State v. Resendis-Felix

unequivocally stated that the medics sample judge from Es- obtaining a blood efforts “actively of law enforce- they transported him to the hos- became extensions trada when ment,” in the trial court’s against we find no error pital his will. finding medics were not implicit that argues findings The state that these medical assis- motivated a desire to obtain that the medics are erroneous and asserts but, rather, by a desire to tance for Estrada help solely by a were motivated desire sample help police from obtain blood support position, In of this Estrada. him. testimony that state cites one of the medics’ in a situation” in he had “never been involved Conclusion police transport had him to

which the asked person specifically purpose for the of ob- 28-1388(E) sum, we construe taining sample had not done so a blood and person must re- implicitly require court, however, appar- case. The trial this ceiving voluntarily for that medical treatment testimony. ently this chose to disbelieve a warrantless blood draw. statute allow event, any had oc- whether this situation findings that defer to the trial court’s We this was the first curred before or whether transported involuntarily Estrada was time is irrelevant. Thus, hospital by agents. we find no state ¶ 21 Furthermore, one of the medics ad trial court’s conclu- abuse of discretion transporting he had discussed Estra mitted sam- sion that the results of Estrada’s blood Gowanlock, although the Sergeant da with ple suppressed the evidence must be because medic later clarified that he had told Gowan a stat- properly pursuant obtained lock that Estrada needed to be taken to the utory exception requirement to the warrant Lastly, little hospital. the record contains Fourth Amendment. The trial court’s support evidence to medics’ claim is, therefore, affirmed. suppression order was such that he re Estrada’s condition suspect quired medical assistance because PELANDER, CONCURRING: JOHN injuries. Although or Es ed head internal BRAMMER, Judge Chief and J. WILLIAM scrapes cuts or on his

trada did have some JR., Judge. head, that he did one of the medics admitted injury. really suspect a serious neck

And, the other medic testified that their as

sessment, one, albeit a limited of Estrada did serious, inju any life-threatening

not reveal Furthermore, pressure ries. Estrada’s blood P.3d 457 give any indication that he had sus did Arizona, Respondent, injuries, pupils did not The STATE tained internal that he had sustained give indication neurological damage. Ivan Kostia RESENDIS- 22 Because the trial court was FELIX, Petitioner. position the best to observe the demeanor No. 2 CA-CR 2003-0114-PR. possible determine their the witnesses and biases, must defer to its assessment of Arizona, Appeals of Court of credibility rejection of the med their A. Department Division testimony their motives for trans ics’ about Gerlaugh, porting Estrada. See State Nov. 2004. (1982), supp. op., 135 Opinion Supplemental Dec. (1983); Fur P.2d 642 Ossana.

thermore, the trial court determines at the

weight given presented evidence to be Keener, hearing.

suppression (1974). Thus, these circumstances where LaWall, County Attorney,

Barbara Pima Tucson, By Hurley, Respon- Elizabeth for dent. Kettlewell, County A. Pima Public

Susan Defender, Leto, Tucson, By Frank P. Petitioner.

OPINION BRAMMER, J.

¶ Interrupted stealing while the victim’s truck, pickup petitioner Kostia Ivan Resen- accomplice dis-Felix and an assaulted the victim, severely. injuring him Resendis-Fe- first-degree charged attempted lix was class murder and five other class three and agreed plead guilty to four felonies. He three, robbery, danger- a class felony. sentencing, At ous-nature aggravating factors —the court found several severity presence accomplice, of an victim, past beating inflicted on the impact future of the crime on the victim and family, danger and the community posed imposed an —and aggravated, 13.5-year imprison- ment. Sentencing outside post- a defendant petition filed a 2 Resendis-Felix illegal limits creates an sen to Rule constitutional pursuant

