7 Conn. App. 660 | Conn. App. Ct. | 1986
The state appeals, with the permission of the trial court, from the judgment dismissing with prejudice the information against the defendant following the suppression of wiretap evidence. The issues involve: (1) the sufficiency of the affidavits accompanying the applications to support the findings of probable cause for the issuance of the wiretap orders; (2) whether probable cause was required as to this defendant, whose telephone was not the subject of the orders but who was one of the named targets of the taps; and (3) whether General Statutes § 54-41c (7) precludes from the probable cause determination information discovered more than twenty days prior to the date of the wiretap application. We find error and remand for further proceedings.
The defendant was charged with four counts involving possession, possession with intent to sell and possession with intent to use various illicit drugs, and with three counts of illegal possession of a pistol. These charges derived principally from evidence gathered pursuant to a search warrant directed at the defendant’s residence. Although this record is not clear, the charges also apparently derived from evidence gathered pursuant to a warrantless search of his car.
The defendant received the statutory notice that his telephone conversations had been intercepted pursuant to wiretap orders directed at the business telephones and the residence telephone of James Sayball, and pur
I
General Statutes § 54-41c requires that a wiretap application include thirteen specified sets of information which will permit the three judge wiretap panel to make a finding of probable cause, pursuant to General Statutes § 54-41d, as to nine specified criteria. See State v. Ross, 194 Conn. 447, 456-62, 481 A.2d 730 (1984). Because the trial court issued no memorandum of decision, orally or in writing, and because the state did not move for articulation, it would therefore arguably be necessary to review all twenty-two items. The parties have, however, narrowed the issues in this appeal to three, and our review of the two original wiretap applications and their accompanying affidavits satisfies us that all the other criteria, required by General Statutes §§ 54-41c and 54-41d, were fully met.
By two essentially similar applications dated October 14,1983, the state’s attorney for the Fairfield judicial district requested authorization to wiretap two telephone facilities: two telephone lines located at the Monroe Fish Market on Main Street in Monroe, Con
Each application was supported by essentially the same affidavit of Inspector John F. Solomon, of the Connecticut division of criminal justice. The critical portions of Solomon’s twenty-six page affidavit are as follows: On or about June 16, 1980, Sergeant Norman Mercier, commanding officer of the Monroe police department, received, from “a reliable and upstanding citizen,” information about a large-scale narcotics operation involving James Sayball at his business establishment known as the Monroe Fish Market on Main Street in Monroe, Connecticut. The informant, the reliability of whom no independent information was supplied, purportedly was acting as a concerned citizen who wanted to pass on information regarding the drug trafficking activities of Sayball, of Mark Ricca and of unknown others. The informant also told Mercier that he had been told by someone with personal knowledge that Sayball was transporting cocaine from outside Connecticut to the Monroe Fish Market, where he would supply others. The informant told Mercier that Ricca got his supply of cocaine from Sayball. Mercier
In December, 1982, Detective William Hughes of the Monroe police department received information from a confidential and reliable source, who had provided accurate information in the past, but was not in December speaking from personal knowledge, that Sayball was distributing cocaine of high quality. On December 31,1982, surveillance of the Monroe Fish Market disclosed that a 1980 Ford pick-up truck registered to Condor, Inc., was at the Monroe Fish Market. A Greenwich police department narcotics officer, Frank Garr, told Solomon that Condor, Inc., or “The Condor,” was known to the Greenwich police department as a tug boat business. Garr had been told by federal agents of the United States Customs Service and of the United States Coast Guard that The Condor was suspected of drug smuggling in Long Island Sound.
In January, 1983, Mercier and Solomon interviewed a confidential source who had given information in the past which had led to at least one arrest and conviction. This source, who lives near Sayball, told Mercier and Solomon that on several occasions in the previous several months he had seen, in the early morning hours of various days of the week, including Saturdays and Sundays, excessive traffic of campers, vans, pick-up trucks and passenger cars pull to the top of Sayball’s driveway and back to the rear of a barn located at the rear of Sayball’s property. Another confidential source who lives in the same general area confirmed these activities.
On October 1, 1983, Solomon received from a federal drug enforcement administration (DEA) agent, Dale J. Seymour, copies of telephone toll call records
For a clearer understanding of the import of the toll call and pen register information, we have chosen to divide the information according to the persons and establishments indicated by the toll call data and the pen register as having been called by and as having called the Sayball business and residence telephones.
