OPINION
{1} Following a jury trial, Defendant Valentin Reyes was convicted in the deaths of three men of the following crimes: three counts of first degree murder by willful, deliberate, and premeditated murder, contrary to NMSA 1978, § 30-2-1(A)(1) (1994); three counts of felony murder contrary to Section 30-2-1(A)(2); conspiracy to commit murder contrary to NMSA 1978, § 30-28-2 (1979) and Section 30-2-l(A); one count of kidnapping with great bodily harm contrary to NMSA 1978, § 30-4-1 (1995); conspiracy to commit kidnapping contrary to Section 30-28-2 and Section 30-4-1; two counts of false imprisonment contrary to NMSA 1978, § 30-4-3 (1963); one count of armed robbery contrary to NMSA 1978, § 30-16-2 (1973); conspiracy to commit armed robbery contrary to Section 30-28-2 and Section 30-16-2; three counts of tampering with evidence contrary to NMSA 1978, § 30-22-5 (1963); unlawful taking of a vehicle contrary to NMSA 1978, § 66-3-504 (1998); and receiving a stolen vehicle contrary to NMSA 1978, § 66-3-505 (1978). This Court has jurisdiction under Rule 12-102(A)(1) NMRA 2002 (providing for direct appeal to the Supreme Court in cases in which a sentence of life imprisonment has bеen imposed).
{2} On appeal, Defendant asserts that the following errors occurred at trial: (1) multiple convictions for overlapping or contradictory charges violated his double jeopardy and due process protections; (2) the trial court erred in various evidentiary rulings; (3) the kidnapping jury instruction was incorrect; (4) there was insufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdict; and (5) his trial counsel was ineffective. We affirm all convictions except, under the facts of this case, the conviction for receiving a stolen vehicle.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
{3} On February 25, 1997, the bodies of two men were found in a motel room in Albuquerque, New Mexico. Both men were strangled to death; they had been bound and one of them had been severely beaten. The man who had rented the room the night before was not found in the room. His body was not found until March 12, 1997, when a state highway employee spotted the body in a ravine at the bottom of a steеp embankment along Interstate 25, north of Santa Fe, New Mexico. This third victim had also been killed by strangulation; he was gagged and also bound hand and foot in a manner similar to the victims in the motel room. His body had been wrapped in a bedspread from the motel. The key to the motel room was found in his pocket, and the one shoe he was wearing was the mate to a shoe recovered from the motel room. According to the testimony at trial, the three victims, who were friends, had planned to meet four Mexican men at the motel that night for a sexual encounter.
{4} On March 3, 1997, four Mexican nationals were arrested in Salina, Kansas, driving a 1987 Ford Taurus that had belonged to one of the victims. The four men were Defendant, Ricardo Martinez-Rodriguez, Ricardo Martinez-Silva, and Rene Hernandez-Hernandez. The Kansas authorities contacted the police in Albuquerque, and a team of officers went to Kansas to interview the four men. Before being interviewed by the officers, Defendant was advised of his Miranda rights and signed a waiver of rights form. During the interview, he denied having been in Albuquerque and said that the four men bought the car in Denver where they had been doing cleaning jobs.
{5} The Kansas authorities kept the four co-defendants 1 separated. On the second day of custody, jail officials found a note, signed by Defendant, concealed in a pair of shoes belonging to one of the co-defendants. In the note, Defendant told the others that they had to develop a consistent cover story for their activities, acknowledged that they may be facing some time in prison, and also stated that “all 4 of us are equally guilty[,] no one more and no one less.”
{6} While the four men were in custody in Kansas, one of the co-defendants talked to another prisoner, Efraim Porras, who was in jail on a federal drug charge. On March 3, 1997, this co-defendant told Porras that he and the others were in jail for having killed two peoрle in Albuquerque. He also disclosed to Porras that there were actually three victims; the third had been thrown into the snow and had yet to be found. The co-defendant also told him that the three victims had been strangled to death. Porras told his attorney about the conversation who reported it to the authorities.
