STATE OF OHIO v. WILLIAM J. REEVES
C.A. No. 27230
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COUNTY OF SUMMIT, OHIO
Dated: November 26, 2014
[Cite as State v. Reeves, 2014-Ohio-5259.]
APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT ENTERED IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS COUNTY OF SUMMIT, OHIO CASE Nos. CR 08 02 0386, CR 09 07 2200, CR 12 04 0938, CR 12 04 1076, CR 13 03 0710
WHITMORE, Judge.
{¶1} Appellant, William Reeves, appeals from the judgment of the Summit County Court of Common Pleas. This Court affirms.
I
{¶2} In May 2013, Reeves hаd five pending cases, and the trial court held a single plea hearing. Pursuant to a plea agreement, Reeves agreed to plead guilty to various charges in exchange for an eight-year prison sentence and the dismissal оf the remaining charges. The court conducted a plea colloquy and accepted his plea. After finding Rеeves guilty, the court proceeded straight to sentencing.
{¶3} During the sentencing portion of the hearing, Reeves requеsted the court delay the execution of his sentence so that he could have surgery to repair his arm, which had been injured
{¶4} Shortly after sentencing, Reeves filed motions to modify his sentence, waive court costs, and have a transcript prepared at the State‘s expense. The court denied his motions. In January 2014, Reeves, pro se, filed a motion seeking a delayed appeal. This Court granted his motion and appointed him appellate counsel. Reeves, through his attorney, now raises one assignment of error for our review.
II
Assignment of Error
APPELLANT‘S PLEA WAS NOT KNOWING, INTELLIGENT AND VOLUNTARY AS IT WAS BASED UPON PROMISES WHICH COULD NOT OR WERE NOT KEPT.
{¶5} In his sole assignment of error, Reeves argues that his plea is constitutionally invalid because it was based on a “promise from the judge” that he would “be evaluated and receive his needed surgery as quickly as possible.”
{¶6} “When a defendant enters a plea in a criminal case, the plea must be made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntаrily. Failure on any of those points renders enforcement of the plea unconstitutional under both the United States Cоnstitution and the Ohio Constitution.” State v. Lewis, 9th Dist. Summit No. 27222, 2014-Ohio-4559, ¶ 5, quoting State v. Barker, 129 Ohio St.3d 472, 2011-Ohio-4130, ¶ 9. If a defendant is induced into pleading guilty based upon a promise by the court and the court dоes not fulfill that promise, the defendant‘s plea is not voluntary. See State v. Bortner, 9th Dist. Lorain No. 13CA010494, 2014-Ohio-4121, ¶ 15.
{¶8} At the plea hearing, the State put the terms of the plеa negotiations on the record as it understood them to be. The State‘s recitation of the agreement includеd a detailed list of which charges Reeves would plead guilty to, which charges the State would move to dismiss, and the agreed to sentence. Defense counsel confirmed that the State had provided an accurate recitation “as to the counts to which he would be pleading and as to the aggregate sentence.” There was no mention of surgery at this point.
{¶9} The court proceeded to conduct a plea colloquy, during which it reviewed the written рlea agreement with Reeves, explained the maximum sentences for the offenses to which he was pleading guilty, аnd apprised him of his various constitutional rights. Reeves repeatedly indicated that he understood and twice cоnfirmed that he had the opportunity to review the written plea form and had not been forced, coerced, or threatened to plead guilty. The court found Reeves had made a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary decision to enter a plea of guilty. At no point during the plea portion of the hearing did the State, Reeves, defense counsel, or the court mention surgery. The written plea agreement signed by Reeves is also devoid of any mention of surgery.
{¶10} After the court found Reeves guilty, the parties waived a pre-sentence investigation report and the court, without objectiоn, proceeded to sentencing. The court asked Reeves if he had anything he wanted to say to mitigate his sentenсe. In response, Reeves discussed his troubles with addiction, thanked various people for their support, and, then, in сlosing, asked the court:
Before you send me to prison, let me get surgery on my arm for the police dog ripping my tricep in half. And Crystal Clinic, my doctors, I will pay for it.
You can put a 25 to life over my head and make sure I go to prison afterwards. And so that I could also give my mom a hug, because she had heart surgery and a heart valve replacement surgery. Thаt‘s why I wanted to do this Tuesday. * * *.
{¶11} The court imposed the agreed to sentence for the various offenses and then stated:
On the issue of your arm, I‘m going to – I have no problem with you getting that – they have excellent medical care involved in the institution. I‘m going to order that he have that surgery evaluated and performed as soon as possible, but I‘m not going to have you do that outside of the institution.
{¶12} The record does not support Reeves’ contention that his plea was based upon a promise by the court that he would receive surgery. There was no discussion of surgery until after he entered his plea. If there is proof outside of the record that supports Reeves’ position that surgery was part of the plea negotiations, a petition for post-conviction relief would be the appropriate remedy. Sеe State v. Porter, 9th Dist. Medina No. 12CA0061-M, 2013-Ohio-3969, ¶ 38.
{¶13} Reeves’ sole assignment of error is overruled.
III
{¶14} Reeves’ assignment of error is overruled. The judgment of the Summit County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
There were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
We order that a spеcial mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common Pleas, County of Summit, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to
Costs taxed to Appellant.
BETH WHITMORE
FOR THE COURT
HENSAL, P. J.
CARR, J.
CONCUR.
APPEARANCES:
ALAN M. MEDVICK, Attorney at Law, for Appellant.
SHERRI BEVAN WALSH, Prosecuting Attorney, and RACHEL M. RICHARDSON, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Appellee.