State v. RameyState v. Ramey
Case Information
*1
[Cite as
State v. Ramey
,
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT CLARK COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO :
:
Plaintiff-Appellee : Appellate Case No. 2017-CA-99 :
v. : Trial Court Case No. 2013-CR-776
:
SHANE R. RAMEY : (Criminal Appeal from
: Common Pleas Court) Defendant-Appellant :
:
. . . . . . . . . . .
O P I N I O N Rendered on the 8th day of February, 2019.
. . . . . . . . . . .
ANDREW P. PICKERING, Atty. Rеg. No. 0068770, Clark County Prosecutor’s Office, Appellate Division, 50 E. Columbia Street, Suite 449, Springfield, Ohio 45502
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellee MARSHALL G. LACHMAN, Atty. Reg. No. 0076791, 75 N. Pioneer Boulevard, Springboro, Ohio 45066
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant
. . . . . . . . . . . . .
FROELICH, J.
{¶ 1} Shane R. Ramey appeals the Clark County Common Pleas Court’s denial of his post-conviction motion to withdraw his guilty pleas to one count of trаfficking in cocaine and one count of having weapons while under disability. The judgment of the trial court will be affirmed.
Factual Background and Procedural History
{¶ 2} On November 12, 2013, a Clark County grand jury indicted Ramey on five counts: Count One, trafficking in cocaine, with a firearm specification; Count Two, possession of cocaine, with a firearm specificatiоn; Count Three, trafficking in marijuana, [1] with a firearm specification; Count Four, having weapons while under disability; [2] and Count Five, aggravated possession of drugs, with a firearm specification. Forfeiture specifications also attached to each count. Ramey appeared with counsel and entered a plea of not guilty to all counts. On January 15, 2014, Ramey moved to suppress all evidence seized during
a search of his residence, as well as any statements he made incident to what he characterized as his “illegal arrest.” Following an evidentiary hearing held on January 24, 2014, the trial court denied that initial motion to suppress. On February 3, 2014, Ramey filed a supplemental motion to suppress,
arguing that the warrant underlying the search of his residence was invalid and that all “fruits” of that warrant should be suppressed. On February 4, 2014, the trial court denied Ramey’s supplemental motion to suppress; the court’s entry stated in its entirety as follows:
The matter is before the Court on the motion of the Defendant to suppress evidence seized as a result of a search conducted pursuant to a search warrant. Following the denial of the defendant’s supplemental request for a Franks [3] hearing, the parties submitted the motion to the Court on the affidаvit and search warrant filed on November 1, 2013. (Joint Exhibit A) Upon review of the affidavit and warrant, the Court finds that the issuing judge had sufficient evidence to grant the warrant and that the terms of the warrant are consistent with the information provided to the judge. The Court having reviewed the evidence presented and the written arguments of counsel finds the motion is not [ ] well taken and the same is OVERRULED.
(Emphasis sic.) (Trial Court Docket (“Doc.”) #22). [4] On March 5, 2014, Ramey entered pleas of guilty to the Count One offense
of trafficking in cocaine in violation of
{¶ 6}
On May 9, 2014, Ramey’s trial counsel filed a notice of appeal from Ramey’s
conviction and sentence. Appellate counsel appоinted for purposes of that appeal filed a
brief pursuant to Anders v. California , 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493
(1967), stating that he had identified no appellate issues with arguable merit. We
thereafter granted Ramey 60 days – plus an extension that he requested – to file a pro
se brief. No pro se brief was filed. We therefore conducted an independent review, found
no issues with arguable merit, and affirmed the trial court’s judgment. State v. Ramey , 2d
Dist. Clark No. 2014-CA-62,
guilty pleas pursuant to
search Ramey’s residence “was issued on November 1, 2013 and executed on November
5, 2013,” but observing that “November 1, 2013 was a Friday,” and that in accordance
with
{¶ 9} On October 25, 2017, without first holding a hearing, the trial court denied Ramey’s motion to withdraw his plea, finding that “[t]he time to execute the search warrant had not lapsed” and that the basis for Ramey’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim therefore lacked merit. (Doc. #40). Ramey appeals that judgment, setting forth this single assignment of error:
“The trial court erred by in overruling [Ramey]’s motion to withdraw guilty pleas without a hearing.”
