delivered the opinion of the Court.
In this appeal, the Appellate Division vacated defendant’s conviction for first-degree aggravated sexual assault because the trial court failed to charge the jury on the lesser-included offense of second-degree sexual assault. In doing so, the Appellate Division denied, without comment, the State’s request that the verdict be molded, and the panel remanded for a new trial on first-degree aggravated sexual assault. We are called upon to determine the propriety of that determination. Because we conclude that defendant was given his day in court, that all the elements of sexual assault are included in the crime of aggravated sexual assault, and that there was no prejudice to defendant, we rеverse the judgment of the Appellate Division and remand the matter to the trial court for entry of judgment against defendant on the lesser-included offense of second-degree sexual assault (count three) and for resentencing.
I.
The record reveals the following. In June 2005, O.M.
Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of first-degree aggravated sexual assault (count two), first-degree aggravated sexuаl assault (count three), and second-degree sexual assault (count four); the jury was unable to reach a verdict on count one, first-degree aggravated sexual assault. Defendant was sentenced to a twenty-six-year aggregate term of imprisonment with a thirteen-year period of parole ineligibility.
Defendant appealed, contending, among other things, that the trial court committed plain error by failing to charge the jury on second-degree sexual assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(c)(l), as a lesser-included offense of first-degree aggravated sexual assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(a)(6) (count three). The appellate panel determined that because there was sufficient evidence for the jury to have convicted defendant of second-degree sexual assault, the trial court’s failure to issue such an instruction on count three was plain error. The panel reversed the conviction on count three, remanded for a new trial on that charge, and vacated defendant’s sentence. The panel did not comment on the State’s request that the verdict be molded to reflect a conviction for second-degree sexual assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(c)(l), as to count three.
The State moved for reconsideration and clarification of the Appellate Division’s decision pursuаnt to Rule 2:11-6(a). Specifically, the State sought clarification as to whether the Appellate Division considered the State’s contention that the verdict on count three should be molded to a conviction for second-degree sexual assault. The Appellate Division denied reconsideration without explanation.
Defendant petitioned for certification, and the State cross-petitioned. This Court granted only the State’s cross-petition, “limited to the issue of whether the Appellаte Division was required to mold defendant’s guilty verdict for first-degree aggravated sexual assault, N.J.S.A 2C:14-2(a)(6), to second-degree sexual assault, N.J.S.A 2C:14-2(e)(l).” 218 N.J. 272,
The State claims that when a conviction is reversed for failure to charge on a lesser-included offense, New Jersey courts consistently afford the State the option of choosing a molded verdict or retrial on the greater offense, citing to State v. Greenberg, 154 N.J.Super. 564, 567-68,
The State argues that all of the elements of second-degree sexual assault are included in first-degree aggravated sexual assault; the only difference between the offenses is that aggravated sexual assault requires a showing of “severe personal injury.” N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(a)(6). The State posits that where the jury verdict constitutes a finding that all of the elements of a lesserineluded offensе have been proven, it is error for the court to refuse the State’s request for a molded verdict if prejudice to the defendant will not result.
Defendant contends that Farrad, supra, 164 N.J. at 266,
Defendant suggests that, if needed, this matter be resolved by remand to the Appellate Division for application of the Farrad test, or by upholding the Appellate Division’s decision because the panel correctly declined the State’s invitation to mold the verdict on count three.
III.
The principles guiding us here were set forth by this Court in Farrad, supra, 164 N.J. at 265-66,
In Farrad, we recognized three factors to be considered in determining whether a verdict should be molded to a conviction for a lesser-included offense where a jury was not instructed on that offense: “(1) defendant has been given his day in court, (2) all the elements of the lesser-included offense are contained in the more serious offense and (3) defendant’s guilt of the lesser-included offense is implicit in, and part of, the jury verdict.”
In addition to the three factors articulated in Farrad, decisions of the Appellate Division have considered in their analysis whether molding the verdict will prejudice the defendant. See State v. Viera, 346 N.J.Super. 198, 217,
Although this Court has not expressly included prejudice to a defendant as a consideration when the State requests, as it did here, that a verdict be molded, other jurisdictions have expressly made prejudice a part of that analysis. For example, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in Allison v. United States,
(1) that the evidence adduced at trial fails to support one or more elements of the crime of which appellant was convicted, (2) that such evidence sufficiently sustains all the elements of another offense, (3) that the latter is a lesser included offense of the former, and (4) that no undue prejudice will result to the accused.
[Id. at 450-51.]
The court “perceive[d] no possible prejudice to [the defendant] as a result” of this disposition because the defendant had full notice of his potential conviction for the lesser crime and there was no indication that the defense strategy would have been altered had the defendant initially been tried only on the lesser-included charge. Id. at 451; see also United States v. Hunt,
With those principles in mind, we consider whether the Appellate Division was required to mold defendant’s verdict here.
IV.
A.
Defendant was charged with first-degree aggravated sexual assault, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(a)(6), which provides that a person is guilty of first-degree aggravated sexual assault if he or she: (1) commits an act of sexual penetration with another person; (2) through the use of physical force or coercion; and (3) severe personal injury is sustained by the victim. N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(c)(l) states that an actor is guilty of second-degree sexual assault if he or she: (1) commits an act of sexual penetration with another person; (2) using physical force or coercion, but the victim does not sustain severe personal injury. Therefore, all of the elements of sexual assault are included in aggravated sexual assault.
B.
In Farrad, supra, we held that a guilty verdict may be molded to convict a defendant of a lesser-included offense — even where the jury was not instructed on that offense — if the following three factors are met: “(1) defendant has been given his day in court, (2) all the elements of the lesser-included offense are contained in the more serious offense and (3) defendant’s guilt of the lesser-included offense is implicit in, and part of, the jury verdict.” 164 N.J. at 266,
We are mindful that other considerations may be relevant to determining whether the State’s request to mold a verdict should be granted where a defendant establishes prejudice. Those considerations include judicial economy and efficiency, fairness to the State, and the right of сrime victims and witnesses “[t]o have inconveniences associated with participation in the criminal justice process minimized to the fullest extent possible.” N.J.S.A. 52:4B-36(d). However, where “no undue prejudice will result to the accused,” such considerations will nоt alter the outcome.
V.
For the reasons set forth above, we find the Appellate Division erred in denying the State’s request to mold the verdict. Therefore, the judgment of the Appellate Division is reversed. The matter is remanded to the trial court for entry of judgment against defendant on the lesser-included offense of second-degree sexual assault (count three) and resentencing consistent with this opinion.
For reversal and remandment — Chief Justice RABNER, Justices LaVECCHIA, ALBIN, PATTERSON, SOLOMON, and Judge CUFF (temporarily assigned) — 6.
Not Participating — Justice FERNANDEZ-VINA.
Opposed — None.
Notes
Consistent with the Appellate Division opinion, we utilize initials to protect the anonymity of the victim and others.
While we did not expressly include prejudice as a factor to be considered when molding a verdict in Farrad, we declined to mold the verdict there because the trial court's error in permitting the use of other-crimes evidence mandated a retrial in light of the resulting prejudice to the defendant.