Lead Opinion
{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant, Barbara Raber, appeals from her conviction in the Wayne County Court of Common Pleas. This court affirms.
I
{¶ 2} On the morning of June 2, 2009, a neighbor discovered Barbara Weaver lying on her bed with a gunshot wound to her chest. The neighbor went to check on Weaver after one of Weaver’s young children came to her and told her that he had found his mother dead in her bed. Medical assistance arrived shortly thereafter, and the Wayne County coroner pronounced Weaver deceased later that morning. The coroner estimated that Weaver died sometime between midnight and six o’clock in the morning on June 2, 2009. It was later determined that Weaver died from a single gunshot wound fired at close range from a .410-gauge shotgun.
{¶ 3} Eli Weaver, Barbara Weaver’s husband and the father of their five children, received a phone call about his wife while on a fishing trip to Lake Erie. Eli had left the Weaver home at approximately 3:00 a.m. that morning. Eli spoke with police when he returned home and initially denied any involvement in his wife’s death. He later admitted, however, that he and his girlfriend, Raber,
{¶ 4} Eli and Raber began a personal relationship several years earlier, after the two met through Raber’s husband. Eli and his family were members of the Amish community when he and Raber began their relationship, but Eli twice left the community after being shunned for his behavior. Eli had several affairs and met women online through the use of a cellular phone that he received from Raber. When the two began discussing the murder of Barbara Weaver, they sent numerous text messages to each other setting out their plan. Police obtained the text messages during their investigation.
{¶ 5} On June 10, 2009, officers from the Wayne County sheriffs office came to Raber’s home to arrest her for Weaver’s murder. After officers arrested Raber, they drove her to the sheriffs office and interrogated her. Raber confessed to Weaver’s murder during the interrogation but refused to complete a written statement. Raber spent the night in jail, and officers questioned her again the next day about several details of her confession. Raber eventually asserted her right to counsel and ended the interrogation.
{¶ 6} On June 12, 2009, a grand jury indicted Raber on one count of aggravated murder, in violation of R.C. 2903.01, and an attendant firearm specification. On August 21, 2009, Raber filed a motion to suppress, seeking to exclude the oral statements she made to police upon and after her arrest. The court held a hearing on Raber’s motion on September 14, 2009. It further held a hearing on September 17, 2009, to announce its ruling on the record before issuing a judgment entry the same day. The court denied Raber’s motion. Thereafter, a jury trial commenced. The jury found Raber guilty of aggravated murder and further found that she had committed the murder with a firearm. The court sentenced Raber to a total of 23 years in prison.
{¶ 7} Raber now appeals from her conviction and raises four assignments of error for our review.
II
Assignment of Error Number One
The trial court erred to the prejudice of Barbara Raber by overruling her motion to suppress evidence.
{¶ 8} In her first assignment of error, Raber argues that the trial court erred by denying her motion to suppress. Specifically, she argues that the court should have suppressed the statements she made to police upon and after her arrest
{¶ 9} The Ohio Supreme Court has held:
Appellate review of a motion to suppress presents a mixed question of law and fact. When considering a motion to suppress, the trial court assumes the role of trier of fact and is therefore in the best position to resolve factual questions and evaluate the credibility of witnesses. State v. Mills (1992),62 Ohio St.3d 357 , 366,582 N.E.2d 972 . Consequently, an appellate court must accept the trial court’s findings of fact if they are supported by competent, credible evidence. State v. Fanning (1982),1 Ohio St.3d 19 , 1 OBR 57,437 N.E.2d 583 . Accepting these facts as true, the appellate court must then independently determine, without deference to the conclusion of the trial court, whether the facts satisfy the applicable legal standard. State v. McNamara (1997),124 Ohio App.3d 706 ,707 N.E.2d 539 .
State v. Burnside,
{¶ 10} Neither party takes issue with the facts that emerged at the suppression hearing or the factual findings reached by the trial court. This court sets forth the facts from the suppression hearing solely to facilitate the legal analysis that follows. Detective John Chuhi of the Wayne County sheriffs office was the only witness who testified at the suppression hearing. He testified to the following events.
{¶ 11} Detective Chuhi arrived at Raber’s Millersburg home at approximately 4:20 p.m. on June 10, 2009, to arrest her for Barbara Weaver’s murder. Several other officers accompanied Detective Chuhi for the purpose of executing a search warrant on Raber’s home. Detective Chuhi met Raber at her door and read her the search warrant. Raber then stepped outside and another officer, Detective Michael Maxwell, placed her under arrest. Detective Maxwell read Raber her Miranda rights from a card while Detective Chuhi observed. Raber did not say anything at that point, but Detective Chuhi testified that Raber appeared to understand her rights. He then proceeded to take Raber toward his police car.
