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State v. Renzulli
935 N.E.2d 200
Ind. Ct. App.
2010
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*1 come about as result change could also shame,

embarrassment, or frustration. to draw an permissible it

do not believe contrary where a in-

evidentiary inference likely. equally

ference is took

Finally, Long there is the fact when he vacated the personal property Wright. notice to To

real estate without

me, mid-April says noth- Long's action mid-February. intention in

ing about his before, evidentiary fact

As Long's part with intention on

consistent goods, equally for the but is pay

not to Wright with the conclusion that

consistent pay goods intended to for the when he

had

signed prem- the contract and vacated the he that he would not be

ises when learned estate, agreed for the real pay

able to

taking only tangible personal property property closing become his had to retain a Wright purchase

when failed

money security goods. interest in the baseball, runner; go ties procedure, they go

eriminal to the defen- Long's

dant. I would reverse conviction. Indiana, Appellant-Plaintiff,

STATE of RENZULLI, Appellee-

Amanda

Defendant.

No. 32A04-1003-CR-194. Indiana.

Oct.

Rehearing Denied Dec. *2 Zoeller,

Gregory Attorney F. General of Indiana, Cynthia Ploughe, Deputy Attor- General, IN, Attorneys ney Indianapolis, Appellant. for Seiter, Taylor, Garri- David M. Joshua LLC, Firm, IN, Indianapolis, son Law At- for torneys Appellee.

OPINION1 RILEY, Judge.

STATEMENT THE OF CASE Indiana, Appellant-Plaintiff, ap- State of the trial court's peals after the stop evidence obtained vehicle that Appellee-Defendant, Amanda (Renzulli), driving. Renzulli affirm. We ISSUE issue, presents The State one which we grant restate as: Whether motion to Renzullis is con- trary to law. AND

FACTS PROCEDURAL HISTORY approximately April At 1:00 a.m. on stated, phoned a caller 911 and "there is a drunk driver in front of me. kill going He's all over the road and he's somebody." (Appellant's p. The App. initially caller said that the vehicle was a Volkswagen blue Jetta but later identified Passat, Volkswagen a simi- vehicle as larly shaped and sized vehicle. caller publish opinion. I vote not 1. Under the criteria forth in set Further, enough stopped. to the vehicle to Officer Stewart did close get did not number. The caller not know who the 911 caller was and could plate a license get dispatch testify credibility officer as to the of the call- explained *3 pulled gas into a station the vehicle had er. gas location of the station. gave and the hearing, At the close of the the trial asked, gave caller his name and

When to suppress court took motion under number. phone 16, 2009, advisement. On October the trial at the gas arrived station Police officers to granted court the motion con- A blue Volkswagen moments later. was cluding responding that the officers to the space and the officers parked parking in a independent did not "establish an 911 call begin space. to back out of the observed it objective and basis to create reasonable stop commanded the vehicle to One officer suspicion necessary of criminal behavior complied having after and the driver investigatory stop." (Appellant's for an police a few feet. The officers only moved App. p. investigation, determined that

