STATE OF OHIO v. RONALD E. RAGLAND II
Appellate Case No. 2018-CA-11
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT CHAMPAIGN COUNTY
August 17, 2018
[Cite as State v. Ragland, 2018-Ohio-3292.]
Trial Court Case No. 2014-CR-287 (Criminal Appeal from Common Pleas Court)
OPINION
Rendered on the 17th day of August, 2018.
JANE A. NAPIER, Atty. Reg. No. 0061426, Champaign County Prosecutor‘s Office, Appellate Division, 200 N. Main Street, Urbana, Ohio 43078 Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellee
RONALD E. RAGLAND II, #719-944, P.O. Box 209, Orient, Ohio 43146 Defendant-Appellant, Pro Se
{¶ 1} Ronald E. Ragland II appeals from a judgment of the Champaign County Court of Common Pleas, which denied his motion for jail time credit for 267 days he was held at the Tri-County Regional Jail on unrelated charges in Clark County, Ohio. For the following reasons, the judgment of the trial court will be affirmed.
Factual and Procedural Background
{¶ 2} On December 11, 2014, a Champaign County grand jury indicted Ragland on one count of domestic violence in violation of
{¶ 3} Ragland was returned to Champaign County on October 5, 2015, for sentencing. The Champaign County trial court imposed sentences of 30 months imprisonment on the domestic violence count and 14 months imprisonment on the disrupting public services count, to run concurrently, for a total prison term of 30 months. The court specified, however, that such 30 month sentence was to “be served CONSECUTIVELY to the sentence imposed in Clark County Case No. 2015 CR 018.” (Emphasis sic.) The trial court further found that “[a]ll time” Ragland had “spent in the Tri County Regional Jail shall be credited to the Clark County term of imprisonment,” with “no jail time credit” to be applied toward Ragland‘s Champaign County sentence.
{¶ 4} Ragland filed a direct appeal in the Champaign County case, raising a single assignment of error that objected to the payment plan the trial court imposed for post-confinement repayment of his court-appointed trial attorney‘s legal fees. State v. Ragland, 2d Dist. Champaign No. 2015-CA-036, 2017-Ohio-2783. This Court sustained that assignment of error and ordered the trial court to modify its judgment regarding the repayment of costs and legal fees. Id. at ¶ 15-16.
{¶ 5} Ragland thereafter moved in the trial court for 267 days of jail time credit, representing the span from January 23, 2015, when he says he was arrested on charges in Clark County, through his October
{¶ 6} Ragland brings this timely appeal from that judgment, setting forth one assignment of error:
THE COURT ABUSED IT‘S [sic] DISCRETION WHEN THE COURT MADE A [sic] AMBIGUOUS RULING OF THE ISSUES THAT WERE BEFORE THE COURT, AND IN SO DOING, FAILED TO FULFILL IT‘S [sic] FUNCTION AS A JUDICIAL DUTIES [sic].
{¶ 7} Specifically, Ragland contends that the trial court‘s ruling was contrary to
{¶ 8} In response, the State asserts that Ragland‘s claim is barred by the doctrine of res judicata, because he could have raised the jail time credit issue in his direct appeal, but did not. Alternatively, the State argues that the trial court correctly applied jail time credit to only one of Ragland‘s consecutive sentences.
Res Judicata
{¶ 9} Before addressing the merits of Ragland‘s assignment of error, we must consider the State‘s contention that the doctrine of res judicata bars Ragland from now appealing a jail time credit issue that he failed to raise on direct appeal. The State cites a single decision of this Court for the proposition that “[r]es judicata applies to motions for jail-time credit that involve a legal determination” rather than “a mere mathematical or clerical error.” State v. Kilgore, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 26478, 2015-Ohio-4717, ¶ 15. Kilgore, however, does not warrant the result for which the State advocates.
