State v. RayburnsState v. Rayburns
- Reporters:
- , ,
- Before:
- Castillo
OPINION
CASTILLO, Judge.
{1} In this case, we examine the scope of our Supreme Court‘s decision in State v. Heinsen, 2005-NMSC-035, 138 N.M. 441, 121 P.3d 1040, to determine if Heinsen permits the State to benefit from a new six-month period under
I. BACKGROUND
{2} On August 6, 2005, Defendant was arrested for driving while intoxicated (DWI), failure to use a signal properly, and violation of the open container law. He was arraigned in magistrate court on August 16, 2005. After a number of hearings and resettings, Defendant‘s magistrate court bench trial was scheduled to take place on February 8, 2006.
{3} On the day of trial, Defendant made an oral motion in limine, arguing that the results of his breath test should not be admitted into evidence because of the State‘s failure to provide the relevant certification for the machine used to test Defendant. The State asserted that it had provided a certification but conceded that the certification related to the wrong time period. Finding that the State had failed to timely disclose the appropriate certification, the magistrate court granted Defendant‘s motion and excluded the breath test results. Following this ruling, the State orally announced its intent to dismiss the charges pending in magistrate court.
{4} The next day, the State refiled the same charges in district court but did not file a written notice of dismissal until a month later, on March 9, 2006. Defendant was arraigned in district court on April 17, 2006. Shortly after his arraignment, Defendant filed a motion to dismiss based on a violation of the six-month rule,
{5} In its order, the district court made the following findings: (1) the time period to take Defendant to trial would have been February 14, 2006, which was 182 days from the date of arraignment in magistrate court; (2) the State filed its written dismissal of the magistrate court charges 205 days after the arraignment; (3) the State maintained that Defendant‘s oral motion was a motion to suppress evidence; (4) no new evidence or facts had been discovered by the State subsequent to its oral dismissal; and (5) the State had not demonstrated a reasonable basis for dismissing the magistrate court charges and
II. DISCUSSION
{6} The State‘s main contention is that the district court erred in not reading Heinsen to allow refiling in district court and the running of a new six-month period after arraignment. The State also argues that the district court incorrectly interpreted and applied
A. Standard of Review
{7} We conduct a de novo review of the district court‘s application of the six-month rule. See State v. Carreon, 2006-NMCA-145, ¶ 5, 140 N.M. 779, 149 P.3d 95 (“We review a district court‘s application of
B. The Six-Month Rule
{8} Because the heart of this appeal deals with the six-month rule, we provide a short review of how this rule functions. The rules of criminal procedure for both magistrate and district courts contain limits regarding the time for commencement of a defendant‘s criminal trial. See
{9} Typically, these rules require the dismissal of criminal charges, with prejudice, if the defendant‘s trial has not commenced within 182 days or six months from a triggering event, such as arraignment. See
{10} If a defendant challenges the state‘s refiling of charges in district court on a six-month rule violation, the state bears the burden of demonstrating that its actions were legitimate. This requires the state to demonstrate that its actions were not done for bad reasons or an improper purpose. See State ex rel. Delgado v. Stanley, 83 N.M. 626, 627, 495 P.2d 1073, 1074 (1972) (holding that if a defendant asserts that the state‘s action was to delay or otherwise circumvent the rule, “the [s]tate must be prepared to demonstrate by proof the bona fides of the procedure it has utilized and that it has not been followed to delay [the] defendant‘s trial beyond the six-month period . . . or to circumvent the operation of the rule“); see also Bolton, 1997-NMCA-007, ¶¶ 1, 8, 10-12, 122 N.M. 831, 932 P.2d 1075 (determining that the general rule of prosecutorial discretion includes the commensurate rule that when a defendant asserts that the state‘s actions were done to circumvent the six-month rule or for another bad reason, the court can dismiss the case where the state fails to satisfy its burden to demonstrate that its actions were not done for bad reasons).
{11} In this context, “fluctuations in the stories of witnesses, the unavailability and subsequent reappearance of witnesses,” or “newly discovered evidence” may constitute a good and sufficient reason for the termination and reinstitution of a criminal prosecution. Delgado, 83 N.M. at 627, 495 P.2d at 1074; see also State v. Vigil, 114 N.M. 431, 433, 839 P.2d 641, 643 (Ct.App.1992) (permitting a new six-month period when the amended complaint contained significant change); State v. Aragon, 99 N.M. 190, 192-93, 656 P.2d 240, 242-43 (Ct.App.1982) (permitting a new six-month period due to newly discovered facts). New Mexico appellate courts also allow the application of a new six-month period in other circumstances, such as when the trial court rejects a plea bargain, when the defendant is in a pre-prosecution diversion program, and when an event is to the mutual benefit of the parties. See, e.g., State v. Sanchez, 109 N.M. 313, 316, 785 P.2d 224, 227 (1989) (setting aside a literal application of the six-month rule if a plea agreement is not approved); State v. Coburn, 120 N.M. 214, 217, 900 P.2d 963, 966 (Ct.App.1995) (setting aside a literal application of the six-month rule when an event extending pre-trial activity is to the mutual benefit of parties); State v. Altherr, 117 N.M. 403, 406, 872 P.2d 376, 379 (Ct.App.1994) (setting aside a literal application of the six-month rule when a defendant is participating in a pre-prosecution diversion program).