{7} Testimony at trial by the investigating officers revealed that Defendant’s palm print was on the wall of the motel room. Two pairs of blood-stained canvas gloves were found in the bathroom. The forensic scientist who conducted a DNA analysis on the gloves testified that the blood of the owner of the car was on the outside of all four gloves. The victim who owned the car also suffered blunt trauma from injuries to the head and neck. The results of DNA testing of the inside of one of the gloves did not exclude Defendant as a donor. The DNA evidence developed from the semen found on the anal swabs taken from the body of the third victim matched that of one of the co-defendants. A friend of Defendant’s, Karmen Grover, testified that Defendant had been accompanied by three other Hispanic men when they visited her in Salt Lake City late in the evening of February 25, 1997. She also stated that the car they were driving had New Mexico license plates.
{8} Defendant admitted at trial that he was present at the motel room with the victims on the night of the murder. Defendant testified that when he left the motel room the three victims were still alive, and that he had no role in their deaths, in hiding evidence, or in stealing the ear. Although he had been in the car, he testified that he was unaware that the body of the third victim had been thrown from the car north of Santa Fe. He explained that the statement in his note about all of them being equally guilty referred to some petty thievery the group had engaged in during their travels. After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of all charges.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Overcharging and Double Jeopardy.
1.First Degree Murder.
{9} Defendаnt asserts that overcharging of offenses led the trial court to err when it accepted verdicts that resulted in multiple convictions for overlapping or contradictory charges. Under this claim, Defendant challenges his convictions for first degree murder, armed robbery, conspiracy, tampering with evidence, unlawful taking of a motor vehicle, and receiving a stolen vehicle.
{10} The State tried Defendant for first degree murder under two theories of first degree murder: murder by deliberate killing and murder in the commission of a felony. Jury instructions were given on the alternative bases for the first degree murder charge for each of the three victims. Instead of a general verdict form for first degree murder for each victim, separate verdict forms were given for each alternative. The jury found Defendant guilty of both alternatives for each count. Defendant claims that his convictions under both theories of first degree murder rеsulted from ambiguous jury instructions because the jury was not told that it could not convict him for both deliberate murder and felony murder. This failure, he contends, resulted in contradictory convictions, violating principles of due process and double jeopardy under the federal and state 2 constitutions.
{11} We disagree with Defendant’s claims for several reasons. We first note that, contrary to Defendant’s assertions, the jury was instructed in the alternative on both theories of first degree murder. For example, in the jury instruction for the first victim, the instructions for felony murder included the following language: “For you to find the defendant Valentin Reyes guilty of Felony Murder, which is First Degree Murder, as charged in the alternative to Count I____” Count I was the charge of first degree murder by deliberate killing. This language was repeated in each of the felony murder instructions for the other two victims.
{12} The jury was instructed on the elements of deliberate intent murder for each of the victims in accordаnce with UJI 14-201 NMRA 2002, as follows:
For you to find the defendant guilty of First Degree Murder by a deliberate killing as charged in Count I, the State must prove to your satisfaction beyond a reasonable doubt each of the following elements of the crime:
1. The defendant killed [the victim];
2. This killing was with the deliberate intention to take away the life of [the victim];
3. This happened in New Mexico on or about the 25th day of February, 1997.
{13} The elements of the felony murder theory of first degree murder are contained in UJI 14-202 NMRA 2002. The jury was instructed on those elements as follows:
For you to find the defendant Valentin Reyes guilty of Felony Murder, which is First Degree Murder, as charged in the alternative to Count I, the State must prove to your satisfaction beyond a reasonable doubt each of the following elements of the crime:
1. The defendant Valentin Reyes committed the crime of Kidnapping and/or False Imprisonment and/or Armed Robbery;
2. Valentin Reyes caused the death of [the victim] during the commission of Kidnapрing and/or False Imprisonment and/or Armed Robbery;
3. Valentin Reyes intended to kill or knew that his acts created a strong probability of death or great bodily harm;
4. This happened in New Mexico on or about the 25th day of February, 1997.
{14} Although Defendant contends that a guilty verdict for both of these crimes was potentially contradictory, he does not explain this claim further or cite any authority in support of it. We are not persuaded by Defendant’s assertions. On their face, the crimes of deliberate intent murder and felony murder are not inherently contradictory. In this case, the two crimes are not factually contradictory. As the State points out, and Defendant acknowledges, the jury could have concluded that Defendant was guilty under each alternative.