{¶ 12} Raber became very emotional as Detective Chuhi walked with her and she stopped to sit down on the tire of a boat trailer. When Detective Chuhi went to help Raber stand up, “she looked at [him] and said, ‘can I have an attorney?’ ” Before Detective Chuhi could respond, however, Raber immediately “bec[ame] more emotional and then started asking [him] questions about her children.”
As I got in the car I told Barbara [Raber] that — actually repeated back to her what she had stated to me in the driveway. And I said, Barbara, you asked me if you can have an attorney. I then told her yes, you can if you wish. And I asked her, Barbara, do you understand this. She stated yes, I do. I then asked her did you understand the rights that Detective Maxwell read to you. She stated that she did. I then asked her if she was willing to speak with us and hear what we had to say. She stated that she was.
Detective Maxwell drove the police car to the police station while Detective Chuhi briefly spoke with Raber about the investigation. The three arrived at the Justice Center at 5:01 p.m.
{¶ 13} Detectives Chuhi and Maxwell continued to speak with Raber at the Justice Center in their lieutenant’s office. They gave Raber something to drink as well as a bathroom break and offered her something to eat. Raber did not ask to speak with an attorney at any point in time during the interview. As the conversation continued, Raber “stated that she did it and that it was an accident.” Yet she did not want to give a written statement. The detectives ended the interview at 6:45 p.m. Raber spent the night in the Wayne County jail.
{¶ 14} The following day, Detectives Chuhi and Maxwell went to the jail to speak with Raber a second time. They advised her of her Miranda rights again, and she agreed to waive her rights and speak with them. At some point during the interview, Raber stated, “[G]ive me a lawyer.” She began to make further statements, but Detective Chuhi stopped her. The detectives told her that the interview was over because she had asked for a lawyer.
{¶ 15} “[A]fter a knowing and voluntary waiver of the Miranda rights, law enforcement officers may continue questioning until and unless the suspect clearly requests an attorney.” Davis v. United States (1994),
{¶ 16} Initially, we note that Raber has largely failed to point to any legal authority in support of her assertion that she clearly invoked her right to counsel. “Invocation [of the right to counsel] and waiver are entirely distinct inquiries, and the two must not be blurred by merging them together.” Smith v. Illinois (1984),
{¶ 17} The question whether a suspect invoked his or her right to counsel is an “objective inquiry.” Davis,
{¶ 18} In State v. Stover (April 16, 1997), 9th Dist. No. 96CA006461,
*405 Detective: State your name.
Defendant: Shawn, my name is Shawn Stover.
Detective: O.K. Shawn, I have a card here in front of you to read along silently if you wish. You have the right to remain silent and anything you say can be used against you in a court of law, you have the right to talk to a lawyer have him present with you while you are being questioned. If you can’t afford to hire a lawyer one will be appointed to represent you. Before any questioning if you wish. You can decide at any time to exercise these rights and not answer any questions or make any statements. You understand these rights as they are explained to you?
Defendant: Yes.
Detective: Right here, yes, or no.
Defendant: My lawyer won’t make any money today.
Detective: Yes or no, that you do or do not understand.
Defendant: (Inaudible.)
Detective: O.K. having these rights in mind do you wish to talk to me now? Defendant: Yea, but I feel like, talk to my, have my lawyer present.
Detective: Where’s your attorney at?
Defendant: He said he was going to come here he said yesterday, today’s Friday right?
Detective: Yea, today’s Friday.
Defendant: He said he was suppose to come yesterday or today.
Detective: Having these rights in mind do you wish to talk to me now? You want to talk to me?
Defendant: Yea.
Detective: You sure?
Defendant: Well I mean, I’d still like to have my lawyer here.
Detective: Either you want to talk to me or you don’t want to talk to me. Defendant: Well, yea, I want to talk to you but * * *.
Detective: Yea, but * * *.
Defendant: Yeah, I’ll talk to you. Yes.
Detective: O.K. Sign that line right here. O.K. I need yes or no on that line. Defendant: (Inaudible.)
Detective: All right you told a * * * you talked to a person by the name of Kim that you wanted to talk to me * * *.