Standard of Review
Pursuant to
may permit him or her to withdraw a guilty plea “only to correct a manifest injustice.” See
State v. Harden , 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 24603,
{¶ 12}
We review a trial court’s decision on a motion to withdraw a guilty plea for
an abuse of discretion, which means “more than an error of lаw or judgment; it implies
that the court’s attitude is unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable.” State v. Harris . 2d
Dist. Montgomery No. 19013,
Preliminary Issue – Jurisdiction of Trial Court As a preliminary matter, we must examine whether the trial court had
jurisdiction to consider Ramey’s motion to withdraw his guilty pleas. “A defect in subject-
matter jurisdiction cannot be waived оr forfeited and may, therefore, be raised at any
time.” NVR, Inc. v. Centerville ,
of jurisdiction, but rather on its findings as to the merits of that motion, “a reviewing court
is not authorized to reverse a correct judgment merely because erroneous reasons were
assigned as a basis thereof.” State v. Blair ,
Merits of Ramey’s Motion to Withdraw Guilty Pleas Although our foregoing conclusion regarding the trial court’s lack of
jurisdiction obviates the need for further analysis, we nonetheless observe that the trial
court did not err in concluding that Ramey’s motion to withdraw his guilty pleas lacks
substantive merit. The undisputed facts establish that the search warrant was executed
within the time permitted by
allowed [for completing some action under the Rules of Criminal Procedure] is less than
seven days, intermediate Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays shall be excluded in
computation.” Under
“rel[ying] on findings regarding the search warrant that are not part of the record.” Specifically, he suggests that thе trial court’s denial of Ramey’s motion to withdraw his guilty pleas was based in part on evidence presented during a February 4, 2014 hearing p. 4; Doc. #13, Bill of Particulars; Doc. #17, Ramey’s original Motion to Suppress, p. 3). In fact, even if the warrant had been served on November 6, as Ramey’s appellate brief suggests (see fn.7, аbove), the search still would have been timely.
-10- on his supplemental motion to suppress, the transcript of which was omitted from the current record. [9] Ramey’s argument to that effect does not dissuade us from our prior
conclusion, for three reasons. First, contrary to Ramey’s suggestion, nothing in the trial court’s decisiоn denying Ramey’s motion to withdraw his plea indicates that the court relied on information presented at a February 4, 2014 hearing in reaching that decision. ( See Doc. #40). Second, nowhere does the record establish that an evidentiary hearing as to the supplemental motion to suppress actually oсcurred. [10] To the contrary, the trial court’s decision denying that supplemental motion to suppress states that the court “deni[ed] * * * [Ramey’s] * * * request for a Franks hearing” and “the parties submitted the motion to the Court on the affidavit and warrant filed on November 1, 2013.” (Doc. #22). It appears that the purportedly “missing” transcript may relate to a non-existent hearing. Third, even assuming that a hearing did occur, the dates that the warrant was issued and executed were not in dispute. We are able to discern the pertinent dates not only from the trial court’s decision, but from Ramey’s own filings as well as the complete record. [11] The absence of a February 4, 2014 hearing transcript is inconsequential to our conclusion. Finally, although Ramey’s argument on this appeal hinges entirely on the trial court’s failure to afford Ramey a hearing before denying his motion to withdraw his guilty pleas, Ramey’s reply memorandum in support of that motion stated that Ramey *11 -11- was “mov[ing] for summary judgment in lieu of an evidentiary hearing ,” because “no genuine issue of fact remain[s].” (Emphasis added.) (Doc. #37, p. 1). Having affirmatively waived a hearing on that motion, Ramey cannot now fault the trial court for failing to afford him such a hearing. The trial court did not err by failing to hold a hearing before denying Ramey’s
pоst-conviction motion to withdraw his guilty pleas, and Ramey’s sole assignment of error is overruled.
Conclusion The judgment of the trial court will be affirmed.
. . . . . . . . . . . . .
DONOVAN, J. and HALL, J., concur.
Copies sent to:
Andrew P. Pickering
Marshall G. Lachman
Hon. Richard J. O’Neill
Notes
[1] Spelled in the indictment as “mari h uana.” (Emphasis added.)
[2] The indictment states that Ramey had prior convictions for aggravated robbery and felonious assault.
[3] Presumably a reference to Franks v. Delaware ,
[4] It is unclear from the record whether or not the trial court held a hearing on Ramey’s supplemental motion to suppress before denying that motion. Although the record suggests that a transcript of such a hearing is missing ( see 6/19/18 Affidavit of Judith L. Pierce, Official Court Reporter), there is no indication in the trial court’s decision on that motion or elsewhere in the record that such a hearing actually occurred.
[5] The Ohio Supreme Court since has made clear that its decision in Special Prosecutors
“does not bar the trial court’s jurisdiction over posttrial motions permitted by the Ohio
Rules of Criminal Procedure.” State v. Davis , 131 Ohio St.3d 1,
[6] A copy оf the subject warrant, dated November 1, 2013, appears in the record as an attachment to Ramey’s motion to withdraw his guilty pleas. ( See Doc. #34).
[7] Ramey’s appellate brief states that the warrant was “executed on November 6, 2013” ( see Brief of Appellant, p. 6), but that unsubstantiated suggestion is contrary to all оther references in the record, which uniformly identify November as the date the search warrant was executed. ( See , e.g., Doc. #34, Ramey’s Motion to Withdraw Guilty Pleas,
[9] The record indicates that a “visiting” court reporter was assigned to cover the February 4, 2014 suppression hearing but failed to produce a transcript, despite multiple requests. ( See 6/19/18 Affidavit of Judith L. Pierce, Official Court Reporter).
[10] See fn.4, above .
[11] See fn. 6, above.