{15} Substantial evidence was presented on both theories of first degree murder. As to the deliberate intent theory of first degree murder, the jury heard evidence that eaсh of the victims was bound hand and foot and each had been strangled with a ligature. The pathologist testified that it takes several minutes of sustained pressure to kill someone by strangulation. This testimony provided sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude that Defendant acted with the deliberate intention to kill. See State v. Rojo,
{16} For the second theory of first degree murder, felony murder, the jury was instructed that to convict Defendant of felony murder they must find that he committed the crimes of kidnapping, and/or false imprisonment, and/or armed robbery and that Defendant caused the death of the victims during the commission of one of those crimes. The jury heard testimony that all three victims were bound hand and foоt. A rational jury could reasonably have determined that Defendant committed the crime of false imprisonment by confining the victims against their will without authority to do so. See State v. Muise,
{17} In State v. Salazar,
{18} As to Defendant’s double jeopardy claims, although we typically address these claims for multiple punishments under the analysis set forth in Swafford v. State,
2. Additional Claims of Overcharging.
{19} Defendant also contends that his convictions for armed robbery, three counts of conspiracy, and three counts of tampering with evidence resulted from overcharging by the prosecutor and thus violated double jeoрardy. First, we address Defendant’s contention that his convictions for both felony murder and armed robbery violate double jeopardy principles. We reject this argument. The evidence in this case supports an inference that the force Defendant and his co-defendants used to commit armed robbery and the force they used to kill the owner of the car were distinct. See State v. Cooper,
{20} With respect to the conspiracy charges, we conclude that there was sufficient evidence of separate conspiracies to support Defendant’s convictions. “Where there is one agreement to commit two or more criminal acts, the perpetrators are guilty of a single conspiracy.” State v. Sanders,
? We conclude that the State presented sufficient evidence of a conspiracy to commit armed robbery. The State presented evidence that the defendants did not possess a vehicle but wished to leave New Mexico. Defendant and his co-defendants were apprehended, with the stolen car outside of the State. Witnesses testified that the victims had joined the defendants at the motel in anticipation of a sexual encounter. The State presented testimony that there were three victims, including two men who weighed close to two hundred pounds, and four perpetrators, who were all, in relation to the victims, small men: each was five foot four or less in height and weighed one hundred and fifty pounds or less. The defendants bound the victims. Based on the fact that the defendants were able to restrain the victims, the jury could reasonably infer from the number and size of the victims that the defendants had a preexisting plan to overtake the victims. As discussed above, the State presented evidence that the owner of the car suffered extensive head and neck trauma, caused by the closet rod, which differed from the injuries to the other two victims. The evidence of bloody fluid in his lungs also indicates that the car owner had his head held underneath water in the bathtub. The jury could infer from this evidence of a specific assault upon the car owner with the closet rod that the defendants’ preexisting plan consisted of luring the victims to the motel in order to commit armed robbery for the purpose of obtaining a vehicle to leave New Mexico.
{22} With respect to the conspiracy to commit murder, the State presented evidence that, after the beating, the car owner was strangled to death in the motel room as was the second victim. The pathologist testified that this manner of killing takes several minutes of pressure to accomplish the murder. Additionally, the State presented evidence that the defendants concealed one victim’s wallet in a plumbing access panel under the bathroom fixtures, as well as another victim’s identification card under the television set. The defendants also hid two of the victims under the beds in the motel room. From this evidence, the jury could reasonably infer that the defendants, having inflicted severe, life threatening injuries with the closet rod upon the car owner during the cоmmission of the armed robbery, then agreed to silence the victims and attempt to cover up their crimes.
{23} Finally, with respect to the conspiracy to commit kidnapping, the State presented evidence that Defendant and the others bound and gagged the third victim, wrapped him in a bedspread, placed him in the car, and transported him out of Albuquerque. A co-defendant’s semen was found in this victim’s anus. Based on this evidence, the jury could reasonably infer that Defendant agreed to hold the victim to service, thus supporting the conspiracy to commit kidnapping conviction.