{¶ 10} In Kilgore, we found the appellant‘s claim to be barred by res judicata not because he failed to raise that claim on direct appeal from his conviction and sentence, but rather because he failed to timely appeal the trial court‘s denial of the first of a series of motions in which he sought a recalculation of jail time credit. See id. at ¶ 5-13. Accordingly, res judicata applied to bar review of the trial court‘s decision on the merits of Kilgore‘s jail time credit argument. Id. at ¶ 12-13. Because the discussion regarding “legal determination[s]” versus “mere mathematical or clerical error[s]” was not the basis for the actual holding in Kilgore, that statement is dicta.
{¶ 11} In addition, we conclude that the above-quoted portion of Kilgore no longer represents an accurate statement of law.
(iii) The sentencing court retains continuing jurisdiction to correct any error not previously raised at sentencing in making a determination under division (B)(2)(g)(i)2 of this section. The offender may, at any time after sentencing, file a motion in the sentencing court to correct any error made in making a determination under division (B)(2)(g)(i) of this section, and the court may in its discretion grant or deny that motion. * * *
(Emphasis added.)
{¶ 12} Subsequently, the Ohio Supreme Court explained the significance of that new provision:
Prior to the enactment of
R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(g)(iii) , an offender was able to seek correction of an error made in determining jail-time credit only on direct appeal. Motions to correct errors made in determining jail-time credit that were filed outside the time allowed for appeal were barred by the doctrine of res judicata.Pursuant to
R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(g)(iii) , an offender can file a motion to correct an error in determining jail-time credit “at any time after sentencing” and the sentencing court has authority to correct any error in determining jail-time credit that was “not previously raised at sentencing.” * * *
(Citations omitted.) State v. Thompson, 147 Ohio St.3d 29, 2016-Ohio-2769, 59 N.E.3d 1264, ¶ 11-12. The Court expressly acknowledged that
{¶ 13} Since the enactment of
{¶ 14} In addition, as observed by another Ohio Court of Appeals,
[s]everal courts have held that since
R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(g)(iii) provides that a [trial] court has continuing jurisdiction to correct any jail-time credit error not previously raised at sentencing, this statute abates the application of res judicata as it relates to issues that could have been raised at sentencing but were not.
State v. Smith, 11th Dist. Ashtabula No. 2016-A-0059, 2017-Ohio-4123, ¶ 21, citing State v. Lynch, 10th Dist. Franklin Nos. 15AP-123, 15AP-124, 15AP-125 and 15AP-126, 2015-Ohio-3366, ¶ 9-11, State v. Quarterman, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 101064, 2014-Ohio-5796, ¶ 8, State v. Copas, 4th Dist. Adams No. 14CA996, 2015-Ohio-5362, ¶ 11-12, and State v. Guiterres, 11th Dist. Trumbull No. 2015-T-0116, 2016-Ohio-5572, ¶ 15. The Eleventh District held that the appeal before it was “not barred
{¶ 15} The determination of whether res judicata bars an appellant‘s post-sentencing jail time credit claim turns not on that claim‘s nature as one related to “mere mathematical or clerical error[s]” rather than “legal determination[s],” but on whether an appellant did or did not raise the same jail time credit issue at sentencing. See
{¶ 16} The record reveals that the only discussion of jail time credit at the time of Ragland‘s sentencing was as follows:
THE COURT: As of today‘s date, you‘ll have no jail time credit because all the time you‘ve spent in Tri-County Jail will be credited to your Clark County term of imprisonment. Do you understand that?
[RAGLAND]: Yes, sir.
(Transcript of 10/5/15 Sentencing Hearing, p. 23). The trial court did not specify the number of days of jail time credit that would be applied to Ragland‘s Clark County sentence, and Ragland raised no challenge to the trial court‘s statement that no jail time credit would be applied to his Champaign County sentence.
{¶ 17} Based on the sentencing hearing transcript, we conclude that the alleged error regarding jail time credit that is the subject of this appeal was “not previously raised at sentencing” for purposes of
Standard of Review
{¶ 18} At any time after sentencing, a defendant may file a motion in the sentencing court to correct that court‘s jail-time credit determination, “and the court may in its discretion grant or deny that motion.”