conviction relief tence, P., A.R.S., can constitute fundamental er claiming the trial court which R.Crim. Thues, by- ror. See State had abused its discretion circum (App.2002). “In limited failing age (eighteen), his immatu- P.3d 368 to find his stances, may recognize that some issues time of the rity, and his intoxication at the important overriding consider mitigating by im- be so to be factors and offense integrity system concerning ations posing sentence instead of the the issue years. party’s The trial will excuse a failure raise presumptive sentence of 7.5 relief, exception This limited is peti- in the trial court. court denied and Resendis-Felix known as the doctrine of ‘fundamental er this court for review. tioned ” White, 344, 45, v. 194 Ariz. ror.’ State 2004, petition July In with his 819, P.2d pending, filed a review still Resendis-Felix authority sup on the Court’s supplemental and 6 Based notice of rationale, Blakely holding briefing, asking to vacate his and we believe plemental us exception” resentencing con falls within that “limited sentence and remand for — harmless, and, Blakely Washington, constitutes fundamen v. unless sistent therefore, —, 2531, will, in our discre 124 S.Ct. 159 L.Ed.2d 403 tal error. We U.S. principles supplemental Resendis-Felix’s Blakely applies the an tion address 567, Taylor, 187 Ariz. Apprendi Jersey, nounced in v. New 530 issue. See State 2348, (App.1996) (appellate court has 147 L.Ed.2d 435 P.2d 1077 U.S. (2000), authority it funda “exceptional” prison sentence to reverse when discovers Dewakuku, error); imposed Washington’s sentencing mental see also State under ¶ 7, (App.2004) con 208 Ariz. 92 P.3d statutes and holds that a defendant is Apprendi to find stitutionally (considering application a deter entitled to have status, on-release even beyond mine a reasonable doubt the exis of defendant’s though objected to court’s any fact to increase the defendant had not tence of used below, making finding penalty beyond the maximum because “a sentence for a crime improperly imposed is can be reversed prescribed by statute. objection”); despite of an appeal on the lack supple- response 4 In to Resendis-Felix’s Johnson, State citation, argues mental the state Resendis- (fundamental (App.1995) error for by failing Felix waived the claim to raise deter court make sentence-enhancement urges until now and us not to consider the make); required mination cf. Blakely issue. counters that Sheldon, Montgomery v. not waive the claim because he could he did (1995) (“[A] Rule 32 P.2d rights knowing not have made a waiver of his appeal for a defendant proceeding is the decided; Blakely Blakely was under before Gross, guilty.”); Ariz. pleading State v. that, sentencing, prior his our at the time of (because Appren (App.2001) 31 P.3d 815 Brown, decision law, presents rule of constitutional di new (App.2003), later vacated pending holding applied to cases will be court, supreme 99 P.3d 15 review). direct (2004), Apprendi inapplicable to had ruled ¶7 Apprendi, circumstances under A.R.S. 13-702(C), than the fact of excusing § failure to Court held: “Other further his conviction, below; prior any fact that increases claim and that he had raise the beyond prescribed seasonably petition penalty for a crime supplement moved statutory be submitted to after the maximum must to raise the issue within two weeks jury, proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” Blakely and Supreme Court issued the decision.1 appears certain that 13-702. It thus court vacated our decision 1. Our post-Blakely part general noncapital applies equally Brown based in on the state’s to Arizona’s Apprendi applicable to Ari- concession that is sentencing statutes. noncapital zona's scheme justice.” uncertain It hold to the ends Blakely, the Court elaborated on the considered jury would even have whether a ‘statutory stating ing Apprendi, that “the factor, found much less this non-enumerated purposes is the max Apprendi maximum’ doubt. a reasonable it established solely on judge impose imum sentence Indeed, aggravating-circum- trial court’s in the basis facts reflected merely been based findings could have — stance by the verdict or admitted defendant.” record,” evidence on “reasonable at —, Meador, 343, 347, 645 P.2d Here, prison maximum at —. Viramontes, 204 (App.1982); State v. guilty solely Resendis-Felix’s authorized (2003), and not satis- years. plea presumptive term of 7.5 was the higher, beyond-a-reasonable-doubt fied the 13-702(B) (C). 13-604(1) §§ and A.R.S. Apprendi mandate for standard sentence, aggravated 13.5-year there His jury findings. fore, Apprendi imposed in violation of ¶ concurring opinion concludes that 10 The Blakely. actually error and Blakely error is structural ¶ conclusion, however, 8 That does subject analysis. thus not to harmless-error supreme has inquiry. not end our Our court Although agree we with much of harmless. Apprendi held that error be concurrence, by in the we feel constrained 534, Ring, 915 See State v. 65 P.3d language paragraphs supreme court’s (2003) III”); (“Ring v. see also State Mur fifty-three Ring III hold fifty-one through of (2004) (find 19, daugh, 209 Ariz. 97 P.3d 844 contrary. The court cited federal to the ing Apprendi capital holding just Ring harmless in sen error in the error cases context, capital Apprendi error in the tencing following guilty plea first-degree context, subject noncapital can to harm murder); 321, Sepahi, 324 analysis. e.g., v. less error United States 732, (2003) (“any n. 78 P.3d 735 3 (7th Dumes, Cir.2002); 313 F.3d 372 United harmless”); Apprendi error would be State (5th Matthews, v. 312 F.3d 652 Cir. States Miranda-Cabrera, v. Sanders, 2002); 247 States v. F.3d United (App.2004). 35 Error is harmless if we can (4th Cir.2001); States v. 139 accord United say beyond a that it reasonable doubt did Sanchez-Cervantes, (9th 282 F.3d 664 Cir. Cropper, affect the sentence. v. 206 White, 2002); United States v. F.3d (2003); see also State (2d Cir.2001). Candelario, United States v. ¶ Dann, 557, 18, v. (11th Cir.2001); 240 F.3d 1300 United States (2003) (error “if re is harmless the court’s (1st Cir.2001); Terry, 240 F.3d 65 United ‘every trial view the entire record shows (7th Nance, Cir.2000); 236 F.3d 820 States necessary every fact to establish element (4th Lewis, 235 F.3d 215 United States doubt’”), the offense a reasonable Meshack, Cir.2000); United States v. Clark, 570, 581, quoting Rose v. (5th Cir.2000); Miranda-Cabrera. F.3d 556 (1986) 3101, 3107, S.Ct. 92 L.Ed.2d beyond a 11 Because we cannot conclude Dann). (internal quotation omitted error did reasonable doubt that sentencing 9 We are unable to conclude the not contribute to or affect the here, outcome we will not consider it harm- error is harmless in this case. Resendis-Felix Cropper. Accordingly, grant less. aggravating factors did not admit grant although petition for review and relief here, by court to exist and none of found grounds presented in different than those them is inherent his