Supp. 388, Beam v. 960 situations. 110 Idaho at 716 P.2d at 1990) (D.Idaho (emphasis original). 1160.

Therefore, 410, I conclude that the review Windsor, In 110 Idaho 420- State v. required by 19-2827(c)(3) entirely I.C. is 1182, 1192-94(1985),the § 716 P.2d Court governed by statutory intent of the said: legislature by any and not constitutional penalty imposed Whenever the death is statutory considerations. This intent is re- required is to conduct an inde- Court provisions the other 19-

vealed of I.C. § pendent review of the record to insure apply- 2827 and decisions of this Court the crime and the ... that when both ing the statute. considered, defendant are a sentence of disproportion- death is not excessive or 19-2827(g) provides I.C. that the Court § ate. After careful consideration both preserve “shall collect and the records of defendant, the crime and the we conclude penalty all cases which the of death was imposed of death that the sentence imposed including year from and 1975.” dispropor- excessive and Creech, this case was In 375 n. State aside the (1983), tionate. We therefore set 670 P.2d 476 n. 2 the Court 19-2827(c)(3) together sentence and remand for resen- (g) death read I.C. § tencing. requiring comparison capital “as present.” from to the cases sentenc- concept of individualized 19-2827(a)provides that this Court I.C. § ing firmly entrenched in modern Amer- a death sentence “on

must review maxim jurisprudence. ican The familiar Scroggins, the record.” State v. fit the crime has punishment should 380, 387, (1985), 716 P.2d punish- provide 19-2827(a) been broadened construed I.C. § fit the criminal. With ment should also (c)(3) require independent together to “an *20 mind, focus to this in we now turn our of the sentence on the record.” review individual, outlining as an the defendant the Court concluded that Scroggins, background in in those factors Windsor’s imposed of death that case was sentence The in and character which convince us that trial court described the defendant findings in in this case court in death was this in- excessive considering penalty: the death begin by noting that stance. We Wind- defendant, Caucasian, male was sor, The capital majority unlike the defen- 18,1957. January He is unmarried. born dants, has no formal criminal record nor par- with Until incarcerated he lived his significant history prior criminal activ- ents____ relationship He has a close ity. history is no of violent crimi- There parents, with his two brothers and two nal activity, nor there an indication sisters. possesses any propensity that Windsor Falls, in and raised Idaho He was born toward violence. school, grade He liked but he had Idaho. omitted). (Citation junior high other in and senior interests dropped he out of in The school and school then reviewed other circum- grade. attempted He to enlist in 9th personally, including stances of Windsor forces, rejected the armed was be- but abilities, education, her her skills and her physical problems caused cause experience training, and her troubled child- polio during early his He childhood. problems hood and serious in her home years age, to work ... at 16 but went 422-23, environment. Idaho at in was involved an industrial accident P.2d at 1194-95. tips fingers and of his were cut off. The crime in this trial court described the healed, fingers When his defendant findings in in case of the court consid- with his uncle and his went work ering penalty: the death dry- father and later his brother The wall defen- construction business. The Defendant Paul Ezra Rhoades ... excellent crafts- dant is considered an loitering around conve- observed man. and nience stores Blackfoot his interests The defendant describes watching employ- Falls the female and fishing boating reading as and and “fan- 28, 1987, February ees. On defen- tasy” novels. dant entered convenience [a store] The defendant denies serious rela- Blackfoot, nearby Idaho. as He worked women, tionships ties with or romantic store, drywaller frequented the a and but although he has numerous female evening, only he a stayed on this short His him as friends. mother describes time then left. responsible easy going and a non- midnight gun- he Near returned and at person violent that does hold clerk, point the till and forced robbed looking out grudge and who “never went Baldwin, Stacy age Dawn into his points She out that chil- trouble.” spot pickup and drove her to a secluded him and was a dren liked that he “father just near River off Rose Road the Snake neighborhood image to children” in the attempted Bingham County. He babysat. and those he back, her, fought finally attack she polio The defendant suffered with at trying hands knees as she was on age spent about 4 and considerable time his get away, pistol. he shot her with at illness [hospital]. necessitated her and The first shots missed made many operations on feet that he have his glancing Finally marks the snow. pain and as a and suffered considerable ricocheting shots hit her. bullet result, One is not well coordi- the defendant lodged one bullet in her elbow and went nated. through lungs. her

through her back and lady His aunts and friends describe being very compassionate on the soles of his boots left tread as defendant Stacy, person responsible he and trust- imprint their as walked toward who worthy. still he left while she was alive. but then “being him as for about 1 to hours and friend ... describes She lived One IV2 listen her big can her brother” who then alone the cold. died *21 presence (death and in whose penalty she feels comfort- im- Fetterly 6. State v. posed) able. (fixed im- Bainbridge

7. State life v. posed) He admits that he has abused alcohol (death 8. im- penalty State v. Paradis drugs. and posed) presentence investigation report indi- (death penalty 9. State Sivak im- v. prior cates that Rhoades had a criminal posed; procedural vacated on resisting record that included offenses of grounds; resentencing) remanded for officer, theft, obstructing petit inat- penalty imposed The death by driving, driving tentive suspended, while upheld by trial court and this Court in the against nature, rape, infamous crime kid- majority of these cases. On the murder, basis napping, degree first use of fire- comparison of this these case in which the felony, arm the commission of a second crime was similar to the murder in this degree murder and robbery. case, I find death imposed sentence on by 19-2827(c)(3) As directed I.C. § case Rhoades this not to be or excessive it, this decisions of I interpreting disproportionate. have reviewed im- sentence death The cases I find most similar to one this posed on compared Rhoades this case so far as the defendant is are: concerned penalty imposed in similar cases in (death penalty 1. State v. Pizutto im- which the imposed sentence was posed) later, considering both the crime defendant, to determine whether Rhoades’ (fixed 2. State Searcy imposed) v. life disproportionate. sentence is excessive or (fixed 3. State v. life imposed) Smith reference, For ease of I append summary (death 4. penalty State v. Beam im- compared. the cases I have posed) The cases I find most similar to this one (death Aragon 5. State im- penalty v. so far as the crime is concerned are: posed) (death

1. State v. Pizzuto im- penalty penalty imposed death posed) upheld trial court this Court in a (fixed Searcy 2. State v. imposed) life majority of these cases. On the basis of comparison of these cases in which the (death 3. State v. im- penalty Lankford circumstances of the defendant most were posed) Rhoades, similar to the circumstances of I (fixed 4. imposed) State v. life Smith imposed find death on sentence (death 5. State McKinney Rhoades not or dispropor- excessive imposed) tionate.

Case Details

Case Name: State v. Rhoades
Court Name: Idaho Supreme Court
Date Published: Sep 12, 1991
Citation: 820 P.2d 665
Docket Number: 17521, 18285
Court Abbreviation: Idaho
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