began an appeals. The State now Additional facts vehicle at the time of the the driver of the provided necessary. will be Renzulli, and that was intoxi- stop was she cated. AND DISCUSSION DECISION day, that same the State filed an Later The State contends that the trial court's operat- Renzulli with charging Information grant of the to suppress was con- intoxicated, a ing a vehicle while as Class trary to law. Specifically, con- misdemeanor, 9-80-5-2(b), § A Ind.Code a tends 911 call was sufficient intoxicated, a vehicle operating while suspicion stop basis for reasonable to § felony, as a D 1.C. 9-30-5-8. On Class driving. vehicle that Renzulli was September Renzulli filed a motion When we review a trial court's to the evidence obtained after the on a motion suppress, decision we deter vehicle. stop of her mine whether the record discloses "sub On October the trial court con- probative stantial evidence of value that suppression hearing. ducted a The State supports trial court's decision." State called Brian S. Stewart of the Officer v. Washington, 898 N.E.2d (Officer Department Plainfield Police (Ind.2008) Quirk, (quoting State v. Stewart) as its sole witness. Officer Stew- (Ind.2006)). We will not art that he was not the officer testified reweigh the evidence. Id. Because the vehicle ordered the driven Renzulli appealing negative judg when stop, present but was that order ment, it must show that was made. Officer Stewart did not wit- ruling contrary to law. Id. maneuvers, ness the vehicle make oth- er began than when it back out "The Fourth Amendment to the space just prior being stop. ordered to United States and Article Constitution He personal admitted that he did not have 11 of the pro Section Indiana Constitution knowledge driving privacy as to who had been tect the possessory interests prior vehicle to pulling parking by prohibiting into the of individuals unreasonable spot. Officer Stewart testified that he did searches and seizures." Coleman (Ind.Ct.App.2006), know whether other blue cars or 847 N.E.2d denied, Volkswagens parking reh'g Generally, were located in the demied. trams. lot of gas requires judicially station at the time Renzulli lawful search issued where a search is con- with children his vehicle. Id. The wom- warrant, search but vehicle, gave description warrant, the State has ducted without a number, plate along his license with infor- proving exception that an the burden mation about where the vehicle was travel- requirement the warrant existed ing. police responded Id. A officer A police the search. Id. officer time of call, caught up with the vehicle while it investigatory stop with- may make a brief if, traveling, confirming and after cause "based probable out a warrant or matched, plate number stopped license together upon specific and articulable facts the vehicle. Id. at 854. facts, from those with rational inferences *4 reasonably warrant- the official intrusion Our supreme court found that there was suspi- the officer has a reasonable ed and suspicion largely upon reasonable based 'may activity cion that criminal be afoot.'" "tipster fact that identified her- State, Moultry v. 808 N.E.2d 170-71 self." Id. at 355. The reasoning behind Ohio, (quoting Terry v. (Ind.Ct.App.2004) supreme our court's "lim- holding was the 1, 21-22, 20 392 U.S. S.Ct. ited scope purpose" Terry stop, of a (1968)). suspi- L.Ed.2d 889 "Reasonable and also because an "identified informant's concept, cion is a 'somewhat abstract' 'reputation can be ... [they assessed and neat readily legal reduced to 'a set of may] responsible be held allega- [their] " State, 261, 264 rules." Ertel v. 928 N.E.2d turn tions out to be fabricated....'" Id. (Ind.Ct.App.2010), (quoting trans. denied J.L., (quoting Florida v. 529 U.S. (2000). Moultry, 808 N.E.2d at Reasonable 120 S.Ct. 146 L.Ed.2d 254 suspicion case-by-case is determined on a However, our supreme court did not hold by totality at the cir- looking basis susceptibility that to "prosecution for mak- cumstances, generally and is satisfied alone, ing report, standing a false will in all when the facts known to the officer at the cases constitute reasonable suspicion." Id. the stop, along Rather, moment of with the reason- potential prosecution is a "cireum- facts, arising able inferences from such bearing stance on the reasonableness of ordinarily prudent would cause an person suspicion," which must be considered in activity that eriminal has totality to be occurred of the cireumstances. Id. at Coleman, is about to occur. 847 N.E.2d at Here, agree we with the State that argues The State that we treat should spotted the 911 caller who the blue Volks tip