Edward Lipnickas, Jr.
During the period January 17,1983, through July 15, 1983, there were seven calls from Sayball’s residence to the residence of Edward Lipnickas, Jr., in Milford, and nine calls from Sayball’s residence to the New World Pet Shop, in Milford, owned and operated by Lipnickas. From March 19,1983, through August 19, 1983, there were ninety-six calls from Lipnickas’ resi
A confidential and reliable informant of a Milford police department drug officer told Sergeant Gerald Hanahan and Detective William Tripp on March 18, 1983, that Lipnickas was actively involved in selling cocaine from his pet shop. The Milford police department told Solomon that the informant personally saw Lipnickas and his wife cutting and packaging cocaine at their Milford residence, and that he had been at the pet shop when Lipnickas had sold cocaine to persons.
Benjamin F. Ralston, Jr., The Defendant
From January 17, 1983, through July 15, 1983, twenty-five calls were made from Sayball’s residence to Auto-Technics, Inc., in Norwalk, owned and operated by Ralston. From September 29, 1983, through October 4,1983, twelve calls were made from Sayball’s telephones to telephone facilities of Ralston. Ralston was previously convicted of possession of cocaine, based on an October 19,1980 arrest in Trumbull in which he was found in possession of approximately one ounce of cocaine.
On September 2, 1983, Detective James Adams, a narcotics officer with the Norwalk police department, told Solomon that in August, 1983, a confidential and reliable informant bought cocaine from Ralston at his place of business in Norwalk. Adams said that he was in the informant’s presence when the informant called Ralston, and that he overheard Ralston tell the informant that Ralston would not sell him any more cocaine until the informant paid for the cocaine already sold
John L. Uberti
During the period January 17, 1983, through August 15,1983, there were ninety-five calls from Sayball’s residence to the residence of John L. Uberti in Milford and three calls from the Monroe Fish Market to Uberti’s residence. From September 29,1983, through October 4,1983, there was one call from Sayball’s telephone facilities to a telephone facility of Uberti. On October 4, 1982, Uberti had been arrested by the Connecticut state police on a charge of possession of narcotics with intent to sell, and was subsequently convicted of illegal possession of a controlled substance.
Carl A. Willsey
During the period January 17,1983, through July 15, 1983, there were eighteen calls from Sayball’s residence to a telephone listed to Carl A. Willsey Co., in Greenwich. On January 19, 1973, Carl A. Willsey had been convicted of sale of narcotics and of aiding and abetting the sale of narcotics.
Francis Scarano
From January 17,1983, through July 15,1983, there were seventy-two calls from Sayball’s residence to the telephone facility of Francis Scarano in Meriden, and four calls from the Monroe Fish Market to the same telephone facility of Scarano. From July 29, 1983,
DEA intelligence reports provided to Solomon indicated that Scarano was believed to be involved in narcotics trafficking in Connecticut. Intelligence reports in 1982 indicated that Scarano was flying cocaine into the Meriden airport from Canada. DEA investigation confirmed that Scarano had an airplane at the Meriden airport. Surveillance of the Monroe Fish Market, by Detective Hughes, at 6:30 p.m. on September 7,1983, disclosed a motor vehicle, registered in New Hampshire to Scarano, parked in front of the Monroe Fish Market; the same vehicle was observed at Sayball’s residence on September 23, 1983, at 5:40 p.m.
Michael J. Desmond
From January 17,1983, through July 15,1983, there were 134 calls from Sayball’s residence to the residence of Sarah Desmond and Michael J. Desmond, her husband, in Stamford, Connecticut, and three calls from the Desmond residence to the Monroe Fish Market. From September 29, 1983, through October 4, 1983, there were five calls from Sayball’s telephone to telephone facilities registered to Sarah Desmond. Michael Desmond operates “The Condor” tugboat operation.
DEA had suspected Michael J. Desmond of drug smuggling since early 1979, as the then owner of the vessel, “Stor Fisk.” Surveillance on September 14, 1983, between 3:30 and 4:30 p.m. at Sayball’s residence in Monroe disclosed a Toyota automobile. The Toyota was registered to Sarah Desmond at a post office box address listed to both Sarah and Michael J. Desmond.
