STATE OF OHIO v. DWIGHT QUINN
No. 110692
Court of Appeals of Ohio, Eighth Appellate District, County of Cuyahoga
June 16, 2022
2022-Ohio-2038
JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: June 16, 2022
Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas Case Nos. CR-19-640694-B, and CR-19-643021-A
Appearances:
Michael C. O‘Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and Timothy Troup and Eben McNair, Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys, for appellee.
Mary Catherine Corrigan, for appellant.
LISA B. FORBES, J.:
{1} Dwight Quinn (“Quinn“) appeals his convictions for several felonies associated with a February 2019 kidnapping and robbery, as well as a police chase that occurred in May 2019, when authorities attempted to take Quinn into custody.
I. Facts and Procedural History
{2} On February 21, 2019, Edward Gibson (“Gibson“) was robbed at gunpoint by three men while in his car in Euclid. These men tied Gibson‘s hands behind his back, duct taped his face, and drove him to an abandoned house in Cleveland. DNA and cellular phone data evidence led the police to Quinn and William Shields (“Shields“), and arrest warrants were issued. The United States Marshals Violent Fugitive Task Force located Quinn and attempted to arrest him on May 31, 2019. A high-speed chase ensued, and Quinn‘s vehicle collided into several other vehicles, resulting in injuries to two people. Ultimately, the authorities detained Quinn.
{3} On June 10, 2019, in Cuyahoga C.P. No. CR-19-640694-B, Quinn was charged with aggravated robbery and kidnapping, each with firearm, notice of prior conviction, repeat violent offender, and forfeiture specifications; grand theft; and having weapons while under disability with forfeiture specification in connection with the February 21, 2019 events. This indictment also charged Shields with various related felonies.
{4} On August 20, 2019, in Cuyahoga C.P. No. CR-19-643021-A, Quinn was charged with aggravated vehicular assault and failure to comply for the events that occurred on May 31, 2019.
- Count 1 - Aggravated robbery, a first-degree felony, in violation of
R.C. 2911.01(A)(1) with firearm, notice of prior conviction, and repeat violent offender specifications. - Count 2 - Kidnapping, a first-degree felony, in violation of
R.C. 2905.01(A)(2) with firearm, notice of prior conviction, and repeat violent offender specifications. - Count 3 - Grand theft, a fourth-degree felony, in violation of
R.C. 2913.02(A)(1) with firearm, notice of prior conviction, and repeat violent offender specifications. - Count 4 - Aggravated vehicular assault, a third-degree felony, in violation of
R.C. 2903.08(A)(2) with a furthermore clause that Quinn was driving under suspension. - Count 5 - Failure to comply, a third-degree felony, in violation of
R.C. 2921.331 with a furthermore clause that the violation caused serious physical harm. - Count 7 - Having weapons while under disability, a third-degree felony, in violation of
R.C. 2923.13(A)(2) with a forfeiture specification.
{6} On May 27, 2021, a jury found Quinn guilty of aggravated robbery with a one-year firearm specification, kidnapping with a one-year firearm specification, grand theft, aggravated vehicular assault with the furthermore clause, and failure to comply with the furthermore clause. The court found Quinn guilty of the notice of prior conviction, repeat violent offender, and forfeiture specifications, as well as having a weapon while under disability.
{7} On June 28, 2021, the court sentenced Quinn to an aggregate term of 13 years in prison. It is from these convictions that Quinn appeals.
A. Motion for Joinder
{8} In his first assignment of error, Quinn argues that the court erred by granting the state‘s motion for joinder and trying his two cases together.
{9} Under
{10}
{11} The state can refute a defendant‘s claim of prejudice one of two ways: “(1) a showing that the evidence of each crime is simple and direct or (2) evidence of the other crimes would be admissible even if the counts were severed.” State v. Williams, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 108275, 2020-Ohio-269, ¶ 79. “A defendant is therefore not prejudiced by joinder when simple and direct evidence exists, regardless of the admissibility of evidence of other crimes under Evid.R. 404(B).” State v. Peterson, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga Nos. 100897 and 100899, 2015-Ohio-1013, ¶ 66.
{12} Generally, “[w]e review the trial court‘s ruling on joinder for an abuse of discretion.” State v. Lee, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 104682, 2017-Ohio-1449, ¶ 15. However, in State v. Owens, 51 Ohio App.2d 132, 366 N.E.2d 1367 (9th Dist.1975) paragraph two of the syllabus, the court held that a “motion for severance due to prejudicial misjoinder * * * must be renewed at the close of the state‘s case or at the conclusion of all the evidence and unless made at that time, it is waived.”
{13} This court has applied Owens to the joinder of two criminal indictments. See, e.g., State v. Frazier, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga Nos. 106772 and 106773, 2019-Ohio-1433, ¶ 11 (“to properly preserve the issue of a trial court‘s joinder of indictments for appeal, the defendant must object to the joinder of indictments at the time of trial, and at the close of the state‘s case or at the close of evidence.“). Failure to renew an objection under these circumstances waives all but plain error.