admission that he had vacate Resendis-Felix’s petition. We Moreover, robbery. committed the case for resentenc- sentence and remand most of the circumstances found Blakely. ing pursuant to inherently subjective, the trial court are community danger —is one— P.J., HOWARD, concurring. among expressly factors set ECKERSTROM, Judge, specially 13-702(C). § can forth in The trial court concurring. only under the have found this circumstance 13-702(C)(20), result, “[a]ny provision, I Although catch-all I concur with the disagree I appropriate separately because with factor that the court deems write other Arizona, Ring 536 U.S. majority’s that our conclusion requires Ring III us to court’s S.Ct. (2002) subject ”), conclude that error (“Ring II 576-77 analysis. the court ob harmless error As capital that Arizona’s Court held III, most trial that we served errors violated the Sixth Amend scheme appeal, those that involve encounter on even it right ment trial because allowed rights, constitutional are violations federal judge rather than a to determine wheth ¶ 45, analysis. error Id. to harmless statutory aggravating factors had been er However, the United 65 P.3d 915. States But, proven. apart from the difference has found harmless error Court fact-finder, identity capital Arizona analysis inappropriate when the error is a pre-Ring defendants sentenced under affecting the framework “structural defect enjoyed had each of the other struc scheme proceeds, rather than within which right protections tural inherent simply process in the trial itself.” allegations to right trial: the to notice of the Fulminante, Arizona v. hearing, aggravation see be asserted at L.Ed.2d P., 15.1(g), Ariz. 16A former Rule R.Crim. (1991). Specifically, it has determined error A.R.S., (1991); right to 167 Ariz. LXXV deprives to be structural when the defen conformity presented have evidence “ protection which ‘a dant of a basic without and, admissibility trial there standards of reliably its func criminal cannot serve fore, challenge that evidence cross- guilt tion as a vehicle for determination of or examination,4 13-703(C), § see former A.R.S. innocence, punishment may criminal and no (“admissi Laws, 260, § ch. 1 2001 Ariz. Sess. regarded fundamentally fair.’” Id. be as any bility of information relevant to of the (citation Clark, omitted), v. 478 quoting Rose aggravating gov circumstances ... shall be 3101, 570, 577-78, 3106, 106 92 U.S. S.Ct. by the of evidence at criminal erned rules 460, L.Ed.2d 470 trials”); and, importantly, right the to most ¶ Accordingly, only can 13 determine aggravating fac presumed be innocent of the appropri- is whether harmless error proven beyond a tor unless it is reasonable ate after we have assessed the nature of the 423, ¶ 28, Kayer, v. 194 Ariz. doubt. State underlying deprivation and the constitutional 31, finding Ring 984 P.2d 41 In that extent to which it affects the basic frame- review, to harmless error was proceeds work within which a trial in our emphasized our court that Arizona’s justice system. Although criminal our su- preexisting capital sentencing scheme had preme opinion Ring court’s III addressed procedural protections provided important species of error that we address the same trial, right jury including inherent the context,2 Blakely in the the nature of here III, proof.” Ring “the correct standard of resulting deprivation the constitutional and ¶ 534, 50, 65 P.3d at 935. impact on the fundamental framework of ¶ contrast, 15 In the error we address justice system significantly is differ- here, ent, judicial imposition non-capital of a the given noncapital context of our state the greater by that sentencing sentence than authorized scheme.3 circumstances, Arizona, 584, requires Arizona law 2. Both v. 536 U.S. (2002) 122 S.Ct. der all other additional 2428, II"), beyond jury ("Ring findings verdict before 153 L.Ed.2d 556 — —, may imposed aggravated a Washington, sentence v. 124 S.Ct. 13-702(B). 2531, (2004), by noncapital L.Ed.2d 403 have been cited case. A.R.S. See 159 that, Brown, (Ariz.2004) (holding applications as of the rule of Court purposes, statutory jurisprudence Appren Apprendi maximum constitutional set forth in for di, 490, by guilty plea a 530 U.S. at 120 S.Ct. at 147 sentence authorized defendant’s sentence, 455, that, "[ojther presumptive super-aggra- not the L.Ed.2d at which held than is the conviction, imposed only prior vated sentence that can be the fact of a fact that in factors). beyond presence penalty pre a of at least two creases the crime statutory must be submitted to scribed maximum right present- Inherent in the to have evidence proved beyond jury, a doubt.” a reasonable conformity of evidence is the ed in opportunity, with the rules circumstances, preexist- to chal- recently under most 3. We have found that Arizona's lenge determining noncapital, means of cross-examina- procedure first- that evidence 450, 452, McVay, degree State v. does not violate the tion. See murder sentence 9, (1980) ("Hearsay generally jury inadmis- principles because the P.2d set forth opportu- highest has no sible ... because the defendant itself authorizes the verdict Sanders, person making nity to cross-examine the available for that offense. statement.”). 77, 29, 902, (App.2004). Un- 97 P.3d Indeed, error”), (“Blakely occurred jury verdict error when faced statutory found structural significantly different Court has against a framework, mild insult comparatively Resen- that with framework. Under process. trial right presentence notice of the criminal had no framework dis-Felix Louisiana, 275, 278, state aggravating factors that Sullivan 2078, 2081, might find. the trial court would assert or (giving 182, 190-91 (1993), P. 17 A.R.S. it found structur Ariz. R.Crim. L.Ed.2d report right presentence erroneously defendant to review trial court al error when the limiting prosecutor court or either to allow a conviction but so as instructed there- potential aggravating factors identified guilt rather than probability the mere on 3, 6, in); Marquez, Here, see also State doubt. upon proof reasonable argu- (App.1980) (rejecting only deprived Resendis-Felix was finding judge limited to instruction, ment that trial accurate reasonable doubt previously aggravating factors had been him have found the trial court well right no alleged prosecutor).5 He had only guilty aggravating factors based of four present proof of those insist that the state evidence,” a standard which on “reasonable conformity aggravating factors proof burden of at all. See Jack imposes no and, therefore, right of evidence no rules Virginia, 443 U.S. son v. challenge through that information cross-ex- 574 n. 2790 n. Conn, amination. See State (1979) (failure necessity to instruct (1983) (“The rules “can proof beyond a reasonable doubt admissibility governing the of evidence error”). never be harmless apply hearing aggrava- at a trial do not short, Resendis-Felix was entitled tion.”). And, importantly, most Resendis- whether to a to determine enjoy