{12} However, lack of preparedness, delay, and circumvention of the six-month rule or other rules of procedure are improper purposes, for which the state does not receive the benefit of a new six-month period in district court. See, e.g., Heinsen, 2005-NMSC-035, ¶ 25, 138 N.M. 441, 121 P.3d 1040 (explaining that the six-month period does not recommence running if dismissal and refiling are done for the purpose of delay); Carreon, 2006-NMCA-145, ¶ 7, 140 N.M. 779, 149 P.3d 95 (noting that it is improper to use a dismissal to circumvent the six-month rule); Gardea, 1999-NMCA-116, ¶ 6, 128 N.M. 64, 989 P.2d 439 (holding that the state cannot use dismissal to circumvent rules of procedure); Bolton, 1997-NMCA-007, ¶ 11, 122 N.M. 831, 932 P.2d 1075 (stating that lack of preparedness is “prima facie a bad reason“).
C. Heinsen
{13} Recently, in Heinsen, our Supreme Court addressed the application of the six-month rule under circumstances somewhat similar to those presented here. Confronted with the state‘s dismissal of magistrate court proceedings and the state‘s refiling in district court after a suppression order, the Supreme Court held that the suppression of evidence is a sufficient basis for dismissing charges filed in magistrate court and for refiling in district court, provided that the suppressed evidence was substantial proof of a material fact in the proceedings and that the dismissal and refiling of charges was not done for the purpose of delay but was done to preserve
D. The State‘s Arguments Based on Heinsen
{14} Here, the State makes three arguments based on Heinsen. The first argument is as follows. Defendant‘s motion in limine was tantamount to a motion to suppress. Once the magistrate suppressed the breath test results, the State had no right to appeal; therefore, the State‘s only available remedy was to dismiss the magistrate court charges and refile them in district court. Heinsen then allows the State a new six-month period for the State to try the case again. Consequently, the district court erred in dismissing the refiled charges.
{15} While we acknowledge that the Supreme Court in Heinsen stated, as a general proposition, that “a new six-month rule period should begin to run when the [s]tate files a nolle prosequi following a suppression order by a magistrate court and refiles in district court,” id., the application of that general proposition to the facts of the present case requires additional analysis. Heinsen explicitly qualifies this general proposition by still requiring the state to demonstrate a reasonable basis for its procedural choices. Beyond the mere existence of a suppression order by the magistrate, Heinsen requires the state to show (1) that it acted in order to preserve its right to appeal and (2) that it did not do so for purposes of delay. Id.
{16} We do not believe that the State in the case at hand may simply point to any adverse magistrate ruling as providing a reasonable basis for a new six-month rule period under Heinsen. Instead, we believe Heinsen continues to require a reviewing court to look at the reasonableness of the State‘s basis for its chosen procedure, which would include a review of the particular order entered by the magistrate court. The State makes its second argument based on this recognition. According to the State, the reasonable basis for the dismissal of the magistrate court proceedings was the State‘s inability to prosecute the charges after the magistrate suppressed the results of Defendant‘s breath test, due to the State‘s alleged failure to provide material evidence to Defendant. However, Defendant contends that the State‘s intent in dismissing the magistrate court charges and refiling in district court was to circumvent the rules by avoiding the discovery sanction placed on the State by the magistrate court for failure to disclose.
{17} We agree with Defendant. The district Court found that the State failed to meet its burden under Heinsen because the State did not demonstrate a reasonable basis for dismissing and reinstituting the same criminal charges. We hold that the district court‘s determination was supported by substantial evidence. See Bolton, 1997-NMCA-007, ¶ 13, 122 N.M. 831, 932 P.2d 1075 (stating that questions of historical fact, such as what motivated the prosecutor, are subject to the deference of the substantial evidence standard).
{18} The magistrate court suppressed the results of the breath test administered to Defendant because the State had failed to timely disclose the appropriate machine certification. This ruling was entered on the day of trial, shortly before the six-month rule was set to expire. The State argues that as a consequence of the suppression order, it was unable to proceed. Furthermore, according to the State, it could not obtain an additional continuance without running afoul of the six-month rule. The State therefore elected to dismiss the magistrate court proceedings and refile the charges in district court. We view these circumstances — failure to produce the correct certification documentation — as similar to those in Lucero, a case in which the state‘s lack of preparedness resulted in the effective dismissal of magistrate court charges.