Mark Ricca
On September 9,1983, Solomon interviewed a confidential source made known to him by the confiden
Frederick Cavuoto
From September 29, 1983, until October 4, 1983, there were twenty-nine calls from Sayball’s telephone facilities to a telephone facility of Frederick Cavuoto in Trumbull. Cavuoto is presently charged with conspiring to sell cocaine and possession of cocaine, having been arrested on February 29, 1980, by the Connecticut state police. Federal Bureau of Investigation records show that Cavuoto was convicted in 1979 in federal court in Florida with conspiracy to smuggle marihuana. DEA records indicate that Cavuoto is considered a major cocaine trafficker in southwestern Connecticut.
Leonard Benton, also known as Leonard Capoziello
DEA has documented Leonard Benton, also known as Leonard Capoziello, as a close associate of DEA fugitive and convicted marihuana smuggler Daniel C. McGuinness. The pen register disclosed a telephone call to Benton’s residence from Sayball’s residence on October 1, 1983. Surveillance disclosed that Sayball frequently drove vehicles registered to Benton’s car rental agency, and vehicles registered to Benton’s agency were observed at the Monroe Fish Market and at Sayball’s residence.
II
We first address the proper scope of review of the wiretap order of the panel, because in this case that
Although the trial court determined that the applications and affidavits did not establish probable cause, or at least that they were not sufficiently close to the mark to invoke the “great deference” normally accorded to warrants; State v. Jackson, 162 Conn. 440, 445, 294 A.2d 517, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 870, 93 S. Ct. 198, 34 L. Ed. 2d 121 (1972); our independent review of them leads us to a different conclusion. Our
Ill
State v. Ross, supra, 463, also made clear that the proper test for evaluating whether an affidavit establishes probable cause for the issuance of a wiretap order is “the so-called Aguilar-Spinelli test; Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 84 S. Ct. 1509, 12 L. Ed. 2d 723 (1964); Spinelliv. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 89 S. Ct. 584, 21 L. Ed. 2d 637 (1969).” That test requires that the affidavit disclose “ ‘(1) some of the underlying circumstances relied on by the person providing the information to the affiant; and (2) some of the underlying circumstances from which the affiant concluded (a) that the informant, whose identity need not even be disclosed, was credible, or (b) that his information was reliable.’ ” State v. Ross, supra, 463 n.14.
When an affidavit contains hearsay, or, as in the case of some of the informants here, hearsay upon hearsay, the magistrate issuing the wiretap order must “ ‘determine whether it can be reasonably inferred “that the informant had gained his information in a reliable way.” The magistrate must canvass the affidavit and the informer’s tip as a whole and measure it against Aguilar standards in order to assess its probative value.’ ” Id., 464-65. Lack of circumstances indicating an informant’s basis of knowledge “may be overcome by the presence of other factors such as corroboration of the information by the police, the existence of a declaration against penal interest, or reputation and past criminal behavior which could form a substantial basis for crediting hearsay. . . . ” Id.,
Finally, the affidavit must be read “in a common sense manner” to determine whether it establishes probable cause. State v. Ross, supra, 468. “Probable cause exists when the facts and circumstances within the knowledge of the officer and of which he has reasonably trustworthy information are sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution to believe that a felony has been committed.” State v. Middleton, 170 Conn. 601, 604, 368 A.2d 66 (1976). This “well-established definition” specifically applies to wiretap cases. State v. Ross, supra, 459. The ultimate question for the issuing magistrate is: “ ‘Was this suspect probably involved in criminal activity?’ ” State v. Jackson, supra. The issuing magistrates, moreover, are not confined to the literal terms of the affidavit, but, in exercising their independent judgment, may draw reasonable inferences from those terms. Id., 444.