Jail Time Credit
{¶ 19} Ragland contends that the Champaign County trial court erred by denying his motion to have 267 days of jail time credit applied to his sentence imposed by that court. He argues that
{¶ 20}
The department of rehabilitation and correction shall reduce the stated prison term of a prisoner * * * by the total number of days that the prisoner was confined for any reason arising out of the offense for which the prisoner was convicted and sentenced, including confinement in lieu of bail while awaiting trial, confinement for examination to determine the prisoner‘s competence to stand trial or sanity, confinement while awaiting transportation to the place where the prisoner is to serve the prisoner‘s prison term, as determined by the sentencing court under division (B)(2)(g)(i) of section 2929.19 of the Revised Code, and confinement in a
juvenile facility. The department of rehabilitation and correction also shall reduce the stated prison term of a prisoner * * * by the total number of days, if any, that the prisoner previously served in the custody of the department of rehabilitation and correction arising out of the offense for which the prisoner was convicted and sentenced.
{¶ 21} In applying that statute, we previously have stated:
If a defendant is sentenced to consecutive prison terms for multiple charges, jail time credit is not applied to each and every prison term as it is for concurrent sentences, but rather is applied but once, to the total term. Ohio Adm.Code 5120-2-04(G); State v. Fugate, 117 Ohio St.3d 261, 2008-Ohio-856, 883 N.E.2d 440. As the Supreme Court in Fugate, id. at ¶ 22, explained:
When a defendant is sentenced to consecutive terms, the terms of imprisonment are served one after another. Jail-time credit applied to one prison term gives full credit that is due, because the credit reduces the entire length of the prison sentence. However, when a defendant is sentenced to concurrent terms, credit must be applied against all terms, because the sentences are served simultaneously. If an offender is sentenced to concurrent terms, applying credit to one term only would, in effect, negate the credit for time that the offender has been held. * * *
State v. Woodward, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 24483, 2012-Ohio-632, ¶ 9-10.
{¶ 22} The Ohio Supreme Court‘s decision in Fugate makes clear that a defendant given consecutive sentences on multiple charges has no right “to multiply his single period of pretrial confinement by the number of convictions entered against him.” See Fugate at ¶ 20, quoting State v. Callender, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 91AP-713, 1992 WL 21247 (Feb. 4, 1992) as “accurately reflect[ing] the proper approach to applying jail-time credit to consecutive prison terms.” On this appeal, Ragland seeks to accomplish precisely what the Supreme Court has held he may not, i.e., to “multiply” a purported 267 days of pretrial confinement into a 267-day credit toward his Clark County sentence and another 267-day credit toward his subsequent Champaign County sentence, for a total credit of 534 days.
{¶ 23} Ragland‘s argument focuses on the “total number of days” language of
{¶ 24} In Gall, we stated that “[t]ime served pursuant to an unrelated prior conviction does not arise out of a subsequent conviction even though a detainer is in effect during the period of incarceration.” Id., quoting State ex rel. Larkins v. Ohio Adult Parole Auth., 10th Dist. Franklin No. 89AP-1348, 1991 WL 16140, * 1 (Feb. 8, 1991). We therefore concluded that the fact that a detainer for one jurisdiction was in effect while a defendant was serving his sentence in another jurisdiction did not mean that the first sentence “arose from” the latter offenses for purposes of
{¶ 25} The record demonstrates that in denying Ragland‘s motion for jail time credit, the Champaign County trial court properly determined that any jail time credit accumulated by Ragland should be credited only to his Clark County sentence, and not also to the Champaign County sentence that was to run consecutively to the Clark County sentence. We therefore overrule Ragland‘s sole assignment of error.
Conclusion
{¶ 26} For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the trial court will be affirmed.
DONOVAN, J. and TUCKER, J., concur.
Copies mailed to:
Jane A. Napier
Ronald E. Ragland, II
Hon. Nick A. Selvaggio