{19} We held in Lucero that where a prima facie bad reason exists, the state must demonstrate a good reason for refiling the
{20} Furthermore, the district court found and the parties do not contest that the complaint filed in district court was identical to that originally filed in magistrate court and that no new evidence or facts had been discovered by the State subsequent to the dismissal of the magistrate court proceedings. In light of the analysis in Lucero, there was sufficient evidence before the district court here to determine that the State had not demonstrated a reasonable basis for reinitiating the charges in district court.
{21} In Bolton, we noted that the rule stated in Lucero differs from the general rule permitting a new six-month period, unless a bad or improper reason for dismissal exists. Bolton, 1997-NMCA-007, ¶ 9, 122 N.M. 831, 932 P.2d 1075 (clarifying Lucero). In so noting, we drew a distinction between circumstances in which the reason for dismissal is a prima facie bad reason, such as the lack of preparedness present in Lucero, and other circumstances surrounding the refiling of charges in district court after the dismissal of magistrate court proceedings. We stated the following:
When the reason for dismissal is a lack of preparedness, which is the precise thing the six-month rule is supposed to guard against, then Lucero‘s analysis will apply and the case should be dismissed unless the prosecutor can offer a good reason for taking the action. Under any other circumstances, however, Delgado‘s analysis will apply and the case should be dismissed only when the prosecutor cannot demonstrate that the reason for dismissing was not a bad one.
Bolton, 1997-NMCA-007, ¶ 11, 122 N.M. 831, 932 P.2d 1075.
{22} Although we believe that the rule stated in Lucero is the appropriate analysis to apply, we would reach the same conclusion if we were to apply the general rule established in Delgado. Applying Delgado, we would determine whether there was sufficient evidence to support a finding that the State had an improper purpose for dismissing the magistrate court proceedings. See Delgado, 83 N.M. at 627, 495 P.2d at 1074; see also Bolton, 1997-NMCA-007, ¶¶ 11, 13, 122 N.M. 831, 932 P.2d 1075. Under the circumstances described above, there was substantial evidence from which the district court could conclude that the State was attempting to delay the running of the six-month period until the State could remedy its failure to disclose the appropriate certification and escape the consequences of a lack of preparedness. Dismissal of magistrate court proceedings to circumvent the six-month rule and to avoid the consequences of the State‘s lack of preparedness are improper purposes and do not entitle the State to the benefit of a new six-month rule period. See Heinsen, 2005-NMSC-035, ¶¶ 25-26, 138 N.M. 441, 121 P.3d 1040; Delgado, 83 N.M. at 627, 495 P.2d at 1074; Bolton, 1997-NMCA-007, ¶ 11, 122 N.M. 831, 932 P.2d 1075. We thus hold that the district court did not err in dismissing the criminal charges against Defendant for a violation of the six-month rule. Allowing the State a new six-month period after a sanction for the State‘s discovery violations would create a situation susceptible to manipulation
{23} In the third argument, the State contends that the magistrate and district courts had concurrent jurisdiction, pending the filing of the notice of dismissal in magistrate court. We read this to address Defendant‘s argument below that the State was not in compliance with Heinsen in that the State did not actually file its dismissal in magistrate court until March 6, 2005, outside of the 182-day period for the six-month rule set forth in
E. The State‘s Remaining Arguments
{24} We briefly address the remaining arguments included in the State‘s brief in chief. The State argues that the district court erred by applying the magistrate six-month rule,
{25} If, on the other hand, the State is arguing that once jurisdiction transferred to district court, the court could only apply the district court rule,
{26} The State also argues that although Defendant filed a motion titled Motion to Dismiss — Speedy Trial, any argument regarding a violation of Defendant‘s right to a speedy trial was not preserved for appeal, since the only argument that Defendant presented in the motion or at the hearing before the district court was that the six-month rule was violated. We acknowledge the following: “A six-month rule issue is analytically separate from a constitutional speedy trial issue, and the two are distinct in their operation and reach.” State v. Stefani, 2006-NMCA-073, ¶ 18, 139 N.M. 719, 137 P.3d 659 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). However, we understand Defendant to concede this point by agreeing that no specific speedy trial argument was presented in the motion or the argument below. We therefore do not address the merits of a speedy trial claim in this matter.
III. CONCLUSION
{27} Based on the foregoing analysis, we hereby affirm the judgment of the district court.
{28} IT IS SO ORDERED.
WE CONCUR: JAMES J. W