IV
With these principles in mind, we turn to the primary issue in this case, namely, whether Solomon’s affidavit established “probable cause to believe that: (1) An individual has committed or is committing” the offense of illegal sale of narcotics or controlled substances; General Statutes § 54-41d (1); as a basis for the issuance of the wiretap order. The application and affidavit posit a continuing scheme of illegal sale of drugs by Sayball involving his place of business, the Monroe Fish Market, his residence on Old Newtown Road in Monroe, and the telephones at those locations. This information came from two sources, neither of which, standing
We, therefore, examine Solomon’s affidavit to determine whether probable cause as to Sayball’s involvement in such a scheme was established by information disclosing (1) some of the underlying circumstances relied on by the persons supplying the information to Solomon, and (2) either (a) that the informants were credible, or (b) that the informants’ information was reliable. We note in this connection that it is not necessary that all the information listed in the affidavit meet this test. As long as one or more of the informants, taken singly or together, establish probable cause as gauged by Aguilar-Spinelli, the affidavit is sufficient to justify issuance of the wiretap order.
A
The first prong of the test is met by the marginal but sufficient information pertaining to Ricca, the unusual traffic at Sayball’s house, and the involvement of the defendant. The informant, who tied Sayball and Ricca together in a drug-selling scheme in 1980 and 1981, disclosed to Solomon that he was speaking from personal observation. See State v. Telesca, 199 Conn. 591, 602-603, 508 A.2d 1367 (1986). This informant was present on several occasions when Ricca obtained cocaine from Sayball at the market and at Sayball’s home which he claimed was then in Huntington, Connecticut. He was also speaking from personal obser
Another confidential source was interviewed by Solomon and Mercier in January, 1983. This source was speaking from personal observation when he reported excessive amounts of motor vehicle traffic entering Sayball’s driveway during the early morning hours of various days of the week, including Saturdays and Sundays. Furthermore, the credibility of this informant was sufficiently established by his track record of having previously given information which led to an arrest and conviction.
A third confidential informant gave information to Solomon through Norwalk narcotics officer Adams which linked Sayball to the defendant in a drug selling scheme. This informant related that in August, 1983, he bought cocaine from the defendant at his Norwalk place of business. This information disclosed the underlying circumstances relied on by Adams and Solomon, namely, the informant’s first-hand participation in the transaction. Adams overheard the defendant confirm that he had sold drugs to the informant. The informant’s reliability was further corroborated by his declaration against penal interest to Adams that he had bought cocaine from the defendant at the defendant’s place of business. The informant also told Adams that the defendant claimed to have a limitless source of drugs. The defendant was linked to Sayball by surveillance for the period of January, 1983, through August, 1983, indicating that Sayball or his wife operated an automobile registered to the defendant’s business, and by the numerous telephone calls between Sayball’s busi
B
The second prong of the Aguilar-Spinelli test is established, again marginally but sufficiently, principally through the information disclosed by the toll call records and pen register tapes, and by the permissible inferences arising therefrom. This information supplied a sufficient corroborating basis for the critical inference drawn by the wiretap panel, namely, that the various informants’ statements indicating that Sayball was involved in a continuing drug selling scheme at his home and business, were reliable. This information is as follows.
From January 17, 1983, through August 19, 1983, there were a total of 112 telephone calls between Sayball and Lipnickas. Lipnickas had been convicted of possessing cocaine and marihuana. There was also first-hand, albeit uncorroborated, information from an informant that Lipnickas was actively selling cocaine. From January 17,1983, through October 4,1983, there were thirty-seven calls from Sayball to the defendant. The defendant had been convicted of possession of cocaine. Furthermore, there was reliable information, described above, that the defendant was selling cocaine, and that he claimed to have a limitless source of drugs. From January 17,1983, through October 4,1983, there were ninety-six calls from Sayball to Uberti, who had been arrested for possession of narcotics with intent to sell and convicted of possession of a controlled substance. From January 17,1983, through July 15,1983, there were eighteen calls from Sayball to Willsey, who had been convicted of selling narcotics and aiding the sale of narcotics. From September 29, 1983, through October 4,1983, there were twenty-nine calls from Say-
The relevance of telephone calls between a wiretap target and persons with drug convictions, as corroboration of an otherwise uncorroborated informant’s information, has not been addressed either by this court or by our Supreme Court. It has been recognized, however, in some federal cases as a legitimate basis for such corroboration. See, e.g., United States v. Tehfe, 722 F.2d 1114, 1116 (3d Cir. 1983); United States v. Webster, 639 F.2d 174 (4th Cir. 1981). In United States v. Tehfe, supra, the court relied for corroboration on the fact that “[p]en register records also revealed that calls, including one on January 10, 1983, were made from a telephone at [the defendant’s] home to other drug dealers in the months before the request for a wiretap was granted.” In United States v. Webster, supra, the court relied on toll call records disclosing that calls from the target telephone, when matched with DEA records of known and suspected drug traffickers, resulted in three such calls. See also United States v. Lanza, 341 F. Sup. 405 (M.D. Fla. 1972) (use of temporal pattern of telephone calls, derived from
There was some further corroboration through the matching of the information supplied by the Massachusetts informant, whose reliability was not established, with that supplied by the reliable informant who described the excessive early morning traffic at Sayball’s residence. The Massachusetts informant’s information was that a load of smuggled marihuana was to be brought to a barn behind the house, north of Bridgeport, of a person in the fish business who was involved in the smuggling. The reliable informant’s information described excessive early morning traffic backing up to Sayball’s barn located behind his home in Monroe, which is north of Bridgeport. Corroboration results where information from different sources dovetails. State v. Kimbro, supra, 232, citing State v. Jackson, supra, 448.
