Upon the close of the evidence the appellant moved the court to-“quash the indictment” for the reason that he could not be tried in Pitt County, since all of the evidence tended to show that the property involved, if stolen, was stolen in Beaufort County, and if received by him, was received by him in Wake County. The motion was denied by the court, and such denial is made the basis of exceptive assignments of error. The assignments cannot be sustained.
In order to sustain a conviction it is not necessary for the State to prove that the crime occurred in the county where the indictment is drawn, as, since the Act of 1844, “in the prosecution of all offenses it shall be deemed and taken as true that the offense wаs committed in the county in which by the indictment it is alleged to have taken place, unless the defendant shall deny the same by plea in abatement.” C. S., 4606.
S. v. Outerbridge,
In the absence of a plea in abatement, it was not necessary for the State in this case to invoke the provisions of C. S., 4250, to the effect that one chargеd with receiving stolen property knowing it to have been stolen may be tried in any county in which he shall have had such property in his possession or in any county in which the thief may be tried.
There was evidence tending to show that within less than a month preceding the date of the commission of the crime for which the appellant was being tried, namely, 5 April, 1935, there had been other offenses of a similar nature committed by the appellant, and some of the other parties named in the bill of indictment, and that shortly after said date other stоlen cigarettes were obtained from the appellant. This evidence was introduced by the State and admitted by the court over objection by the appellant, and is mаde the basis for exceptive assignments of error. There was no error in the admission of this evidence, since it comes within a well recognized exception to the genеral rule that a particular crime may not be proved by evidence of distinct substantive offenses. The exception is that when it becomes necessary to prove the guilty knowledge of the accused, evidence of similar independent offenses committed by him is competent to show such knowledge, or
scienter.
In
S. v. Twitty,
which he passed the note is to be collected from the concomitant circumstances.” See, also,
S. v. Walton,
This exception to the general rule applies not only to prior transactions of the accused but also to his recent subsequent transactions of a similar nature. In
S. v. Murphy,
The evidence of prior collateral offenses which the State introduced tended to prove that 26 cases of stolen Chesterfield cigarettes were hiddеn at Youngsville, in Franklin County, and that the appellant, in March, about two weeks before the date alleged in the bill of indictment as the date the defendant knowingly received stolеn property, went with some of his codefendants and hauled them “to a little place back of his house” in Wake County. The evidence of subsequent collateral offenses which the State introduced tended to prove that on 8 April and 15 April, three and ten days, respectively, after 5 April, 1935, the date alleged in the bill of indictment, four cases of Chesterfield and Camel cigarettes (two cases on each date), with no consignee marks on them, were obtained from the appellant in Wake County. All of this evidence as tо both prior and subsequent collateral offenses was sufficiently connected and contemporaneous with the crime charged to render it competent as tending tо prove that the appellant knew that the cigarettes named in the bill of indictment were stolen at the time he received them.
As to all the evidence relative to similаr collateral offenses, the court was careful upon its admission in each instance to instruct the jury that it was admitted only to show, if it did show, the knowledge on the part of the appellant that he was receiving stolen property when he received Lucky Strike cigarettes from his eodefendants on or about 5 April, 1935. This instruction was also repeated in the charge.
The appellant directs a number of exceptions to the court’s permitting the State to introduce, over his objection, parol evidence to еstablish the contents of Norfolk Southern freight car No. 20635, when there was evidence to the effect that the records of the railroad company showed such contents, uрon the theory that such records were the best evidence of the fact sought to be proved. While it is generally agreed that writings themselves furnish the best evidence of their cоntents, the “best evidence rule” has no application here, since the fact sought to be proved was whether certain cigarettes had been put in a certain сar, and had no relation whatsoever to the contents of any writing or record. No problem of primary and secondary evidence was presented. The making of a rеcord did not prohibit a witness, who loaded the car and saw what went into it, from testifying as to its contents. *778 The appellant assigns as error that “the trial court did not at any time instruct the jury thаt the burden of proof was upon the State, nor did it explain to the jury the meaning of burden of proof.” In the light of the charge as a whole, this assignment is untenable. At the outset of the charge his Honor correctly defined the offense of feloniously receiving stolen property knowing it to have been stolen, and told the jury that the defendant was presumed to be innocent until proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, and carefully explained the meaning of the words “reasonable doubt,” and, later on in the charge, instructed the jury as follows: “Now, gentlemen, right there, if you convict Garvey Ray, you would have to be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt, first, that he received the cigarettes at his filling station; and secondly, yоu would have to be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that at the time he received them he knew they were stolen goods. If you have a reasonable doubt about еither one of these essentials, you would return a verdict of not guilty as to Garvey Ray.” This instruction, when read contextually with the rest of the charge, fully meets the only exception to the charge brought forward in the appellant’s brief.
In the trial in the Superior Oourt we find no error.
The motion in arrest of judgment lodged in this Court is denied.
No error.