(Emphasis added.) Stover at *1-2. This court held that none of the foregoing, italicized statements amounted to an unambiguous, unequivocal request for
{¶ 19} Multiple Ohio courts have reached conclusions similar to the one this court reached in Stover when faced with the issue of whether a statement or question amounted to an unambiguous and unequivocal request for counsel. See State v. Long, 1st Dist. Nos. C-090248 and C-090249,
{¶ 20} The question that Raber posed to Detective Chuhi was “[C]an I have an attorney?” The Tenth District dealt with a virtually identical question in State v. Curtis, 10th Dist. No. 05AP-795,
In the case at bar, defendant did not unambiguously, unequivocally request an attorney. Defendant’s question, ‘[c]an I [get] a public defender?’ can be interpreted in two different ways: either defendant was asking whether his rights, as he had just read them, included the right to a public defender or he was asking for access to a public defender. [The officer’s] response — that defendant would be entitled to a public defender if he could not afford to hire an attorney — indicates that he believed defendant wanted a clarification of his rights, not that he sought to invoke his right to counsel. Given the ambiguity inherent in defendant’s question, we find that a reasonable police officer would come to the same conclusion, and thus, [the officer’s] decision to question defendant without counsel present did not violate defendant’s right to counsel.
Id. We agree with the Tenth District’s analysis.
{¶ 21} Officer Maxwell read Raber her Miranda rights when he and Officer Chuhi arrested her. She did not say anything at that point. Officer
Considering the question in context, it is not clear that [the defendant] was actually requesting the presence of an attorney when he asked “Could I call my lawyer?” [The defendant] had just asked whether he could contact his girlfriend, and [an officer] had informed him that he could not. [The officer] could have reasonably believed in these circumstances that [the defendant] was merely inquiring whether he had the right to call a lawyer, rather than believing that [the defendant] was actually requesting counsel.
Dormire v. Wilkinson (C.A.8, 2001),
{¶ 22} Detective Chuhi could not immediately respond to Raber’s question about an attorney when she posed it because he first wanted to address her concerns about her children. Once he did so and gave Raber a few minutes to collect herself, however, he answered her question. He repeated her question back to her and confirmed that she could have an attorney. He asked her if she understood, and she said that she did. He asked her if she understood her Miranda rights, and she said that she did. He then asked her if she was willing to speak with him, and she said that she was. “Miranda does not require a police officer to ask [a] defendant whether he wants an attorney.” State v. Edwards (1976),
{¶ 23} Because Raber never invoked her right to counsel, we need not address her argument that she never waived her clearly invoked right. Even so, we note that the requirement that police stop questioning a suspect upon his or her assertion of the right to counsel “is ‘designed to prevent police from badgering a defendant into waiving his previously asserted Miranda rights.’ ” Davis,
{¶24} As previously noted, Raber does not argue that she did not receive or did not understand her Miranda warnings. Detective Chuhi testified that Raber initially appeared to understand her rights when Detective Maxwell first read them. Raber then explicitly agreed that she understood her right to have an attorney and her Miranda rights with Detective Chuhi in the police car. Further, Raber does not argue that her confession was involuntary or the product of coercion. Detective Chuhi responded to all of Raber’s concerns about her children and gave her time to collect herself. He and Detective Maxwell
Assignment of Error Number Two
The trial court erred, or committed plain error, to the prejudice of Barbara Raber, by admitting the testimony about text messages or electronic communications allegedly exchanged between Eli Weaver and Barbara Raber, by admitting the text messages or electronic communications as exhibits, and by not affirmatively demonstrating compliance with the requirements for the admission of such evidence contained in Ohio Revised Code 2933.51 et seq.
{¶ 25} In her second assignment of error, Raber argues that the trial court committed plain error by admitting into evidence several text messages that she and Eli Weaver had exchanged around the time of Barbara Weaver’s murder.
{¶ 26} An argument that a court must not consider a piece of evidence because the state obtained it pursuant to an invalid warrant is a suppression-based argument. State v. Patterson, 9th Dist. No. 09CA0014-M,
To correct a plain error, all of the following elements must apply: “First, there must be an error, i.e., a deviation from the legal rule. * * * Second, the error must be plain. To be ‘plain’ within the meaning of Crim.R. 52(B), an error*411 must be an ‘obvious’ defect in the trial proceedings. * * * Third, the error must have affected ‘substantial rights[ ]’ [to the extent that it] * * * affected the outcome of the trial.”