Reading the entire affidavit in a common sense manner, applying the Aguilar-Spinelli test to its contents, and giving the decision of the issuing panel the great deference which, because this is a marginal case, it is due, we believe that it was a permissible inference that Sayball’s nearly 300 calls, in a period of less than ten months, with convicted drug offenders were part of his role in the continuing drug selling enterprise which had
V
We next consider whether it was necessary that the affidavit establish probable cause as to this defendant. The defendant argues that the affidavit did not establish probable cause as to him and that, therefore, the wiretap evidence was properly suppressible as to him. We agree with the state, however, that there is no requirement that the affidavit establish probable cause as to all persons named in the application as probable conversers. Because probable cause was established as to Sayball, the interception of his conversations with the defendant, who was also named in the application as a person whose communications were to be intercepted, was permissible.
First, there is nothing in the statutory scheme or language to suggest that probable cause must be established as to all potential interceptees in order for a wiretap order to be valid. General Statutes § 54-41c (5) (D) requires that the application include “the identity of the person, if known, who has committed or who is committing the offense and whose communications are to be intercepted . . . . ” General Statutes § 54-41d, which spells out the nine probable cause determinations which must be made by the wiretap panel, requires in subsection (1) only that there be probable cause that “[a]n individual has committed or is committing an offense enumerated in section 54-41b,” which includes sale of cocaine. (Emphasis added.) Thus, this statutory distinction between the language of General Statutes §§ 54-41c (5) (D) and 54-41d (1) belies the defendant’s argument. The defendant’s interests are adequately protected in the statute by permitting him
Second, our wiretap statute has been interpreted, consistently with the federal wiretap act, to permit the overhearing of unnamed individuals who are parties to the conversation of named persons as long as the panel’s order includes appropriate permissible language, such as “ ‘in conversations of others unknown,’ or some clear equivalent thereto . . . . ” State v. Thompson, 191 Conn. 360, 375, 464 A.2d 799 (1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1006, 104 S. Ct. 999, 79 L. Ed. 2d 231 (1984). It would be a bizarre construction, indeed, to permit the interception of conversations of unnamed individuals, as to whom it may be unlikely if not impossible to establish probable cause, but to bar the interception of conversations of named probable conversers as to whom there is a quantum of information.
Third, this construction of our wiretap statute is consistent with federal cases construing essentially the same language in the federal wiretap statute. Neither the fourth amendment nor the federal statute require a showing of probable cause as to all persons named in the application as probable conversers, as long as probable cause is established as to one of them. United States v. Martin, 599 F.2d 880, 884 (9th Cir. 1979); United States v. Kirk, 534 F.2d 1262 (8th Cir. 1976); United States v. Tortorello, 480 F.2d 764 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 866, 94 S. Ct. 63, 38 L. Ed. 2d 86 (1973); see Fishman, Wiretapping and Eavesdropping (1985 Sup.) § 50. We recognize that in some respects our statute is more stringent than the federal act; see, e.g., State v. Formica, 3 Conn. App. 477, 483-84, 489 A.2d 1060, cert. denied, 196 Conn. 806, 494 A.2d 903 (1985); but we see nothing in our legislative scheme or its history, which we have examined,
The defendant’s reliance on United States v. Donovan, 429 U.S. 413, 97 S. Ct. 658 , 50 L. Ed. 2d 652 (1977), is misplaced. In that case, the Supreme Court held that, pursuant to the federal wiretap statute, the government must name in its application any individual it has probable cause to believe is engaged in the investigated criminal activity and whose conversations it expects to overhear. It did not decide, nor has any other case brought to our attention, that the government must establish probable cause as to any individual so named in order for the wiretap order to be valid against that individual.