the 911 call as a from an identified wagen should be considered an identified citizen. informant or concerned In Kel citizen, opposed informant or concerned (Ind. v. lems and, thus, anonymous to an the was tip, tip 2006), reh'g grounds, reversed on on other a cireumstance which bore in favor of rea supreme "tip our court held that a from an suspicion. sonable we conclude informant or identified concerned citizen police 'couple' that failed to the con coupled police with some corroborative in tip cerned citizen's with corroborative in vestigation is sufficient to create reason vestigation. ("tip See id. at 358 from an suspicion investigative stop." able for an identified informant or concerned citizen case, In City Depart the Tell Police coupled police with some corroborative in ment call telephone received from a vestigation is sufficient to create reason by woman who identified herself name. suspicion investigative stop") able for an reported seeing Id. The woman a man that added). Kellems, (emphasis our su li driving preme police she knew name without a court twice noted that plate officer confirmed that the license insurance, intoxicated, cense or while MATHIAS, J., concurring in result. Kellems matched the driven the vehicle tip- citizen by the concerned given number I so concur result. do respectfully I however, Here, and 357. Id. at ster. procedural the State's deci believing that by the State testi- called witness the sole court level have forfeited sions at the trial another not know whether fied that he did appeal.2 car, Volkswagen or another blue lot at gas parking station in the parked the State's begin by noting It stopped. vehicle was time Renzulli's cases is limited. Sim criminal that another officer possible said, erimi- may appeal ply vehicle that Renzulli's to be sure checked only when authorized proceedings nal gas at the station only vehicle was the Gradison, v. statute. by the 911 description given matched (citing State (Ind.Ct.App.2001) caller, not introduce that State did but the Aynes, hearing. As evidence at 1999)); Hicks, see also State v. above, the State bears the we have stated Pease, (Ind.1983); State v. *5 to the exception that an proving burden of (both 1207, (Ind.Ct.App.1988) N.E.2d 1208 present. is Cole- requirement warrant cannot in criminal noting that State man, light at 262. of 847 N.E.2d authorized to do specifically cases unless police officers any lack of evidence statute). Important to our consider by so Renzulli's car was the corroborated that here, when State is authorized ations to, we the 911 caller referred vehicle which cases, in criminal statute to grant that the trial court's cannot conclude strictly because it con statute is construed contrary suppress of the motion to Pease, principles. common-law travenes law. (citing

531 N.E.2d at 1208 State v. Hol CONCLUSION 832, land, 273 Ind. 403 N.E.2d (1980)). we conclude foregoing, Based on the of Renzulli's grant governing appeals The Indiana statute contrary was not provides: the State in criminal matters law. supreme court or to the Affirmed. appeals, court of if the court rules so be taken the state in provide,[3] MATHIAS, J., concurs in result with following cases: separate opinion. (1)

BRADFORD, J., a motion to separate granting with From an order dissents opinion. dismiss an indictment or information. party raises the issue of the timeli 2. Neither sponte. Jernigan, the issue sua 894 N.E.2d Nevertheless, appeal. ness of the State's jurisdic timely filing notice of is a of a prerequisite tional that can be raised suc provide' clause 'if the court rules so 3. "[The sponte parties question if the do not even intended to differentiate between the re is jurisdictions Supreme spective jurisdiction. Jernigan v. 1044, (Ind.Ct.App.2008); thereby v. Appeals, Bohlander and act as a Court of Bohlander, 299, guide for the State as to which to counsel Jackson, properly 2007), appellate court the should (citing Georgos v. trans. denied Thus, not ... intended to (Ind.2003)). filed with. clause is sub waived, ject jurisdiction require adoption appellate court rules matter cannot be of authorizing appeals by v. obligated the State" State courts at all levels are to consider judgment ap- a final and was prosecution (2) for the judgment order or From an under Indiana Code section 35- defendant, pealable motion for dis- upon his his trial not delay 38-4-2(5). Hunter, of charge because See State v. act, upon plea (Ind.Ct.App.2009); or his by his caused (Ind.Ct. Snider, and ruled jeopardy, presented 892 N.E2d former judg trial. from this final prior to It was upon App.2008). have perfected ment that the State should (8) a motion to order From an appeal. correct errors.