right Felix did not to insist that the necessary aggravating factors were beyond a proven factors be rea- predicate to his sentence were Viramontes, sonable doubt. See court, proven. finding The trial those contrary, 64 P.3d at 190. To the scheme, factors under Arizona’s noncapital require scheme does not even requirement fell of that in a fashion short aggra- the trial court to find the existence of that offended the core structures vating by preponderance a factors the jury as a which such a trial would function (“In cases, non-capital evidence. See id. view, my fact-finding process. reliable aggravators only by supported need be rea- trial committed structural the court therefore evidence.”). sonable error. ¶ Thus, while error and ¶ 19 The United States Court’s from error arise the same essential flaw—the States, opinion in Neder v. United U.S. jury failure to afford a defendant a trial on (1999), 144 L.Ed.2d 35 com 119 S.Ct. necessary predicates facts that are to an There, pels analysis. the no different Court far more increased sentence — that a trial court’s failure to instruct found dramatically un- insults the core structures jury materiality tax the on the element of proceeds der which a trial and without which analysis. to harmless error fraud was “reliably a trial could not serve its function at at 144 L.Ed.2d at Id. S.Ct. guilt or as a vehicle for determination Although Blakely error could be similar 53. Rose, 577-78, at innocence.” ly as the omission of an element described If S.Ct. at 92 L.Ed.2d at 470. necessary aggravated an impose to notice, right challenge to ad- defendant’s such, would, subject to arguably as be cross-examination, through verse evidence Neder, analysis under harmless error proven presumed and to innocent unless be encourage opinion does not such Neder itself guilty beyond a doubt are not reasonable holding. application a mechanical of its crimi- three of the- core structures which a result, First, reaffirms the stan- a I cannot nal trial assures reliable Rose, which focuses struc- might fathom those structures be. dard set forth what however, 13-702.01, A.R.S., requires gravating provision, a factors.” That 5. Section trial give require that the trial court court to inform the defendant in advance if it does defendant notice it considered relevant impose aggravating impose "exceptional” aggravated as to which factors an intends term and unless the trial court finds two "substantial forming prohibits imposition its intent of such a term ag- "exceptional" term. analysis approved by analysis specific 22 Under the Rose tural error on the features Neder, in this case deprivation actual constitutional the Court the error of the jury reliability function of a fall into the class of simply context of the does not “narrow Neder, 2,n. at trial. U.S. Neder. Id. As dis- cases” addressed at 144 L.Ed.2d at 46- cussed, did not receive the above, 52 n. As demonstrated doubt standard or benefit of the reasonable expose dramatically different in- can a evidentiary and testimonial structure of jury to the structure of a trial even sults challenge aggravating factors the trial to when the error arises from identical constitu- And, ultimately trial court found. unlike the Thus, deprivations. pro- failure to tional Ring, circumstances in Neder and Resendis- jury a trial on an element of an offense vide notice of Felix did not receive formal can, circumstances, sig- under some cause no prosecution factors the those of a disruption nificant to the core structures prove.7 would seek to But see United States error) while, jury (Ring trial under other Cotton, 625, 632-34, U.S. circumstances, fundamentally under- can 868-70 purposes jury guarantee of the trial mine the (2002) alone, (standing Ap- failure to include error). (Blakely altogether plain prendi element in indictment not er- Second, majority ror). Neder re peatedly suggests might that it reached have readily distinguished Neder a different if the omission in the case result respect one other as well. Resendis-Felix substantially it had more undermined before merely deprived a trial on was not designed promote the structures the relia allegation an that was other one element of bility Initially, of a trial result. it observed proven jury as to all its other wise of an does not the omission element (the Neder). Rather, scenario in elements “necessarily” satisfy criteria for the Rose deprived of a trial as to each of he was Neder, structural error. the four factors found —as well (“[A]n 1833, 144 in 5.Ct. at L.Ed.2d at 47 aggra potential subparts as all of the of each of the struction that omits element offense short, vating factor. Resendis-Felix lost necessarily a criminal trial does not render right merely trial not as to one fundamentally unfair or an unreliable vehicle component other uncontested offense innocence.”). determining guilt or Obvi rather, proven respects, in all wise other ously, reasoning preclude such does not totality grounds aggrava as to the finding of structural error when the omission presumptive ting his sentence procedur comparatively has a more dramatic reason, finding of struc sentence. For this Moreover, impact. describing why al “the require tural error here would not a new “always omission of an element” would not focusing primarily already “contested is unfair,” majority empha a trial render the properly on which the was instruct sues impact procedural sized the limited Neder, at during ed” the first trial. deprivation specific in that case. Id. at 1837, 144 L.Ed.2d at 51. 119 S.Ct. at (“Neder 1834, 144 at L.Ed.2d at 47 Rather, any such trial would focus exclusive impartial judge, an tried before ly contesting that on issues Resendis-Felix ”).6 proof .... Final the correct standard of opportunity litigate an in a trial never had critique ly, rebutting in Justice Scalia’s forum. logic would allow a trial court to the court’s ¶ 24 majority correctly As noted against a verdict a defendant in a direct opinion Ring in opinion, our court’s ease, criminal an event characterized as wording III contains and cites cases that Rose, majority structural error in the ex suggest that all forms of could be read to pressly ruling allowing its harmless limited subject to harm Apprendi error should be error review to “the narrow class of cases III, Id., analysis. Ring less error present at 17 n. like the one.” III, But, Ring in 2, 119 2, 144 at 935. L.Ed.2d at 52 n. P.3d S.Ct. at 1838 added). with, and did the court was not confronted (emphasis Neder, materiality opportunity that was Although provided in a trial 7. the element of 6. an jury’s was in- determination omitted from materiality to the trial forum to contest —albeit among charges formal in the indict- cluded Neder, 527 U.S. at court —Neder did not. L.Ed.2d at ment. Id. at 119 S.Ct. at S.Ct. at 144 L.Ed.2d at 52 45. aggravate sen address, Resendis-Felix’s question arising court used pivotal not tence. Ring Blakely error and error here: whether ¶ 2 differently they carry analyzed when no