State v. Hardges, 9th Dist. No. 24175,
{¶ 27} Raber’s brief largely consists of a series of citations to the section of the Revised Code governing interception warrants and blanket statements concluding that the state did not comply with the listed statutes. Raber does not cite any applicable law in support of her argument that the state had to obtain a warrant pursuant to R.C. 2933.51 et seq. in this matter. App.R. 16(A)(7). Moreover, the warrant the state relied upon to procure the text messages in this case is not even a part of the record on appeal because Raber never challenged it at the trial level. Id. See also State v. Moore, 9th Dist. No. 24126,
{¶ 28} Bidinost is distinguishable from the case at hand. Here, the state did not seize an ongoing communication. The state obtained the text messages between Raber and Eli Weaver after the fact. Moreover, the state did not have to rely upon a third party to introduce this evidence. Even assuming that R.C. 2933.51 et seq. applies to electronic communications that are not ongoing, Eli Weaver testified at trial as to the content of the text messages at issue. R.C. 2933.52, the code section prohibiting the interception of an electronic communication absent an interception warrant, does not apply to “[a] person who is not a law enforcement officer and who intercepts a[n] * * * electronic communication, if the person is a party to the communication.” R.C. 2933.52(B)(4). See also State v. Bell, 12th Dist. No. CA2008-05-044,
{¶ 29} Based on all the foregoing, Raber’s assertion that the court committed plain error by admitting text messages between her and Eli Weaver lacks merit.
Assignment of Error Number Three
The trial court committed plain error by admitting evidence of digitally stored information and other electronic communications taken from computers.
{¶ 30} In her third assignment of error, Raber argues that the court committed plain error by admitting into evidence testimony about digitally stored information recovered from her computers. Raber relies upon the argument she set forth in her second assignment of error and avers that the state violated R.C. 2933.51 et seq. by not obtaining an interception warrant before searching her computer. Raber asserts, without any legal support, that “digitally-stored information from a computer search fits the definition of an ‘electronic communication.’ ” Further, she does not set forth any law or argument explaining how she believes that the state “intercepted” her digitally stored information or what “interception device” she believes the state used to obtain the information. An appellant bears the burden of setting forth an argument on appeal and pointing this court to applicable, legal authority in support of that argument as well as to the relevant portions of the record. App.R. 16(A)(7). “As we have repeatedly held, ‘[i]f an argument exists that can support [an] assignment of error, it is not this [c]ourt’s duty to root it out.’ ” NSK Industries, Inc. v. Bayloff Stamped Prods. Kinsman, Inc., 9th Dist. No. 24777,
Assignment of Error Number Four
The conviction was against the manifest weight of the evidence.
{¶ 31} In her fourth assignment of error, Raber argues that her conviction is against the manifest weight of the evidence. We disagree.
{¶ 32} In determining whether a conviction is against the manifest weight of the evidence, an appellate court “must review the entire record, weigh the evidence and all reasonable inferences, consider the credibility of witnesses and determine whether, in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the trier of fact
{¶ 33} R.C. 2903.01(A) provides that “[n]o person shall purposely, and with prior calculation and design, cause the death of another.”
A person acts purposely when it is his specific intention to cause a certain result, or, when the gist of the offense is a prohibition against conduct of a certain nature, regardless of what the offender intends to accomplish thereby, it is his specific intention to engage in conduct of that nature.
R.C. 2901.22(A). Whoever commits the foregoing act is guilty of aggravated murder. R.C. 2903.01(F).
{¶ 34} Eli Weaver testified against Raber at her trial as a result of his plea agreement with the state. Eli admitted that he had multiple affairs during his marriage and “just didn’t love [his] wife the way [he] should have loved her.” He left his Amish faith and home more than once because he wanted “more freedom” but was welcomed back each time. Eli recalled that he began a relationship with Raber about six years before his wife’s murder. According to Eli, once he mentioned wanting to be rid of his wife to Raber, Raber “ran with [the idea]” and repeatedly suggested poisoning Weaver. Eli testified that he considered ingesting poison along with his wife so as to commit suicide. He accepted “poison pills” from Raber about two to three weeks before Barbara Weaver’s actual death but did not go through with the poisoning. Raber also suggested that Weaver be suffocated or murdered with a firearm.