(4) by the question reserved Upon notice of filing But instead of state, acquitted. if the defendant is Octo thirty days of the trial court's within (5) a motion to From an order pursuant ber evidence, the ultimate ef- if 9(A)(1), Rule filed preclude order is to further fect titled a "motion to reconsider" what it prosecution. later, three weeks on November almost if interlocutory order any From the trial court denied the motion the eourt on

trial court certifies and later, on November 2009.4 It one week on judge thereof finds appeal or well settled that a motion to reconsider petition that: "extend the time for further does not action, motion, (A) or required permitted or will suffer substan- appellant 53.4(A)5 injury Ind. Trial proceedings." damage, tial expense, the de- the order is erroneous and And, it was filed importantly, most because *6 withheld until termination thereof is judgment, entry final after of judgment; after should have been treated as State's motion to correct error. See Hubbard v. a motion (B) the order involves substantial (Ind.Ct. law, early Hubbard, determi- question of N.E.2d (a prop is App.1998) motion to reconsider a more promote nation of which will a mo case; only judgment, er before final disposition of the orderly judg final to reconsider filed after tion (C) remedy by appeal judg- after as a motion to ment should be considered inadequate. otherwise ment is error).6 correct (emphasis § Ind.Code 35-38-4-2 added). error, motion to correct Even as a cireumstances, normal under

Here, granted Renzulli's the trial court thirty days have had on October 2009. would then motion to motion of the trial court's denial of its suppressed court's order date Because the trial appeal. App. file notice of See R. investiga- from the to stemming all evidence effectively precluded further 9(A){(1). Here, tory stop, it appeal the State's notice of Williams, Criminal Procedure. Ritchie v. the Rules of statute). 1983) (Ind.2004). (referring predecessor to 12, 2009, the State still had 4. As November incorporate[d]" "expressly 6. Trial Rule 59 is thirty time to file its notice of within 16(B) applicable "insofar as Criminal Rule days of the trial court's October any specific in with and when not conflict suppress. See order the motion to Supreme adopted by the Indiana rule 9(A)(1). Ind. procedure." conduct of criminal for Ritchie, apply 16(B); Trial Rules to criminal 5. The Indiana N.E.2d at 268. Crim. R. proceedings they not conflict with do 14, 2009, just with statutory right December State's to in crimi was filed on derogation nal cases is in of the common thirty-day period.7 in time strictly law and must therefore be con are not normal cireumstances But these Pease, strued. See 531 N.E.2d at 1208. appeal in crim State's because the strictly It tempting limited statute. to believe that the effect inal cases is 1010; Gradison, Aynes, legislative oversight. 715 of statute is Hicks, 948; 453 N.E.2d at 1016. But Assembly N.E.2d at the General could well have above, governing pro reasonably statute chosen to allow the State As noted denial, may appeal grant, vides that the State from the but not the "[from granting a motion to correct example, errors." of a motion to correct error. For 35-38-4-2(8) added). if a to file a defendant chooses (emphasis § ILC. however, Here, the trial court demied the correct error after a motion granted motion, simply State's and there is no stat suppress, the defendant is the one choos utory authority ing delay for the State to the normal appellate process denying practice. from an order the State's own if the State discretionary files a motion to correct er motion to correct error. initially prevails, ror after the defendant it purpose clear structure delay is the State who acts to the normal to pro- Indiana Code section 35-38-4-2 is appellate process, while the defendant's vide the State and its citizens with an liberty remains at perhaps risk or is even exclusive list of six instances in which the restrained. In this it regard, is also in permitted State is a criminal structive that the Assembly General has many "bright case. There are not lines" constitutional, exercised its policy-making law, but Indiana Code section 35-38-4- authority by adding grounds for State ap Interpreting is meant to be one. peals in eriminal proceedings over the his prohibit statute to allow what it does not See, tory of eg., the statute. State v. contrary would run to both its letter and McMillan, 274 Ind. spirit. 260 Ind. Sterp, See State *7 612, (1980) (noting 616-17 that 1955 (19783)("when 245, 292 N.E.2d 246 permitting amendment to statute the State sovereign capacity brought state in its appeal to judgment from discharging a tribunals, citizen into its own before its defendant in response previous to officers, own and in obedience to its own court holdings that State could not appeal lost, processes, avenging and hand Williams, judgments); such v. State stayed except should be in unusual cases 582, (Ind.Ct.App.1983) 583 power appeal where the to expressly (noting that 1981 amendment to statute conferred.") (quoting 92 ALR. 1137 allowing the State to appeal from interloc (1934)). Even if it unlikely seems utory adopted expand orders was to Assembly General intended to deprive the limited instances in which the State could right appeal State the to when it chooses appeal). error, to file a motion to correct and even if might make logically reasons, more sense to read For all of these I would hold permit statute to appeal although State to right State had the to from the denial of its own motion to cor- from the trial grant- court's order ing Renzulli's error, suppress, motion to rect the case law is clear that Saturday, giving which fell on a 7. The trial court denied the State's motion to 12, 2009, thirty reconsider on November following Monday, until December timely appeal. 12, 2009, days file a notice of after this date is December