VI
The final question involves the meaning of General Statutes § 54-41c (7), which provides in pertinent part: “No order authorizing or approving the interception of a wire communication shall be issued if the facts and circumstances relied upon by the applicant were discovered more than twenty days next preceding the date of the application.” Admittedly, much of the information in the affidavit was known to the the law enforcement agencies long beyond the twenty day period. It is also true, however, that it was within the twenty day period preceding the date of the application that further information was discovered which, taken together with the earlier information, permitted a finding of probable cause and thus permitted a wiretap order to issue. It is not necessary in this case to define the precise contours of the meaning of the statutory provision at issue here. We conclude that, at least where the application and affidavit indicate a continuing course of criminal activity, as they do here, the twenty day
A statute, even one which has been held to be subject to strict construction; State v. Formica, supra, 481; must be read with common sense, so as to accomplish a reasonable result and not to thwart its purpose. State v. Roque, 190 Conn. 143, 151, 460 A.2d 26 (1983). It cannot be denied that one of the principal purposes of our statutory scheme is to permit wiretaps where there is probable cause to believe that an individual is illegally selling a drug such as cocaine. See General Statutes §§ 54-41d (1), 54-41b and 21a-277.
Probable cause is not ordinarily produced as one piece of precast concrete. It is a “mosaic”; State v. Abbott, 5 Conn. App. 441, 445, 499 A.2d 437 (1985); which is established by fitting pieces of information together so that they can ultimately convince a magistrate that there is “ ‘a fair probability [of] proscribed activity’ . . . . ” Id., 446.
The illegal sale of drugs is a criminal activity which is not necessarily confined to a twenty day period, as if it were inherently akin to the traditional Thanksgiving-to-Christmas retail sales period. It often, as was shown in this case, involves a course of conduct which continues over a long period of time. State v. Burgos, 7 Conn. App. 265, 271, 508 A.2d 795 (1986). It would be an unreasonable construction of General Statutes § 54-41c (7), would thwart its purpose, and would be inconsistent with the nature of the process of establishing probable cause, to hold that none of the information discovered beyond the twenty day period could be used to establish probable cause for a wiretap aimed at ferreting out evidence of a continuing course of illegal drug selling.
The federal wiretap statute has no analog to our twenty day rule. Under that scheme, the only pertinent inquiry is whether the information in the affidavit is sufficiently fresh to meet federal constitutional limitations on staleness. United States v. Martino, 664 F.2d 860, 867 (2d Cir. 1981). “Where the supporting affidavits present a picture of continuing conduct or an ongoing activity, as contrasted with isolated instances of illegal acts, the passage of time between the last described act and the presentation of the application becomes less significant.” Id., 867. Thus, our reading of the twenty day rule, which does not preclude resort to older information in a case involving ongoing criminal activity, is consistent with the federal constitutional staleness principle.
There is error, the judgment granting the motion to suppress and dismissing the information is set aside, and the case is remanded for further proceedings according to law.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.
A pen register is a mechanical device, usually installed at a central telephone facility, which records on a paper tape all the telephone numbers dialed from the telephone line to which it is attached. It does not record the contents of the actual conversations involved in the calls. The fourth amendment does not apply to a pen register because a telephone user has no legitimate expectation of privacy in the information which it gathers and supplies. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 99 S. Ct. 2577, 61 L. Ed. 2d 220 (1979).
In addition, in the same general time period, there were a total of 222 telephone calls between Sayball and Scarano, Desmond and Benton, all of whom were suspected by DEA of being involved in drug smuggling. These suspicions were, however, essentially uncorroborated. We do not rule out the use in an appropriate case of such suspicions by federal drug officials, if sufficiently documented or at least partially corroborated, as additional material forming the basis of a probable cause determination. We do not, however, believe them to be necessary in this case. Therefore, we do not rule on the effect of such assertions in the affidavit in this case.