{¶ 35} Eh testified to the content of the text messages that he and Raber exchanged about Barbara Weaver’s murder. Eli planned on going on a fishing trip to Lake Erie with several of his friends on June 2, 2009. When he told Raber of his planned trip, she sent him a text message asking him what time he was leaving and stating that June 2 “would be a good day to do it” because Eli would not be at home. Eli responded by text that he would leave his basement door open when he left. The next day, June 2, 2009, Eli left his home for his
{¶ 36} Eli testified that he received a phone call at about 6:00 a.m. from Firman Yoder, a neighbor who lived behind the Weavers’ home. Yoder indicated that Barbara Weaver was “not responding,” and Eli left for home. Eli met with Detective Chuhi when he got back to town and gave a statement. Eli denied any involvement in his wife’s death but mentioned that he was having a sexual relationship with Raber. After speaking with Detective Chuhi, Eli remained at home the rest of the day. He testified that he received a text message from Raber at 2:46 p.m. that said, “[W]hatever you do don’t give your cell phone, please.” He later received another text message from Raber, asking if they could change phone numbers so that their phones could not be traced. Raber, who had given Eli his cell phone as a part of her phone plan, later changed Eli’s cell phone number.
{¶ 37} Eli testified that Raber came to his barn about one week later and the two discussed his wife’s murder. Raber told Eli that she was “sorry for everything” and explained how she had gone into his house and Eli’s bedroom. Additionally, she asked Eli about how to clean a gun so that it might appear that the gun had not been used. She also asked Eli what to say if her husband noticed that their .410-gauge shotgun was missing.
{¶ 38} Linda and Firman Yoder testified that they lived behind the Weavers’ home in a house that was attached to a gun shop that Eli owned and operated. Outside of the shop, a small shanty contained a phone equipped with voicemail. Linda Yoder testified that she checked the voicemails on the shanty’s phone on June 3, 2009. One voicemail, from an unidentified male, stated, “Eli, you can run but you can’t hide. Obviously we got the wrong person last night.” Police later identified the male caller as David Weaver, a friend of Raber’s family. David Weaver testified at trial that Raber called him shortly after Barbara Weaver’s murder and asked him to leave the message on the shanty’s phone. He also testified that he loaned Raber his .410-gauge shotgun four to five years before Barbara Weaver’s murder, but Raber never returned it.
{¶ 40} Dr. Lisa Kohler, the Summit County chief medical examiner, performed the autopsy on Barbara Weaver’s body. She concluded that Weaver died as the result of a single gunshot wound to the right side of her chest. Dr. Kohler found shotgun pellets inside Weaver’s body, but not any type of wadding, cork, or shot cup. She explained that when a person is shot from a very close distance with a shotgun, the latter items are generally found in the person’s body along with the shotgun pellets. Dr. Kohler opined, however, that it would be possible to fire a shotgun at close range and leave only pellets behind if the shot passed though another substance before entering the body. She opined that such a wound might occur if a shotgun was fired through a bedspread or comforter. Dr. Kohler agreed with Dr. Joliff s assertion that arriving at a time of death is “not an exact science.”
{¶ 41} John Gardner, a firearms examiner for the Ohio Bureau of Criminal Identification and Investigation, testified that he examined the shotgun pellets extracted from Barbara Weaver’s body as well as her bedspread. He testified that he determined that the pellets were “[njumber six shot,” a common type of shot used in at least four different gauges of shotguns. Gardner also testified, however, that Weaver’s bedspread contained two holes that he was able to measure and use to determine the size of the projectiles that passed through it. Gardner concluded, based on the measurements he made, that either a .410-gauge or .410-bore shotgun was used to kill Barbara Weaver.
{¶ 42} Detective Maxwell of the Wayne County Sheriffs Office testified that he went with Detective Chuhi to arrest Raber on June 10, 2009, and also searched the Weavers’ home as part of the investigation. Detective Maxwell testified that police found money on the kitchen counter at the Weaver home, which he indicated would be unlikely if a robbery had occurred. He also indicated that the police collected two .410-gauge shotguns from Eli’s gun shop as well as a box of .410 slugs with one slug missing. Detective Maxwell testified that when he and Detective Chuhi interviewed Raber, she admitted to sending texts to Eli but claimed that she only meant them as a joke and wanted to see how far he would
{¶ 43} Detective Chuhi testified that he initially met Raber on June 3, 2009, as a result of Eli’s statement that he and Raber were having an affair. Raber denied having any information about Barbara Weaver’s murder when Detective Chuhi first spoke with her, and she gave a written statement to that effect. Only after the detectives had arrested Raber and began discussing the text messages she had exchanged with Eli did she admit to murdering Weaver. Detective Chuhi confirmed Detective Maxwell’s testimony that Raber said the murder was Eli’s idea and that it was an accident.
{¶ 44} Dena Unangst, Raber’s cellmate at the Wayne County Jail, also testified against her. Unangst testified that Raber told her she had purchased a .410-gauge shotgun and made several statements about Eli, indicating that he wanted to kill his wife. Unangst further testified that Raber asked her how long fingerprints would remain on a gun.