207 pro 'substantial evidence of forfeited when ord discloses appeal was State's the trial court's supports within bative value that notice of failed to file its it Washington, 898 The State State v. days after that order. decision'" thirty (Ind.2008) (quoting from its 1203 authority N.E.2d had no simply (Ind. reconsider, interim, Quirk, N.E.2d 340 v. denied State law a operation 2006)). that was motion reweigh the evidence. We do State, See State v. negative to correct errors. from a appealing Id. The 586, 587, N.E.2d Ind.App. Buckley, 175 show that the trial court's judgment, must curiam) con on the motion was ruling (dismissing (per controlling statute by State where trary to law. Id. authority provide did not It well-established that even a brief a new defendant following of its stop of an automobile and detention trial). constitutes a seizure under the oceupants ap- I that the State's Although believe of the States Fourth Amendment United dismissed, the ef- practical be peal should I, and Article section 11 of Constitution that the would be fect of such a dismissal Smith, the Indiana State v. Constitution. Renzulli's mo- trial court's order (Ind.Ct.App.1994). would remain undis- tion to investigative stop a brief Judge turbed. This is the same result as justified by suspicion reasonable Riley's conclusion ac person detained is involved eriminal should be affirmed on suppression order State, tivity. Finger v. concur in result.

the merits. I therefore (Ind.2003) Ohio, v. (citing Terry 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 88 S.Ct. U.S. J., BRADFORD, dissenting. (1968)). suspicion "The reasonable stan the trial court Because I believe that demanding probable than dard is less erroneously Renzulli's motion to granted considerably requires showing cause the in- evidence, all evidence derived from preponderance less than a stop of Renzulli's vehicle and vestigatory minimal requires but it still at least a level timely ap- filed the instant that the State justification and more than an objective peal, respectfully dissent. unparticularized suspicion inchoate activity." Teague hunch of criminal Erroneously The Trial

I. Granted Renzulli's Motion justify investigatory In order to Suppress *8 officer must be able to stop, police erroneously I believe that the trial court and articulable facts point specific motion to be- granted Renzulli's which, together with the when considered police I conclude that officers cause would facts, inferences drawn from those rational stop ample suspicion had reasonable of suspicion create a reasonable criminal appeal, the State Renzulli's vehicle. On part conduct on the of the vehicle's occu sup- that the trial court erred in argues pants. Smith, at 1355.The 638N.E.2d the evidence that was recovered

pressing suspicion determination of reasonable during investigative stop traffic of Teague, de novo. reviewed offi- police Renzulli's vehicle because 1128. suspicion cers involved had reasonable investiga- make an police A officer stop. appellate "In the review of make tory upon of an automobile based suppress, stop the re- a trial court's that a police dispatcher information from a court determines whether the ree- viewing 208 reported had to believe the driver of the blue Volks-