{24} Defendant contends that, at most, only one continuous conspiratorial agreement existed, relying upon State v. Jackson,
{25} Based on the differing treatment of the three victims and the distinct timing of the various crimes, we conclude that the State presented sufficient evidence to support separate agreements between Defendant and his co-defendants to commit armed robbery, the three murders, and the kidnapping. See State v. Ketchum,
{26} We reach a different conclusion, howеver, with regard to the convictions for unlawful taking of a vehicle, contrary to Section 66-3-504, and receiving a stolen vehicle, contrary to Section 66-3-505. Defendant argues that under the facts of this case Defendant cannot be convicted of both crimes. We agree. See State v. Stephens,
B. Admission of Evidence.
{27} Defendant challenges several of the trial court’s evidentiary rulings regarding statements made by the co-defendants, including those made to the police and to a fellow inmate. Defendant also claims that the trial court erred in admitting a note he had written while in custody. The admission of evidence is entrusted to the discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed on appeal absent a showing of abuse of that discretion and that the error in the admission of evidence was prejudicial. See State v. Jett,
1. Statements of the Co-defendants.
{28} Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it permitted the introduction of the custodial interviews given by the four defendants to the Albuquerque police in Kansas. In the statements the four gave to the police, they all denied any involvement in the murders and gave an innocent explanation for how they came to be in possession of the car of one of the murder victims. At trial, the State offered the statements to show that the co-defendants were engaged in a conspiracy to cover uр their responsibility for these crimes, and they were admitted on that basis. The jury was given a limiting instruction when the statements were first introduced, and then later during jury instructions, that the statements were being admitted for “the limited purpose of attempting to prove that a conspiracy existed” among Defendant and the co-defendants.
{29} On appeal, Defendant asserts that these statements were inadmissible hearsay. A hearsay statement is an out-of-court oral or written assertion offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted therein, Rule 11-801(A), (C) NMRA 2002, and is inadmissible absent an exception under the rules of evidence, Rule 11-802 NMRA 2002. However, if an out-of-court statement is offered in evidence merely for the purpose of establishing what was said at the time, and not for the truth of the matter, the testimony is not hearsay. Rule 11-801; accord 5 Jack B. Weinstein & Margaret A. Berger, Weinstein’s Federal Evidence § 801.11[1], at 801-11 (Joseph M. McLaughlin ed., 2d ed. 2002) (“If the significancе of an offered statement lies solely in the fact that it was made, no issue is raised as to the truth of anything asserted.”) (quoting Fed.R.Crim.P. 801 advisory committee’s note).
{30} The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the statements by the four co-defendants. The statements were not admitted into evidence to prove the truth of anything said by the co-defendants, but rather to show the opposite-that the statements were untrue. See Anderson v. United States,
2. Statement of Defendant.
{31} While the four defendants were in custody in Kansas, jail officials found a message, hand written in Spanish, concealed in a pair of -shoes belonging to co-defendаnt Martinez-Silva. The note was signed by Defendant. A handwriting examiner testified that the note had been written by Defendant, and Defendant acknowledged in his testimony that he had written the note. The note advised the others as follows (the comments in brackets were added by the certified judicial interpreter) (emphasis omitted):
whenever you want to write to Mexico[,] write to Carmen and there [that way] you send a letter to your mother — have Carmen send it — to Mexico for you. Deny everything},] I also denied everything}.] They are trying to tell us lies[,] that they have photos of us in Albuquerque — just say that you were never there. Just for about 3 hours in Solei Siry Yuta [Salt Lake City, Utah] and we worked in Denver cleaning homes and gardens},] to see what happens[.] Throw this paper when [after] you read it. ATT. [Spanish abbreviation for Atentatmente = Yours truly] Valentin Qz VR [sic] [in smaller letters]
[....]
what they found is the blood of their shirts}.] I think we are going to be inside a few years since we all said different— things},] but all 4 of us arе equally guilty[,] no one more and no one less. I’ll be seeing you.