must be further contends that The state at once Blakely error occurred all because impacts dramatically different core existence of had admitted the view, In my of a trial. structures factor, eligi single aggravating he became relevant standard aggravated sentence and ble receive Rose, 577-78, forth 478 U.S. at Court set could, turn, as consider the trial court 106 S.Ct. at it many aggravating factors as additional depriva- of on the nature which focuses of this appropriate. Division One deemed species constitu- tion than on the of rather held in State Mar recently court has so error, readily question. tional answers that ¶ 16, tinez, (App. P.3d 30 2004) (establishment any 25 Because the Arizona of one range sentencing expands factor both III compel does Court’s discretion; scope trial court’s error is the conclusion authorized aggravating factor is “[w]hen one analysis, I to harmless error and because satisfied”); jury, Blakely is see also error, when committed believe such Henderson, State v. general noncapital context of Arizona’s sen- Conn., ex rel. State Smith (App.2004); structural, scheme, tencing respectfully is I (App.2004). 98 P.3d 881 disagree with the conclusion that a harmless ¶ 3 The state did not advance this latter analysis appropriate in this case. argument response in its to Resendis-Felix’s But I ultimate result —vacat- concur authority, supplemental memorandum of ing sentence and remand- Resendis-Felix’s time in its presents instead it for first resentencing. the case for if we motion for reconsideration. Even were Martinez, despite appar inclined to follow SUPPLEMENTAL OPINION eighty-seven paragraphs ent conflict with Ring, ninety through FOR ON MOTION RECONSIDERATION (2003), we 65 P.3d 915 will address untimely MOTION DENIED first asserted a motion issue McCall, reconsideration.10 ¶ 1 The state has moved for reconsidera tion, arguing Blakely8 that no error occurred ¶ 4 The motion for reconsideration is de that, correctly points in this case. It out nied. robbery, pleading guilty aggravated Re had, fact, sendis-Felix admitted one statu JOSEPH W. CONCURRING: factor, tory presence an HOWARD, Presiding Judge PETER J. 13-702(C)(4), §§ accomplice. See A.R.S. ECKERSTROM, Judge. 13-1903(A)(presence of “one or more accom plices” is element of offense of however,