concerned citizen erratically. being wagen, driven who was later determined to be automobile Smith, Generally, Renzulli, at 1855. N.E.2d in- operating a vehicle while victim of a citizen includes the concerned toxicated in violation of Indiana law. personally who wit person crime or a would therefore reverse the trial court's State, crime. Pawloski sup- Renzulli's motion to nesses a N.E.2d Ind. press. (1978). usually citizens are Concerned II. Timeliness is Not an Issue of such that no basis one-time informants Subject Matter Jurisdiction prior dealings exists from to determine matter, As an initial I would note that reliability. their Id. concerned challenge Renzulli did not of timeliness provide citizens who law enforcement offi the State's notice of before this identifying gen are cials with information Therefore, court. I believe that chal erally considered reliable because "a lenge timeliness of State's notice reputation known or identified informant's of has been waived. See Timber may] ... can be assessed and be held [he State, (Ind. lake v. allegations if responsible turn out to [his] 2001) (providing generally that an issue be fabricated...." Washburn v. available, was known and but not raised on (Ind.Ct.App.2007) (quota N.E.2d waived). appeal, agree direct it is While I omitted), tion trans. denied. Judge "timely with filing Mathias Here, I believe that the record estab- of appeal jurisdictional of notice is a lishes that the officers had reasonable sus- prerequisite, and failure to conform to the picion investigatory stop to conduct an applicable time limits results in forfeiture Renzulli's vehicle. The record establishes Bohlander, appeal," of an Bohlander v. that a concerned citizen alerted officers to 301 (Ind.Ct.App.2007), trans. by an driving driving erratic individual denied, I do not believe that timeliness is a Volkswagen.