{32} Defendant filed a pretrial motion to suppress the note on the basis that, as a Mexican national, he should have been advised upon his arrest that he could confer with the Mexican consul as provided by the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, April 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77, 596 U.N.T.S. 216 (VCCR). In denying the motion, the trial court assumed for the sake of argument that the VCCR applied and also that it had not been complied with but held that the appropriate remedy would not be to suppress evidence. An appellate court reviews rulings on a motion to suppress to determine whether the law was correctly applied to the facts, reviewing them in the light most favorable to the prevailing party and drawing all reasonable inferences to support the decision below. State v. Salgado,
{33} This Court has recently resolved the question of claims raised under the VCCR contrary to Dеfendant’s position. State v. Martinez-Rodriguez,
3. Testimony of Efraim Porras.
{34} Defendant asserts that the trial court erred when it admitted an out-of-court statement of co-defendant Martinez-Rodriguez as a statement against penal interest through the testimony of Porras. See Rule 11-804(B)(3) NMRA 2002. ■ The trial court ruled in a pretrial hearing that the statement was admissible. The court found that the statement was significantly against Martinez-Rodriguez’s penal interest, in that he did not attempt to shift responsibility to others but rather implicated himself in the murders to a greater degree, and he was not talking to the authorities in an attempt to get favorable treatmеnt.
{35} On appeal, Defendant claims that the statement did not qualify as a statement against interest and that its admission violated his confrontation rights under the Sixth Amendment. U.S. Const, amend. VI. “As a general matter, we review a trial court’s admission of evidence under an exception to the hearsay rule only for an abuse of discretion.” State v. Torres, 1998-NMSC- ‘ 052, ¶ 15,
? Rule 11-804 defines exceptions to the hearsay rule that apply when the declarant is unavailable as a witness; one of the exceptions is a statement against interest which is defined as follows:
A statement which was at the time of its making so far contrary to the declarant’s pecuniary or proprietary interest, or so far tended to subject the declarant to civil or criminal liability, or to render invalid a claim by the declarant against another that a reasonable person in the declarant’s position would not have made the statement unless believing it to be true.
Rulе 11-804(B)(3). This type of statement is admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule “because it is presumed that one will not make a statement damaging to one’s self unless it is true.” Weinstein & Berger, supra, § 804.06[1], at 804-47. A reviewing court must decide whether the trial court abused its discretion in making the determination that a statement so far tended to subject a person to criminal liability, rather than to relieve him or her of it, that a reasonable person in the declarant’s position would not have made the statement unless he or she believed it to be true. Torres,
{37} In this case, Defendant does not challenge the unavailability of declarant Martinez-Rodriguez, see Rule 11-804(A), but rather the trial court’s determination that the statement was against penal interest. As we understand Defendant’s claim, he is maintaining that the statement is not against Martinez-Rodriguez’s penal interest because he is not accepting responsibility, but rather trying to shift responsibility to the other defendants. He asserts that Defendant’s having included the three others in his statement is an attempt to shift blame. Porras testified that when he first met Martinez-Rodriguez in the Salina jail, Martinez-Rodriguez told Porras that he and some others had killed three men by strangling them, one of whom had not yet been found by the authorities. Porras testified that Martinez-Rodriguez repeated the story when they next encountered each other.
{38} We agree with the trial court that the statement equally incriminates Martinez-Rodriguez and the other defendants in the murders, rather than minimizing his culpability by shifting responsibility to them. “[Statements that demonstrate a declarant’s inside knowledge of a crime are also against the declarant’s penal interest.” United States v. Westmoreland,
{39} We review de novo the question of whether the Confrontation Clause has been violated by the admission of hearsay evidence. Gonzales,
{40} Defendant relies on the plurality opinion in Lilly v. Virginia,
C. Remaining Claims by Defendant.
1. Kidnapping Jury Instruction
{41} Defendant also challenges the jury instruction for kidnapping. He raises this argument for the first time on appeal. Because he did not object to the instruction at trial or tender an instruction, the claim of error has not been preserved. See State v. Varela,
{42} The doctrine of fundamental error should be applied sparingly, to prevent a miscarriage of justice, and not to excuse the failure to make proper objеctions in the court below. With regard to a criminal conviction, the doctrine is resorted to only if the defendant’s innocence appears indisputable or if the question of his [or her] guilt is so doubtful that it would shock the conscience to permit the conviction to stand.