robbery).9 fact, That does alter other factors — U.S. —, filed, Washington, issues not to the extent that raises parties (2004). already presented by the or addressed L.Ed.2d 403 court, we them when would address erroneously of 9. We stated in 9 in a for reconsid- for the first time motion raised McCall, has no fac- admitted eration. had, tors, ideed, presence general when he admitted the Finally, attorney accomplice. attorney represent county of the State of Ari- both zona, attorney general’s amicus brief and the consent, attorney general parties’ 10. With the already argued by positions advocates same recently sup- brief in has filed an amicus curiae broader, state, ”provid[ing] a rather than reconsideration, port the state’s motion of presentation law more abstract 31.25(A), P., citing Rule Ariz. R. Crim. A.R.S. narrowly case.” Ariz. R. tied to the facts permits filing To the extent that Rule 31.25 seeking only By Crim. P. 31.25 cmt post-conviction at all an amicus curiae brief already expand arguments made restate or P., proceedings Crim. “background under Rule Ariz. R. offer instead of to state A.R.S., decision,” id., expressly provide for such a it does attor- context for Court's filing ney support general's does not constitute a true a motion reconsideration. brief assuming properly amicus curiae brief. Even the amicus brief was

Case Details

Case Name: State v. Resendis-Felix

Court Name: Court of Appeals of Arizona

Date Published: Dec 9, 2004

Citation: 100 P.3d 457

Docket Number: 2 CA-CR 2003-0114-PR

Court Abbreviation: Ariz. Ct. App.