blue This citizen concerned question subject jurisdiction. matter provided law enforcement officials with his Subject jurisdiction matter is "[JJurisdic identity phone and his number. He de- tion over the nature of the case and the driving being scribed the erratic as "all type sought." of relief Buack's Law Dictio running over the road" and over a eurb. Nary (8th Appellate ed. Indiana p. Tr. concerned citizen notified 5(A) explicitly Rule defines "nature of law enforcement officials of both his loca- types cases and sought" of relief over tion and the location of the blue Volks- subject which this court wagen. juris has matter light coupled these facts 5(A) with the rational inferences that officers diction. Appellate provides Rule as 4,[8] "Except provided follows: in Rule facts, could draw these I believe that police suspicion officers had reasonable Appeals jurisdic Court of shall have 4(A) (b) provides Judgments Indiana declaring of Final *9 Supreme the Indiana Court shall have man- state or federal statute unconstitutional in | datory jurisdiction and exclusive over the fol- part. in wholeor lowing cases: (c) Appeals involving parental waiver of (a) Appeals Criminal in which a sentence of consent to abortion under Rule 62. imprisonment parole death or life without (d) Appeals involving mandate of funds un- imposed § is under Ind.Code 35-50-2-9 60.5(B) der Trial Rule and Rule 61. Appeals post and Criminal conviction relief cases in which the sentence was death. timeliness has question of of believe Judgments from Final appeals in all tion notwithstanding, I waived. Waiver been Probate, County Cireuit, and Superior, law, the State's notice of statute believe that Courts, notwithstanding any directly timely to the was filed. for providing or rule of Indiana." Supreme Timely Filed III. Appeal the Instant jurisdiction: types of "There are three (2) matter; (1) subject jurisdiction of matter, appeals the instant the State (8) jurisdic jurisdiction person, granting Renzulli's Kondamu case." particular tion over the It is well-established suppress. Kondamuri, ri v. may appeal from criminal subject The issue of (Ind.Ct.App.2003). by stat only when authorized proceedings by deter is resolved jurisdiction matter Gradison, ute. State involved falls whether the claim mining (Ind.Ct.App.2001) (citing State v. authority of con general scope within Aynes, by the Indiana Consti ferred on the court 1999)). Further, because the State's statu Id. a court by or statute. When tution in criminal cases is in tory right jurisdiction, its ac subject matter lacks principles, contravention of common-law at may tions are void ab imitio strictly is construed. statutory right On the other at time. Id. tacked (Ind. Pease, State v. hand, case particular over the jurisdiction Ct.App.1988). authority, and right, a court's refers to (2008) Indiana section 35-88-4-2 Code specific decide a case power to hear and may appeal when the State establishes over which it has within the class of cases Indiana proceedings. from eriminal Code judg AId. subject jurisdiction. matter provides as follows: section 35-38-4-2 juris that lacks by ment rendered a court or to the supreme to the court is voidable particular over the class diction if rules appeals, court of the court so objection or the lack requires timely be taken the state provide, case is jurisdiction particular of over the following cases: at 1156-57. waived. Id. (1) a motion From an order of timeliness I believe that issue an indictment or informa- to dismiss authority, and right, court's refers to this tion. specific decide a case power to hear and (2) judgment or for From an order which this the class of cases over within defendant, motion for upon his See subject jurisdiction. matter court has delay his trial discharge because of Therefore, I that time at 1156. believe id. act, plea his upon his not caused over the question jurisdiction liness is a presented and jeopardy, of former Moreover, be particular case. See id. trial. upon prior ruled ques is a I believe that timeliness cause (3) a motion From an order case, jurisdiction particular over the tion of errors. to correct timeliness challenge I believe that (4) reserved Upon question challenged by is waived not state, acquitted. if the defendant Kondamuri, 799 N.E.2d party. See either 1156; Timberlake, 753 N.E.2d at 597 granting a motion From an order evidence, if the ultimate if an issue providing generally that (again *10 preclude is to fur- available, effect of the order not raised on was known and but prosecution. ther waived). Therefore, it is appeal, direct (6) any interlocutory order if on granted From Renzulli's motion October certifies and the court trial the trial 2009. The court's court order judge thereof finds on suppress or Renzulli's motion to amounted to appeal on judgment that: a final because it the petition precluded using principal State from of evi items (A) appellant will suffer sub- prosecution dence which were vital to its damage, injury or expense, stantial Williams, Renzulli. See 445 N.E.2d at and the order is erroneous if the The State filed a motion to reconsid thereof is withheld determination 5, 2009, Judge er on November which Mat judgment; until after correctly hias treats a motion as to correct (B) the order involves a substantial effectively error because it was filed after law, early determi- question entry judgment. of a final See Hub promote nation of which will a more Hubbard, bard v. case; orderly disposition (Ind.Ct.App.1998) (providing that because (C) remedy by appeal after motions to reconsider and to correct error otherwise judgment inadequate. is motion, effectively are the same a motion The ultimate effect of an order to entry reconsider filed after the of final preclude motion to is to further judgment should be treated as a motion to when, here, prosecution error). correct trial court denied the precludes using prin order the State from State's motion to correct error on Novem cipal of evidence which are vital to items ber 2009. The State subsequently ini prosecution of the defendant. See tiated an appeal on