STATE OF OHIO, Plaintiff-Appellee, - v - WALTER E. REYES, Defendant-Appellant.
CASE NO. 2021-P-0014
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO ELEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT PORTAGE COUNTY
September 30, 2021
[Cite as State v. Reyes, 2021-Ohio-3478.]
Criminal Appeal from the Court of Common Pleas, Trial Court No. 2009 CR 00623
Decided: September 30, 2021
Judgment: Affirmed
Victor V. Vigluicci, Portage County Prosecutor, and Pamela J. Holder, Assistant Prosecutor, 241 South Chestnut Street, Ravenna, OH 44266 (For Plaintiff-Appellee).
Walter E. Reyes, pro se, PID# A590-238, Richland Correctional Institution, 1001 Olivesburg Road, P.O. Box 8107, Mansfield, OH 44905 (Defendant-Appellant).
THOMAS R. WRIGHT, J.
{1} Appellant, Walter E. Reyes, appeals the trial court‘s judgment entry denying his “motion to vacate classification” without a hearing. We affirm.
{2} In June 2010, Reyes pleaded guilty to four counts of rape, which had occurred between October 1, 2006, and January 1, 2007, and a subsequent count of violating a protection order. The trial court sentenced Reyes on July 8, 2010, to an aggregate 30-year prison term and classified him a Tier III Sex Offender.
{4} The matter now before us is the trial court‘s denial of Reyes’ motion to vacate his Tier III Sex Offender classification, from which Reyes advances one assignment of error:
The trial court abused its discretion by failing to vacate the void Tier III classification, which violates Section 28, Article II of the Ohio Constitution, which prohibits the General Assembly from enacting retroactive laws.
{5} In his motion, Reyes argued that the trial court should not have classified him under Am.Sub.S.B. No. 10 (“S.B. 10“), Ohio‘s version of the Adam Walsh Act, because the rape offenses were committed prior to S.B. 10‘s effective date of January 1, 2008. Citing as authority State v. Williams, 129 Ohio St.3d 344, 2011-Ohio-3374, 952 N.E.2d 1108, Reyes argued his classification was void and sought reclassification under Megan‘s Law, the law in effect at the time of his offenses. In Williams, the Supreme Court of Ohio held that “[S.B. 10], as applied to defendants who committed sex offenses prior to its enactment, violates
{7} Void judgments may be reviewed at any time, on direct appeal or by collateral attack. State v. Walker, 11th Dist. Trumbull No. 2018-T-0024, 2018-Ohio-3964, ¶ 12. A voidable judgment, on the other hand, may be set aside only if successfully challenged on direct appeal. Id., citing State v. Payne, 114 Ohio St.3d 502, 2007-Ohio-4642, 873 N.E.2d 306, ¶ 28. Whether a sentencing entry is void or voidable raises a question of law that we review de novo. State v. Mitchell, 11th Dist. Portage No. 2019-P-0105, 2020-Ohio-3417, ¶ 43, citing State v. Clay, 2d Dist. Miami No. 2015-CA-17, 2016-Ohio-424, ¶ 5 and State v. Brown, 11th Dist. Lake No. 2017-L-038, 2017-Ohio-7963, ¶ 8 (“an appellate court‘s standard of review on the denial of a motion to vacate void judgment is de novo“).
{8} After years of expanding on the void sentence doctrine, in the cases of Harper and Henderson, the Supreme Court of Ohio returned to the “traditional understanding” of void and voidable judgments. State v. Harper, 160 Ohio St.3d 480, 2020-Ohio-2913, 159 N.E.3d 248, ¶ 4; State v. Henderson, 161 Ohio St.3d 285, 2020-Ohio-4784, 162 N.E.3d 776, ¶ 34. Pursuant to the traditional view, “[a] judgment or sentence is void only if it is rendered by a court that lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over the case or personal jurisdiction over the defendant. If the court has jurisdiction over the
{9} There is no question that this felony offense case was within the trial court‘s subject matter jurisdiction, see
{10} Reyes did not challenge his classification in a timely direct appeal, which would have been his earliest available opportunity to do so. In certain circumstances, however, a voidable judgment may be challenged via a postconviction relief petition. “Any person who has been convicted of a criminal offense * * * and who claims that there was such a denial or infringement of the person‘s rights as to render the judgment void or voidable under the Ohio Constitution or the Constitution of the United States” may file a postconviction relief petition, “stating the grounds for relief relied upon, and asking the court to vacate or set aside the judgment or sentence or to grant other appropriate relief[.]”