{14} In the instant case, the trial court joined, over Quinn‘s opposition, his two indictments for one trial. Quinn did not expressly renew his objection after the hearing on the state‘s motion for joinder. Therefore, we review the trial court‘s joinder of Quinn‘s indictments for plain error.
{15} In CR-19-640694-B, Quinn was charged with aggravated robbery, kidnapping, grand theft, and having weapons while under disability for events that occurred in February 2019. In CR-19-643021-A, Quinn was charged with aggravated vehicular assault and failure to comply for events that occurred in May 2019, when law enforcement officers were executing Quinn‘s arrest warrant for the crimes charged in CR-19-640694-B.
{16} This court addressed a similar fact pattern involving alleged crimes committed on one date followed by a failure to comply committed on a subsequent date in Cisternino, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 66387, 1994 Ohio App. LEXIS 4856. This court found that the trial court did not err by denying the defendant‘s motion to sever.
{17} Cisternino was charged in one indictment with “seven counts related to events occurring on June 25, 1991 and two counts for events occurring on July 1, 1991.” Id. A jury acquitted Cisternino on the seven counts relating to the June incident and found him guilty of drug abuse and failure to comply regarding the July
{18} This court found that Cisternino failed to show prejudice under
{19} Upon review of the facts in the case at hand, we find that under
{20} On appeal, Quinn argues that “the jury was prohibited from making a fair and impartial decision,” claiming that joinder unfairly prejudiced him. In support, Quinn asserts only that “there were no common facts, or victims.” In doing
{21} Accordingly, we find no plain error in the trial court‘s joinder of Quinn‘s two indictments. Quinn‘s first assignment of error is overruled.
B. Speedy Trial Rights
{22} In his second assignment of error, Quinn argues that the trial court erred by failing to dismiss his case because his speedy trial rights were violated. According to Quinn, 719 days passed from his arrest to his trial, and, although he concedes that his statutory right to a speedy trial under
{23} “Review of a speedy-trial claim involves a mixed question of law and fact. Therefore, we defer to the trial court‘s factual findings if they are supported by competent credible evidence, but we review the application of the law to those facts de novo.” State v. Long, 163 Ohio St.3d 179, 2020-Ohio-5363, 168 N.E.3d 1163, ¶ 15. In the case at hand, on January 15, 2021, the court denied Quinn‘s motion to dismiss for violation of speedy trial rights without making any factual findings.
{24} The
{25} “To determine whether an accused has been denied his or her constitutional right to a speedy trial, a court must consider the following four factors: (1) the length of the delay, (2) the reason for the delay, (3) the accused‘s assertion of his or her right to a speedy trial, and (4) the prejudice to the accused as a result of the delay.” State v. Robinson, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 105243, 2017-Ohio-6895, ¶ 8, citing Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972).
1. Length of Delay
{26} Quinn was arrested on May 31, 2019, and Quinn‘s trial began on May 19, 2021. Quinn argues that 719 days passed, and the state does not dispute this.
2. Reason for Delay
{27} Our review of the trial court‘s docket shows that, from June 21, 2019, through December 2019, Quinn requested multiple continuances to conduct discovery, and he filed multiple pro se motions.
{29} From April 30, 2020, through September 2020, the court issued multiple continuances “due to the stay at home lock down mandated by the state of Ohio and in an effort to reduce community spread of Covid-19 * * *.”
{30} On September 28, 2020, Quinn waived his speedy trial rights through January 31, 2021, in writing and in open court.
{31} From January 2021, through May 2021, the court continued Quinn‘s trial multiple times “due to the Covid-19 pandemic and administrative order of the administrative judge * * * that jury trials are suspended * * *.”
{32} Quinn‘s trial commenced on May 19, 2021.
3. Assertion of Right
{33} On September 16, 2020, Quinn filed a motion to dismiss for speedy trial violations. On September 28, 2020, Quinn filed a pro se (despite being represented by counsel) “Notice to deny consent to any continuances ‘at the request of the defendant and move this court to set immediate trial date’ (speedy trial
4. Prejudice to Defendant
{34} On appeal, Quinn argues that “the prejudice in this matter is clear: a criminal defendant who has spent two (2) years’ incarceration prior to his trial, over a year of which was occurring during a global pandemic is not afforded the same abilities to assist in his own defense as a bail defendant tried quickly after the incident.”
{35} Ohio courts have held that “[p]rejudice to the defense is the ‘most serious’ interest protected by the speedy-trial right, yet it is often difficult to prove.” State v. Muhammadel, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-190683, 2021-Ohio-567, ¶ 30. In lieu of showing actual prejudice, a defendant can show presumptive prejudice, which focuses “on the culpability of the state in failing to bring the defendant to trial.” Id. at ¶ 31. The United States Supreme Court has recognized that presumptive prejudice generally involves “excessive delay.” Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 655, 112 S.Ct. 2686, 120 L.Ed.2d 520 (1992).