December 2009.9 Williams, State v. (Ind.Ct.App.1983)(providing sup provides Trial Rule 59 that generally, a pression amounted to a dismissal of motion to correct error is not a prerequi precluded the action because the order appeal. site for there are limit using principle State from items of evi- circumstances, ed none of which apply to case). denee which were vital to the State's matter, the instant when a party is re appealable Such an order is as a final quired to file a motion to correct error (5) judgment under subsection of Indiana before an initiating appeal.10 See Tr. R. Hunter, Code section 35-88-4-2. State v. 59(A). If party chooses or required to (Ind.Ct.App.2009). error, file a motion to correct it "shall be Here, Renzulli filed a motion to thirty filed no later than days after certain at trial. The trial entry evidence court of a final judgment or an appeal- 59(A). Further, 9. The trial court denied the State's motion to exceedingly Tr. R. it seems 12, 2009, thirty reconsider on November unlikely, impossible, if not in these situ- days date is after December ations the State would be able to file a mo- 12, 2009, however, December fell on a Satur- error, tion to correct ruling, receive a day, giving following the State until the Mon- thirty day initiate an within the time day, timely December file a no- 9(A). period set forth in appeal. tice of Therefore, seemingly unintended result of Judge opinion Mathias's is that the illogical 10. It seems that the General Assem- situations, some could find itself in a "Catch bly require could have intended to precluded 22" situation where it could be forfeit its if it first filed a following procedural requirement motion to correct error because the State could, prior that it file a motion to correct error theory, required least to file a its notice of if it wished to prerequisite correct error as a ruling of the trial court. initiating in some instances. See *11 9(A). Rule To the recognized by Appellate 59(C). Tr. R. A motion final order." able sug- denied if the opinion error is deemed extent that Mathias's to correct Judge 35-38-4-2(8) the motion for a court fails to set trial acts gests that Indiana Code the forty-five days after hearing within appealing the State from the instant to bar filed or fails to rule on motion was pursuant to Indiana Code 35-88-4- matter days after it was thirty within 2(5) to correct merely because the motion 58.3(A). heard. Tr. R. was filed the State in re- error that 9(A) suppression ruling to a trial court's sponse provides Rule Appellate Indiana by filing a "party appeal a initiates an denied, that I Indiana believe Code 35-38-4-2(8) with the trial court clerk Appeal Notice of apply does not section (80) entry a thirty days after the because, within Judge instant matter as Mathias Ap- Indiana Judgment." Final asserts, correctly Indiana section 35- Code 9(A) provides further a pellate Rule 38-4-2(3) presupposes that the motion to motion to correct "party timely files a correct error would have been filed error, Appeal a Notice of must be filed defendant, unlikely as it is that the State (80) thirty days after the court's within appeal granting would an order its own motion, days thirty on such ruling Therefore, I not believe that motion. do motion is deemed denied under after the 85-38-4-2(8) any Indiana Code section has 58.8, whichever comes first." Trial Rule right appeal effect on the State's an 9(A) Thus, Appellate party Rule allows a motion to evi- timely appeal following ruling a on to file pursuant dence to Indiana Code section error, to correct and ensures that a motion 85-38-4-2(5). first a motion party who chooses to file relinquish to correct error does his Moreover, I believe that the General judgment. in Assembly intends for statutes to be read harmony appellate with trial and rules recognizes that under Judge Mathias explicit absent an statement to the con cireumstances, normal the State's trary. Supreme The Indiana Court has However, I timely filed. believe that held that where a statute is in conflict with squarely the instant matter falls under procedural appellate trial and rules these "normal cireumstances" because the govern litigation, which the conduct of seemingly State acted accordance with conflicting take over the precedent rules appellate timely the trial and rules first statutes. State ex rel. pursuant a motion to correct error Gaston Gibson filing initiating timely (Ind. Rule 59 and then Court, Circuit Trial 9(A). 1984). Therefore, Rule appeal pursuant Appellate Judge the extent that opinion provides Mathias's Indiana was filed in accor- State's precludes section 35-38-4-2 Code 35-38-4-2(5), Indiana dance with Code exercising option State from its to file mentioned, which, provides as previously motion to correct error in accordance with that the State from "order 9(A), evidence, if Trial Rule 59 and a motion to trial rules appellate believe that pre- effect of the order is to the ultimate precedent should take over Indiana Code prosecution." Nothing clude further where, Accordingly, section 35-38-4-2. relevant portion section 5 or other here, timely filed a motion to the State from exer- precludes the statute subsequently initiated its to correct correct error cising option to file a motion with Trial Rule 59 error in accordance with Trial Rule 59 as in accordance *12 9(A), ap- believe timely. considered should be peal STATE HOSPITAL

RICHMOND Similarly In

All Situated State Other Agencies, Appellants-

stitutions

Defendants, BRATTAIN,1 Ernst, Re

Paula Francis Terry Sutcliffe, Strong, Individ

becca Collectively,

ually, and on Behalf Similarly Situated, Appel

All Others

lees-Plaintiffs.

No. 49A02-0908-CV-718.

Court of Indiana.

8,Oct. Denied Dec.

Rehearing Veregge. 1. Paula now Brattain is deceased and has nie replaced representative by been as class Jen-

Case Details

Case Name: State v. Renzulli
Court Name: Indiana Court of Appeals
Date Published: Oct 5, 2010
Citation: 935 N.E.2d 200
Docket Number: 32A04-1003-CR-194
Court Abbreviation: Ind. Ct. App.
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