State v. Clark,
2. Sufficiency of the Evidence.
{43} On appeal, Defendant has challenged the sufficiency of the evidence for all of his convictions. “[T]he test to determine the sufficiency of evidence in New Mexico ... is whether substantial evidence of either a direct or circumstantial nature exists to support a verdict of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt with respect to every element essential to a conviction.” State v. Sutphin,
{44} After a thorough examination of the evidence presented at trial and the applicable law, we have determined that Defendant’s claims are without merit. We conclude that there was sufficient evidence to support Defendant’s convictions for three counts of first degree murder, conspiracy to commit murder, kidnapping, conspiracy to commit kidnapping, two counts of false imprisonment, armed robbery, conspiracy to commit armed robbery, unlawful taking of a motor vehicle, and three counts of tampering with evidence.
3. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel.
{45} On appeal, Defendant contends that his counsel provided ineffective assistance in preparing for the trial and at trial. Following his conviction, Defendant had filed a pro se motion with the trial court alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. In his motion, Defendant raised several claims of ineffective assistance including that his attorney failed to offer DNA studies as evidence; failed to summon a co-defendant, Ricardo Martinez-Rodriguez, to testify; failed to object to part of the prosecutor’s closing argument; failed to meet or speak more often with Defendant for trial preparation; and failed to investigate adequately Defendant’s claim that Defendant had been detained by the Immigration and Naturalization Service on a day that a witness had reported seeing him in Albuquerque. The trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing during which it reviewed each of these claims.
{46} A defendant has a right to effective assistance of counsel under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. To establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show that his or her attorney failed to exerсise the skill of a reasonably competent attorney and that the defendant was prejudiced by the failure. Lytle v. Jordan,
{47} The trial court determined that the first claim about the DNA testing did not raise a significant issue. As to the second issue, evidence was presented that the attorney for the co-defendant Martinez-Rodriguez indicated that because his case was on appeal he would not honor the subpoena. The trial court concluded that Martinez-Rodriguez was unavailable and therefore could not have been produced by Defendant’s attorney. The trial court determined that Defendant’s claim regarding the closing argument mischaracterized what the prosecutor had said. As to the claim of ineffective preparation, the trial court observed that the trial attorney had been “fully prepared and fully aware of the evidence against Mr. Reyes.” The trial court was unable to fully resolve the final claim because Defendant did not waive attorney-client privilege for the trial court to determine whether Defеndant had, in fact, told his attorney about the alleged detention by INS. Having reviewed all of Defendant’s claims, the trial court denied the motion based on what it had observed of Defendant’s attorney at trial and in the light of all the evidence presented at trial.
{48} Defendant has failed to show that his trial attorney failed to exercise the skill, judgment, and diligence of a reasonably competent attorney in defending him. State v. Gonzales,
Although we have discussed the performance component of an ineffectiveness claim prior to the prejudice component, there is no reasоn for a court deciding an ineffective assistance claim to approach the inquiry in the same order or even to address both components of the inquiry if the defendant makes an insufficient showing on one.
Strickland,
4. Remaining Claims of Error.
{49} Defendant claims that the trial court erred when it twice excluded evidence that Defendant wanted to use for impeachment purposes. In each instance the trial court found that the proffered evidence was only marginally relevant and that any probative value was substantially outweighed by a danger of unfair prejudice and confusion of the issues. See Rule 11-103 NMRA 2002. Defendant also challenges the qualifications of one of the jurors. Defendant rаises these claims pursuant to State v. Franklin,
III. CONCLUSION
{50} We hold that Defendant’s convictions for first degree murder do not implicate either due process or double jeopardy and that the jury’s verdict was supported by substantial evidence. We conclude that the trial court acted within its discretion in admitting the statements of the defendants, the admissions of the Defendant, and the statement against penal interest by the co-defendant. No fundamental error occurred in instructing the jury about the kidnapping charges. Defendant did not receive ineffective assistance from his trial counsel. Under the fаcts of this case he cannot be convicted of receiving a stolen vehicle. We affirm all remaining convictions and remand for the entry of an amended order of judgment, sentence and commitment reflecting that Defendant is guilty of three counts of first degree murder based on two alternative theories and vacating the conviction for receiving a stolen vehicle.
{51} IT IS SO ORDERED.
Notes
. For ease of reference, the opinion calls the four men charged in this case "co-defendants,” even though they were tried separately.
. Although Defendant refers to the New Mexico Constitution, he does not argue that our state constitution should be interpreted more broadly than the federal in terms of either his due process or double jeopardy claim. See State v. Gomez,