{36} We acknowledge that a two-year delay between arrest and trial is lengthy. However, we cannot say that it is excessive in light of the Covid-19 pandemic that has affected and essentially delayed everyone‘s life starting in the spring of 2020. Furthermore, Quinn requested numerous continuances of his trial, including waiving his speedy-trial rights at times, most notably in light of his pending case in federal court. Additionally, the record does not reveal any lengthy
C. Evidence Rule 404(B) — Detective Carpenter‘s Testimony
{37} In his third assignment of error, Quinn argues that the court erred by failing to grant a mistrial “after Det. Carpenter spontaneously testified to impermissible
{38} “The admission or exclusion of relevant evidence rests within the sound discretion of the trial court.” State v. Sage, 31 Ohio St.3d 173, 180, 510 N.E.2d 343 (1987). Pursuant to
{39} Pursuant to
{40} In the instant case, Euclid Police Detective Dave Carpenter (“Det. Carpenter“) testified that he is “assigned full-time as a deputy U.S. marshal for the Northern Ohio Violent Fugitive Task Force.” In May 2019, he was “asked to attempt to locate Mr. Quinn.” On May 31, 2019, he received information of Quinn‘s location in Cleveland. Det. Carpenter, along with other law enforcement agents, attempted to apprehend Quinn as he was getting into the driver‘s seat of a car, but Quinn “put the car in gear and intentionally struck” one of the agent‘s vehicles. A high-speed chase ensued, and Quinn‘s vehicle struck several other vehicles.
{41} During Det. Carpenter‘s cross-examination, defense counsel asked about the procedure when “you‘re trying to take down somebody,” and Det. Carpenter answered as follows:
With the job, task force, yeah, I mean typically again going after violent people, violent criminal histories we obviously know who they are when we‘re going after them because they have a warrant in this case, a criminal history, knew it was a lengthy violent criminal history, so we always approach with caution and typically have weapons out. Sometimes you know might even have a rifle. In this case we did not but a lot of times we have a rifle also.
{42} As stated previously, Quinn‘s concern on appeal is Det. Carpenter‘s reference to Quinn‘s “lengthy violent criminal history.”
{44} Given the nature of the charges against Quinn, including failure to comply, and the evidence presented that he was being apprehended by the Northern Ohio Violent Fugitive Task Force, to which defense counsel lodged no objections, we cannot say that this isolated comment by Det. Carpenter during his cross-examination was prejudicial to Quinn. Accordingly, his third assignment of error is overruled.
D. Evidence Rule 801(D)(2)(e) – William Shields‘s Statements to Detective Caruso
{45} In his fourth and final assignment of error, Quinn argues that the “court erred in permitting William Shields‘s statement to be introduced pursuant to
{46} For a statement to be admissible under
{47} In the instant case, Euclid Police Detective Mike Caruso (“Det. Caruso“) testified that on February 21, 2019, Gibson picked Shields out of a “six-pack photo array” as one of the men who robbed him. Det. Caruso and other law enforcement agents executed a warrant to search Shields‘s home, which resulted in Shields‘s arrest. Approximately one week later, Shields made a statement to Det. Caruso. Shields‘s statement was videotaped and played for the jury in Quinn‘s trial. According to the state, Shields told Det. Caruso that he “was also the victim of a robbery, that he and Mr. Gibson were robbed and zip tied and duct taped together and that Mr. Shields does not know the identity of anyone who planned or orchestrated the robbery * * *.”
{48} Defense counsel objected, arguing that Shields‘s statements “violates [the] confrontation clause right under the
{49} At trial, Gibson testified that Shields, who he knew as “Tuffy,” set him up on February 21, 2019. According to Gibson, he and Tuffy arranged to meet that day because Tuffy owed him $300 from a drug transaction. When Gibson met Tuffy at the agreed upon location, Tuffy and two other men with guns robbed and kidnapped Gibson.
{50} Cell phone records introduced into evidence showed that Shields contacted Gibson and then Quinn on February 21, 2019, just prior to the commission of the crimes at issue. The general location of Quinn‘s cell phone matched the general location of Gibson‘s cell phone “between the hours of 5:22 p.m. and 7:14 p.m.” on February 21, 2019. DNA found on the zip ties used to bind Gibson was consistent with Quinn‘s DNA profile.
{51} Upon review, we find that the state made a prima facie showing that Shields and Quinn participated in a conspiracy to kidnap and rob Gibson. Furthermore, we find that Shields‘s statement to Det. Caruso that Shields was also “robbed and zip tied and duct taped,” and he did not know the identity of the perpetrators was made during the course, and in furtherance, of the conspiracy. In State v. Braun, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 91131, 2009-Ohio-4875, ¶ 109, this court held that a “conspiracy does not necessarily end with the commission of the crime. A statement made by a co-conspirator after the crime may be admissible under
{52} Judgment affirmed.
It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution. The defendant‘s conviction having been affirmed, any bail pending is terminated. Case remanded to the trial court for execution of sentence.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
LISA B. FORBES, JUDGE
KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, P.J., and EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, J., CONCUR