{11} “A motion can be construed as one for postconviction relief where it ‘was filed subsequent to a direct appeal, claimed a denial of a constitutional right, sought to render a judgment void, and asked for the vacation of the judgment and sentence.‘” State v. Garner, 11th Dist. Lake No. 2018-L-057, 2018-Ohio-4661, ¶ 11, quoting State v. Perry, 11th Dist. Trumbull No. 2016-T-0005, 2016-Ohio-7446, ¶ 16; State v. Schlee, 117 Ohio St.3d 153, 2008-Ohio-545, 882 N.E.2d 431, ¶ 12 (“Courts may recast irregular motions into whatever category necessary to identify and establish the criteria by which the motion should be judged.“). Reyes’ motion to vacate his classification substantively falls within
{12} We review the trial court‘s denial of a postconviction relief petition without a hearing for an abuse of discretion. State v. Miller, 11th Dist. Lake No. 2019-L-084, 2020-Ohio-3329, ¶ 8-10, citing State v. Gondor, 112 Ohio St.3d 377, 2006-Ohio-6679, 860 N.E.2d 77, ¶ 51-52, citing State v. Calhoun, 86 Ohio St.3d 279, 714 N.E.2d 905 (1999).
{13} “If no appeal is taken, * * * the petition shall be filed no later than three hundred sixty-five days after the expiration of the time for filing the appeal.”
(a) Either the petitioner shows that the petitioner was unavoidably prevented from discovery of the facts upon which the petitioner must rely to present the claim for relief, or, subsequent to the period prescribed in division (A)(2) of section 2953.21 of the Revised Code or to the filing of an earlier petition, the United States Supreme Court recognized a new federal or state right that applies retroactively to persons in the petitioner‘s situation, and the petition asserts a claim based on that right.
(b) The petitioner shows by clear and convincing evidence that, but for constitutional error at trial, no reasonable factfinder would have found the petitioner guilty of the offense of which the petitioner was convicted * * *
{15} Reyes’ classification was not void; his motion, construed as a postconviction relief petition, was untimely; and he has not established the statutory conditions for the trial court to consider a second petition. On this basis alone, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion without a hearing. See State v. VanPelt, 11th Dist. Portage No. 2014-P-0058, 2015-Ohio-1070, ¶ 17 (“When dismissing a petition upon the grounds that it was untimely, the trial court is under no obligation to hold a hearing or to issue findings of fact and conclusions of law.” (Citations omitted.)).
{16} Moreover, under the doctrine of res judicata, “a defendant who was represented by counsel is barred from raising an issue in a petition for postconviction relief if the defendant raised or could have raised the issue at trial or on direct appeal.” State v. Adams, 11th Dist. Trumbull No. 2003-T-0064, 2005-Ohio-348, ¶ 38, citing State v. Szefcyk, 77 Ohio St.3d 93, 671 N.E.2d 233 (1996), syllabus, and State v. Reynolds, 79 Ohio St.3d 158, 161, 679 N.E.2d 1131 (1997). Because Reyes could have challenged the trial court‘s retroactive application of the Adam Walsh Act in a timely direct appeal from his conviction, any review of that issue in a postconviction relief petition is barred by res judicata. Thus, even if Reyes’ motion had satisfied the statutory requirements, the
{17} Reyes’ sole assigned error lacks merit, and the judgment of the Portage County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.
MARY JANE TRAPP, P.J.,
CYNTHIA WESTCOTT RICE, J.,
concur.
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Case No. 2021-P-0014