{¶ 45} Several other pieces of evidence also emerged at trial. In addition to the .410-gauge shotgun that Raber had borrowed from David Weaver, Larry Miller testified that Raber purchased a .410-gauge shotgun from his gun supply store on November 15, 2008. Accordingly, Raber had access to two different .410-gauge shotguns, the type of weapon used to kill Barbara Weaver. Officers also found a notebook from Raber’s home with several types of poisons written down inside it. Finally, Raber had several discussions with her husband over the jail phone during her stay in the Wayne County Jail. Raber admitted to her
{¶ 46} Based on all the foregoing, we must conclude that Raber’s conviction is not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Raber had access to two different .410-gauge shotguns, the type of murder weapon that killed Barbara Weaver. She confessed to killing Weaver with a gun, which the forensic evidence revealed was fired at close range. Moreover, Raber exchanged text messages with Eli both directly before and after Barbara Weaver’s murder, placing herself at the scene. According to the estimated time of death, Raber had the opportunity to kill Weaver after Eli left for his fishing trip. She sought to create confusion surrounding the murder by asking a friend to leave a message, making it sound as if people had shot Weaver when trying to kill Eli. Further, she gave the police inconsistent statements, initially denying any involvement and then later claiming Weaver’s death was accidental. Weaver’s argument that her conviction is against the manifest weight of the evidence lacks merit. Her fourth assignment of error is overruled.
Ill
{¶ 47} Raber’s assignments of error are overruled. Wayne County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed. The judgment of the
Judgment affirmed.
Notes
. Raber's brief also contains an argument that the court erred by allowing testimony about the text messages because they were translated from Amish-Dutch to English, absent an oath from the interpreter that he had made a true translation. Raber has conceded by way of motion, however, that the text messages were actually in English and her assignment of error “should be limited to the compliance with statutory law regarding intercepted communications, pursuant to R.C. 2933.51 et seq.”
Concurrence Opinion
concurring in judgment only.
{¶ 48} I concur in the judgment of the majority. I agree that Raber’s first assignment of error is properly overruled, however, I do so on a different basis.
{¶ 49} It is well settled that “law enforcement officers must immediately cease questioning a suspect who has clearly asserted his right to have counsel present during custodial interrogation.” Davis v. United States (1994),
{¶ 50} Based upon the facts of the instant case, I would conclude that Raber clearly and unambiguously invoked her right to counsel when she said, “Can I have an attorney?” As a result, the police were required to stop all questioning. See id. It is troubling that upon Raber’s asserting her right to counsel, the police neglected to follow their own protocol, which required the police to inform Raber how and when a lawyer would be provided.
{¶ 51} Statements strikingly similar to Raber’s have been held to constitute invocations of the right to an attorney. For example, in United States v. Lee (C.A.7, 2005),
{¶ 52} Thus, because Raber invoked her right to counsel, it is necessary to examine whether Raber waived her right to counsel. See Smith v. Illinois (1984),
{¶ 53} Here, after Raber invoked her right to counsel, Raber “stated that she did it and that it was an accident.” While this statement is certainly damaging to Raber, the state presented overwhelming evidence of Raber’s guilt. While the breadth of the state’s evidence against Raber is detailed in the main opinion’s manifest-weight analysis, I think it important to reiterate a few salient pieces of evidence that were presented by the state. First, Eli Weaver testified against Raber, noting that after he spoke of wanting to be rid of his wife, Raber brought up poisoning his wife, suffocating her, or killing her with a firearm. Raber’s computer evidenced searches for various ways to kill a person. Moreover, Eli Weaver explained the rather detailed text messages he and Raber sent that clearly showed Raber’s plan to murder Eli Weaver’s wife. These included a text message in which Raber suggested that June 2 “would be a good day to do it,” and multiple messages shortly before and after the murder. After the murder, Eh Weaver received a text message from Raber asking that he not give up the cell phone, showing her awareness of its damaging content. There was evidence presented that Raber had access to two weapons of the same type as the one that killed Eli Weaver’s wife. After the murder, Raber sent a text message to Eli Weaver asking him how to clean a gun so that it would not appear that it had been fired and asking him what Raber should tell her husband if he discovered that the .410-gauge shotgun was missing. Thus, in light of all the evidence presented by the state that supported Raber’s conviction, it is reasonable to conclude that the improper admission of her statement was harmless error. Therefore, I concur in the judgment of the majority.